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This study is about how people interacted with the legal system and navigated 
different forms of recourse for civil disputes in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-
century Normandy, an important transitional period for the legal system in France. 
Broadly conceived (across a range of activity), yet narrowly focused (on records from 
1500 and 1510), it traces practices along a spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and 
resolution. Using qualitative and quantitative analysis of notarial records as well as 
court records from the vicomté of Elbeuf and the Échiquier (Parlement) in Rouen, it 
shows that the courts played a limited role in civil dispute practice and resolution 
relative to their over-representation in historiography of the French legal system, and 
I argue for a broadening of perspective on the legal system and records utilized in 
order to more completely capture how people interacted with it. This study begins 
with an overview of laws and institutions and analysis of commentaries by jurists to 
set up the evident disconnect between theory and practice. It moves to an analysis of 
contracts to show how individual wants and communal norms may be reconciled with 
the letter of the law, the commemorative and defensive functions of contracts, and 
the coexistence of oral and written practices. Delving into actions in and out of court--
from instigating maneuvers such as seizing goods and clameurs to patterns of court 
appearances, defaults and obstruction tactics to new complications posed by 
documentation to settlements, arbitration, and court rulings to enforcement practices 
and challenges to them—reveals civil dispute practices to be non-linear and variant 
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INSTIGATING A DISPUTE: OFFENSIVE BEHAVIORS AND INITIATIVES  

















Note on Translations and Transcriptions 
 
 
 All translations and transcriptions within this dissertation are my own unless 
otherwise noted. I have opted for a more literal approach to the translations to preserve 
some of the character of the original and to give the non-specialist reader a taste of the 
authentic source. Those who are more accustomed to later periods of French writing will 
also notice, and perhaps experience some discomfort with, the absence of accents and 
the irregular (phonetic) spelling in the texts, which are typical of the sixteenth century. 
The major exception to this practice of preserving the original has been in regularizing 
the spelling of names to make them more searchable. Finally, a note on dates: dates 
were commonly written in French using a mix of words and Roman numerals, so “mil 
cccc iiii^xx dix huit” is “mille quatre cent quatre-vingt-dix-huit“ (1498). The exact mix also 






“To keep the peace and brotherly love between them…and to avoid further 
proceedings in court…” 
 
Pierre Delamare, residing in the parish of St. Austreberte near Pavilly, and 
Jean Delamare, residing in the parish of St. Nigaise [Niçaise] of Rouen, appeared, at 
the behest of their friends, before notaries of Rouen on January 2, 1500 to formalize 
a settlement to their dispute.1 After a disagreement over division of their 
inheritance—specifically, Pierre tried to “prevent Jean Delamare his brother from 
taking possession and enjoying the benefits of a piece of land gifted to Jean by their 
mother Marion, widow of Romain Delamare their father”—they ended up “before the 
vicomte of Rouen or his lieutenant in the court session at the sergent’s hall of 
Pavilly.” The notarial document stipulated that a formal contract, drawn up by a high-
level judge had transferred the property with “formal letters of title drawn up on the 
fourth of July 1497 before Charles Monfault, commissioned lieutenant of the Bailli of 
Rouen.” Nonetheless, Pierre “contested that his mother had no right” to leave this 
property to Jean and fought hard to recover it. By the time Pierre and Jean came to 
the table, the case was stalled and hanging before the court, “after several days of 
                                                          
***A much shorter version of this study appeared as a chapter contribution (“Skipping Court: Civil 
disputes in sixteenth-century Rouen”) in: Griet Vermeesch, Manon van der Heijden, and Jaco 
Zuijderduijn, eds., The Uses of Justice in Global Perspective, 1600-1900 (New York, NY, USA: 
Routledge, 2019): 123-42. I have borrowed, reprinted and expanded upon that chapter throughout the 
entirety of this dissertation with the permission of the publisher, for which permission I am truly 
grateful. I am also deeply grateful to the editors of that volume for their insights, criticisms and support 
which have greatly enriched the work. 
1 Archives de Seine Maritime (hereafter ADSM), 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. 
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proceedings,” and was shaping up to be a long, and likely expensive, affair, which 
both of them wanted “to escape and avoid” as much as they wanted to preserve “the 
peace and brotherly love” between them. To this end, they came to an agreement 
whereby Pierre would pay Jean 50 sous per year to Jean for use and hereditary 
possession of the land on the condition that Pierre could lease the land to one or two 
parties agreeable to both of them. These terms being formalized before notaries in 
Rouen, both parties “agree to go without further session in court by which they agree 
to vacate the court.”2 
                                                          
2 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. The brothers negotiated a rente, which was a type of loan and 
investment. Rentes and other types of contracts will be examined in depth in Chapter Two. “Comme 
proces fut meu et pendant es ples de la sergenterie de pavilly devant le viconte de rouen ou son 
lieutenant entre Pierre Delamare demourant en la parroisse sainte austreberte pres led lieu de pavilly 
d’une part Jehan Delamare son frere demourant en la parroisse saint nigaise de rouen d’autre sur ce 
que led Pierre Delamare voulloit et s’efforcoit empescher led Jehan Delamare son frere en la saisie 
possession et joyssance d’une piece de terre contenant trois acres ou environ assis en lad parroisse 
sainte austreberte…le droit de laquelle piece led Jehan Delamare soustiennant et disant lui appartenir 
a tiltre de don et delais a lui fait par Marion veufve de feu Romain Delamare père et mere desd freres 
ainsi qu’il faisant aparoir par lettres passees l’an mil cccc iiii^xx xvii le iiii^e jour de juillet devant 
Charles Monfault lieutenant commis de monsieur le bailly de rouen lequel don led Pierre Delamare 
avoit voullu debatre et contredire soustenant que sad mere ne le pouvoit ne devoit faire a son 
prejudice par certaines raisons dont il s’estoit aide sur quoy lesd parties avoit procede par certaines 
journees et en crire estoit en voye destre et encourur en long proces pour auquel fuir et eviter etc afin 
d’entretenir paix et amour fraternelle entreulx ilz soient par le moien d’aucuns leurs amys conveins 
ensemble et de ce fait traicte transaction et appoinctement entreulx en la manière qui eussent comme 
ilz disoit savoir faisant etc furent presents led Pierre Delamare d’une part et led Jehan Delamare son 
frere d’autre etc lesquelz confessant sur ce que dit est leurd traicte transaction et appoinctement estre 
tele cest assavoir que led Jehan Delamare bailla quicta transport et delaissa et par ces presentes 
baille quicte etc a heritage etc aud Pierre Delamare son frere etc tout tel droit raison action et 
reclamation que a raison dud don ainsi a lui fait par sad mere il avoit povoit avoir demander et 
reclamer en lad piece de terre dessus bournee voullant consentant et acordant en tant que a lui estoit 
que led Pierre Delamare son frere sesd hoirs etc en joyssance et possession hereditalle comme de 
leur propre chose et tout ainsi que led Jehan eust peu faire a raison et en vertu dud don les lots 
Duquel il bailla et rendy presentement aud Pierre son frere pour estre etc d’aussi grant force etc et est 
ce fait pour eviter aud proces et moiennant le pris de l s t de rente a heritage par an que led Pierre 
Delamare en sera tenu et promist pour ce rendre paier par execution franche aud Jehan son frere etc 
ou etc chacun an au terme de noel premier parement commencant a noel prouchain venant par 
condition que led Pierre Delamare ne pourroit bailler lesd l s t de rente en bonne et suffisant assiecte 
en lad sergenterie de pavilly a une ou deux parties touteffoys qu’il leur plaira de laquelle assiene led 
Pierre Delamare sesd hoirs ne seront et demoureront garans vers tous et partant lesd parties acorder 
eulx en aller sans jour et hors dud proces duquel ilz acorderont vuider la court et faire qu’il appartendit 
et a ce tenir etc obligeant l’un a l’autre biens et heritages presents Robert Langloys et Jaques Alain.’’ 
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The account of family strife and legal dispute narrated above is hardly 
exceptional and in that regard it will serve as a useful opening vignette for this study. 
The dispute between brothers Pierre and Jean Delamare represents common 
discontent and disagreement over inheritance and transfer of property, especially 
when a woman was involved, in the early sixteenth century in Rouen (and elsewhere 
in France). That the dispute moved in and out of a court and ended in a settlement 
formalized before a notary is also not out of the ordinary and yet is of great interest. 
This case represents the capacity for initiative of people in resolving civil disputes as 
well as the prominence of notaries (and those acting as such) relative to the courts in 
this process. The notaries bore witness to a resolution that the courts played a limited 
role in influencing. Although going to court and appealing to legal authorities may 
have been an option, even an instrumental one, my study will draw on this case of 
the Delamare brothers and numerous similar examples to argue that going to court 
was not necessarily the most common or definitive option for resolving a dispute. 
This dissertation will show that the courts’ representation in scholarship on the 
legal system stands disproportionate to their role in resolving civil disputes. 
Overemphasis of the importance of the courts and their legal authorities and over-
analysis of court records risk distorting practice, misrepresenting the processes of 
resolving disputes, and misrepresenting the role of the courts in the legal system and 
society on a larger scale.3 Along these lines, this study will show that the courts 
                                                          
3 Nicole Castan has made a similar argument in her study of criminal proceedings in Languedoc. See 
Nicole Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc à l'époque des Lumières (Paris, France: 
Flammarion, 1980); Nicole Castan, “The Arbitration of Disputes under the Ancien Régime,” in Disputes 
and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983: 219-60; Nicole Castan, “Crime and Justice in Languedoc: The 
Critical Years” Criminal Justice History Vol. 1 (New York, NY, USA: The John Jay Press, 1980): 175-
85; Nicole Castan, “La justice expéditive” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 31:2 (Mar. - Apr., 
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(which, in this study, will serve as shorthand for the authority they represent and the 
officials who act on behalf of that authority), relative to the disputants and the petty 
officials they hire, play an almost passive role in the resolution of civil disputes; 
moreover, it will at the same time advocate for historians to look beyond court 
records when analyzing the legal system and will show the rich potential of 
alternative sources such as notarial records.  
To this end, my work will build on and engage a small but growing literature on 
settlements and infrajustice. Alfred Soman, notably, in outlining some of the 
methodological problems of relying too heavily on court records to draw conclusions 
about criminality and criminal procedures, and in so doing drawing on work by Nicole 
Castan and others, called for attention to “infra-judicial” institutions and practices by 
historians of the legal system and gave a brief introduction of insights for the history 
of crime, redress and procedures to be gleaned from settlement contracts drawn up 
before Parisian notaries.4 The concept of infra-justice has been elaborated upon 
more recently by Benoît Garnot who has added the concepts of “parajustice” and 
“extrajustice” to the mix to more neatly define and categorize practices outside of 
court. He has defined infrajustice as public action taken out of court which he 
contrasted with parajustice (private action taken outside of court) and extrajustice (no 
                                                          
1976): 331-361; Nicole Castan, “Délinquance traditionnelle et répression critique à la fin de l’Ancien 
Régime dans les pays de Languedoc” Annales historiques de la Révolution française 49:228 (Juillet-
Septembre 1977): 182-203; and Nicole Castan and Yves Castan, “Une économie de justice à l'Âge 
Moderne: composition et dissension” Histoire, économie et société 1:3. (1982): 361-367. 
4 Alfred Soman, “Deviance and Criminal Justice in Western Europe, 1300-1800: An Essay in 
Structure” Criminal Justice History Vol. 1 (New York, NY, USA: The John Jay Press, 1980): 1-28; and 
Alfred Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives notariales” Histoire, économie et société 1:3 
(1982): 369-375. See also Castan, “La justice expéditive”; and Castan and Castan, “Une économie de 
justice à l'Âge Moderne.’’ 
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action taken). Infrajustice implies intervention and publicity, and he insists that “it is 
not infrajustice without the intervention of a third party—individual or collective.”5   
These finer distinctions, being a little obtuse, have not, by and large, taken off 
in the emergent literature. Although these concepts are interesting methodologically 
as a reminder of how misleading the surviving record can be and encourage a more 
fine-grained analysis of the records and a broader perspective of actions and options, 
the lines between “public action” and “private action” remain difficult to define, 
especially for the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century. Moreover, the dearth of 
meaningful quantities of evidence for “private action” (in the strictest sense) or “no 
action” leave “parajustice” and “extrajustice” a little flat, both of which considerations, 
in turn, make these concepts difficult to apply. As such, I have elected not to adopt 
them explicitly, although my understanding of the law and approach to studying it has 
benefited from them. 
The crux of the debate about settlements (and arbitration, although a separate 
phenomenon not fully appreciated by many), for scholars of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries especially, is whether to interpret them as a good thing or a bad 
thing.6 That interpretation, in turn, supports conclusions about whether the court 
                                                          
5 Benoît Garnot, “Justice, infrajustice, parajustice et extrajustice dans la France d'Ancien Régime” 
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 4:1 (2000): 103-20; 110. Garnot is one of the 
more prolific authors on crime and justice in France in recent years. See Benoît Garnot, “Une 
réhabilitation? Les justices seigneuriales dans la France du XVIIIe siècle” Histoire, économie et 
société 24:2 (2005): 221-232; Benoît Garnot, Histoire des juges en France: de l’Ancien Régime à nos 
jours (Paris, France: Nouveau monde éditions, 2014); Benoît Garnot, Histoire de la justice: France, 
XVIe-XXIe siècle (Paris, France: Gallimard, 2009); Benoît Garnot, ed., Les juristes et l’argent: le coût 
de la justice et l’argent des juges du XIVe au XIXe siècle (Dijon, France: Éditions universitaires de 
Dijon, 2005); and Benoît Garnot, “Une illusion historiographique: justice et criminalité au XVIIIe siècle” 
Revue Historique 281:2 (570) (Avril-Juin 1989): 361-379. 
6 For more on the distinction between settlements and arbitration, see Jeremy Hayhoe, “L’arbitre, 
intermédiaire de justice en Bourgogne vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle,” In Entre justice et justiciables: Les 
auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, Canada: Les Presses 
de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 617-26; and Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial 
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system effectively delivered justice and, more broadly, whether the legal system met 
the needs of the people (or a specific group of people). For some, like Nicole Castan, 
the settlement represented a sort of failure of justice, framing her argument with an 
old popular saying “a bad settlement is better than a good trial.”7 On this model, 
settlements were a grudgingly accepted reality, a bad alternative to the worse 
prospective of going to court, which was characterized by corrupt, greedy, ignorant 
officials; unreasonably long proceedings; and an exorbitant price tag. In short, “Old 
Regime justice” was simply not practical for many people and forced them to accept 
the deal they could get, even if it was not just.  
For others, like Rafe Blaufarb and Jeremy Hayhoe, the settlement was the 
underlying purpose of going to court. Rather than being symptomatic of the failings of 
the judicial system, the settlement was the outcome desired by both court and 
litigants. Litigants went to court, or even merely threatened to go to court, with the 
aim of finally prompting a reluctant opponent to come to the bargaining table to 
negotiate a settlement. In support of this practice, courts were in no hurry to bring a 
case to a close, giving parties ample opportunity to work things out on their own. 
Courts provided leverage for negotiation, and the overarching goal was reconciliation 
and communal harmony, which, in theory, was better achieved by the parties coming 
to their own compromise than by the intervention and imposition of a court ruling.8 
                                                          
Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-Century Northern Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University 
of Rochester Press, 2008). 
7 Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc, 15. See also Anthony Crubaugh, Balancing the Scales 
of Justice. Local Courts and Rural Society in Southwest France, 1750-1800 (University Park, PA, 
USA: The Pennsylvania State University, 2001). 
8 See Rafe Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise: Communauté and Seigneurie in Early Modern 
Provence” The Journal of Modern History 82:3 (September 2010): 519-45; and Hayhoe, Enlightened 
Feudalism. For a comparative example, see James A. Sharpe, “‘Such Disagreement betwyx 
Neighbours’: Litigation and Human Relations in Early Modern England,” In Disputes and Settlements: 
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The latter interpretation assumes that this dual practice by litigants and courts to 
promote reconciliation was effective because the court was a formidable coercive 
power, albeit held in reserve. Settlements did not undermine the courts’ authority (or, 
by extension, the state-building project) because the courts helped enforce 
settlements.9 Hayhoe also adds, against the general stream, that officials were 
competent and took their roles seriously and that costs were not prohibitive.10   
What these studies on both sides of the aisle have in common is a court-
centric perspective of the legal system, part of which may be attributed to a heavy 
reliance on court records, law codes, and legal treatises. My study will attempt to 
broaden the perspective of the legal system and reposition the court by analyzing 
notarial records alongside records from two very different courts (the seigneurial 
court of Elbeuf and the Échiquier, which would become the Parlement of Rouen) to 
create a more comprehensive understanding of practice. In so doing, I will show how 
people influenced the trajectory of their disputes in choosing different options along a 
                                                          
Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983): 167-87. Kagan and Smail also touch on this point, but their focus is more on the 
agreements that go wrong (litigation) than the ones that go right (settlements). See Richard L. Kagan, 
“A Golden Age of Litigation: Castile, 1500-1700,” In Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human 
Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 145-
66; and Richard L. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castille, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1981); and Daniel Lord Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal 
Culture of Late Medieval Marseille,” In Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France: Provence 
and Languedoc, 1000-1500, ed. Kathryn Reyerson and John Drendel (Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 1998): 
23-50; Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in 
Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2003). For a good review of the 
literature, see Griet Vermeesch, “Reflections on the relative accessibility of law courts in early modern 
Europe” Crime, History and Societies 19:2 (2015): 53-76. 
9 The problem of settlements and arbitration undermining the official legal system and the power of the 
state has been suggested by Brian Tamanaha. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal 
Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global” Sydney Law Review 30:375 (2008): 375-411. 
10 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; and Jeremy Hayhoe, “Le parlement de Dijon et la transformation 
de la justice seigneuriale (1764-1774),” in Les juristes et l’argent: le coût de la justice et l’argent des 




spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution; which social groups used which 
options, where possible; and some of the challenges that they faced along the way.11 
This analysis will, in turn, add complexity to our understanding of the coercive 
potential of the court and the role people played in supporting it. 
Drawing on Julie Hardwick’s work on litigation and daily life for the 
seventeenth century, this dissertation is, additionally, an attempt to counterbalance a 
distortion in current scholarship, which has privileged criminal law and practice 
through the study of criminal records, by focusing on civil law and practice through 
the study of civil records—although I acknowledge the overlap and easy escalation 
from civil to criminal in the unfolding of a case.12 In so doing, it will suggest ways in 
which the history of daily life and the legal system in the sixteenth century in France 
might be understood differently if we shift our attention from criminal punishment to 
civil disputes. Along these lines, this dissertation will specifically explore the insights 
provided by civil litigation into the daily life and dispute resolution practices of greater 
Rouen in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, a timeframe which will also 
                                                          
11 A good comparative example is Robert B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment: Petty crime 
and the law in London and rural Middlesex, c. 1660-1725 (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1991). For a good overview of comparative literature on practice, see Manon van der Heijden 
and Griet Vermeesch, “The Uses of Justice in Global Perspective, 1600-1900,” in The Uses of Justice 
in Global Perspective, 1600-1900, ed. Vermeesch, Griet, Manon van der Heijden, and Jaco 
Zuijderduijn (New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 2019): 1-22. 
12 Julie Hardwick, Family Business: Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern 
France (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009). Zoe Schneider has shown the value of studying 
civil and criminal cases side by side: Zoe A. Schneider, The King’s Bench: Bailiwick Magistrates and 
Local Governance in Normandy, 1670-1740 (Rochester, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 
2008). Hervé Piant especially advocates studying civil and criminal side by side at the lower court 
levels to better understand the relationship between civil and criminal law and practice and to achieve 
a more balanced view of the social context and people’s interactions with the legal system. See Hervé 
Piant, “Des procès innombrables: Éléments méthodologiques pour une histoire de la justice civile 
d’Ancien Régime,” Histoire et mesure 22:2 Déviance, justice et statistiques (2007): 13-38; and Hervé 
Piant, Une justice ordinaire: justice civil et criminelle dans la prévôté royale de Vaucouleurs sous 
l’ancien régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006). I concede that this is a 
valuable approach, but given that examining civil and criminal was too large an undertaking, I elected 
to focus on the civil side to fill a much more significant gap. 
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serve to counterbalance scholarship of the French legal system which has, by and 
large, focused on the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The sixteenth century 
has been largely recognized as the “golden age of litigation,” witnessing a “legal 
revolution” and a dramatic spike in lawsuits across much of Europe, and yet as 
striking as the rate of litigation is, the amount of research on the subject is even more 
so--much research remains to be done on the subject.13   
Civil law in France, especially in the sixteenth century, remains an 
understudied area of society because the sources are voluminous, largely 
unindexed, and deal with seemingly mundane issues of life, but it is important to 
understand how this aspect of the legal system functioned in order to understand the 
system as a whole.14 People were much more likely to be drawn into civil cases than 
criminal ones.15 If we privilege the criminal system, we arrive at a skewed 
understanding of daily life and of the courts--an institution that has been attributed 
such importance. Scholarship on the legal system, and notably what has been done 
                                                          
13 For the concepts quoted, see Kagan, “A Golden Age of Litigation.” For more on litigation in the 
sixteenth century, see Christopher W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth: The 
‘Lower Branch’ of the Legal Profession in Early Modern England (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986); and Christopher W. Brooks, Lawyers, Litigation and English Society Since 
1450 (Rio Grande, OH, USA: The Hambledon Press, 1998); and Craig Muldrew, Economy of 
Obligation: the Culture of Credit and Social Relations in Early Modern England (New York, NY, USA: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1998); Craig Muldrew, “The Culture of Reconciliation: Community and the 
Settlement of Economic Disputes in Early Modern England” The Historical Journal 39:4 (Dec., 1996): 
915-42; and Craig Muldrew, “Credit and the Courts: Debt Litigation in a Seventeenth-Century Urban 
Community” The Economic History Review 46:1 (Feb., 1993): 23-38. For a good review of 
historiography on litigation, see Michael P. Breen, “Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern 
France” The Journal of Modern History 83:2 (June 2011): 346-86. 
14 For an elaboration on methodological difficulties, see John A. Dickinson, “L'Activité judiciaire d'après 
la procédure civile: La bailliage de Falaise, 1668-1790” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale 54:2 
(1976): 145-68; and John A. Dickinson, Justice et Justiciables: La Procédure Civile à la Prévôté de 
Québec, 1667-1759 (Québec, Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 1982); and Piant, “Des 
procès innombrables.’’ 
15 For a good overview of the literature, see Griet Vermeesch, “The social composition of plaintiffs and 
defendants in the Peacemaker court, Leiden, 1750-54” Social History 40:2 (2015): 208-29. 
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thus far on the civil side, has argued for a close relationship between the growth of 
the judicial system (the courts) and state formation.16 
All of that being said, scholarship on civil law is increasing, and each study 
offers a new and important way of understanding the behaviors observed on the civil 
side of the legal system. Daniel Smail provides an intellectual history of civil law 
procedure in late medieval Marseille framed by the issues of consumption and 
emotion. The ideas of consumption and emotion help illuminate the motives and 
value of litigating and the legal system more generally.17 Drawing on this approach, 
Julie Hardwick uses civil litigation cases to reconstruct economies of daily life in 
seventeenth-century French families and communities. The framework of economy 
and community underscores the relationships that influenced the behavior of the 
subjects and anchors the observed behaviors within a larger set of dynamics.18 Zoe 
Schneider frames her study on lower courts, including civil ones, in late seventeenth- 
and early eighteenth-century Normandy in terms of local governance, focusing on 
officials and their relationships both within their communities and with the monarchy. 
Shifting the angle of analysis to focus on the officials and the idea of governance 
helps to challenge the divide between civil and criminal law and the disruptive 
potential of both proceedings.19 Amalia Kessler’s study of the merchant court in Paris 
in the eighteenth century provides important insights into the relationship between a 
                                                          
16 Ross and Stern have notably cautioned against the teleology of state formation, yet state formation 
seems to dominate the discussion of legal pluralism nonetheless. Richard J. Ross and Philip J. Stern, 
“Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism,” in Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-
1850, ed. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York, NY, USA: New York University Press, 
2013): 109-41. See also Hardwick, Family Business; Smail, Consumption of Justice; and Tamanaha, 
“Understanding Legal Pluralism.” 
17 Smail, Consumption of Justice. 
18 Hardwick, Family Business. 
19 Schneider, The King’s Bench. 
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specific court and a community and the intersection of the court and arbitration 
practices with the social pressures of reputation and credit.20 Finally, for my purpose 
here—and I do not claim that this is a definitive list—Hervé Piant offers a social 
history of justice and infrajustice from the perspective of the lower courts and 
presents justice as a social activity. In so doing, he uses the framework of sociability. 
Sociability and infrajustice add to the discussion of motives and community and of 
social networks and legal culture that we find in Smail and Hardwick’s studies and 
further shifts the focus away from the courts.21 
Michael Breen has published an excellent essay on recent historiography on 
law and social history in early modern France. Although praising the above works, he 
argued that “the current tendency to focus on litigants’ agendas and strategies, and 
the ways in which they ‘consumed’ justice and manipulated the law in pursuit of their 
own ends, can sometimes come perilously close to removing the law and those who 
administered it from the equation altogether. Or at the very least, it reduces them to 
little more than mere accessories.”22 Taking his point very seriously, I would 
nonetheless argue that the legal system as a whole, in the period chosen for my 
study especially—and Breen is primarily concerned with the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries for his review, since that is where the bulk of the work has been 
                                                          
20 Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of 
Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 
2007). Hadfield has singled out social pressures as an important aspect of enforcement for contractual 
commitments. See Gillian K. Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual 
Commitments,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005): 175-203. 
21 Piant, Une justice ordinaire.  
22 Michael P. Breen, “Law and Social History in Early Modern France,” in Social Relations, Politics, 
and Power in Early Modern France: Robert Descimon and the Historian’s Craft, ed. Barbara B. 
Diefendorf (Kirksville, MO, USA: Truman State University Press, 2016): 42-60; 44. 
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done--is more fluid in terms of institutions (like courts) and practice both on the part of 
litigants and legal officials than is often acknowledged. Breen has even alluded to the 
legal professions as an important new direction of study as the “growing 
differentiation between practitioners” “may have originally been more distinct in 
theory than in practice.”23 This, as will become evident in the chapters to come, was 
especially so at the turn of the sixteenth century, a hundred or so years earlier than 
Breen’s focus. Shifting attention away from the courts helps us to better understand 
their role within a larger system of practice and helps bring into focus the parts played 
by legal professionals, the options that people had in resolving disputes, and the 
decisions that people made in pursuing different options. In that sense, arguing that 
the courts’ role in resolving disputes was small is not to remove them from the 
equation but to change them from constant to variable within the equation. 
Drawing on my research in civil archives for this period, court and notarial 
records suggest that the courts’ role in resolving civil disputes was limited. I will show 
alternative routes to resolving civil disputes, enabled by the complex legal pluralism 
of late fifteenth-, early sixteenth-century Rouen, by combining a quantitative analysis 
of settlements out of court and defaults with a close reading of several important case 
studies. My quantitative inquiry will analyze the characteristics of plaintiffs and 
defendants in civil litigation (including their occupation, gender, position within the 
family, relationship to other parties to the law suit) as well as the object of the 
litigation, the monetary value at stake and the outcome. This data, read alongside 
particularly representative and interesting case studies, will enable reconstruction of 
                                                          
23 Breen, “Law and Social History in Early Modern France,” 53. 
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some of both the social characteristics and the processes of negotiation, conflict, and 
resolution along the spectrum of civil dispute practices.24 To this end, analysis of 
legal activity outside of court will enrich our understanding of the role of the courts in 
the legal system and society more generally and the decisions that brought people 
into which court, if any. That said, the limitations of these methods and the 
conclusions drawn from them will be acknowledged and transparent throughout the 
dissertation as it seeks to further the conversation on how one studies legal 
pluralism—by which, I mean the co-existence of multiple, overlapping, even 
competing, sources of law and institutions and officials to support them--in a 
meaningful way.25 
My analysis thus relies on an accumulation of data drawn from mundane civil 
cases. The challenge of relying on quantitative methods lies in defining the data set 
and finding a representative sampling. For very practical reasons—the volume of 
available sources and the limited, yet meaningful, space in which to discuss them—I 
have specifically focused my inquiry in time and space on the courts of Elbeuf and 
the Échiquier (which would become the Parlement of Rouen) in the year 1510 read 
alongside notarial records from Rouen from the year 1500. This narrow focus has 
                                                          
24 Methodology has been one of the bigger barriers to studying civil law because of the volume and 
general difficulty of working with the court records in particular. Suggestions for how to resolve this 
have been proposed by Piant, “Des procès innombrables”; Dickinson, “L'Activité judiciaire d'après la 
procédure civile”; Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment; and Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris 
d'après les archives notariales”; and Soman, “Deviance and Criminal Justice.” Mine comes closest to 
that suggested by Piant, who advocates for a mixed quantitative and qualitative approach, but 
whereas he focuses on court records, I weave in notarial records, which adds a degree of complexity 
to this approach. 
25 For more on the “problem” of legal pluralism, start with Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism”; 
Richard J. Ross and Philip J. Stern, “Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism”; and 




allowed for a thorough sounding of the abundant records from Elbeuf, the Échiquier, 
and the notaries of Rouen from the same period. Documentation from each of these 
jurisdictions, with the exception of Elbeuf in 1500, exists in sufficient quantity and 
quality to allow for meaningful analysis across records for these years. Comparing 
practice across these record sets also allows for a more holistic view of people’s 
experiences with the civil legal system in this period. While the records of the 
Échiquier, the vicomté of Elbeuf, and the notaries of Rouen each tell us about 
practice in their respective part of the legal system, they also reveal activity outside of 
their reach.  
The Échiquier represents the peak of the royal judicial system with records 
recounting how the case before it progressed to the final stage.26 The vicomté of 
Elbeuf represents the first audience before a court in the seigneurial jurisdiction--the 
lowest court. The notarial records recount everything in between from the 
negotiations prior to disputing before a court to the follow up, even enforcement, of a 
court sentence to the formalization of settlements and arbitration. It is uncommon to 
see lengthy analysis across these jurisdictions, largely due to the massive 
undertaking involved in going through them for a longer timeframe, with each year 
typically spanning at least two hefty volumes of records (representing both the 
quantity and the length of the individual cases and contracts). This is another reason 
why I have chosen to limit my examination of these records to what may be 
considered a fairly short timeframe of ten years. I chose these years and these 
                                                          
26 I have chosen to draw my sample from the arrêts sur rapport, which limits analysis to cases which 
proceeded all the way to a ruling but which also often include fairly detailed narratives by litigants of 
events leading up to their appearance before this court. 
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jurisdictions specifically because they offer a manageable set of records and allow 
me to pinpoint my analysis. More importantly, 1510 is one of several years for which 
court records survive in meaningful quantities for multiple jurisdictions. 
Late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Rouen is particularly interesting for 
a study of legal practice and legal pluralism because it was a port city (the “port of 
Paris”--at the farthest point up the Seine river that a ship could travel, unload its 
goods and send them on smaller craft up the river to Paris) and a center of 
commerce, administration, religious activity, and law.27 It had an unusually large and 
thriving guild presence relative to most other European cities in this period and a 
population of about 50,000.28 It was also surrounded by centers of agriculture and the 
cloth industry, and Rouen had strong connections to the surrounding areas. All of 
these attributes in and around the city supported its economy in important ways. 
Furthermore, because of its different administrative and commercial capacities, it 
drew in people from the surrounding areas and had multiple jurisdictions to meet the 
needs of these people. And because so much of the business conducted in the city 
                                                          
27 Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981); Gayle K. Brunelle, The New World Merchants of Rouen, 1559-1630 (Kirksville, MO, 
USA: Sixteenth Century Journal Publishers, Inc., 1991); Lucien René Delsalle, Rouen et les 
Rouennais au temps de Jeanne d’Arc, 1400-1470 (Rouen, France: Éditions du P’tit Normand, 1982); 
Michel Mollat, ed., Histoire de Rouen (Toulouse, France: Edouard Privat, 1979); and Jean Pierre 
Bardet, Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles: les mutations d’un espace social 2 vol. (Paris, France: 
Société d’édition d’enseignement supérieur, 1983). 
28 Very little has been done on guilds in Rouen prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which is a shame given its rich existing record. For more on guilds in Rouen, see Maryanne Kowalski 
and Judith M. Bennett, “Crafts, Gilds, and Women in the Middle Ages: Fifty Years After Marian K. 
Dale,” in Sisters and workers in the Middle Ages, ed. Judith Bennett et al. (Chicago, IL, USA: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989): 11-38; Daryl M. Hafter, Women at Work in Preindustrial France 
(University Park, PA, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Daryl M. Hafter, “Female 
Masters in the Ribbonmaking Guild of Eighteenth-Century Rouen” French Historical Studies 20:1 
(Winter, 1997): 1-14; Daryl M. Hafter, Emmanuel Parent, and Philippe Minard, “Stratégies pour un 
emploi: travail féminin et corporations à Rouen et à Lyon, 1650-1791” Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine (1954-) 54:1 (Jan. - Mar., 2007): 98-115.  
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involved people and property residing outside of the city, it makes more sense to 
consider the influences of the surrounding area on the city and vice versa and to 
discuss the legal practice of greater Rouen rather than trying to limit discussion to the 
city itself, which would be misleading and very difficult. This will, in turn, add more 
nuance to our understanding of the relationship between urban and rural life.29 
In terms of the surrounding area, Elbeuf is of particular interest and relevance 
to a study on Rouen because it was in close geographical proximity to the city of 
Rouen but was a center of cloth production in its own right. Elbeuf had a set of 
seigneurial courts that had the capacity to exercise haute justice (the right to hear all 
types of cases and deliver capital punishment, as opposed to basse justice for some 
other seigneurial courts, which was more limited) including a bailliage and a vicomté 
(lowest court in the legal system of the region), which, after the sixteenth century, 
were referred to interchangeably and were imperfectly consolidated in stages through 
the Old Regime. Its bailliage had the privilege of appealing directly to the Échiquier 
(Parlement of Rouen), rather than, as was common, beginning the appeals process 
in the lower royal courts and moving up to the Échiquier from there. This study will 
focus on the records from the vicomté which has an extensive surviving record set, 
better in fact than Rouen’s vicomté. And in terms of the issues of legal pluralism and 
legal culture, the people of Elbeuf contributed to the overall legal culture of Rouen, 
                                                          
29 Claire Dolan, “The Artisans of Aix-en-Provence in the Sixteenth Century: A Micro-Analysis of Social 
Relationships,” in Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict (New York, 
NY, USA: Routledge, 1992): 174-94; Philip Benedict, “French Cities from the Sixteenth Century to the 
Revolution: An Overview,” in Cities and Social Change in Early Modern France, ed. Philip Benedict 
(New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 1992); 7-64; Bardet, Rouen aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles; Jean-Claude 
Perrot, Genèse d’une ville moderne: Caen au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Mouton and Co., 1975); 
Pierre Goubert, Beauvais et le Beauvaisis de 1600 à 1730 (Paris, France: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1960); and 
Maurice Garden, Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Flammarion, 1975). 
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which, as a major administrative and legal center, drew people in from outside its 
walls to conduct legal business, and their legal activities linked into the legal system 
and legal pluralism of greater Rouen. Analyzing cases from Elbeuf provides insight 
not only into the process of civil litigation as people moved through the courts but 
also various influences on the legal culture of Rouen.  
Norman law is particularly interesting for a case study because the customary 
law code on which it was based differed significantly from other customary codes in 
France. It was especially remarkable to contemporaries, as it has been to the most 
recent scholars, for its strictures on women in the inheritance and management of 
property. These will be elaborated further in chapter one, but important features were 
the strict separation of a woman’s dowry from the husband’s property (which he 
managed on her behalf but could not alienate) and the denial of communal 
ownership of property acquired by the couple during their marriage.30 As Jacqueline 
Musset has characterized it, “the matrimonial régime denied all ‘frank collaboration’ 
between the couple and was articulated in a sort of permanent climate of 
                                                          
30 Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage has recently made important contributions to our understanding of the 
divergence of practice from theory on the subject, see, in particular, Le statut de la femme mariée 
dans la Normandie coutumière: droit et pratiques dans la généralité de Rouen (Presses Universitaire 
de la Faculté de Droit de Clermont-Ferrand, 2005); “Les tendances communautaires des époux à la 
lecture des actes des tabellions et des notaires dans la Normandie coutumière de l’époque moderne,” 
in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, 
France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 67-81; “Les tabellions et 
l’assouplissement de la norme: l’exemple normand,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France 
Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des 
Chartes, 2011): 349-66; and “Le régime matrimonial normand à l’épreuve des conflits de coutumes 
(XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)” Les Annales de droit 2 (2008). Also important is Jacqueline Musset, Le régime 
des biens entre époux en droit normand du XVIe siècle à la Révolution française (Caen, France: 
Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1997). For more of the older canon, focused on theory, see chapter 
one. Contrast these studies of Norman law to Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Women and property in ancient 
régime France: Theory and practice in Dauphiné and Paris,” in Early Modern Conceptions of Property, 
eds John Brewer and Susan Staves (London, UK: Routledge, 1995): 170-93; and Ralph E. Giesey, 
“Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France” The American Historical 
Review 82:2 (Apr., 1977): 271-89. 
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suspicion.”31 Nevertheless, the notarial and court records are full of women.32 Given 
this apparent contradiction, when teasing out patterns of contracts and dispute 
practices, I will make a point not only of tracing which actions were more likely to be 
taken by women—or provoked by women—but also to try to determine the 
relationship of the woman to other parties as well as her social (primarily marital) 
status. This will serve to highlight the activities of women within this strict system and 
further our understanding of their legal authority, capacity, and practice in Normandy 
more generally. 
The late fifteenth and early sixteenth century is particularly interesting for a 
focused study of legal practice not only because of its limited presence in the 
historiography but also because it was a period of uneasy transition legally, politically, 
and culturally, especially in Normandy.33 The decades following the end of the 
Hundred Years War and leading up to the early sixteenth century bore witness to the 
monarchy, particularly Charles VIII and Louis XII (reigning king for the period under 
consideration), instituting and encouraging important changes in the legal system. 
The monarchy made a concerted effort to promote royal jurisdictions, began a larger 
                                                          
31 Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux, 25.  
32 For more on this, see the works by Lemonnier-Lesage cited in note 30 above, and Henri Dubois, 
“Nobles dames et damoiselles de Normandie en cour d’appel (1374-1403),” in Au cloître et dans le 
monde: Femmes, hommes, et sociétés (IXe – XVe siècle), ed. Patrick Henriet and Anne-Marie Legras 
(Paris, France: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2000): 301-9. 
33 For some general overviews of the post Hundred Years War period in Normandy, see Jean-Paul 
Lefebvre-Filleau, La guerre de cent ans en Normandie: L’histoire d’un grand massacre (Condé-sur-
Noireau, France: Éditions Charles Corlet, 2011); Jean-Paul Lefebvre-Filleau, La guerre de cent ans en 
Normandie (Luneray, France: Éditions Bertout, 2002); Kathleen Daly, "Villains into heroes? Some 
French and Norman attitudes to Norman history in the later Middle Ages,” The Burgundian hero : 
proceedings of the annual conference of the Centre européen d'études bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe 
siècles) at Edinburgh and Glasgow, 28-30 September 2000 (2000): 183-98; Jean-Philippe Genet, “La 
Normandie vue par les historiens et les politiques anglais au XVe siècle,” in La Normandie et 
l’Angleterre au Moyen Âge, ed. Pierre Bouet and Véronique Gazeau (Caen, France: Publications du 
CRAHM, 2003): 277-91; Delsalle, Rouen et les Rouennais au temps de Jeanne d’Arc; and Mollat, ed., 
Histoire de Rouen. 
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trend of creating offices, and launched the massive project of the compilation, 
translation and consolidation of customary law codes in the entire kingdom, all of 
which would continue in greater force under Francis I and more so after the Wars of 
Religion. With the creation of offices, came ideas that moved in the direction of 
venality (still illegal in the early sixteenth century). More specifically, there was an 
increase in the importance of documentation in the legal system with the passing of 
ordinances requiring notarization of contracts to render them legal and the 
recognition of the importance of preparation of documentation in court appearances 
and in postponements for this purpose. This trend toward privileging documentation 
resulted in the increasing importance of lower level officials, like notaries and 
procureurs (legal representatives), whose primary responsibilities included the 
preparation of legal documents.34 And yet, I will show that in spite of this trend toward 
greater documentation, the importance of orality, performance, and witnessing 
persisted through, coexisted alongside, and even supported emergent writing 
                                                          
34 Notaries and procureurs will be discussed at length in chapters 2 and 3, respectively, and the former 
has a vast literature but a good starting point is Claire Dolan, ed., Entre justice et justiciables: Les 
auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle (Saint-Nicolas, Québec, Canada: Les Presses de 
l’Université de Laval, 2005); Claire Dolan, Les Procureurs du Midi, sous l’Ancien Régime (Rennes, 
France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise’’; Claire Dolan, 
Le notaire, la famille et la ville: Aix-En-Provence à la fin du XVIe siècle, Histoire Notariale (Toulouse, 
France: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1998); Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin, eds., 
Tabellions et tabellionages de la France médiévale et moderne (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 
2011); Isabelle Bretthauer, “Official Rules of Writing in the North of France? The Writing of Notarial 
Documents in Normandy between Practices and Regulations,” in Ruling the Script in the Middle Ages: 
Formal Aspects of Written Communication, ed. Sébastien Barret, Dominique Stutzmann, and Georg 
Vogeler, Books, Charters, and Inscriptions (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2016): 75-94; Philip T. 
Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, “What do Notaries do? Overcoming 
Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 154:3 (Sept. 1998): 499-530; Jean-Luc Laffont, ed., Le notaire, le paysan et la 
terre dans la France méridionale à l'époque moderne (Toulouse, France: Presses universitaires du 
Mirail, 1999); Jean-Paul Poisson, Notaires et société: travaux d’histoire et de sociologie notariales 2 
vols. (Paris, France: Economica, 1985); and Jean-Yves Sarazin, “L’historien et le notaire: acquis et 
perspectives de l’étude des actes privés de la France moderne,” Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes 
160:1 (2002): 229-270. 
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practices.35 These changes and resistance to them make the late fifteenth and early 
sixteenth century an important period of study for the legal system and bear 
important implications for the wider culture.  
With this in mind, when looking at the legal system of sixteenth-century 
Rouen, we find the coexistence of practices that give the pursuit and resolution of 
civil disputes a character of multiplicity and fluidity. In the court and notarial records 
under consideration here, the simplicity of a final resolution often belies the 
complexity of the system in place. That said, the complexity of the system appears to 
have created opportunities as well as frustrations. In the mundane as in the 
spectacular cases, the multiple legal actions taken and multiple appearances and 
postponements are striking. A plethora of defaults appear alongside jurisdiction 
hopping as people took advantage of the fluidity of overlapping and contradictory 
jurisdictions. Also apparent is the fluidity of the geography under consideration. 
People residing in the city of Rouen are entering into contracts with people from 
outside the city to transfer property within the city and outside of it. Disputes arise 
over similar contracts and cases before the Échiquier bring in people from even 
farther a-field. Added to the mix of contractees and disputants are the legal 
                                                          
35 There has been a recent surge in scholarly interest in understanding writing practices, especially 
among medievalists. For some examples, see Peter Schulte, Marco Mostert, and Irene van 
Renswoude, eds., Strategies of Writing: Studies on Text and Trust in the Middle Ages (Turnhout, 
Belgium: Brepols, 2008); Marco Mostert and Anna Adamska, eds., Uses of the Written Word in 
Medieval Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy II (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2014; Mostert, Marco and 
Anna Adamska, eds. Writing and the Administration of Medieval Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy I 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2014); Marco Mostert and P. S. Barnwell, eds., Medieval Legal Process: 
Physical, Spoken and Written Performance in the Middle Ages (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011). 
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professionals we find playing multiple roles alongside those individuals acting in the 
capacity of another legal professional—e.g. when a judge acts as a notary.  
Following this, the challenge of using the law, broadly conceived, as a 
category of analysis, discrete concept, and subject of study is that the law, with its 
institutions, officials, and records, intersects with and is interwoven into many other 
categories and subjects of social, economic, and culture interest like business and 
family affairs, gender, urban and rural life, and relations between subjects and the 
state. The law is a useful lens of comparison, but it is not so useful to try to examine it 
detached from these categories because they offer important context to its creation, 
practice, and impact.36 The social practices and implications and impact of the law on 
the community more broadly must always be understood as context to the 
conversation on the law in this dissertation. Further, this study has as much to tell us 
about how the community shaped the law as how the law shaped the community. If I 
use the law as shorthand, it is not meant to be the end but rather the beginning, 
conceptually. The law is a comparative concept even within fairly narrowly defined 
geographical and temporal parameters because it intersects with so many other 
strata and conceptual categories.37 Even if one legal system is under discussion, the 
inherent pluralism within that system, especially in sixteenth-century France, wears 
away at its coherency. Legal pluralism is inherent to the legal system not only of 
                                                          
36 For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between legal history and social, political, and 
cultural history in the historiography of early modern France, see Michael P. Breen, Law, City, and 
King: Legal Culture, Municipal Politics, and State Formation in Early Modern Dijon (New York, NY, 
USA: University of Rochester Press, 2007); and Breen, “Law and Social History in Early Modern 
France.” 
37 For a discussion of the challenges to defining “law” in recent scholarship, see Tamanaha, 
“Understanding Legal Pluralism.” He has argued that defining the boundaries of the concept of law is 
less important than setting up the specific context. 
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France more broadly but of Normandy, even Rouen, more specifically. Broadly 
speaking, the question of whether it is appropriate to refer to a legal “system” has 
been raised recently, and it is an interesting question with much promise for fruitful 
debate among scholars, especially, but not exclusively, when studying a customary 
“system.” C. W. Brooks has argued that a “legal system” did not exist in sixteenth-
century England for instance.38 Michael Breen in particular has suggested that it may 
be better to think of France as having two (at least) legal systems to reconcile 
apparent contradictions of discourse and practice.39 As intriguing as this line of 
questions is, I would encourage caution. Even if the emergence, evolution, and 
practice of the institutions and laws was not systematic in the purest sense, the 
connections and influences between overlapping, contradictory, contested 
institutions, laws and divergent practices outweigh the dis-connects and differences. 
In short, a pluralistic system is still a system, as apparently inefficient, disorganized, 
and contradictory as it may be, especially by modern Western standards.40 Speaking 
of the law as the law or the legal system as the legal system will always be fraught 
with the risk of oversimplifying the narrative; however, this risk being acknowledged, 
it is necessary to take to move the discussion along. 
Among the many questions this dissertation poses (and works to answer) are 
those that attempt to give contour to different parts of the legal system and to practice 
therein. One of the more fundamental questions is at what point a dispute becomes 
                                                          
38 Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth. 
39 Breen, “Law and Social History in Early Modern France.” 
40 For more on this discussion, please see: Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth; 




“legal.” Daily life is full of squabbles and disagreements, but when do we begin to 
recognize a legal dispute?41 Parties to a dispute turned to sources of authority to 
support claims and seek favorable resolution—most of these sources examined in 
this dissertation will have legal backing (laws will be written to guide their use), from 
written contracts to courts and their officials to witnesses and the memory of older 
members of the community; however, the interpretation and the enforcement of the 
law could enflame disagreement, and we cannot assume that turning to the law 
meant turning to a court. To the contrary, this dissertation will argue that in the larger 
perspective of civil dispute practice, the role the courts played in resolving disputes 
was limited and that the plural nature of the legal system opened up many options for 
complainants and defendants. 
  The focus of this study are the practices and resolution of civil disputes; 
however, to fully put these practices into perspective, it is also necessary to trace the 
outlines of activity which lead up to open hostilities. It is for this reason that I will be 
referring to the range of activity which led up to and encompassed civil disputes as 
the spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution, again recognizing that the 
(arbitrary) boundary between civil and criminal could be thin to nonexistent within the 
exigencies of daily life. The broad sketches of my dissertation follow. 
 Chapter One will discuss perspectives on the legal system from its highest 
levels and ideas about how the system worked in theory. It will outline, in broad 
strokes, the most essential institutions of the legal system for late fifteenth- and early 
sixteenth-century Rouen and its environs to serve as a groundwork for finer-tuned 
                                                          
41 For a good overview of these considerations and relevant theories, see Hayhoe, Enlightened 
Feudalism, chapter 4. 
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discussions of legal maneuvers in later chapters. This will include a brief discussion 
of the theoretical duties and responsibilities of three specific lower-level officials—
notaries, sergents, and procureurs—who will play important roles in the spectrum of 
activity related to civil disputes and who have been the subject of interest in recent 
scholarship. It will also problematize some of the bigger developments and transitions 
for the legal system in terms of tensions underlying the relationship between the 
recently re-acquired territory and the monarchy. It will end with an analysis of a 
selection of legal commentaries and their views on the more common or more 
important (from their perspective) actions taken. This analysis will ultimately serve to 
highlight the important disconnect between theory and practice that will become 
evident in later chapters. 
 Chapter Two will provide an in-depth look at the most common contracts 
drawn up before the notaries of Rouen and situate them within alternative options. It 
will show that orality, performance, and witnessing were important elements of the 
written contracts which were at once part of a negotiated process of standardization 
and mechanism of regulation, a form of property, a tool to recall terms and 
obligations agreed upon, and an instrument to reconcile individual wants and 
communal norms with the letters of the law. The chapter will explore the flexibility of 
the notarial profession as well as some of the stakes involved in drawing up 
contracts. These contracts will help to contextualize disputes that arise over similar 
types of contracts in subsequent chapters. They will also take their place on the 
spectrum of disputes because they will show not only evidence of pre-dispute re-
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negotiation but also that contracts served a defensive purpose in preventing future 
disputes.  
 Chapter Three will examine legal activity leading up to or pursuant to a dispute 
outside of the courts. Knowing that many of the actions taken in advance of a court 
appearance did lead to a court appearance, they will nevertheless be treated 
separately from court appearances because they did not necessitate an appearance. 
This chapter will highlight the initiative taken by individuals in instigating an open 
dispute and will focus on various sources of policing, on the execution of a seizure of 
goods, and on clameurs--specifically the haro, the gage-plege, and the marché de 
bourse—to show some of the range of activity. This chapter will also explore the 
flexibility of practice of three important lower level officials—notaries, sergents, and 
procureurs--to reinforce the larger argument about the multiplicity inherent in the legal 
system and the flexibility of certain professions. The chapter will conclude by 
examining settlements reached out of court that make no mention of a court 
appearance to round out activity out of court and set up the following chapter.  
 Chapter Four will be an in-depth examination of disputes where parties 
appeared before one or more courts and then resolved their dispute in a settlement 
before the courts rendered a judgment. This chapter will show the range of options 
for litigants in court proceedings, examining, in particular, patterns in appearances or 
lack thereof (defaults). It will also show movement between jurisdictions and will 
explore obstruction tactics. These topics will ultimately lead to a discussion of time 
and the length of procedures before one or more courts. In showing the range of 
activity before a court, but in which the court did not provide a direct resolution, this 
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chapter will explore the role of the courts in the legal system and reveal a larger 
perspective of the courts and the cases that appeared before them.  
 Chapter Five will examine challenges to resolution and enforcement. It will 
analyze cases in which a court provided a ruling but will at the same time question 
the finality of this resolution. It will show different types of judgments, especially from 
the Échiquier. It will explore the nature of appeals and will question whether an 
appeal was a commitment to see a dispute through to the bitter end. This chapter will 
also examine enforcement from various angles including the logistics of it and the 
forms it took. It will show failed resolutions and enforcement in cases that were 
renewed after a judgment had been rendered and will finally come full circle back to 
postscripts to judgments and formalization of the terms of enforcement in contracts 
drawn up before notaries. Finally, it will elaborate on themes of witnessing, cost, 
discretion, and reputation as they come through practices observed. 
 This dissertation is about how people interacted with the legal system and 
navigated different forms of recourse for civil disputes in late fifteenth- and early 
sixteenth-century Normandy, an important transitional period for the legal system in 
France as elsewhere in Europe. Indeed, this period has been recognized as the 
“Golden Age of Litigation” across many parts of Europe and yet, for France 
especially, remains critically understudied. Broadly conceived (across a range of 
activity), yet narrowly focused (on records from 1500 and 1510), it traces practices 
along a spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution. Using qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of notarial records as well as court records from the vicomté of 
Elbeuf and the Échiquier (Parlement) in Rouen, it shows that the courts played a 
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limited role in civil dispute practice and resolution relative to their over-representation 
in historiography of the French legal system, and I argue for a broadening of 
historiographical perspectives on the legal system and records utilized in order to 
more completely capture how people interacted with it. This, in turn, underscores a 
different meaning of justice in this legal culture, one which is less focused on court 
rulings and speedy proceedings and more so on building and maintaining social 
relations by exploring more flexible and fitting resolutions to disputes. Highlighting the 
divergence between theory and practice (indeed it becomes obvious that law is the 
theory and practice is the norm), I show how individual wants and communal norms 
may be reconciled with the letter of the law, the commemorative and defensive 
functions of contracts, and the coexistence of oral and written practices, even as an 
increasing privileging of documentation creates new challenges for the legal culture. 
Delving into actions in and out of court--from instigating maneuvers such as seizing 
goods and clameurs to patterns of court appearances, defaults and obstruction 
tactics to new complications posed by documentation to settlements, arbitration, and 
court rulings to enforcement practices and challenges to them—reveals civil dispute 
practices to be non-linear and variant as people took advantage of the opportunities 








This chapter will lay out a preliminary sketch of the structures—the law codes 
and institutions—of the legal system in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century 
Rouen and its environs in order to reveal how the system worked on paper—that is, 
in theory and in writing. This overview illustrates the most obvious options with which 
people had to work and the guiding principles behind the legal system—structures, 
options, and principles which these same people drew on in their practices.1 Before 
beginning, it is important to acknowledge a significant problem with reconstructing the 
legal system more broadly and with studying legal pluralism more specifically—
namely, how one studies legal pluralism when surviving records do not represent all 
institutions or options for legal action by people and when we may not even know of 
all options. It is an attempt at reconstruction without all of the pieces or knowing how 
many pieces there are.2 Furthermore, significant discrepancies existed between 
theory and practice; nevertheless, mapping the idealized structures of the legal 
system to the best of our ability helps anchor our understanding of what was 
theoretically possible as well as underscoring the significance of the divergent 
practices uncovered by the sources. The overview that follows will cover different 
                                                          
1 Julie Hardwick, Family Business: Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern 
France (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Julie Hardwick, “Women ‘Working’ the Law: 
Gender, Authority, and Legal Process in Early Modern France” Journal of Women’s History 9:3 
(Autumn, 1997): 28-49. 
2 I would relate this, conceptually, to the “chiffre noir” suggested by Benoît Garnot and others, but on a 
much larger scale. See Benoît Garnot, Questions de justice: 1667-1789 (Paris, France: Belin, 2006); 
Hervé Piant, “Des procès innombrables: Éléments méthodologiques pour une histoire de la justice 
civile d’Ancien Régime” Histoire et mesure 22:2 Déviance, justice et statistiques (2007): 13-38; and 
Michael P. Breen, “Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France” The Journal of Modern 
History 83:2 (June 2011): 346-86.  
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sources of the law in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Rouen before moving 
to a discussion of the most commonly-used institutions and jurisdictions and ending 
with a brief discussion of privileges and the role of notaries in the legal system.3 
Finally, I will devote some time to legal commentaries as a way of bridging the gap 
between theory and practice. Commentaries often elaborate on sources of law and 
offer interpretations based on precedent in legal cases in order to provide a 
systematized, cohesive, and theoretical, even philosophical, view of the law and how 
it worked from a high-level perspective; however, upon closer examination, we see 
that they also reveal a great deal in spite of themselves about fissures in the system 
and how it worked on the ground, uncertainties or concerns in day-to-day practice, 
and the broader, even popular, legal culture that influenced and shaped the formal 
legal system. Given the overall project’s focus on civil law, this overview focuses 
more on that which pertains to the civil part of the system rather than the criminal 
(with the acknowledgement that civil and criminal could overlap in jurisdictions and 
the unfolding of cases—we will see a few comparative examples of this overlap in 
chapters 3 and 4, especially, where criminal cases appeared alongside civil cases in 
the lowest courts and where civil disputes devolved into criminal cases with the 
                                                          
3 For more on the legal system and institutions in France, see Bernard Barbiche, Les institutions de la 
monarchie française à l’époque moderne, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1999); Gaston Zeller, Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle (Paris, France: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1948); Roger Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle, 2 vols. 
(Paris, France: Éditions A. et J. Picard et Cie, 1948); Ferdinand Lot and Robert Fawtier, eds. Histoire 
des institutions françaises au Moyen Age, 5 vols. (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1957-1962); François Olivier-Martin, Histoire du droit français des origins à la Révolution, third edition 
(Paris, France: CNRS Éditions, 2010); Roland Mousnier, Les institutions de la France sous la 
monarchie absolue, 1598-1789, vol. 1: Société et État (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1974); Charles Homer Haskins, Norman Institutions (Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard 
University Press, 1918); Cédric Glineur, Histoire des institutions administratives, Xe-XIXe siècle (Paris, 
France: Economica, 2017). 
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irruption of violence; civil actions and cases still vastly outnumber criminal ones, 
however).4   
There were many complementary and competing sources of the law in late-
fifteenth-, early-sixteenth-century Rouen. The most well-known, and arguably the 
most influential, source of law in Rouen, as in much of Northern France, was 
customary law. The customary law tradition prevalent in the north of France set it 
apart from the south, where Roman law, especially the Corpus Juris Civilis was the 
primary structuring source well before and well beyond the sixteenth century.5 The 
south of France, as a pays de droit écrit (statutory law), had a legal system and legal 
culture distinctive from that of the north, a pays de coutume (customary law).6 It is 
interesting to observe that scholarship on the legal system in France—and by 
extension social history drawing on legal sources—tends to follow this same great 
divide and even edited volumes tend to favor north or south even when addressing a 
more generalized theme. An important exception to this trend is Barbara Diefendorf’s 
essay on women and property in Dauphiné and Paris, which calls attention to 
common assumptions and conceptions across the Roman statutory-customary law 
divide. She argues, compellingly, albeit in broad strokes and in preliminary fashion, 
that these common conceptions ultimately allowed the two systems to coexist and 
                                                          
4 For more on the interplay between civil and criminal, see Piant, “Des procès innombrables”; and 
Hervé Piant, Une justice ordinaire: justice civile et criminelle dans la prévôté royale de Vaucouleurs 
sous l’ancien régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006). 
5 “Roman law” and “civil law” are synonymous terms in many texts and scholarly works because the 
primary Roman law code known and used was the Corpus Juris Civilis (Body of Civil Law). 
6 Incidentally, Guillaume Terrien, whose commentary on Norman law is examined in detail below, also 
shares that where other sources of inspiration are lacking in deciding cases, Roman law may be used 
not as a binding source but as a source of common reason. See Guillaume Terrien, Commentaires du 
droit civil tant public que privé, observé au pays et Duché de Normandie, Second edition (Paris, 
Jacques du Puys, 1578), book 1, ch 2, p. 11. 
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interact fruitfully.7 This important exception aside, the divide, still pronounced in the 
historiography, makes drawing generalizations on France collectively in the early 
modern period more challenging. 
Rooted in a much older oral tradition, the Norman customary law was first 
codified in the early thirteenth century in Latin and by a translation into French 
followed soon thereafter. This early iteration, known as the Très Ancien Coutumier, 
was a work of law and procedure created by a practitioner for his own reference.8  
The second compilation and codification, from the mid-thirteenth century, was also 
written in Latin and then swiftly translated into French under the title Grand 
Coutumier de Normandie. Like the first, it was written by a practitioner of law, in an 
ecclesiastical position, as a tool of reference and was colored by the author’s training 
in Roman and Canon law, which were the common basis for education and most 
                                                          
7 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Women and property in ancient régime France: Theory and practice in 
Dauphiné and Paris,” in Early Modern Conceptions of Property, eds John Brewer and Susan Staves 
(London, UK: Routledge, 1995): 170-93; esp. 184-85. 
8 Very little is known of the author, who remains anonymous. For more on this early work, start with 
more recent studies of Norman customary law and its developments: Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, Le 
statut de la femme mariée dans la Normandie coutumière: droit et pratiques dans la généralité de 
Rouen (Presses Universitaire de la Faculté de Droit de Clermont-Ferrand, 2005); Jacqueline Musset, 
Le régime des biens entre époux en droit normand du XVIe siècle à la Révolution française (Caen, 
France: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1997); Jean Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de 
Normandie (Rouen, 1583). Son esprit” Annales de Normandie 36:1 Identités normandes. (1986): 3-36; 
Jean Yver, Égalité entre héritiers et exclusion des enfants dotés: essai de géographie coutumière 
(Paris, France: Éditions Sirey, 1966). To go further in depth, consult the older canon: Robert Besnier, 
La Coutume de Normandie. Histoire Externe (Paris, France: Librairie du Recueil Sirey, 1935); M. 
Astoul, Observations sur l’Évolution du Régime matrimonial normand et les doctrines juridiques au 
XVe siècle (Rouen, France: Imprimerie Léon Gy, 1911); Robert Génestal, “L’Histoire du Droit public 
Normand,” Bulletin de la société des antiquaires de Normandie vol. 37 (Caen, France: Jouan et Bigot, 
1929): 75-149; Robert Génestal, L’origine et les premiers développements de l’inaliénabilité dotale 
normande (Paris, France: Société Anonyme du Recueil Sirey, 1925); Pierre Petot, Histoire du droit 
privé: la formation historique du régime de communauté entre époux. Les cours de droit. Répétitions 
écrites (Paris, France: 1943). For good annotated editions of the work, see E. J. Tardif, ed., 
Coutumiers de Normandie 3 vol. (Rouen and Paris): vol. 1 (1881) Très Ancien Coutumier (latin); vol. 2 
(1903) Très Ancien Coutumier (French and Norman); vol. 3 (1896) Summa de Legibus Normannie in 
curia locali (latin version of the Grand Coutumier de Normandie). 
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circulated among learned crowds.9 Unlike the first, the second codification enjoyed a 
more official, influential, and enduring status because it synchronized more effectively 
with the monarchy’s campaign in the region (recently conquered from the English), 
which encouraged, and outright ordered that, out of respect for its origin and quality, 
it could only be edited by royal jurists.10   
The early codification of Norman custom, relative to other regions of France, 
explains, to a large degree, why Norman law, especially that governing inheritance, 
property management, and women’s prerogatives, was so different from many other 
regions of France, and mystifying to outsiders, by the sixteenth century. The 
codification (mediated by savants), and determination to preserve it (instigated by 
monarchical ambitions), changed the nature of the law, which as an oral custom had 
been more adaptive and responsive to changing priorities over generations, making it 
                                                          
9 For a more detailed and comprehensive breakdown of the most commonly available (and therefore 
influential) legal texts in contemporary Norman libraries, see Charles Lefebvre, Msgr., “La culture 
juridique médievale: d’après la bibliothèque du Mont Saint-Michel et autres entres intellectuels de 
Normandie,” in Vie Montoise et Rayonnement Intellectuel du Mont Saint-Michel, ed. R. Foreville, Vol. 2 
of Millénaire Monastique du Mont Saint-Michel (Paris, France: Bibliothèque d’Histoire et d’Archéologie 
Chrétiennes, P. Lethielleux Editeur, 1967): 275-88. For more on medieval Norman legal culture and 
jurisprudence, see Bernard Jacqueline, “Les études juridiques au Mont Saint-Michel des origines au 
XVIe siècle,” in Vie Montoise et Rayonnement Intellectuel du Mont Saint-Michel, ed. R. Foreville, Vol. 
2 of Millénaire Monastique du Mont Saint-Michel (Paris, France: Bibliothèque d’Histoire et 
d’Archéologie Chrétiennes, P. Lethielleux Editeur, 1967): 257-73. For more on the Grand Coutumier, 
start with Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux; Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de 
Normandie’’; Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie; and Lemonnier-Lesage, Le statut de la femme 
mariée. For editions of the Grand Coutumier, see, in particular, Tardif, ed., Coutumiers de Normandie; 
and L’Ancienne Coutume de Normandie, ed. William Laurence de Gruchy (Jersey: Charles Le Feuvre, 
1881).  
10 Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux. For more on Franco-Norman relations in the fifteenth 
century, see Kathleen Daly, “Villains into heroes? Some french and norman attitudes to norman 
history in the later Middle ages,” The Burgundian hero: proceedings of the annual conference of the 
Centre européen d'études bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe siècles) at Edinburgh and Glasgow, 28-30 
September 2000 (2000): 183-98; Jean-Philippe Genet, “La Normandie vue par les historiens et les 
politiques anglais au XVe siècle,” in La Normandie et l’Angleterre au Moyen Âge, ed. Pierre Bouet and 
Véronique Gazeau (Caen, France: Publications du CRAHM, 2003): 277-91; Jean-Paul Lefebvre-
Filleau, La guerre de cent ans en Normandie (Luneray, France: Éditions Bertout, 2002). And for a 
comparative description and analysis of the French monarchy’s relation to other regions in the north, 
see Carol Symes, “The ‘School of Arras’ and the Career of Adam,” in Musical Culture in the World of 
Adam de la Halle, ed. Jennifer Saltzstein (Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 2019): 1-40. 
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more rigid and “true to its origins.” Whereas, in its most ideal state, customary law 
was derived from and transmitted by practice, “remembered” or “forgotten” by 
succeeding generations of people, who agreed upon or negotiated its terms, within a 
given territory, and sanctioned and enforced by one with judicial power and authority, 
a lord of one form or another, within said jurisdiction, the written word was not so 
conveniently altered or forgotten (though this is not to say that orality, especially in 
practice, did not endure).11 To the extent that transformations happened (slowly), it 
typically came through interpretation, via official rulings, from the sovereign court (the 
Échiquier), which became the most obstinate guardian, ironically, of regional 
peculiarity in the face of reforming and centralizing efforts of the monarchy, budding 
in the mid-fifteenth century and blossoming in the sixteenth century and later.12   
Ostensibly a response to complaints about the multitude, confusion, and 
private character of customary laws, the monarchy, on the heels of the Hundred 
Years War, prescribed, in the Ordonnance of Moutils-les-Tours in 1454, the 
codification of all customary law in the kingdom. The complaints in question were an 
                                                          
11 This echoes Terrien’s definition of customary law (see below). For more on the nature of customary 
law and its generational malleability, see Martine Grinberg, Écrire les Coutumes: les droits 
seigneuriaux en France, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Presses universitaires de France, 2006); 
Martine Grinberg, “Écrire le droit: les coutumes, la langue, et le ‘bon usage,’” in L’Écriture des juristes, 
XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, ed. Laurence Giavarini (Paris, France: Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2010): 57-71; 
and Martine Grinberg, “Rédaction des coutumes et territoires au XVIe siècle: Paris et Montfort-
L’Amaury” Revue d’histoire moderne et contemporaine (1954-) 59:2 (avril-juin 2012): 7-55. For 
Normandy specifically, see Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux; Yver, “La rédaction officielle de 
la coutume de Normandie’’; and Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie. 
12 Terrien calls attention to the importance of the Échiquier in directing interpretation of the law. For 
more on the broad strokes of the development of Norman customary law and the Échiquier’s role in it, 
see Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux; and Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de 
Normandie.’’ For more on the Parlement of Normandie and its political and legal history, see Olivier 
Chaline, Godart de Belbeuf: le parlement, le roi et les normands (Luneray, France: Éditions Bertout, 
1996); Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: the Magistrates of the Parlement of 
Rouen, 1499-1610 (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 1980); Amable Floquet, Histoire 
du Parlement de Normandie 4 vols. (Rouen, France: É. Frère, 1840-42); and Vincent Maroteaux, 




outcry perpetuated variably by jurists, political theorists, and specific interests (which 
historians have perpetuated) and amplified by the ad fontes [to the source] ideals 
creeping into learned crowds (humanism, broadly speaking, was particularly 
interested in a return to origins), who looked back on Roman law.13 This undertaking, 
due to its massive scale, physical and material constraints, and the resistance it 
encountered, was not completed until the mid- to late-sixteenth century, by which 
time most customary laws had gone through a second edition or “reform” to clean 
them up. On the tail end of this campaign, in response to the Estates General of Blois 
in 1576, Henry III, via special decree, unequivocally ordered Normandy to fall in line 
and follow suit. This decree was a deliberate response to apparent apprehension and 
                                                          
13 I am here paraphrasing Musset but taking a different critical interpretation of these events. Inspired 
in part by Hayhoe’s suggestion that people in later centuries using the legal system did not seem so 
confused by it, I am suggesting that the echoed complaint, and assumption, of extreme complexity and 
confusion by the vast majority of the historiography on the French legal system, whether it be the 
traditional school of legal history or the newer school of social legal history (broken down by Breen and 
others), amplified and reinforced by over-reliance on Charles Loyseau’s works, is more rhetoric, with 
varying and sometimes opposing agendas, than reality. As more work is being done on the lower 
courts generally, and civil litigation specifically, this image of widespread confusion and discontent is 
breaking down. On the monarchy’s customary law project, see Musset, Le régime des biens entre 
époux); Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de Normandie’’; Grinberg, Écrire les Coutumes; 
Grinberg, “Écrire le droit”; Grinberg, “Rédaction des coutumes et territoires au XVIe siècle’’; and 
Robert Descimon, ‘’L’écriture du jurisconsulte Charles Loyseau (1564-1627): un modèle d’action 
rhétorique au temps d’Henri IV ?’’ in L’Écriture des juristes, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle, ed. Laurence Giavarini 
(Paris, France: Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2010): 277-94. Related to the above critical interpretation, 
see also Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in 
Eighteenth-Century Northern Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008); 
Breen, “Law, Society, and the State”; Robert Descimon, “Les paradoxes d’un juge seigneurial: Charles 
Loyseau (1564-1627)” Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 27 (2001): 1-21. On legal 
humanism, see Donald R. Kelley, “Jurisconsultus Perfectus: The Lawyer as Renaissance Man” 
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 51 (1988): 84-102; Donald R. Kelley, “Law,” in The 
Cambridge History of Political Thought, ed. J.H. Burns and Mark Goldie (New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994): 66-94; Donald R. Kelley, “Legal Humanism and the Sense of 
History” Studies in the Renaissance 13 (1966): 184-99; Donald R. Kelley, “Guillaume Bude and the 
First Historical School of Law” The American Historical Review 72:3 (Apr., 1967): 807-34; Donald R. 
Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the French 
Renaissance (New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 1970); Donald R. Kelley, “Men of Law 
and the French Revolution,” in Politics, Ideology, and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in 
honor of J.H.M. Salmon, ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 
1994): 127-46; Coleman Phillipson, “Jacques Cujas” Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation 
13:1 (1912): 87-107. 
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a pre-emptive attempt to avoid a later reclamation of the new edition, and it was 
intended to undermine the entrenched resistance, clouded in conservatism and 
claims that the coutumier already existed in an official form (thereby fulfilling the 
requirement of the ordonnance that the coutume be codified) and that such a project 
would threaten the integrity of the law. Despite the force of the decree, the project 
took six years to complete and was followed in short order by another project which 
lasted into the seventeenth-century.14 The transition to written law—and more 
expansively, the writing of law--was full of political implications, as was the translation 
of legal documentation into the vernacular, another large project of the monarchy in 
the first half of the sixteenth century.15  
The customary law of Normandy was itself distinctive from other customary 
regimes. The coutume prevailing in Normandy was significantly different from that of 
Paris, for instance, despite the fact that the regions were contiguous—this fact is 
partly explained by the political history of Normandy but is no less significant given 
that the coutume of Paris became the pervading standard post-Hundred Years War 
as the monarchy worked to consolidate law codes and jurisdictions. These 
differences were most acutely felt in civil law because the rules governing inheritance 
                                                          
14 Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux; and Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de 
Normandie.’’ 
15 Guillaume Terrien alludes to these implications in his commentary on the customary law. See 
Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 1, ch 2, 11-12. Grinberg, Écrire les Coutumes; Grinberg, 
“Écrire le droit’”; Grinberg, “Rédaction des coutumes et territoires au XVIe siècle”; Musset, Le régime 
des biens entre époux; Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie; Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la 
coutume de Normandie.’’ For more on the transition to writing more broadly, see Michael T. Clanchy, 
From Memory to Written Record, England 1066-1307, Second edition (Cambridge, MA, USA: 
Blackwell, 1993); Laurence, Giavarini, ed.,  L’Écriture des juristes, XVIe-XVIIIe siècle  (Paris, France: 
Éditions Classiques Garnier, 2010); and Laurence Giavarini, ed.,  Pouvoir des formes, d'écritures des 
normes: brièveté et normativité (Moyen Âge, Temps modernes) ( Dijon, France: Éditions universitaires 




and marriage in particular were so divergent. For example, in most other parts of 
France, married couples shared ownership of property (known technically as 
communal goods), meaning that their moveable goods and immovable property 
acquired during the marriage were held communally, with husband and wife having 
an equal claim to them, and the husband or wife would inherit this communal 
property upon the death of the other spouse.16  
This was not the case in Normandy. Normandy was a régime dotal (dot = 
dowry). This meant that the wife’s dowry was always strictly separate from the 
husband’s property, and rigidly preserved and governed as such property. This 
property included their moveable goods and the immoveable property that they 
acquired during the marriage. The wife held her dowry, the husband owned and 
controlled everything else, and neither could inherit from the other (in theory), even 
via contract. Norman custom, relative to most other regions of France, was extremely 
lineage-focused and concerned above all with preserving property within a family, 
and women could not transmit the lineage.17 As Jacqueline Musset characterizes it, 
“the matrimonial régime denied all ‘frank collaboration’ between the couple and was 
articulated in a sort of permanent climate of suspicion.”18 She also shows that 
although not the heir of her husband in the strictest sense, the widow did exercise a 
right akin to it in practice in the sixteenth century up to the French Revolution, having 
                                                          
16 Diefendorf, “Women and property.” See also Ralph E. Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies 
of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France” The American Historical Review 82:2 (Apr., 1977): 271-89. 
17 Lemonnier-Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée; Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tendances 
communautaires’’; Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tabellions et l’assouplissement de la norme’’; Lemonnier-
Lesage, “Le régime matrimonial normand’’; Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux; Yver, “La 
rédaction officielle de la coutume de Normandie’’; Yver, Égalité entre héritiers et exclusion des enfants 
dotés; and Génestal, L’origine et les premiers développements de l’inaliénabilité dotale normande. 
18 Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux, 23-25, quotation p. 25.  
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the right to claim possession of a third of moveable goods and non-lineage property 
acquired during the marriage for the remainder of her lifetime (these could not be 
transmitted to her heirs). She also had the right to renounce this temporary (or term-
limited) succession, which she may have done to preserve her dowry (over which she 
regained control upon her husband’s death) in situations where the debts of the 
estate, for which she would also be liable for a third, exceeded the assets. 
Renunciation could be a valuable means of ducking creditors.19 
Furthermore, the patchwork nature of customary law imbued itself on a smaller 
scale as well with variations existing within the smaller seigneuries under the same 
larger umbrella. Standards of measurement as well as rules governing harvests, 
dues owed to the lord, and privileges governing legal procedure could all vary with 
important implications for civil law practice and disputes. 
 It should be noted that Norman law, like much of French law, was an 
accumulation of laws over time and was not codified into neatly organized categories 
like criminal and civil law—or even public versus private law like the modern French 
legal code.20 More commonly, the laws were categorized into whether they pertained 
to people, goods, or actions and judgments.21 For court cases specifically, “civil” and 
“criminal” referred less to the nature of the offense than to the procedure by which the 
                                                          
19 Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux, part II, chapter 1. 
20 It should be noted that in the sixteenth century law was conceptualized and divided into natural 
(sometimes subdivided into natural and human) and civil law. For an example of this see, Terrien, 
Commentaires du droit civil, ch. 1, pp. 1-2. Likewise, it should be noted that public power was a 
subject of interest and discussion. For an example of this see Charles Loyseau, Traicte des Ordres; 
and Cinq Livres des Droicts des Offices in Les Œuvres, contenant les cinq livres du droit des Offices, 
les Traitez des Seigneuries, des Ordres et simples Dignitez, du Déguerpissement et Délaissement par 
Hyptheque, de la Garantie des Rentes, et des Abus des Justices de Village (Lyon: La Compagnie des 
Libraires, 1701); Charles Loyseau, A Treatise of Orders and Plain Dignities, ed. and trans. Howell A. 
Lloyd (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); and Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 15-16. 
21 See, for example, Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 2, ch 1, 15.  
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matter was judged. In terms of procedure, especially in the highest courts, a division 
was made between criminal procedure and civil procedure so that different chambers 
of the Échiquier (Parlement) heard one type of case or another. It is therefore 
following the procedural distinction and echoing historiographical conventions (largely 
for ease of discussion) that I use the terms criminal and civil in talking about the 
law.22 Additionally, civil law procedure is commonly categorized according to whether 
it was “gracieuse”—undisputed--or “contentieuse”—disputed.23 Although capacious 
as a category, for the purposes of this study, I would break down civil law, roughly, 
into family law, property law, and business law (categories which are not 
contemporary, strictly speaking, but which are helpful for navigating the terrain). Of 
these subcategories, property law, including personal and lineage property--
intersects with the other two.24   
Although I will not go into too much detail about specific laws, it is important to 
delve into property law since it was so important in civil law and so central to many 
disputes. Property—acquiring it, exploiting it, selling it, and transferring it—was at the 
                                                          
22 Hervé Piant has argued that procedural differences were not as important as the links between civil 
and criminal and calls for examining them together at the micro-level. There are certainly merits to this 
approach, but given the colossal number of records involved, it is not always practical. Accepting the 
downside and acknowledging the real potential for overlap as disputes played out, I have nevertheless 
chosen to focus intensively on the civil side, which allows me to add more counterbalance to the over-
representation of the criminal and to weave in the notarial records (an even more colossal record set), 
which are essential for a study of civil proceedings and yet are not part of the emerging canon. See 
Piant, “Des procès innombrables.” 
23 Of the still thin but growing literature on civil law proceedings, justice gracieuse has been neatly 
bracketed and set aside in favor of justice contentieuse. An important exception to this trend is the 
work of Sylvie Perrier on the establishment and reckoning of the guardianship of minor children. Sylvie 
Perrier, Des enfances protégées: La tutelle des mineurs en France (XVIIe-XVIIe siècles), Enquête à 
Paris et à Châlons-sur-Marne (Saint-Denis, France: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1998); and 
Sylvie Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” in Entre 
justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan 
(Saint-Nicolas, Québec, Canada : Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 491-503. 
24 Diefendorf, “Women and property.” 
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center of livelihood, family relations, social mobility, and personal honor, as Ralph 
Giesey, Julie Hardwick, Barbara Diefendorf, Robert Harding, Jonathan Dewald and 
many others have shown.25 It was at the center of major life cycle moments, 
especially marriage and death. It was carefully guarded and hotly contested. 
Moreover, Norman law was (in)famously strict in governing inheritance and the 
transfer of property. The restrictions placed on women in the inheritance, 
management, and alienation of property were especially rigid compared to the 
regimes of its neighbors in other regions of France and Europe more broadly.26 The 
stakes for those involved in civil disputes were thus high, and one could argue that 
these cases could be just as much a matter of life and death as criminal cases. This 
is especially so if we consider that it was not unusual for murderers to receive a civic 
death—to have their goods seized and to be exiled. The importance of a civic death 
reveals the blurriness of the division between civil and criminal as well as highlighting 
the significance of civil disputes and the stakes involved. 
Adding great complexity to customary law was the more localized seigneurial 
(customary) law with the institutions and jurisdictions to match. Lords of higher rank 
                                                          
25 The bibliography is vast, but for starters, see: Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance”; Hardwick, Family 
Business; Diefendorf, “Women and property”; and Barbara B. Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors in the 
Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 1983); 
Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New 
Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 1978); Dewald, Formation of a Provincial Nobility. 
26 For a good introduction to the topic, see Zoe Schneider, “Women before the Bench: Female 
Litigants in Early Modern Normandy” French Historical Studies 23:1 (winter 2000): 1-32; Lemonnier-
Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée; Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tendances communautaires’’; 
Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tabellions et l’assouplissement de la norme’’; Lemonnier-Lesage, “Le régime 
matrimonial normand’’; Hardwick, “Women ‘Working’ the Law”; Musset, Le régime des biens entre 
époux; Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de Normandie’’; and Yver, Égalité entre héritiers et 
exclusion des enfants dotés. See also the older canon: Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie; Besnier, 
“Les filles dans le droit successoral normand”; Astoul, Observations sur l’Évolution du Régime 
matrimonial normand; Génestal, “L’Histoire du Droit public Normand”; Génestal, L’origine et les 
premiers développements de l’inaliénabilité dotale normande; Petot, Histoire du droit privé; and 
Knecht, “Des conflits des coutumes matrimoniales de Paris et de Normandie’’. 
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had the privilege of (delegated) governing—making laws and rendering judgments—
within their territory, and the lord’s rank and status determined the weight of the laws 
and authority of the jurisdictions therein. These laws were often based on customs, 
practices, and interpretations of the more overarching Norman custom within that 
territory. The lord could hold fixed or itinerant court (the latter being more common) 
and could claim jurisdiction over cases alongside other jurisdictions in the area. 
Appeals from seigneurial courts and where in the system of royal courts the case 
would enter was determined by the status and privilege of the seigneurial court and 
of the litigants. Thus, where someone lived could determine to which regulations they 
were subject and to which jurisdictions they had a right to turn. The same applied to 
the location of fixed property. These more localized laws could make a difference to 
people residing in the city of Rouen if they owned property outside of the walls, or if 
they entered into legal agreements or disagreements with people from the 
surrounding area.  
At the top of the hierarchy, though not necessarily the most immediately 
influential within the geographical or social community, in the legal system was the 
monarchy, which issued legislation in the form of edicts, ordinances and statutes.27 
The monarchy issued laws that ruled and affected the entire kingdom, but it could 
also pass laws with a more specific target. Although the monarchy did not seem to 
issue laws systematically—repeatedly, yes, but not systematically in the sense of 
                                                          
27 Looking these up in Huguet’s dictionary of sixteenth-century French, these terms were 
synonymous—written law. To add a little more nuance, statutes refer to a written law or body of laws 
or rules governing practice (as in the case of guild statutes). “Edict” and “ordinance” both conceptually 
refer to a decree, command, or order (deriving from Latin words with these meanings), the main 
difference between them seems to be one of scale, with ordinances being more localized and edicts 
being more expansive. Huguet, Edmond. Dictionnaire de la langue française du seizième siècle. 7 vol. 
Paris: E. Champion, 1925. 
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putting together an overarching code (though the ideal, emulating Roman law, was 
present)—it did issue a lot of them. Even though the laws could apply to the entire 
kingdom, the biggest impact could be more localized, depending on the existing 
customary law in place. Of particular interest in relation to the customary law of 
Normandy and legal practice in Rouen were ordinances passed by Charles VIII and 
Louis XII which required officials in the Échiquier (the sovereign court of Rouen which 
became the Parlement)—présidents, conseillers, procureurs, avocats, greffiers, and 
huissiers--to swear to specifically uphold royal ordinances, to inform on those who do 
not, and to pursue with diligence those who would transgress them.28 That Louis XII 
re-issued the ordinance suggests how well received it was the first time around, and 
it underscores the tension between competing sources of law and their jurisdictions 
charged with rendering decisions and enforcing them. Lack of enforcement may have 
been due to considerations other than purely means. The question of enforcement, 
including questions of discretion (at the intersection of theory and practice) and 
logistics, will be the subject of chapter 5. Suffice it to say here that one of the primary 
means by which the Échiquier (and other Parlements) expressed its displeasure with 
and resisted royal laws was to ignore them, to delay registering them, and to mitigate 
them through interpretation in enforcing them. This was especially true in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.29 
                                                          
28 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil; and Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’an 
420, jusqu’à la révolution de 1789, 29 vol. Edited by François André Isambert et al. (Paris: Belin-
Leprieur and Verdière, 1821-1833). 
29 Most of the work of the relationship between the parlements and the monarchy has focused on the 
Parlement of Paris, though studies of the provinces are emerging. In particular, for Normandy, see 
Chaline, Godart de Belbeuf; Dewald, Formation of a Provincial Nobility; Floquet, Histoire du Parlement 
de Normandie; Vincent Maroteaux, Parlement de Normandie. For other provinces, see Caroline Le 
Mao, Parlement et parlementaires: Bordeaux au grand siècle (Seyssel, France: Champ Vallon, 2007); 
and Jacques Poumarède and Jack Thomas, eds., Les parlements de province: pouvoirs, justice et 
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Aside from its ordinances, one of the most important ways the monarchy 
shaped the legal system was through the judicial system through the rendering of 
decisions in disputes and interpreting laws or even favoring competing laws or 
jurisdictions. It also, in theory, enforced these decisions, though there are a lot of 
questions about how effectively it did so and how to measure this. Although the 
monarchy reserved the right to grant pardons at the top of the system and to pass 
additional laws to clarify interpretations of laws, it generally delegated adjudicating to 
a hierarchy of courts and officials (separate from and not to be confused with that 
delegated to lords as part of the seigneurial branch).30 The lowest level of courts was 
the vicomté (known as the prévôté in other parts of France) which held sessions 
(itinerant or fixed, though fixed became more common especially within the city) at 
which people could present themselves and their cases. These sessions were 
subdivided by location into subjurisdictions (and often, but not necessarily called a 
sergenterie) and could be held on location or the sessions designated for that 
                                                          
société du XVe au XVIIIe siècle (Toulouse, France: Framespa, 1996). For the Parlement of Paris, start 
with Christopher W. Stocker, “The Politics of the Parlement of Paris in 1525” French Historical Studies 
8:2 (Autumn, 1973): 191-212; Françoise Hildesheimer, Le Parlement de Paris: histoire d’un grand 
corps de l’État monarchique, XIIIe-XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Honoré Champion, 2018); Albert N. 
Hamscher, The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673 (Pittsburgh, PA, USA: University of 
Pittsburgh Press, 1976); John J. Hurt, Louis XIV and the parlements: the assertion of royal authority 
(New York, NY, USA: Manchester University Press, 2002); A. Lloyd Moote, The Revolt of the Judges: 
The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-1652 (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 
1971); David Avrom Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: the Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France, 
(New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press, 1994); François Bluche, Les magistrats du Parlement 
de Paris au XVIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Économica, 1986; James D. Hardy, Judicial politics in the Old 
Regime: the Parlement of Paris during the Regency (Baton Rouge, LA, USA: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1967); J. H. Shennan, The Parlement of Paris (Gloucestershire, UK: Sutton, 1998); 
J. H. Shennan, “The Political Role of the Parlement of Paris, 1715-23” The Historical Journal 8:2 
(1965): 179-200; Julian Swann, Politics and the Parlement of Paris under Louis XV, 1754-1774 (New 
York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
30 Natalie Zemon Davis, Fiction in the Archives: Pardon Tales and their Tellers in Sixteenth-Century 
France (Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford University Press, 1987). For a comparative study of pardons, 
see James E. Shaw, “Writing to the Prince: Supplications, Equity and Absolutism in Sixteenth-Century 
Tuscany” Past and Present 215 (May 2012): 51-83. 
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location could be held at the site of the vicomté, so, for instance, the session for the 
sergenterie of Pavilly under the vicomté of Rouen could be held in Pavilly or Rouen.  
Acting as an appellate court for the vicomté of Rouen and other vicomtés of 
the surrounding area was the bailliage (known as the sénéchaussée in other regions 
of France). The most predominant royal bailliages in Normandy were Alençon, Caen, 
Caux, Cotentin, Evreux, and Rouen but which in closer proximity to Rouen also 
included Aumale (with a seigneurial bailliage too), Cany, Caudebec, Dieppe, 
Longueville, Montivilliers, Neufchatel, and Le Havre among others. Adding more 
nuance to this breakdown (and confusion for the outsider), in some places (and 
particularly in seigneurial jurisdictions), in Normandy and especially other regions of 
France, “vicomté” and “bailliage” could be interchanged, especially if only one of 
them existed, and the monarchy in later periods worked to consolidate some of these 
courts.  
Sitting above all of them, the highest court of appeals, which heard cases from 
the bailliages of Normandy, was the Échiquier (Exchequer, a vestige of the English 
administration system in Normandy), which the monarchy made a permanent 
institution in 1499 and promoted to the status of Parlement in 1515. The Échiquier, 
like other parlements, not only acted as a judicial body, hearing appeals and 
providing official interpretations of laws, it also acted as a legislative body. It could 
pass rulings which would have the force of law, and it was charged with registering 
royal laws, which would put them into effect in the region. It could also ignore them or 
formally object to (remonstrate) them, but it would run the risk of penalty and could be 
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ordered by special decree to register them anyway. This dual judicial-legislative role 
made it an important and powerful local institution.  
Parallel to the Parlement was the Cour des Aides which rendered final 
judgments concerning taxes. In the middle of the sixteenth-century, after the period 
under consideration in this study, Henry II created the présidiaux to act as a final 
court of appeals for civil cases in an attempt to alleviate some of the pressure on the 
parlements due to the high volume of cases. It should be noted too that although the 
présidiaux did not enjoy the same status and privileges as the parlements, the 
parlements nevertheless did not like the re-direction of cases to the présidiaux.31 The 
above-mentioned royal courts all had their sets of officials—judges, lawyers, clerks, 
and sergents (agents who did most of the out-of-court business)—and interpreted 
and enforced relevant laws—not only royal statutes, but customary law and corporate 
statutes too.32   
All of the courts mentioned in this hierarchy, especially at the lower levels, 
could also compete in jurisdiction and authority with specialized courts or with other 
vicomtés (even bailliages across levels of the hierarchy)--if the jurisdictional 
boundaries were unclear or exceptions, such as privileges, had been added--within 
                                                          
31 Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe siècle. 
32 For more on the présidial courts, see Sylvain Soleil, Le Siège royal de la sénéchaussée et du 
présidial d’Angers (1551-1790) (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 1997); Christophe 
Blanquie, Les présidiaux de Dagusseau (Paris, France: Publisud, 2004); Christophe Blanquie, Les 
présidiaux de Richelieu: justice et vénalité (1630-1642) (Paris, France: Éditions Christian, 2000); 
Christophe Blanquie, Justice et finance sous l’Ancienne Régime: la vénalité présidiale (Paris, France: 
Harmattan, 2001); Christophe Blanquie, “Royaux et seigneuriaux, les officiers du présidial de Nérac” 
Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 27 (2001): 1-12; Michel Cassan, “L’activité du 
présidial de limoges (fin XVIIe siècle - fin XVIIIe siècle)” Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches 
Historiques 23 (1999): 1-15; Jean Nagle, “Présidial et justice seigneuriale au XVIIe siècle: Le Châtelet 
contre Saint-Germain-des-Prés” Les Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 27 (2001): 1-12; 
Guy Saupin, “La compétence criminelle du présidial de Nantes sous le règne de Louis XIV” Les 
Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Historiques 23 (1999): 1-10. 
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the system of royal courts and with courts external to it, such as seigneurial or 
ecclesiastical courts. To the extent that laws and institutions could be controversial, 
the controversy (in the sense of conflict or open disagreement), or even the 
unpopularity, could inform litigants’ decisions in taking legal action. Overlapping 
jurisdictions enabled these decisions. Which court had the right to hear which cases 
or overrule other jurisdictions could be a matter of great contention among legal 
authorities.  
On a smaller scale, but no less important for the local legal system, municipal 
rules and regulations also played an important role. Local officials were tasked with 
keeping public order in their municipalities, and if they failed to do so, they were held 
accountable to the monarchy.33 These local laws attended to the specific needs of 
the city. Being a permanent resident of the city (bourgeois) brought with it special 
status and privilege, including the ability to participate in city governance.34 City 
residents were not subject to the local nobility (the monarchy traded this privilege of 
“liberty” for “loyalty” as part of efforts to undermine power bases of local lords), 
meaning municipal rules and privileges could shape existing options and offer new 
ones. Among the privileges enjoyed, residents may be exempt from some taxes 
                                                          
33 Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981); Michael P. Breen, Law, City, and King: Legal Culture, Municipal Politics, and State 
Formation in Early Modern Dijon (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2007); and Zoe 
A. Schneider, The King’s Bench: Bailiwick Magistrates and Local Governance in Normandy, 1670-
1740 (Rochester, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008).  
34 This is obviously a much simplified description as “participation” in city governance varied (and 
could be widely interpreted), and the lion’s share was largely the domain of a small group of elite; 
however, the theoretical privilege imbued status. Regarding the term “bourgeois,” as Barbara 
Diefendorf has succinctly noted, “The term ‘bourgeois’ presents special problems, for even in the 
sixteenth century the term had several, overlapping definitions,” among which, importantly, include a 
“juridical” definition and a “functional” one. Since my sources are not clear on these distinctions, I 
leave the definition more open at “permanent residents.” Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors, xxiii-vi.  
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(which the monarchy traded for “order,” cities being commonly hotbeds of “disorder”). 
We will see an example of the existence of such a privilege and the complexity in 
how it worked in later chapters when I analyze a lawsuit initiated by Michel de 
Batenceurt, bourgeois of Rouen, against tax collectors from Caen for levees collected 
on one of his boats on the basis that “bourgeois de Rouen” were exempt from such 
taxes by royal privilege.35   
 In direct competition with secular law--customary or Roman, civil or criminal--
was ecclesiastical law deriving from the Christian tradition. Rouen was no exception. 
Although predominantly rooted in Canon law and the medieval Church’s tradition, 
bureaucracy, and institutions, the reform movements of the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries and the particularities of the Gallican Church, undermined whatever 
coherence there may have been of ecclesiastical law in France.36 Even though the 
period under consideration predates the large scale reform movements of the 
sixteenth century, it is nevertheless worth pointing out that Rouen, at different periods 
of the sixteenth century, alternated between being a Catholic and Protestant 
stronghold.37 The seeds of these diverse viewpoints among the population existed in 
the period under consideration and earlier (as there were many reform movements 
                                                          
35 ADSM, 1B 331, January 12, 1510. 
36 For more on the Gallicanism, see Frederic J. Baumgartner, “Louis XII’s Gallican Crisis of 1510-
1513,” in Politics, Ideology and the Law in Early Modern Europe: Essays in honor of J.H.M. Salmon, 
ed. Adrianna E. Bakos (Rochester, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 1994): 55-72; Alain 
Tallon, La France et le Concile de Trente (1518-1563) (Paris, France: École française de Rome, 
1997); Thierry Wanegffelen, Ni Rome Ni Genève: Des fidèles entre deux chaires en France au XVIe 
siècle (Paris, France: Honoré Champion, 1997); Thierry Wanegffelen, Une Difficile Fidélité: 
Catholiques malgré le concile en France, XVIe-XVIIe siècles (Paris, France: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1999); Jotham Parsons, The Church in the Republic: Gallicanism and Political Ideology in 
Renaissance France (Washington D.C., USA: Catholic University of America Press, 2004). 
37 Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion; and Stuart Carroll, Noble Power during the French 
Wars of Religion: The Guise Affinity and the Catholic Cause in Normandy (New York, NY, USA: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
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prior to the sixteenth century) and may have stemmed from the different draws of the 
city as a major port city, center of legal activity and the rest. This may have 
weakened ecclesiastical law and jurisdictions in the face of secular institutions once 
the instability of the Wars of Religion faded and the monarchy made strides toward 
consolidating its power and authority, but early in the sixteenth century, competing 
and overlapping jurisdictions created opportunity for those seeking to resolve 
disputes.  
Rouen, partly due to, and partly resulting from, its status as an administrative, 
legal, and religious center, had a strong ecclesiastical presence in the late fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries. Regarding the medieval Church, it was the home of an 
archdiocese and of several large monasteries and convents within or just outside of 
the city itself. Members of the clergy, both secular and regular, played different roles 
in the larger legal system in Rouen as elsewhere, depending on the circumstances. 
They could act as judges hearing cases and rendering judgment in ecclesiastical 
courts; as plaintiffs bringing suit (or criminal charges) against other clerics or non-
clerics for thefts, embezzlement, trespassing, damage to property, or dispute over 
ownership of property; and of course, as defendants in the same sorts of cases. 
Disputes over benefices were especially common, and Terrien writes a lot about 
them. Property disputes and debt collection were also common as will become 
obvious in chapters to come. Clergy also played an important, though often 
undocumented, role in mediating disputes and encouraging reconciliation. No less 
important, though less apparent, clergy acted as legal counsel (many of whom in 
Rouen in this period probably had a formal legal education) advising different parties 
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of their options and as notaries (not the same as royal notaries) or more simply, as 
literate people drawing up legal documents that may or may not have had to 
withstand challenges in various courts.38 
 The size and compartmentalization of the medieval Church allowed for 
internal rivalries and disputes that fed into its courts but also shaped the opportunities 
for lay people both in resolving disputes with members of the clergy and with other 
lay people. The most notable of such divisions (and rivalries) for the purposes of this 
study was the separation of the clergy into secular and regular clerics, the latter of 
which was further divided into cloistered (monks) and mendicant (friars) categories. 
The archdiocese represented the highest authority for the secular clergy in the city 
and surrounding area. For the regular clergy, there were numerous groups, but the 
monastery of St. Ouen and the (female) convent of Dominicaines have the richest 
sets of surviving records for the period under consideration. St. Ouen was large, old, 
and wealthy (it owned extensive property in the area) and had the privilege--the 
                                                          
38 On mediation, see Éric Wenzel, “Des lois du roi au sang du Christ. Le clergé paroissial, auxiliaire 
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Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983): 167-87; and Ghislain Brunel, “Du tabellion de l’évêque au tabellion du roi: le cas de la 
Picardie méridionale aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale 
et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 
85-98. For an example of some of the court cases which involved clerics, see Ernest Désiré Glasson, 
Étude historique sur la clameur de haro (Paris, France: L. Larose et Forcel, 1882).   
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option--of bypassing lower jurisdictions to appeal directly to the Échiquier to resolve 
disputes that fell outside of ecclesiastical purview.39   
Increasing institutional complexity—in size, number, and competition—was not 
limited to religious institutions in the sixteenth century. There existed an uneasy 
relationship between canon law and secular law in the larger legal system, and the 
commentaries under examination below draw a definite distinction between the two, 
even when both sources of law are in effect. Although secular law in this period 
coexisted with and supported ecclesiastical law for the most part (for this study it is 
especially notable in the outlawing of usury—condemned by the Church, which the 
State supported and enforced, and worked around by both clergy and laymen in the 
form of rentes, which will receive more attention in chapter 2), there were important 
points of contention, which flared up during disputes and which could influence 
certain decisions in the ensuing efforts to resolve them, such as to whom to turn to 
have a judgment rendered, to solve or to stall, or even to advise.  
One such contested area was marriage. Canon law and secular law defined 
the age of majority at vastly different ages, which could make a difference controlling 
the entire process of marriage.40 On the one hand, marriage was a sacrament, but on 
                                                          
39 This is clearly a very simple breakdown of ecclesiastical laws and institutions influencing the legal 
system in the city, and of course, it does not go into great detail on reform movements (interests for 
reform) either internal or external. Although this study ends its analysis before the Wars of Religion 
began in France, it is nevertheless important to be cognizant of such movements. Unfortunately for 
this study, source material on reform movements, especially in relationship to legal practice, are 
sparse and difficult to work with. It is worth recalling that, in theory, reform movements, could 
strengthen or undermine the authority and integrity of ecclesiastical laws and institutions. 
40 The official age of majority was also in transition, as were many other social considerations, in the 
sixteenth century, most notably after the Council of Trent. The Council of Trent set the age of majority 
at 16; it had been 12 for women and 14 for men through much of the late medieval period. France did 




the other hand, it was an important node of social alliance and networking and of 
property transmission and inheritance. It was as much a legal and social (and 
economic) act as a religious one. The increasing prominence of the bureaucratic 
class, the robins (noblesse de robe), exacerbated these tensions as parental, 
specifically paternal, control and prerogative became much more important, 
expanding in power and authority, especially as the sixteenth century passed.41   
Adding nuance to these laws and jurisdictions were privileges, which acted as 
exceptions and made the system much more complicated and full of contradictions 
and overlapping jurisdictions. The term “privilege” derives from the Latin for “private 
law.” Privileges could be large or small, could grant immunity from certain regulations 
or jurisdictions, and could grant expedited or exceptional access to resources. They 
could redefine the boundaries of jurisdictions. They could apply to individuals, 
groups, offices, and institutions. We have already seen that the monastery of St. 
Ouen had the privilege of having its cases heard directly before the sovereign court 
of the Échiquier.  
The monarchy was the most important source of privilege in the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries. The Échiquier and the municipality could also grant 
privileges. This would change in the seventeenth and especially the eighteenth 
centuries with the movement toward restricting the right to grant privileges to the 
                                                          
41 For more on the robins, start with Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Give Us Back Our Children: Patriarchal 
Authority and Parental Consent to Religious Vocations in Early Counter-Reformation France” The 
Journal of Modern History  68:2 (Jun., 1996): 265-307; Diefendorf, Paris City Councillors; Robert 
Descimon, “The Birth of the Nobility of the Robe: Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of Paris, 
1500-1700,” trans. Orest Ranum, in Changing Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael Wolfe 
(Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 1996): 95-123; Sarah Hanley, “Engendering the State: 
Family Formation and State Building in Early Modern France” French Historical Studies 16:1 (Spring, 
1989): 4-27.  
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monarchy. Moreover, although it is unclear whether granting privileges enhanced or 
undermined the authority of those granting, receiving, mediating, or executing such 
privileges. If we take the privilege of St. Ouen before the Échiquier as an example, 
does this privilege lend authority to St. Ouen, the Échiquier, the monarchy, or a 
combination of these?  Privileges were both exceptions to and part of the legal 
system. However, as we shall see in chapters to come, the fact that Michel de 
Batenceurt had to appeal the bailliage of Caen’s decision to the Échiquier to uphold 
his claim to privilege suggests that privileges were not so easily recognized or 
leveraged across jurisdictions in practice.42   
Privileges were typically granted to corporate entities, and these “corps” were 
treated as legal persons and enjoyed, among other things, the right to autonomous 
self-government, which could be especially significant when the majority “ruled” to 
lend money to the king, for instance, collecting internally and paying collectively as 
one.43 Because early modern French society was largely corporate in nature—
encompassing, in broad strokes, not only sociability and internal regulation but also 
strong values of collective interest or good and “order”—“membership” was a serious 
preoccupation and was understood as a pre-requisite to privilege and status.44   
                                                          
42 ADSM, 1B 331, January 12, 1510. 
43 For more on the role of corporations in state finance and credit, see David A. Bien, ‘’Offices, Corps, 
and a System of State Credit: The Uses of Privilege under the Ancien Régime,’’ in The French 
Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, Vol. 1 of The Political Culture of the Old 
Regime, ed. Keith Michael Baker (New York, NY, USA: Pergamon Press, 1987): 89-114. 
44 For more on the corporate nature of society and privileges, see Jacques Revel, ‘’Les corps et 
communautés,’’ in The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture, Vol. 1 of The 
Political Culture of the Old Regime, ed. Keith Michael Baker (New York, NY, USA: Pergamon Press, 
1987): 225-42; Robert Descimon and Alain Guéry, ‘’Privilèges: la légalisation de la société,’’ in L’État 
et les pouvoirs, ed. Jacques Le Goff, Series Histoire de la France (Paris, France: Seuil, 1989): 325- 
56; and Bien, ‘’Offices, Corps, and a System of State Credit. On corporations and policing, see, in 
particular, Steven Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail, 1700-1815” Revue Historique 
261:1 (Janvier-Mars 1979): 17-77. 
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Guilds and other corporations, like universities, enjoyed special privileges 
within a city like Rouen and created statutes to govern the activities of their members. 
Rouen was an important city in terms of the scale of its corporations.45 The wool and 
textile industries were especially influential in the city and surrounding area. Guilds 
not only created most of their own regulations (others, such as the institution of a new 
corporation or where they could practice, came from the city and the monarchy), they 
also negotiated (and sometimes hotly contested) boundaries of production with other 
guilds. The cloth and clothing guilds are but one example with tailors, seamstresses, 
lingères, cloth-makers, hat-makers, and others all guarding their rights to production. 
The guilds also had a quasi-policing force, in the sense that their privileges gave 
them the right to regulate and police the trade, a function performed by their elected 
officials.46 
 Finally, with regard to this overview, another important node of the legal 
system which will receive a lot of attention in this study is notaries. Notaries were key 
players in the civil legal system, and as legal officials, went through specialized 
                                                          
45 For more on guilds, see Judith Bennett et al., eds., Sisters and workers in the Middle Ages 
(Chicago, IL, USA: University of Chicago Press, 1989); James R. Farr, Hands of Honor: Artisans and 
Their World in Dijon, 1550-1650 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 1988); James R. Farr, 
The Work of France: Labor and Culture in Early Modern Times, 1350-1800 (Lanham, MD, USA: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). More work has been done on guilds in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries (there were more of them by then). For Rouen, start with Daryl M. Hafter, Women at Work in 
Preindustrial France (University Park, PA, USA: Pennsylvania State University, 2007); Daryl M. Hafter, 
“Stratégies pour un emploi: travail féminin et corporations à Rouen et à Lyon, 1650-1791” Revue 
d’histoire moderne et contemporaine (1954-) 54:1 (Jan. - Mar., 2007): 98-115 ; and Daryl M. Hafter, 
“Female Masters in the Ribbonmaking Guild of Eighteenth-Century Rouen” French Historical Studies 
20:1 (Winter, 1997): 1-14. For comparative studies, see, in particular, Clare Haru Crowston, 
Fabricating Women: The Seamstresses of Old Regime France, 1675-1791 (Durham, NC, USA: Duke 
University Press, 2001); Steven Laurence Kaplan, The Bakers of Paris and the Bread Question, 1700-
1775 (Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 1996); and Simona Cerutti, La ville et les métiers: 
Naissance d’un langage corporatif (Turin, 17e-18e siècle) (Paris, France: Éditions de l’École des 
Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1990). 
46 Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail, 1700-1815.” 
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training. They received their offices by appointment, and their activities and numbers 
were regulated by the monarchy.47 Though not exclusively—priests and even legal 
officials doing double duty in smaller jurisdictions drew up contracts--they were 
charged with drawing up and formalizing legally binding contracts, agreements, wills, 
and even settlements of disputes among many other things. They were required by 
law to keep registers of these contracts, which could be sold to other notaries, and 
were designed, in theory, to recall agreements between people, which would 
minimize or resolve disputes, and to give clear direction to the transfer of property.48 
                                                          
47 For more on the monarchy’s relationship with and regulation of notaries, see Olivier Poncet, 
“Théorie et réalité de l’institution des tabellions au XVIe siècle: les affaires de Monsieur Le Jay, 
tabellion troyen (+1553),” and “La monarchie et l’institution du tabellionage (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles): le 
cas des provinces du nord de la France,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et 
Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 369-
425 and 453-506. The literature on notaries and their roles in society is expansive (and expanding), 
especially for France. Notarial practices varied somewhat by region and time period, but a good place 
to start for late medieval and early modern France, and Normandy in particular, is Jean-Louis Roch, 
ed., Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir (Rouen, France: Presses 
universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014); Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin, eds., 
Tabellions et tabellionages de la France médiévale et moderne (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 
2011); Jean-Paul Poisson, Notaires et société: travaux d’histoire et de sociologie notariales 2 vols. 
(Paris, France: Economica, 1985); Jean-Yves Sarazin, “L’historien et le notaire: acquis et perspectives 
de l’étude des actes privés de la France moderne,” Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes 160:1 (2002): 
229-270; and Jean-Luc Laffont, ed., Notaires, notariat et société sous l’Ancien régime (Le Mirail, 
France: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1990).  
48 For more on notarial writing practices, see Isabelle Bretthauer, “Official Rules of Writing in the North 
of France? The Writing of Notarial Documents in Normandy between Practices and Regulations,” in 
Ruling the Script in the Middle Ages: Formal Aspects of Written Communication, ed. Sébastien Barret, 
Dominique Stutzmann, and Georg Vogeler, Books, Charters, and Inscriptions (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2016): 75-94; Denise Angers, “Être tabellion à Caen à la fin du Moyen Âge,” in Tabellions et 
Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin 
(Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 279-302; Denise Angers, “Possibilités et limites des 
registres du tabellionage pour l’histoire de Caen aux XIVe et XVe siècles,” in Tabellionages au Moyen 
Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses 
universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 85-96; Mathieu Arnoux, “De la charte à l’acte de tabellion: 
formes locales, régionales ou nationales d’une transition. Réflexions à partir du cas normand,” in 
Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier 
Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 7-27; Caroline Bourlet and Julie Claustre, “Le 
marché de l’acte à Paris à la fin du Moyen Âge: juridictions gracieuses, notaires et clientèles,” in 
Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier 
Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 51-84; Isabelle Bretthauer, “Actes et registres 
du tabellionage ancien d’Alençon (1352-1404),” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale 
et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 
253-77; Isabelle Bretthauer, “Le statut du registre entre usage privé et usage public,” in Tabellionages 
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In order to make such documents as sound as possible the notaries had to navigate 
and reconcile as many of the different laws relevant to the interested parties as 
possible. 
 
Overview of Legal Commentaries 
 
With this broad sketch in mind, it is time to turn to published commentaries on 
the legal system from (near) contemporary authors. Looking at commentaries offers a 
contemporary perspective on the legal system from the viewpoint of the most erudite 
men of law. They offer a wealth of theory and generalizations about the letters of the 
law, the purpose of the law and its institutions, the structure of the legal system, and 
procedure. These works are by and large tools of reference; however, there are 
certain theoretical undertones that resonate with political theorists. Some of these 
undertones reflect the current events of the period in which they were published—
during or right after the Wars of Religion—and some of them reflect ongoing projects 
to consolidate letters of the law and institutions. One of the downsides of selecting 
commentaries from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century is they do not 
provide an exact “view from above” for the cases and contracts from the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth century that will be the focus of this study, and the perspective 
                                                          
au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses 
universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 13-24; Kouky Fianu, “Les notaires du châtelet d’Orléans, 
rédacteurs et auxiliaires de justice (XIVe-XVe siècles),” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France 
Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des 
Chartes, 2011): 197-223; Claude Jeay, “Les seings manuels des tabellions (Normandie, XIVe-XVe 
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France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des 
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very likely shifted to a degree unknown. Given the dearth of material from the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth century, this trade-off is acknowledged but does not 
negate their utility, for the commentaries offer a valuable glimpse at the disconnect 
between theory and practice. They also reveal, intentionally or unintentionally, some 
of the major problems and critiques of the legal system.  
The scant commentaries surviving from the early sixteenth century are not 
completely lacking in utility. At the very least, they suggest a different way of thinking 
about the legal system. Rather than in abstract, formal and systematic terms 
common among the more well-known legal humanists such as Charles Dumoulin, 
Jacques Cujas, and others, the absence of such manuals suggest a more open-
ended, practice-based approach.49 One of the earliest examples of a commentary on 
Norman custom from the early sixteenth century is the Grand Coutumier du pays et 
duché de Normendie of Guillaume Le Rouillé, first published in Paris in 1534 and 
then again in Rouen in 1539.50 Le Rouillé was born in and practiced law in Alençon 
(under Norman custom, but with its own autonomous Échiquier) before becoming, by 
the time he published this work, lieutenant général (once an important military post, 
but which by this time was more of an administrative post, like a governor) of 
Beaumont and Fresnay (in Le Maine, under the custom of Le Maine) at the behest of 
Marguerite of Valois (King Francis I’s sister).51 As an early example of legal 
                                                          
49 For more on legal humanism, see Kelley, “Jurisconsultus Perfectus”; Kelley, “Law”; Kelley, “Legal 
Humanism and the Sense of History”; Kelley, “Guillaume Bude”; Kelley, Foundations of Modern 
Historical Scholarship; Kelley, “Men of Law”; Phillipson, “Jacques Cujas.” On education in the early 
sixteenth century, see George Huppert, Public Schools in Renaissance France (Urbana, IL, USA: 
University of Illinois Press, 1984). George Huppert, The Idea of Perfect History: Historical Erudition 
and Historical Philosophy in Renaissance France (Chicago, IL, USA: University of Illinois Press, 1970). 
50 Le Rouillé, Le grand coustumier du pays et duché de Normendie. 
51 Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie; Besnier, “Les filles dans le droit successoral normand”; Rudolf 
Leonhard, Les Additions au Coutumier de Normandie de Guillaume Le Rouillé d’Alençon en tant 
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humanism, the work, in French, is structured following the thirteenth-century 
compilation of the custom, but it includes “additions” (annotations) by the author at 
the end of each chapter, in Latin. In the view of Robert Besnier, a prominent scholar 
of Norman customary law from the earlier twentieth century, are “encumbered with 
abundant references to texts of Roman or Canon law and their 
commentators…[T]hese developments are often pointless….[A]t its depth, there is, in 
this work, a tendency toward rational systematization and a unification of the law, but 
it is singularly gauche and makes very clumsy use of Roman law, which is too 
different from the customary system.” Besnier concludes that “Without a doubt, the 
unknown author of the Summa de legibus [Grand Coutumier, thirteenth-century] was 
a mind of greatly superior quality than that of Le Rouillé.”52 This, the work is not well-
received among historians of Norman custom as an object of study, specifically 
among legal historians pre-occupied with the law code.53 While I would not go so far 
as to dismiss it outright as an object worthy of study—it does reveal different pre-
occupations and standards of asserting one’s credibility and authority as a scholar, at 
the very least—it is difficult to use, in large part because it is difficult to tease out Le 
Rouillé’s own ideas and impressions about the law in theory and especially in 
                                                          
qu’elles touchent au droit Romain (Rouen, France: Imprimerie Léon, 1911). B. Haureau, Histoire 
Littéraire du Maine. Vol. 7 (Paris, France: Dumoulin Libraire, 1874). For more on the lieutenants, see 
Robert R. Harding, Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1978). 
52 Besnier, La Coutume de Normandie, 147-48. Besnier’s work remains influential as part of the legal 
history canon but reads, like a good portion of Norman legal history, as rather stale in its judgments in 
light of more recent social and cultural studies of the law in other parts of France for other periods. 
53 More recently, Jacqueline Musset, concurring with Besnier, has described this and similar works 
from the early sixteenth century as “a flaunt, without measure and nearly unrestrained, of their school 
knowledge, nourished in Roman law, juxtaposing or mixing resolutely pragmatic customary solutions 
with reasoned and logical considerations from erudite law…it is possible, as a result, to abstain from 
naming these authors here.” Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux, 13-14. 
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practice, which are the most valuable part of a commentary for historical inquiry. It 
also does not seem to have been widely influential. For these reasons, I have chosen 
not to examine it at length in this dissertation, but it is still worth acknowledging its 
existence.  
All that said, I have chosen to focus on a selection of commentaries which 
offer insights most closely bearing on the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. As 
a set up to the commentaries, Pierre Ayrault’s De l’Ordre et instruction judiciaire, dont 
les anciens Grecs et Romains ont usé en accusations publiques, conferé à l’usage 
de nostre France, first published in 1576, offers an important perspective on civil 
practices from a high-level official--Ayrault was, for a good portion of his life, 
lieutenant criminal (the highest ranking provincial judge who presided over criminal, 
as opposed to civil, cases) in Angers.54 This work, a treatise on judicial theory and 
procedure and full of references to ancient Greek and Roman precedent (part of his 
credential as an educated man of law), champions the rule of law, apparent in its 
consistent procedures and hierarchy, with the king as the keystone. Ayrault focuses 
primarily on criminal proceedings, which he deems “more noble” than mundane “civil 
matters” (“matieres civiles”)—for example, jurisdiction (the right to judge) can be 
delegated in civil matters but not criminal ones. In so doing, he focuses on cases that 
have a public interest rather than those which may be resolved privately such as “civil 
matters” and petty crimes (“delict privé et pecuniaire”).55 His apparent disdain for civil 
                                                          
54 John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance: England, Germany, France (Cambridge, 
Harvard University Press, 1974), 220. 
55 Pierre Ayrault, De l’Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire, dont les anciens grecs et romains on usé en 
accusations publiques. Et si on peult condamner ou absouldre sans forme ne figure de procés (Paris: 
Jaques du Puys, 1576), 5v-6. “Car mesmement si ce n’estoit que quelque delict privé et pecuniaire, 
les Preteurs et Magistratz criminels, que nous avons appellé Quaestores, ou Quaesitores, deleguoient 
semblablement telles causes, et en faisoient comme le Praetor Urbanni, dees matieres civiles. Mais 
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procedure suggests a hierarchy of legal practice and a priority among elites when 
discussing the legal system. Although it would be unfair to envision Ayrault 
specifically as the mouthpiece of erudite men of law in this period, the proportion of 
publications on criminal law relative to those on civil law, does reinforce the idea of 
hierarchy and priority. Nevertheless, some of Ayrault’s ideas about procedure and the 
legal system more generally are broadly applicable, and he does use metaphors 
drawn from “civil matters” to elaborate on criminal ones: “in Justice, the parties have 
to find equity, and nothing must be permitted to one that is not consequently 
permitted to the other; everything must be common for them—the audience, the 
proofs, the delays, the option and the recusal of Judges. Otherwise with crimes, he 
who has been offended holds the place and position of creditor and he who has erred 
is properly the debtor.”56 Again, Ayrault’s focus is on procedure to the point that he 
states that justice without formality has no authority and a trial should still be 
conducted after an execution (execution preceding trial only in extraordinary cases 
                                                          
quant aux crimes publics, aux grandes et graves accusations, les Preteurs n’en commettoyent ny 
pouvoyent commettre à aultruy la cognoissance et jurisdiction: les parties estoiyent ouyes en leur 
presence, le procés s’instruisoit devant eux, ils presidoyent aux jugements, les donnoyent et 
prononçoient eux mesmes….Pour le regard des Atheniens, il est certain qu’ils en usoyent tout de 
mesme, c’est que les matieres civiles, ils les terminoyent par arbitres; mais du crime public c’estoit ce 
grand Senat d’Areopage, c’estoit le peuple seul, qui en congnoissoit….Parquoy (comme nous disons) 
puis qu’ainsi est que l’ordre et formalité judiciaire gist en l’instruction de la cause procedure, et 
contexture; que l’instruction criminelle est la plus noble; et quant à celle don’t nous usons pour le 
jourd’huy qu’il m’a semblé plusieurs fois, pour ce peu d’experience, qu’il s’y faisoit beaucoup de fautes 
par mespris ou ignorance de l’antiquité; j’ay deliberé pour ce coup de traicter et esclaircir ceste partie 
de la matiere criminelle.” 
56 Ayrault De l’Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire, 14-14v. “en Justice les parties doibvent trouver equalité, 
et rien n’estre permis à l’un, qu’il ne le soit consequemment à l’autre; tout leur doibt estre commun, 
l’audience, les preuves, les delaiz, l’option et la recusation des Juges. Or és crimes, celuy qui est 
offencé tient le lieu et place de crediteur; celuy qui a delinqué, est proprement le debteur.” 
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where immediate action of the kind was necessary).57 The importance of procedure 
thus bridges the divide between civil and criminal procedure.58  
With these broad views of civil law in mind, it is important to focus in further on 
customary law, being the form of civil law most influential in sixteenth-century 
Normandy. Guillaume Terrien’s Commentaires du droict civil tant public que privé, 
observé au pays et Duché de Normandie, first published posthumously in 1574 but 
surviving in the second edition from 1578 (the year after Henri III ordered the new 
compilation of the customary code in Normandy), is a reference guide to legal 
procedure specific to Normandy from the hand of the lieutenant général of the Bailli 
of Dieppe.  
As a collection of the customary law (both “written and unwritten”), edicts and 
royal ordinances, and rulings of Parlement, which informs on the “usage and style of 
proceeding in the courts and jurisdictions of Normandy,” the work is billed as “very 
necessary and required, not only for Judges, Juris consults, and practitioners of the 
said Duchy, but also for all those in other provinces and jurisdictions of this 
Kingdom.”59 Unlike Le Rouillé’s compilation, however, Terrien’s commentary does 
not follow the structure of the Grand Coutumier from the thirteenth century but rather, 
following the style of contemporary jurists (like Charles Loyseau, see below), draws 
on Roman law and organizes his work according to people, things, and actions. This 
structure breaks down in the details, and the influence of the Grand Coutumier and 
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59 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, title page. ‘’Coustume dudit Duché, tant redigee par escrit, que 
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the compartmentalization of Norman custom in thought and practice infiltrate the 
organization when he subdivides civil and criminal procedures and further divides 
procedures involving property disputes according to whether the property is 
moveable or immoveable. And none of this was accidental or a surrender to the 
monumental task of forcing Norman custom into the Roman mold; it was a conscious 
decision on Terrien’s part. As a tool of reference, it makes sense that people trained 
in Roman law in their schooling would think in those categories and approach the law 
with those terms in mind at the outset. That is, this familiar categorization would also 
be a common foundation (similar to a common language) which, along with periodic 
annotations and references to a sort of common precedent (guide posts), would aid 
those approaching law and practice in Normandy from “other provinces and 
jurisdictions.” The peculiarities of the legal system in Normandy are then more 
apparent and accessible and, perhaps, also more legitimate (and less provincial) on 
the larger scale of legal codes and systems in other regions (and not just in France). 
These annotations were also intended to help more localized practitioners navigate 
ambiguities where the letter of the custom did not help in interpreting and applying 
the law to practice, thereby making it multifunctional and more than a work of 
erudition.  
Of further note, Terrien acknowledges the evolving nature of customary law 
both internally through practice but also in relation to other sources of law such as 
royal ordinances or court rulings. He notes that “the Coutume and the manner of 
proceeding in their beginning were not written: but only kept and observed by 
common usage, and since ruled upon and rendered into writing. But just as by long 
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usage they have been kept and observed, so also by contrary usage or non-usage, 
as by a tacit consent that they have been in part abolished, and by Royal ordinances 
and Court rulings, have they been reformed and corrected.”60 He observes that court 
rulings (by which he means Parlement) have potentially multiple uses: they decide a 
case; they could be used to guide interpretation of the law in future cases; and they 
could have the force of law. Published collections of such rulings, he notes, are 
intended for reference and to persuade interpretation.61 Terrien thereby reconciles 
competing sources of law and lends legitimacy to continued practice. However, his 
view of practice is court-centric and very much top-down.  
Similar to Terrien’s Commentaires, Jean Bouteiller’s Somme rural, ou le grand 
coustumier general de practique civil et canon, is a compilation of customary law in 
use in France more broadly with royal ordinances and court rulings that override or 
influence interpretation of the customary law. It is intended as a guide for 
practitioners. Originally published in the fifteenth century as the Somme rural, it was 
re-published several times and became Le Grand coutumier in the early sixteenth 
century.62 The edition consulted in this dissertation is one from 1603 and was 
published and annotated by Charondas Le Caron, who was a juris consult and 
lieutenant to the bailliage of Clermont in Beauvaisis. This work is particularly 
interesting because it includes commentary from both Bouteiller and Le Caron and 
reveals clear changes in practice and interpretation of the law between the fifteenth 
                                                          
60 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 1, ch 2, pp. 9-10. ‘’la Coustume et le stile en leur 
commencement ne furent escrits: mais seulement gardez et observez par un commun usage, et 
depuis arrestez et redigez par escrit. Mais tout ainsi que par long usage ils avoyent esté gardez et 
observez, aussi par usage contraire ou non usance, comme par un tacite consentement de tous ils ont 
esté en partie abolis, et par ordonnances Royaux et arrests de la Cour, reformez et corigez.’’ 
61 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 1, ch 2, p. 10. 
62 ARLIMA Permalien: https://arlima.net/no/3442) Accessed November 3, 2018. 
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and seventeenth centuries—most evident when Le Caron notes that some practice or 
another has fallen out of use.63 In terms of the law, Bouteiller draws fine distinctions 
between types of law, drawing the expected distinction between written law and 
customary law but then also dividing customary law into “private custom” and 
“common knowledge custom”.64 Related to these others and also in the list is “hateful 
law,” which he defines as “the law which by means of the custom of the territory is 
contrary to the written laws.” 65 Bouteiller and Le Caron also carefully distinguish 
custom from “usage” and “style” as well as other similar categories.66 This double 
commentary will be examined alongside Le Caron’s 1598 edition of another 
(anonymous) commentary from the fifteenth century, Le Grand coustumier de 
France.67 As a pair, these commentaries offer several layers of insight on law and 
practice. 
Finally, I have chosen to use Charles Loyseau’s Les Cinq livres du droit des 
offices and Discours de l’abus des justices au village contained within a collection 
(published in 1701) of his works. These books were published first as separate books 
                                                          
63 Jean Bouteiller, Somme Rural ou le Grand Coustumier General de Practique Civil et Canon. Reveu 
et Corrigé sur l’Exemplaire par Louys Charondas Le Caron (Paris: Barthelemy Macé, 1603). See p. 18 
note c and the notes on pp. 43-44, for example. 
64 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 3-6. ‘’Et y a difference entre coustumes: Car il y a coustume privee et 
coustume notoire. Et est perilleuse chose à arguer la premiere pout doute de la preuve, sinon qu’elle 
fust redigee par escrit, de l’authorité du Prince, et ses trois Estats du lieu ou Bailliage pour se faire 
appellez et assemblez, arrestée pour coustume. Et la notoire est plus legere, car elle se preuve d’elle 
mesme.’’ Quote pp. 5-6. 
65 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 3. ‘’Droit haineux est le droict, qui par le moyen de la coustume de païs 
est contraire au droict escrit, comme sont cas de retrait lignagier, qu’aucuns coustumiers appellent cas 
ou droict de promesse, ou autres plusieurs cas qu’à droit sont contraires, et toutesfois coustume les 
souffre et appreuve.’’ 
66 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 6-8. ‘’Us’’ and ‘’Stille.’’ 
67 Louis Charondas Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, contenant tout le droict François, et 
Practique judiciaire, pour plaider és Cours de Parlement, Prevosté et Vicomté de Paris, et autres 
Jurisdictions de ce Royaume. Reveu et corrigé sur l’exemplaire escrit à la main et ancienne 
impression, et illustré de tres-doctes annotations, enrichies des Arrests des Cours de Parlement et 
diverses observations (Paris: Jean Houzé, 1598). 
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in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century and republished several times in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Loyseau held positions as avocat in 
Parlement and lieutenant particulier in the présidial court of Sens and took a more 
critical view of the legal system, particularly of the seigneurial branches and on the 
subject of venality. Loyseau reflects one strain of opinion in the period following the 
Wars of Religion and does not necessarily reflect ideas from the early sixteenth 
century, but he does single out the reigns of Louis XII and François I as important 
periods of change in the legal system. This attention underscores the importance of 
examining practice in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.  
Loyseau’s works, especially his Des Ordres et simples dignitez, Les Traitez 
des seigneuries, and Discours de l’abus des justices au village, have been much 
more influential in the historiography of early modern France than the commentaries 
from the other authors noted above, as much on the subject of political and social 
theory as legal theory.68 Those who have studied his works in depth comment on the 
quality of his legal expertise, but in spite of his erudition and his background, these 
same scholars do not give much attention to the legal system. When his work is not 
used by socio-legal historians as an authoritative contemporary witness (even 
beyond his lifespan), it is mined for political theory, particularly in relation to the idea 
of public power and the state, and especially for his understanding of France as a 
society of orders and how that relates to the monarchy.69 However, for my purposes, 
                                                          
68 Loyseau, Les Œuvres. See Loyseau, A Treatise of Orders. See also Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, 
Aux origines de l’Etat Moderne: Charles Loyseau 1564-1627 Théoricien de la puissance publique 
(Paris, France: Economica, 1977); Kelley, “Law”; Descimon, “Les paradoxes d’un juge seigneurial’’. 
69 For more on the society of orders, see Arlette Jouanna, Ordre Social: Mythes et hiérarchies dans la 
France du XVIe siècle (Paris, France: Hachette, 1977). 
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Loyseau’s works will be examined specifically for their perspective on civil law and 
practice. Similar to Ayrault’s De l’Ordre et Instruction Judiciaire, Loyseau’s scope is 
broad, leading him to hedge his work with the sentiment that, “Given that the infinite 
variety of human affairs produces so many diverse encounters with the Law, and that 
it is not easy to assemble and understand them all under one general proposition, 
which is uniformly true, the juris consult can conclude without risk, that all definitions, 
that is, generalized resolutions, are risky in law.”70  
Having introduced the commentaries, it is now possible to collect their 
thoughts on various subjects of interest to the rest of the dissertation. In particular, I 
will examine what the various authors have to say about jurisdictions to show the elite 
views, or pretensions, of the structure of the legal system and how important it was. 
Jurisdiction being foundational to procedure, according to the authors, this will 
provide important background for subsequent discussions of officials and of 
procedures in and out of court. Because the chapters to come focus on contracts, 
seizures of goods, clameurs, patterns of appearances and defaults, settlements, 
enforcement practices, and lower-level officials such as notaries, sergents and 
procureurs, I have focused my analysis of the commentaries on these topics. 
Ultimately, the commentaries provide a court-centric perspective of the legal system. 
Regarding jurisdiction especially, the authors describe an ideal hierarchy of authority 
                                                          
70 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices in Les Œuvres; 1. ‘’La varieté infinie des affaires 
humaines produit tant de diverses rencontres au Droit, qu’étant mal aisé de les assembler et 
comprendre toutes sous une proposition generale, qui soit entierement veritable, le jurisconsulte a pû 




with clear-cut boundaries between jurisdictions and give the impression, in trying to 
force reality into this mold, of a more or less well-ordered—well-governed—system.  
The echoes of complaints and disputes over jurisdiction, taken up here and 
there within the commentaries, reveal implicit criticisms of the system as practiced. 
Such criticisms, made explicit in preambles to legislation from the monarchy, suggest 
a system which is overly confusing, complex, and inefficient, thereby advocating for 
the ideal described above “to better meet the needs of the people” and “serve the 
interest of justice.” These commentaries provide (and advocate for) a theoretical and 
professional practitioner’s perspective on authority and who wields it, and also on 
what justice means, which is challenged by the individuals and groups who used the 
system to their fullest advantage. Jurisdiction, from the court’s perspective and 
predominant in elite legal culture, represents the primary point of initiative for litigants 
and will thus feature as an important element of the discussion of people’s capacity 
for initiative in the legal system in the chapters to come. 
 
Legal Commentary on Jurisdictions 
 
Beginning with the subject of jurisdictions, Loyseau argues that delegation of 
justice derived from delegation of governance and assumes that exercise of justice 
must be by men of letters not sword. Along these lines, the royal system replaced the 
seigneurial one in the city when the cities were reunited with the crown and the city 
governors similarly delegated exercise of justice. 71 He argues (contradictory to 
                                                          
71 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 32. 
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practice) that simple jurisdiction alone can be delegated and draws a distinction 
between lieutenants, who have the power to punish and whose decisions are 
appealed up to next tier in judicial system, and the “simple juge,” who has the power 
to decide and whose decisions are appealed to the person who delegated authority 
to him.72 He also draws an important distinction between audientia (more traditionally 
linked to justice and encompassing the right to hear cases, judge, and sentence) and 
jurisdictio (the right to execute—literally) and which he compares to the authority and 
practice of ecclesiastical judges in relation to secular ones.73 With slightly less 
subtlety, Terrien defines jurisdiction as “the dignity by which one has the power to do 
right by complaints which are made before him,” further divided into seigneurial and 
royal jurisdictions.74 Bouteiller defines jurisdiction similarly but divides it into 
“ordinary,” “natural,” and “bestowed” with which Le Caron disagrees and considers 
the definition too fine, preferring instead to define it as “public power to render law 
and administer justice”.75 Le Caron continues with a more succinct breakdown of 
jurisdiction: “that of the King, which is of two kinds, sovereign and inferior, and that of 
lords and after that into ordinary and extraordinary or delegated, and then into high, 
low, or middle.”76   
                                                          
72 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 30-31. 
73 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 37. 
74 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 3, ch 3, p. 54. ‘’Jurisdiction est la dignité qu’aucun a, 
pource qu’il a pouvoir de faire droict des plaintes qui sont faites devant luy.’’ 
75 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 8-9; 18. ‘’Si dois sçavoir que jurisdiction est divisee en trois manieres: Car 
l’une est ordinaire, l’autre naturelle, et l’autre est commise.’’ (Bouteiller) ‘’La jurisdiction est icy trop 
estroictement definie: les Docteurs en font une generale, et l’autre speciale selon qu’elle est prise aux 
livres du droict Romain à la difference d’imperium merum et mixtum. Prise generalement se peut 
definir une puissance publicque de rendre droict et administrer justice.’’ (Le Caron) 
76 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 18. ‘’Jurisdiction se pourroit plus elegamment diviser, premierement en 
celle du Roy, qui est de deux sortes, souveraine et inferieure, et celle des seigneurs: en apres en 
ordinaire et extraordinaire ou deleguée; plus en haute, basse, et moyenne.’’ 
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Beyond these simplified, theoretical divisions, I have found that all of the 
authors establish a similar structure and hierarchy of jurisdictions with clear 
competencies and connect jurisdiction to social status—not only who has the right to 
hear certain cases regarding certain people but also, from the opposite perspective, 
who has the right to appear before which court, to have the privilege of bypassing a 
lower court on first instance, for example. Le Caron notes that “the Bourgeoisie is a 
seigneurial right” and that a “Bourgeois du Roy” is subject only to the royal courts, 
regardless of whichever lord’s territory he is residing in.77 They also admit indirectly 
that jurisdictions can overlap and be disputed among officials, but although this can 
cause “vexations” for the people, the concern expressed is almost exclusively 
procedural, with noted exceptions in Loyseau’s works. An example of one of these 
disputes is provided by Terrien where he includes a ruling from 1516 from the 
Parlement of Rouen sorting out overlapping and contested jurisdiction between the 
vicomté and the bailliage of Constances.78 Despite the difficulties that the multiplicity 
of jurisdictions posed (and the vexations), the commentaries suggest a conscientious 
effort to preserve jurisdictions.79  
The question of jurisdiction in these commentaries affects not only the right by 
various lords and officials to hear and decide on cases but also affects notarial 
practice. Notaries practice “at all times under the name and authority of Judges” and 
they “must not practice outside of the territory of their Judges and if they do so, they 
                                                          
77 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 77. Le Caron also gives a lengthy description of privilege in his Le Grand 
Coutumier de France, 245. ‘’La Bourgeoisie est un droict seigneurial…Lequel appartient au Roy, ou 
au Seigneur qui en a le privilege et droict du Roy, et a tel effect que le Bourgeois du Roy encores qu’il 
soit demeurant en la terre de quelque Seigneur, n’est toutesfois justiciable d’autre que du Roy, et son 
Seigneur ne le peut vindicquer.’’ 
78 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 63. 
79 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 62-63. 
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may be punished.”80 Taking this train of thought a stop further, Loyseau elaborates 
on the question of the validity of contracts passed out of jurisdiction and answers it 
tentatively, “certainly with regard to the Notaries of Lords who passed contracts under 
the primitive Justice of the King or from another Lord who did not appear before 
them, there is a great appearance that these contracts are null in the face of rigor just 
as those of a foreign Notary like that of the Emperor, the Duke of Lorraine or of 
Savoy had they been passed in France.”81 The greater doubt still, according to 
Loyseau, hangs over the royal notaries who practice outside of their zone and parish, 
which by the letter of the law of Francis I and Henry II, these contracts are null and 
the notaries are responsible fourfold for all expenses, damages and interest of the 
parties. Loyseau suggests that enforcement of such would be too “rigorous” 
especially in the most important contracts—marriage, constitution of rente, and even 
a will—not because of the damages to the parties but because “Gentlemen, 
Merchants, and Foreigners, who know nothing of the separation of Justices, put their 
trust in the Notary, who, more often than not, does not have the means to dissuade 
them.”82 Loyseau concludes: “Would this not be to lay the foundation of Justice, 
                                                          
80 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 40. ‘’Voila pour la jurisdiction contentieuse; quant à la 
volontaire dont les Notaires ont le plus frequent exercice, sous le nom toutesfois et authorité des 
Juges, qui sont toûjours intitulez és greffes des Contracts, c’est chose bien certaine, qu’ils ne doivent 
pas instrumenter hors le territoire de leurs Juges, et s’ils le font, ils peuvent être punis.’’ 
81 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 40. ‘’mais la question est, si les Contracts qu’ils ont 
passez hors leurs territoire, sont nuls. Et certainement à l’egard des Notaires des Seigneurs, qui ont 
passé des Contracts en la Justice primitive du Roy, ou d’une autre Seigneur, qui ne ressortit devant 
eux, il y a grande apparence que ces Contracts soient nuls à la rigueur, tout ainsi que ceux qu’un 
Notaire étranger comme de l’Empereur, du Duché de Lorraine, ou de Savoye, auroit passé en 
France.’’ 
82 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 41. ‘’Mais le plus grand doute est és Notaires Royaux, 
qui ont instrumenté hors la branche et Paroisse dont ils son établis, attendu les Ordonnances du Roy 
François I et Henry II….Neantmoins cela seroit bien rigoureux, qu’un contract d’importance comme de 
mariage, de constitution de rente, ou même un Testament, fust declaré nul, sous pretext que des 
Gentils hommes, des Marchands, des Etrangers, qui ne savent pas la separation des Justices, s’en 
sont fiez au Notaire, qui le plus souvent n’a pas moyen de les deinteresser.’’ 
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which relies on the faith of contracts, on too fine a point, a formality and subtlety of 
chicanery, rather than on equity and all apparent good faith?”83 A notable practical 
counter-example, from the eighteenth century, is described in Jean-Claude Perrot’s 
study of the way people from Normandy went to Paris to have their marriage 
contracts drawn up to avoid the limitations of the Coutume de Normandie, which, in 
theory, would create potential jurisdictional issues.84 I have not, unfortunately, had 
the opportunity to investigate whether this practice existed in the sixteenth century, 
but it is interesting given the monarchy’s increasing emphasis from the late fifteenth 
century onward on regulating notarial practice and requiring contracts to be 
formalized before notaries to be considered legally binding.  
Loyseau’s discussion of notaries and contracts is important because it 
validates the foundational importance of contracts in civil law. It also illuminates the 
underlying risk not only for the parties entering into the contract but also for the 
notary drawing it up. The ambiguity and contestation of jurisdictions amplifies this 
risk, and the stakes of sorting out the jurisdictions touches not only the judges 
collecting fees and the wealthier litigants who drag out their disputes but also the 
lower rungs of the judicial hierarchy, anyone entering into a contract, and the very 
bedrock of the system. The importance of notarial practice and contracts underscores 
the necessity of drawing up good contracts, as we will see in later chapters. Also 
                                                          
83 Loyseau, Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 41. ‘’Seroit-ce pas establir le fondement de la Justice 
qui gist en la foy des Contracts, sur une pointille, une formalité et subtilité de chicanerie, plûtost que 
sur l’équité et bonne foy toute apparente?’’ 
84 Jean-Claude Perrot, “Note sur les contrats de mariage normands,” in Structures et relations sociales 
à Paris au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, ed. Adeline Daumard and François Furet (Paris, France: Libraire 
Armand Colin, 1961): 95-97. 
70 
 
significant is the close conceptual link in practice between scribes and notaries who 
record sentences and contracts.85   
Among the other commentators, on the subject of notaries and contracts, 
Terrien echoes, but does not problematize at length, the jurisdiction of notarial 
practice, delving more into the finer points of different types of property, the rules 
governing transfer of them, and who can enter into contracts, including conditions for 
women and children.86 Bouteiller and Le Caron also lay out different types of property 
and rules governing it, but their interest in notaries specifically focuses on the right to 
institute a notary, the control of the royal seal, and the collection of revenue 
associated with notarial practice, with a pinch of “good morals” to finish it off.87   
 
Commentary on Legal Actions, Procedures and Practitioners 
 
Related to jurisdiction, but more expansive than contracts, are the 
explanations of legal actions and procedures, from how to initiate a dispute to how 
the resolution is to be enforced. On the subject of seizure of goods and various 
clameurs, Terrien, whose scope is most specific, has far more to say than the other 
authors, suggesting variant practices in different regions of France. For example, 
Terrien cites the privilege of the bourgeois of Rouen of being able to seize the 
moveable goods of outsiders who are their debtors who are found in the city until 
                                                          
85 Loyseau devotes an entire chapter to scribes and notaries. Les cinq livres du droit des Offices; 114-
20. 
86 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, books 2, 3, 5 and 7. 
87 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 701-3. Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, book 2. 
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they have paid their debt.88 Terrien’s focus on Normandy allows for greater detail. It 
also suggests more interest in these practices in Normandy, especially the clameur. 
Although clameurs of various sorts, such as the haro, were not a practice unique to 
Normandy, Normandy did have a reputation for favoring them. 89 
Taking one example in particular of this association, François Ragueau’s 
Indice des droit royaux et seigneuriaux (part dictionary and part index), published in 
1620, indicates, echoing and citing Terrien, that the clameur de haro is a Norman 
practice (or at least especially in use in Normandy) and is “le cry de force qu’on leve 
sur aucun.”90 Ragueau continues to explain that the haro “must only be cried in 
response to criminal acts—that of fire, theft, homicide, or evident peril—against the 
offender so that everyone responds to it and takes and hands over the offender to 
Justice.”91 The haro, then, in this context, is an indicator of imminent peril of concern 
for those in the immediate vicinity and is a call to witness and to action and 
intervention for an immediate halt to the offense. “However,” Ragueau adds, “by the 
style of proceeding in the Justice system of the country of Normandy, the haro is also 
practiced to the end of hereditary possession, and he who finds himself dispossessed 
and his property usurped, can call upon the aid of the Prince, if there is no competent 
                                                          
88 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, book 3, ch 5, p. 61. 
89 Miriam Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry in two fourteenth-century villages” Journal of 
Medieval History 31 (2005): 29-53; and Glasson, Étude historique sur la clameur de haro. 
90 François Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux : Des plus notables dictions, terms et 
phrases de l’Estat, de la Justice, des Finances, et Practique de France, Recueilli des Loix, 
Coustumes, Ordonnances, Arrests, Annales, Histoires du Royaume de France et ailleurs (Lyon: 
Simon Rigaud, 1620); 375. Ragueau also includes an anecdote from the 100 Years War, claiming 
that, “the inhabitants of Rouen, being sieged by the King of England in 1418, cried out the great Haro 
by their deputy to the King of France to call for help” (376). This anecdote is, if unlikely, an amusing 
caricature and highlights popular assumptions at the very least. 
91 Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux, 375. ‘’Le Haro ne doit estre crié que pour 
cause criminelle, comme pour feu, larcin, homicide, ou evident peril contre celuy qui mesfait, afin que 
chacun sorte au cry pour le prendre et rendre à Justice.’’ 
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Judge or Sergent on site at that time. And upon this clameur being cried, the 
offending party must cease and desist his enterprise.”92 The placement of ancestral 
property and the proper transfer of it on the same level as criminal acts like arson and 
homicide underscores the peculiar strictness of hereditary property rights and is 
highly significant for understanding Norman legal culture and the disputes to come. 
On the clameur de gage plege Ragueau, again singling out this clameur as a 
Norman practice, indicates that it is “both a proprietary and a possessory action in 
one, taken when anyone doubts that the endeavors taken by another to seize 
possession or the right pertaining to him.”93 Similar in certain respects to the haro, 
the clameur de gage plege concerns property seizure and possession, but it is not 
specific to hereditary lands (patrimony) and lacks the undertones of imminent danger, 
though it is easy to imagine the initial response scene being comparable. For the final 
clameur under examination in the chapters to come, Ragueau, in familiar fashion, 
specifies that the clameur de marché de bourse is a Norman practice, “when by 
action, one takes back or reclaims patrimony that had been sold, by right of lineage 
or seigneurie.”94 The subtle differences between the clameurs and their use as 
outlined by Ragueau and others, and their survival to this day in the Channel Islands, 
where Norman custom persists, suggest a special, but not exclusive, prominence of 
                                                          
92 Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux, 375. “Toutesfois par le stil de proceder en la 
Justice du pays de Normandie, le Haro se practique aussi à fin heredital possessoire, et celuy que l’on 
veut dessaisit et deposseder, peut appller l’ayde du Prince, s’il n’y a Juge competent ne Sergent sur le 
lieu et heure. Et à ceste clameur la partie doit cesser de son entreprise à peine d’attentat.” 
93 Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux, 343-44. “Clameur de gage plege au stil du 
pays de Normandie. C’est une action proprietaire et possessoire ensemble, quand aucun se doute 
qu’autre face entreprinse sur saisine possessoire ou droicture à luy appartenant.” 
94 Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux, 125. “Clameur de bourse, ou de marché de 
bourse: au styl du pays de Normandie, quand par action l’on veut retirer l’heritage vendu soit par droict 
de linage ou de Seigneurie.” 
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clameurs in Norman legal culture.95 Their significance as evidence for the survival of 
orality in the legal system, despite a precocious written code, along with patterns of 
usage as documented in the notarial and court records will be examined at length 
alongside scholarship on the subject in chapter three. 
For sixteenth-century practice specifically, Terrien notes that the clameur de 
haro is preferred in Normandy over other procedures and that it is meant to be a 
means of resistance for the “weaker, simple people” to recover and hold on to their 
possessions and defend them against the “violence of stronger people”—once 
“cried,” the aggressing party must cease his activity until justice decides possession. 
Terrien adds that the haro is not valid against a sergent or other official.96 Unlike the 
clameur de haro, other clameurs had to be reiterated to a sergent or judge to remain 
in effect, and the party or parties pursuing the clameur did not have to appear at 
every court session but had to appear at least once a year for the clameur to remain 
in effect; once a year and a day passed, the clameur lapsed.97 These provisions 
underscore the importance of sergents, and their range of duties, and also the 
patterns of appearances observed in the court records, all of which will be discussed 
                                                          
95 Andrew Bridgeford has written an interesting article on popular beliefs about the clameur de haro, 
still in force in the Channel Islands. “’Harrow!’ Quod He,” Jersey and Guernsey Law Review (Feb. 
2008), < http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/feb08/JLR0802_Bridgeford.aspx> 
Accessed September 17, 2012. For an even more recent example of the use of the haro, see Ephrat 
Livni, “Clamoring for Justice: How a Guernsey woman brought a construction project to a grinding halt 
with an ancient plea,” Quartz (August 17, 2018), < https://qz.com/1361353/guernsey-woman-uses-
clameur-de-haro-to-halt-a-construction-project/> Accessed April 20, 2019. 
96 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 265, 272-73. ‘’Lequel Haro ainsi crié, la partie doit cesser de 
son entreprise….remede aux simples gens impuissans de resister, pour recouvrer leur possession à 
eux tollue par la force des puissans hommes. Depuis la clameur de Haro a esté pratiquee et receuë 
en usage pour garder sa possession, et la defendre contre la violence des plus forts….Mais Haro ne 
peut estre crié, ne (comme on dit en France) complainte formee contre un Sergent, ou autre Officier 
publique, pour quelque exploit par luy fait par authorité de Justice: sinon qu’il fist prejudice à la 
jurisdiction d’autruy, ou que par ledit exploit il vousist s’attibuer la jurisdiction appartenant à autruy.’’ 
97 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 321-22. 
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at length in chapters to come. Clameurs were an important means of disputing and 
revoking a contract, most commonly used to reclaim alienated property.98 
On the matter of disputing before a court and associated proceedings, the 
authors go into much more detail than on actions taken out of court. All explain the 
manner in which a person must be summoned to court in the case of a dispute, once 
an appearance date is assigned. Not following the procedure may incur a delay at 
best or excuse a default at worst. An appearance, however, is only the beginning, 
and the defendant and the plaintiff are entitled to several forms of postponement 
(“delays”) for preparation.99 Le Caron elaborates that the defendant can only use this 
at the beginning of the court proceedings but that the plaintiff can use it whenever a 
new point of defense is presented.100 Bouteiller suggests, but dismisses, concerns of 
stalling and obstruction related to these delays.101 Le Caron notes that some of these 
delays indicated by Bouteiller were abolished by the ordinances of 1539 (Le Caron is, 
I believe, optimistic here--as noted above and discussed at length in chapter 4, the 
monarchy passed repeated ordinances to try to speed up proceedings, but change 
was slower in practice than Le Caron is letting on, though they may have been more 
noticeable in practice by the time he was writing).102 Bouteiller also enumerates a list 
of exceptions that can be employed by defendants to delay court action, including 
                                                          
98 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 321-38. 
99 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 38-39; Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 299-302. 
100 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 301. 
101 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 38-39. 
102 As will also be discussed in chapter 4, it is clear that the monarchy was passing laws to regulate 
the speed of proceedings, but it is unclear how rigorously these were enforced (their repetition 
suggests enforcement was ineffective or lacking). It is also unclear who was instigating these changes 
and who might benefit. Judges, backed more or less by royal authority, seemed content to encourage 
disputants to work things out on their own, and disputants were not necessarily in a hurry to reach a 
formal resolution either. “Efficiency” and “speedy” by a modern understanding of justice did not seem 
to be a primary concern or concept of justice in the period under examination. 
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questioning jurisdiction. Le Caron summarizes these exceptions as those “concerning 
the competence or incompetence of a Judge and the place where the case must be 
heard,” those that defer an action (such as not having heard the claim or not being 
able to be present for the designated appearance), and those that head off or 
overturn an action (such as proposing a settlement or claiming that the claim is 
inept).103   
It is in these finer points of procedure that the character of Bouteiller’s and Le 
Caron’s works as reference guides for practitioners (likely procureurs) become 
clearer, especially since they switch to the second person (“tu”) at times. Terrien’s 
work differs from Bouteiller and Le Caron in that it is primarily giving directions to 
officials.104 Terrien does indicate that, in most cases, parties have the right to a delay 
to the next session held—the most notable exception being the case of a clameur de 
marché de bourse.105 Loyseau, similar to Terrien, is concerned primarily with the 
actions of officials, and his treatise on the abuses of seigneurial justice condemns the 
confusion of jurisdictions and sources of law that enable abuses and obstruction on 
the part of litigants.106 
Not appearing in court may constitute a default, but the commentaries provide 
quite a few points and technicalities that would excuse a default. According to 
Bouteiller, the default of a defendant does not bring an end to the case or an 
                                                          
103 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 76; 73-85, 295-304. ‘’concernans la competence ou incompetance du 
Juge et du lieu où la cause se doit traicter.’’ 
104 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 340-49. 
105 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 371-72. 
106 Charles Loyseau, Des Abus des Justices de Village in Les Œuvres, contenant les cinq livres du 
droit des Offices, les Traitez des Seigneuries, des Ordres et simples Dignitez, du Déguerpissement et 
Délaissement par Hyptheque, de la Garantie des Rentes, et des Abus des Justices de Village, 
Derniere edition plus exacte que les precedentes (Lyon: La Compagnie des Libraires, 1701). 
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immediate ruling in the plaintiff’s favor, but each default does constrict the 
defendant’s options until the final default brings a ruling in the plaintiff’s favor; 
however the default of a plaintiff is ruled immediately.107 In most cases of appeal, 
default of one or other party ends the appeal immediately.108 Le Caron notes in his 
edition of Bouteiller’s text and in his proper work that the ordinances of 1539 reduced 
the number of defaults permitted (again, a signal of changes in legal culture to come 
but not as immediate as the passing of a set of laws).109 Terrien adds that the letter of 
Norman customary law categorizes a default as a delay, but “according to the 
common manner of speaking, we do not number defaults among delays.”110 Terrien 
also notes that denying that one received a summons, had it been delivered by the 
Sergent in the absence of witnesses, would excuse a default.111 All of this adds up to 
a lack of immediate repercussions for those who did not appear in court at the turn of 
the sixteenth century. 
Again, the authors are mostly interested in court actions, so the commentaries 
do not delve into settlements too much. Bouteiller and Le Caron both acknowledge it 
as a means to expedite an end to court proceedings, but they add undertones of fear 
of proceedings and define it as a pact and a “doubtful and uncertain thing.”112 Terrien 
does not discuss settlements at all, and his brief discussion of arbitration includes an 
ordinance from 1561 which praises settlement and arbitration as alternatives to in-
                                                          
107 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 25-26, 36-37; Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 314-15. 
108 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 26. 
109 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 31; Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 349-56. 
110 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 355. ‘’Toutesfois selon la commune manière de parler nous ne 
mettons les defauts au nombre des delais, et appellons delais seulement ceux qui son demandez et 
ottroyez par Justice.’’ 
111 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 355. 
112 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 305. ‘’Transaction est de chose douteuse et incertaine, ou de chose non 
finie ou accomplie faire par paction et accord certain.’’ 
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court obstructions and which gives the final decision in an arbitrage the same force 
as a court sentence, making the appeal of such more difficult (and thereby undoing 
an ordinance from Louis XII which had made the appeal a more ready option 
resulting in the drawing out of proceedings rather than abbreviating them, contrary to 
its intent).113 This is suggestive of a larger shift in legal culture; however, it is unclear 
who was driving this change and how deep it went. If it does constitute one element 
of the larger arc of change, it may also, in part, explain underlying causes for the 
decline of litigation later in the seventeenth century.114 Arbitration, according to 
Terrien, was intended to pacify the parties and bring them to an agreement. Le Caron 
generally acknowledges the intent of arbitration shared by Terrien, but he adds that 
“it is not enough to compromise in general in all things.”115 Bouteiller separates 
arbitration from settlement completely and defines it as “a will or power given” to one 
elected through the consent of both parties to make a determination on the 
disagreement between both parties in accordance with the law.116 Whereas the 
“arbiter” is bound strictly by the law, abritrateurs, amiables compositeurs, and 
appaisseurs serve a similar function in bringing parties to agreement but without the 
                                                          
113 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 421-22. 
114 For a recent discussion of the problem of the decline of litigation after the sixteenth century, see 
Breen, “Law, Society, and the State.” 
115 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 490. ‘’Nota, qu’il ne suffit pas de compromettre en 
general de toutes choses, de tout le temps passé, si par special n’est nommé et exprimé par paroles 
ou par escript de quelles choses.’’ 
116 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 693-94. ‘’Arbitres sont dicts selon l’opinion d’aucuns arbotires, et selon 
aucuns artbitrateurs, et selon aucuns amiables appaiseurs, et selon Jean André son dicts ceux qui du 
consentement des deux parties sont esleus, et sur peine obligée et stipulée à tenir ce que faire 
voudront du discord d’entre eux. Ou autrement arbitrage est une volonté ou puissance donnée à 
aucun qui entreprendre le veut à determiner et prononcer sur le debat des parties, ce que raison en 




same constraints.117 Although similar in function, the main difference between judges 
and arbiters, according to Bouteiller, is judges hold public power whereas arbiters are 
judges by will of the parties.118 Le Caron notes that the difference between arbiters, 
arbitrateurs, and appaiseurs was set into the law in 1510 by Louis XII.119 The 
apparent disconnect between the monarchy’s promotion of settlement and arbitration 
and the more hesitant or outright negative opinion of jurists serves as a reminder of 
the priorities of the authors which does not necessarily reflect practice. 
Very much associated with practice and court actions, but almost as much 
reviled, are procureurs. Bouteiller defines a procureur as a person acting as a legal 
representative of another, and procureurs can appear in court on behalf of a party in 
that party’s absence “if it is a case that can be served by a procureur.”120 By the time 
Le Caron publishes his edition of Bouteiller’s work, he insists that “in civil cases each 
party can and must plead by Procureur.”121 The authors all distinguish different types 
of procureurs: the procureurs aux causes; the procureur aux negoces (one who by 
procuration sees to the needs of another, in special cases); and the procureur à litige 
                                                          
117 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 693.94. ‘’Si doit sçavoir que difference y entre arbitre et arbitrateur, et 
entre amiables compositeurs et appaiseurs. Arbitre ne peut et ne doit en la cause à luy submise 
proceder, ou autrement que par ordre de droict gardé selon qu’il est allagué ou prouvé devant luy; car 
nul traicte ny peut ne doit faire non plus que feroit le Juge, ne plus ne doit avoir de faveur à une partie 
qu’à l’autre, mais tout laisser aller selon la reigle de droict….Arbitrateur si est celuy qui de la cause est 
chargé à sa conscience, ordre de droict gardé, ou non gardé, et peut les parties appoincter selon que 
bon luy semble. Amiable compositeur ou appaisseur, si est celuy qui du consentement des parties les 
met en accord.’’ 
118 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 700. 
119 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 700-701. 
120 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 33-36. Representation was not allowed in criminal cases, for example. 
See, John H. Langbein, “The Criminal Trial before the Lawyers” The University of Chicago Law 
Review 45:2 (Winter, 1978): 263-316; and John H. Langbein, Prosecuting Crime in the Renaissance 
(Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 1974). ‘’Presentation est soy comparoir en 
personne, ou par procureur en la Cour, ou aucun qui est adjourné, au jour assigné à heur deuë, le 
Juge seant en tribunal, et Cour avestie d’hommes et de Juge, si c’est en Cour jugeant par conjure du 
Seigneur.’’  ‘’si c’est en cas qui puisse servir par procureur. ‘’Et en cas de crime n’a procuration lieu.’’ 
121 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 38.’’Les styl de cet article est du tout hors d’usage; car en causes Civiles 
chacun peut et doit plaider par Procureur.’’ 
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(one who files claims and defends in all causes and common disputes and to whom 
general procuration suffices).122 The procureur d’office can receive and listen to the 
pleas of opposing parties in civil cases and can then report his conclusions to the 
judge.123 Norman custom, according to Terrien, also has the category of attourné, 
who serve specifically on one case or set of cases. The procureurs by contrast are 
contracted before a notary to serve on all actions and disputes on behalf of another 
whether that be as plaintiff in one case or defendant in another. Furthermore, 
whereas the attourné is contracted privately and serves in a specific and temporary 
capacity, the procureur’s status is public like that of an avocat and is more 
permanent.124 Le Caron echoes this point and notes that procurations (the act 
whereby a man is formally designated as procureur for another person) must be 
passed before a notary or public person to be official; private papers of the sort have 
no regard.125 This requirement brings notaries closer to civil disputes than they are 
explicitly given credit in these texts. 
 Most types of procureurs were not held in high regard. According to Terrien, 
“The office of those whom the civil law calls Procureurs, who are not like the 
Procureurs sworn in to take charge of a case, but are receivers only, or 
administrators of goods of a house, not being established and ordered by Justice,” is 
“vile.”126 Terrien notes the distinction between different types of Procureurs and 
                                                          
122 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 44.  
123 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 50.  
124 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 353. 
125 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 52. 
126 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 353. ‘’L’office desquels [tout le Procureurs reputez comme 
Advocats] n’est pas vil, comme est l’office de ceux que le droict civil appelle Procureurs, qui ne sont 
pas comme les Procureurs jurez pour prendre la charge des causes, mais sont receveurs seulement, 
ou a administrateurs des biens d’une maison, n’estans establis et ordonnez pas Justice.’’ 
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although the Procureurs of the Sovereign Courts, appointed to an office, are 
illustrious persons, “procuration is a vile and infamous thing” and “the opinion of all of 
the Doctors [of law]” on the other sorts is that “notwithstanding this so-called oath and 
charge of common Procureur,” “the noble person who takes on the charge of 
Procureurs aux causes loses his nobility.”127 Terrien includes a ruling from the 
Parlement (1520) which requires the bailli of Rouen to enquire as to the morals, 
legality, diligence, and ability of all practitioners (procureurs) who present 
themselves. This ruling along with the note from Terrien cross-referencing another 
ruling on the reduction of the number of Procureurs suggest legal business was 
booming and attracting questionable people. Terrien’s collection and comments all 
suggest that procureurs were classified as practitioners or men of practice alongside, 
but not of the same character, as the men of law (judges and avocats). The general 
disdain of procureurs is in keeping with the general disdain of civil procedure (with 
which the non-official procureurs are exclusively concerned) seen in Ayrault’s 
treatise. This hostility also suggests a division between the erudite jurists who placed 
greater value in jurisprudence (theory) and rhetoric (pleas) and who campaigned 
more or less subtly for professionalization among legal practitioners (a process of 
exclusion of elements they deemed less favorable) and a large number of people, 
with varying specializations not necessarily deriving from formal education, who took 
advantage of opportunities presented by fluidity and ambiguity in the system and 
used the system as it was, for better or worse (practice). 
                                                          
127 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 353. ‘’Tellement que nonobstant ce pretendu serment et 
charge de Procureur commun, l’opinion de tous les Docteurs est en cela toute une : que la personne 




Setting forth who procureurs are, the authors then elaborate on their activities 
and set them in (hierarchical) relation to other legal professionals. Le Caron spells 
out the duties and responsibilities of the procureur and lists being loyal and diligent 
(support good causes, uphold the honor of the Court and the Judges, and show 
reverence to Judges and Avocats), determining when and where the court 
appearance is and whether his master [client] will be present, reviewing the 
documents and reports from the case, and determining whether there is a point of 
interruption or other advantage.128 In other words, the procureur is charged with 
organizing the case, reviewing the finer points of the case and arguments made, and 
with determining opportunities of procedure. However, he must consult and take 
direction from his avocat who is to formulate the actual texts and pleas.129 The 
procureur is to serve as the intermediary between the master (party to a suit) and the 
avocat.  
Once the court proceedings examined above reached their end, proceedings 
could extend by appeal. Bouteiller indicates that there are several types of appeals. 
One type is against a judge, who would be called before the appellate court along 
with the disputing parties. Another form of appeal is against the sentence given by a 
judge.130 The appellant does have the option of renouncing the appeal but would 
have to pay a fine.131 If the appellant defaults twice, the judgment will be carried 
                                                          
128 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 289-90. 
129 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 291-92. 
130 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 773-74. Terrien adds that this appeal must be made at the very next court 
session, if at all. Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 681-82. 
131 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 776-77. 
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out.132 No appeal can be made before a sentence is given.133 Le Caron also draws a 
distinction between renouncing an appeal and acquiescing to the sentence.134  
There are strict rules governing the timing of an appeal, the sharing of case 
materials, the investigation by commissaires, and the assigning of blame depending 
on the findings. These rules suggest a concern about abuses, and this concern is 
echoed in the laws compiled by Terrien.135 Le Caron confirms the timing and breaks 
down appeals into two types: judicial and extrajudicial. An extrajudicial appeal would 
oppose an action taken out of court in relation to letters, and a judicial appeal would 
oppose a sentence, act, or appointment by a judge. Furthermore, the appeal must be 
made modestly and in such a manner as to not insult the judge.136 Le Caron’s work 
indicates a concern for not diminishing the authority of judges of the lower courts in 
the appeals process.137 In addition to appealing a sentence, a party may have the 
option of trying to have a sentence annulled, and one of the grounds for this is in a 
case where the sentence is passed by virtue of four defaults.138 Terrien indicates that 
for Normandy specifically, there are four cases in which a sentence may be annulled: 
“by proof that the sentence was pronounced by an incompetent judge either because 
it is outside of his territory and jurisdiction or because he has no corrective power 
over the person; the sentence is given during a delay; if the sentence is given against 
an undefended minor or against someone who is absent, who was not properly 
                                                          
132 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 472. 
133 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 777. 
134 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 778-79. 
135 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 775-776 ; Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 681-93. 
136 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 778. 
137 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 467. 
138 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 469-70. 
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summoned; and if the sentence was pronounced on a notoriously false case.”139 One 
of the most notable grounds for appeal may be the negligence of a procureur.140 
Another is “when one hopes for another definitive ruling; or when the grief inferred by 
the lower court Judge is irreparable definitively; or when appeal of the ruling is not 
sufficiently provided to the party; or when after the definitive sentence is given, there 
is some question about conditions of the execution of it.”141  
Appeals notwithstanding, the commentaries make enforcement (“execution”) 
of rulings sound fairly simple, but the more they talk about swift and decisive 
enforcement, the more it seems like they are advocating for it and the less convincing 
it is. Behind the prescriptive measures are hints of ineffectiveness and those who 
would capitalize on it. When meting out justice, Bouteiller notes that the judge “must 
not enable the party to say or ask for anything frivolous nor to propose something 
impertinent to the cause, nor by delay or impertinent refuge to lengthen the process 
of legal decision and must not suffer matters and actions already definitively 
adjudged to be revived.”142 Moreover, if a judge does not pronounce on each article 
                                                          
139 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 683. ‘’Et outre desdites sentences diffinitives par le Style de 
ladite Cour n’y a autre pourvoy que la voye d’appellation. Car voyes de nullité son abroguees et n’a 
lieu en ce païs de Normandie ; fors en quatre cas. Le premier, si le condamné monstre et fait 
deuëment apparoir que la sentence qu’il veut impugner de nullité, est donnee par Juge incompetent, 
soit à cause de la chose qui n’est situee en son territoire et jurisdiction, ou à cause de la personne sur 
laquelle il n’a pouvoir ne correction ; en ce cas, s’il n’a prorogué la jurisdiction du Juge, il ne peut 
alleguer nullité. Le second, si la sentence est donnee durant le delay, pendant lequel doit conquiescer 
tous office de Juge. Le tiers, si la sentence est donnee contre un mineur indefendu, ou contre un 
absent non deuëment adjourné. Le quart, si en la sentence en la partie dispositive notoirement y a 
fausse cause exprimee. Esquels cas audit païs de Normandie est loisible ou permis d’arguer sentence 
diffinitive de nullité.’’ 
140 Le Caron, Le Grand Coutumier de France, 471. 
141 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 682. ‘’Le tiers quand on n’espere autre diffinitive; ou que le 
grief qui est inferé par le Juge inferieur est irreparable en diffinitive; ou que par l’appellation interjettee 
de la diffinitive n’est suffisamment pourveu à la partie; ou qu’apres la sentence diffinitive se donne 
quelque interlocutoire sur les dependances de l’execution.’’ 
142 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 763. ‘’et ne doit souffrir à partie dire ne demander quelque chose frivolle, 
ne proposer chose impertinent pour alongner la cause de decision du droict, et ne doit souffrir de 
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of the complaint in a dispute, the court proceeding could be considered defective.143 
In a similar vein, Terrien includes an ordinance from Charles VIII requiring rulings and 
sentences to be certain and clear “because we have heard that several Judges in our 
land of Normandy, as much ours as others, give judgments and sentences so 
obscure and doubtful that one has difficulty understanding them; and they judge by 
experience without regard for the allegations or evidence provided by the parties; by 
which, on the interpretation and execution of these sentences and judgments, the 
parties are embroiled in as great a case as before, and in great fees and expenses, 
and the parties are often greatly damaged by them.”144 Part of the sentence implies 
imposing the cost of the winner onto the loser. In describing the difference between 
expenses, damages, and interest, Bouteiller hints at the cost of litigation by listing 
different sources of fees: “procureur, avocat, sergent, witnesses, letters, 
documentation, commissaires, and the like.”145  
Once a sentence is pronounced, it is carried out by sergents.146 Following this, 
Bouteiller adds, “The execution of the sentence given must be made according to 
proper form until the complete accomplishment of the sentence, and the executor 
must not exceed the sentence and commission lest there be a point of opposition or 
                                                          
relever action de chose autres-fois passée en force de chose adjugée, ne dont autrefois action ait esté 
faicte, et demande ouverte luy present, supposé que par default ait le demandeur obtenu sa querelle.’’ 
143 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 763. 
144 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 406. ‘’Pource que nous avons entendu que plusieurs Juges de 
nostre pays de Normandie, tant nostres qu’autres donnent et font leurs jugemens et sentences si 
obsccurs et douteux qu’à peine les peut-on entendre; et jugent par experience, sans avoir regard aux 
choses alleguees, et prouvees par les parties; parquoy sur l’interpretation et execution d’icelles 
sentences et jugemens, les parties sont constituees en aussi grand procez comme paravant, et en 
grans frais et despens, et en sont les parties souventesfois mout endommagees.’’ 
145 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 768. ‘’Despens sont les frais de Procureur, d’Advocat, de sergent, de 
tesmoins, de lettres, escritures, Commissaires, et autres semblables.’’ 
146 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 696 [718]. 
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other delay.”147 Terrien echoes this sentiment, “The execution of the rulings of the 
Court cannot and must not be delayed by opposition or appeal under the shadow of a 
suggestion of error.”148 A complaint about the enforcement must be registered within 
one month, and anyone who would prevent execution of a sentence is subject to a 
fine.149   
Aside from these technical points, the authors do not elaborate much on the 
process of enforcement; the difficulty of enforcement is apparent in the 
pronouncements against opposition, resistance and delay. Terrien’s inclusion of a 
ruling from the Échiquier of Rouen in 1501 indicates that this difficulty was especially 
important during the period under consideration in this dissertation.150 An excerpt 
from an ordinance passed by Charles IX in 1561 suggests the cyclical nature of 
disputes and the challenges to definitive resolution. Praising settlements as the best 
way to abridge court proceedings, it is conceded that “the spirits of men are so full of 
contentions that what they have just come to approve and agree upon, soon after 
they disapprove and disagree upon, contravening the settlements and compromises 
by them made and agreed upon.”151 Such predispositions and behaviors may 
                                                          
147 Bouteiller, Somme Rural, 767. ‘’L’execution de la sentence donnée doit estre faite par forme 
executoire jusques au plain accomplissement de la sentence, et n’y chet point d’opposition ne autre 
delay que l’executeur se doive pour ce arrester de faire son execution, ne l’executeur ne doit exceder 
la sentence et commission.’’ 
148 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 695 [717]. ‘’L’Execution des arrests de la Cour ne peut, ny doit 
estre retardee par opposition, ou appellation, ne sous ombre de proposition d’erreur.’’ 
149 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 695 [717] ; 425. 
150 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 695 [717]. 
151 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil, 421-22. ‘’Comme le vray moyen d’abbreger les procez soit de 
venir au devant, et empescher qu’ils ne soent amenez par devant les Juges, ains decidez hors 
jugement, par accord et transaction d’entre les parties mesmes, ou par arbitres, arbitrateurs et 
amiables compositeurs qui sont eleus du consentement desdites parties; toutesfois les esprits des 
hommes sont si pleins de contentions, que ce qu’ils ont peu avant accordé et approuvé, tost apres ils 
reprouvent et discordent, contrevenans aux transactions et compromis par eux faits et accordez.’’ 
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These commentaries provide a rich perspective on the priorities and primary 
concerns of elite jurists, as well as a view on practice from above. In theory, 
jurisdiction, represented by various courts, was foundational to practice within the 
system; however, it is clear not only in the chapters to come, but even in the 
commentaries themselves, that the idea of jurisdiction, with clear-cut boundaries and 
hierarchy, was more of an ideal--an elite aspiration--than reality. And further, the 
“problem” of jurisdiction, and who had the right to hear a case, troubled elite minds 
much more than people who turned to the legal system to settle their affairs and who 
actually took advantage of ambiguities, despite claims that the system was too 
confusing or inefficient.  
This “problem”—ultimately, of who is in control of the system and who is 
driving it and how well it meets the needs of those who have a vested interest in it—
serves the drive toward professionalism and underlies subsequent discussions of 
procedures and practice, such as contracts; actions taken in and out of court, from a 
seizure of goods or a clameur to appearances, delays, and even defaults; 
settlements and arbitration; officials such as notaries, sergents, and procureurs; 
rulings on cases and appeals thereof; and enforcement. Highlighting the divergence 
of theory and practice reveals the different priorities of individuals and groups which 
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shaped changes in later periods. Each of the chapters in turn will challenge the 
different subjects drawn out of these commentaries with observations of practice from 
below to provide a more comprehensive understanding of people’s interactions with 
the legal system.  Now that we have laid some groundwork for how the legal system 
worked in theory, we can turn to an examination of how people used the resources 




An Ounce of Contract Is Worth a Pound of Litigation 
 
 
Turning our attention from theories and perspectives on how the legal system 
worked from above to a lengthy examination on how it worked in practice, we must 
pause on our route to civil disputes to lay some important groundwork for 
understanding the nuances of cases to come. This chapter will provide foundational 
material for understanding the notarial records that will play a pivotal role in my 
argument for decentralizing the court from discussion of civil disputes and will 
position notaries and their work in relation to the spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and 
resolution under examination in this dissertation. It will answer important questions 
about common types of contracts, about the notarial profession, and the clients they 
served, such as what role contracts are playing in negotiations and mitigating 
disputes and how notaries, and those stand-ins fulfilling similar functions, facilitated 
these strategies; what the critical elements of a contract were, how they could vary 
and what these variations might reveal about social relations and even anticipated 
problems; and what groups of people were drawing up contracts, with particular 
attention to women and their activities, which were notably at odds with the letter of 
Norman customary law. It will also show some of the opportunities present in the flow 
of wealth and property as well as in the legal system. Progressing closer to the 
interjection of disputes, this chapter highlights the importance of a good contract to 
contractees, and to a certain degree, notaries, whose services were not strictly 
required in this period, and underscores some of the strategies behind drawing up 
contracts. Finally, it will show an alternative to the formal processes of litigation that 
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we will examine in chapters to come in order to illuminate more of the threads 
connecting contracts to disputes and of the options that people had. 
The literature on notaries and their roles in society is expansive (and 
expanding) for France as elsewhere in Europe. Since notarial practices varied by 
region and time period, many of these studies focus on a specific legal culture. 
Because of the volume of surviving contracts and the wealth of information they 
contain about social and economic relations, many studies also focus on a particular 
type of contract. That said, notarial contracts also present significant methodological 
challenges for historians because of how formulaic and heavily regulated they were, 
especially in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Denise Angers, Jean-Yves 
Sarazin, and Claire Dolan especially have made important contributions to the 
discussion of these problems, and Dolan in particular has shown through her study of 
notaries’ notes that the contracts were much more formulaic than had been assumed 
and cautioned against reading too much into views and values expressed in the 
contracts.1 Along these lines but taking a more open-ended approach, Isabelle 
Brettahauer and others, have taken a keen interest in the practice and regulation of 
notarial writing as a subset of a much larger wave of interest in writing and 
documentary practices among historians of medieval Europe.2 I will carry both lines 
of inquiry in mind in the analysis which follows. 
                                                          
1 Denise Angers, “Possibilités et limites des registres du tabellionage pour l’histoire de Caen aux XIVe 
et XVe siècles,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-
Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 85-96; Jean-Yves 
Sarazin, “L’historien et le notaire: acquis et perspectives de l’étude des actes privés de la France 
moderne,” Bibliothèque de l'école des chartes 160:1 (2002): 229-270; and Claire Dolan, Le notaire, la 
famille et la ville: Aix-En-Provence à la fin du XVIe siècle, Histoire Notariale (Toulouse, France: 
Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1998). 
2 Isabelle Bretthauer, “Official Rules of Writing in the North of France? The Writing of Notarial 
Documents in Normandy between Practices and Regulations,” in Ruling the Script in the Middle Ages: 
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A Spectrum of Contracts 
 
Notarial records understandably feature heavily in this study of civil law and 
disputes. These contracts are in many instances the focal points around which 
disputes revolved. However, in focusing our attention on notarial documents, we 
must nevertheless be mindful of the fact that these too represent only a percentage 
of the contracts entered into in this period. Important alternatives included the sous-
seing privé (a private, written, contract formulated between parties) and oral 
agreements. Whereas the notarial contract represented the most formal of contracts, 
with the application of an official seal in front of a minimum of two witnesses who 
knew the parties personally (in theory) and with the notary maintaining his own public 
copy of the agreement, the other two were less formal and less regulated. The sous-
seing privé produced a document to which reference could be made as long as it 
survived, and the oral contract, depending on to what degree the parties wanted to 
cover the agreement, typically had a number of direct or indirect witnesses (the latter 
being the case when parties negotiated and agreed to the contract in an open, public 
                                                          
Formal Aspects of Written Communication, ed. Sébastien Barret, Dominique Stutzmann, and Georg 
Vogeler, Books, Charters, and Inscriptions (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2016): 75-94; Isabelle 
Bretthauer, “Actes et registres du tabellionage ancien d’Alençon (1352-1404),” in Tabellions et 
Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin 
(Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 253-77; and Isabelle Bretthauer, “Le statut du registre entre 
usage privé et usage public,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, 
ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 13-24. For 
a good start on the recent literature on documentary practices, see Marco Mostert and P. S. Barnwell, 
eds., Medieval Legal Process: Physical, Spoken and Written Performance in the Middle Ages 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011); Peter Schulte, Marco Mostert, and Irene van Renswoude, eds.,  
Strategies of Writing: Studies on Text and Trust in the Middle Ages (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 
2008); and Marco Mostert and Anna Adamska, eds., Writing and the Administration of Medieval 
Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy I (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2014). 
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space with passersby).3 It is worth emphasizing that the written documentation 
served a commemorative function for the contract, which was the oral agreement 
between the parties; the documentation was not the contract itself. The oaths 
exchanged between the parties to hold to the terms of the agreement was the legally 
binding aspect of the contract, and the witnesses and documentation that 
accompanied recalled those oaths.4 In fact, Daniel Smail has shown that in 
fourteenth-century Marseille, the testimony of witnesses to a contract (oral agreement 
between parties) was much more valuable to the resolution of any dispute than 
written proof constituted by the document. The oral practices written into the 
contracts in late fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Normandy suggest that the 
importance of orality persisted even with the increasing privileging of documentation.5 
The oral (by which I mean undocumented) contract had the merit of being free 
whereas documentation incurred costs associated with purchasing writing materials 
(parchment or paper, ink, etc.) and possibly with paying someone who knew how to 
                                                          
3 Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of 
Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 
2007); Daniel Lord Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late Medieval Marseille,” in 
Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France: Provence and Languedoc, 1000-1500, ed. Kathryn 
Reyerson and John Drendel (Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 1998): 23-50; and Gillian K. Hadfield, “The Many 
Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments,” in Handbook of New Institutional 
Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005): 
175-203. 
4 On writing as an act of witnessing, see Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 
England 1066-1307, Second edition (Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell, 1993); and Carol Symes, “Out 
in the Open, in Arras: Sightlines, Soundscapes, and the Shaping of a Medieval Public Sphere,” in 
Cities, Texts and Social Networks, 400-1500: Experiences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban Space, 
ed. Caroline Goodson, Anne E. Lester, and Carol Symes (Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2010): 279-
302. 
5 Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late Medieval Marseille.’’ 
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write. The notary charged fees for his services commensurate with the type of 
contract and the length of the document.6  
All that being said, my use of notarial records over these other options is 
largely one of convenience. Although the analysis of notarial records certainly poses 
its own challenges, the evidence for the alternatives is scant. I have therefore elected 
to set aside what might be a piecemeal collection of accidental findings buried in 
other documents for a voluminous set of records that lends itself to more systematic 
analysis. This decision will necessarily represent a more formal segment of contracts, 
entered into by a more elite segment of the population, but keeping this limitation in 
mind, the notarial contracts serve as a useful starting point and an anchor for the 
examination of legal activity in this period.  
A contract formalized before a notary had a special significance and came with 
a cost.7 We have seen that the monarchy took a keen interest in regulating notarial 
contracts and in exhorting, if not extorting, people to choose to make use of this 
option in conducting their affairs.8 Decidedly unrhetorical, notarial contracts were as 
formulaic as they were formal, as will become quickly apparent by the widespread 
use of abbreviations not only of words but of entire clauses, implied and understood 
                                                          
6 Philippe Cailleux, “Pratiques et tarifications des actes des tabellions rouennais à la fin du Moyen 
Âge,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch 
(Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 25-44. 
7 Cailleux, “Pratiques et tarifications des actes des tabellions rouennais à la fin du Moyen Âge.” 
8 For more on the promotion and regulation of notarial contracts by the monarchy, see: Claude Jeay, 
“Les seings manuels des tabellions (Normandie, XIVe-XVe siècles), signes personnels ou expression 
du pouvoir royal?” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu 
Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 325-48; Olivier Poncet, “La 
monarchie et l’institution du tabellionage (XVIIe-XVIIIe siècles): le cas des provinces du nord de la 
France,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and 
Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 453-506; and Denise Angers, “Être 
tabellion à Caen à la fin du Moyen Âge,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et 




by those who would refer to them (in the registers). Indeed, one of the most important 
purposes of the notarial contract was to serve as a tool of reference. The notarial 
contract was a public record in a legal system that was increasingly, and deliberately, 
privileging written records.9 By “public” record, I mean that many contracts were 
drawn up (or at least read aloud, formally witnessed and signed) in public spaces in 
full view, and within earshot, of passersby, that officials could consult the registers 
freely, and that private parties could request a copy of a contract for a fee.10 Also, 
there were always witnesses present, noted at the end, and some sources hint that it 
was common practice to read them aloud in a highly public place (for example, in 
front of the parish church or a market square).11 This suggests that orality helped 
support the authority and authenticity of the contract and that performance, 




                                                          
9 Isabelle Bretthauer, “Le statut du registre entre usage privé et usage public,” in Tabellionages au 
Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses 
universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 13-24. 
10 Unlike in later periods like the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, they were not necessarily 
drawn up in an office, and to the extent they were, the setting was not exactly private by our 
understanding. 
11 Terrien suggests that a contract of sale which is read aloud has a narrower timeframe in which 
family may dispute it than those which are not. Guillaume Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil tant 
public que privé, observé au pays et Duché de Normandie, Second edition (Paris, Jacques du Puys, 
1578); 320-21. A case before the Échiquier involving a dispute over an announcement in church also 
supports this. This case will be examined in chapter three. ADSM, 1B 331 January 28, 1510. 
12 Smail has argued that witnesses testifying to a contract had a greater impact on a court’s decision in 
a dispute than the terms of the contract itself. See Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of 
Late Medieval Marseille.” For more on writing practices and legal texts, see Marco Mostert, “Making 
Court Decisions Known in Medieval Holland,” in Medieval Legal Process: Physical, Spoken and 
Written Performance in the Middle Ages, ed. Mostert, Marco and P. S. Barnwell (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2011): 281-95. 
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Notaries and Their Profession 
 
Turning our attention to the men drawing up these contracts, it is worth 
recalling that notaries were officials of the legal system. Sometimes characterized as 
intermediaries between people and the judicial system, they nevertheless take their 
place within the hierarchy of officials.13 To drive this point home, their practices 
followed familiar jurisdictional boundaries. The court records, and even some of the 
notarial records themselves, make reference to seigneurial and royal jurisdictions. 
For example, an exchange drawn up between Rogier Trenchant and Colin Andrieu 
references a contract previously drawn up before the “tabellions [notaries] in the 
sergenterie of St. Victor under the tabellions of the said Rouen.”14 Similarly a sale 
between Jean Boissel and Jean Dufour the elder references a prior contract drawn 
up before the “tabellions commissioned in the sergenterie of Pont St. Pierre under the 
tabellions of Rouen.”15 Both examples identify a sub-unit (sergenterie) of the larger 
jurisdiction (Rouen). By the end of the sixteenth century and into later periods (which 
the bulk of scholarship on notaries covers), notaries worked primarily in études 
(offices) with assistants on hand to help and learn the practice.16 Moreover, as lower 
                                                          
13 Claire Dolan, ed., Entre justice et justiciables : Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe 
siècle, (Québec, Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005), especially the introduction, 15-
32. 
14 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
15 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
16 Julie Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy: Gender and the Politics of Household Authority in Early 
Modern France, (University Park, PA, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1998); Branka 
Grbavac, “The Professional Formation of Public Notaries in Dalmatia from the Second Half of the 
Twelfth Century to the End of the Fourteenth Century,” in Writing and the Administration of Medieval 
Towns: Medieval Urban Literacy I, ed. Marco Mostert and Anna Adamska (Turnhout, Belgium: 
Brepols, 2014): 285-312. 
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level officials, they were members of an upwardly mobile socioeconomic group.17 
Although we see glimpses of these trends in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth 
centuries, notarial practice was not so narrowly professionalized and sequestered; 
much of it was conducted out in the open. Notaries commonly traveled to clients to 
take notes before returning to their office to draw up the formal contract, which would 
then be read, acknowledged and signed by the parties before witnesses. Unlike later 
periods, notarial offices were not venal (bought, sold, and transmitted via inheritance 
like personal property).18 
In spite of these considerations, the term “notary” runs the risk of being 
somewhat misleading. There were actually two roles under the notarial umbrella. 
According to Ragueau, introduced in chapter one, a notary was one who “takes down 
briefs, notes, writings, or minutes of obligations, contracts, and other instruments in 
brief.”19 Under the same listing, suggesting that the two were very similar in nature 
                                                          
17 Sylvie Charton-Le Clech, Chancellerie et culture au XVIe siècle: Les notaires et secrétaires du roi 
de 1515 à 1547, Histoire Notariale (Toulouse, France: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1993); ); 
Robert Descimon, “The Birth of the Nobility of the Robe: Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of 
Paris, 1500-1700,” trans. Orest Ranum, in Changing Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael 
Wolfe (Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 1996): 95-123; Barbara B. Diefendorf, Paris City 
Councillors in the Sixteenth Century: The Politics of Patrimony (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton 
University Press, 1983); Jonathan Dewald, The Formation of a Provincial Nobility: the Magistrates of 
the Parlement of Rouen, 1499-1610 (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 1980). 
18 Claire Dolan, Le notaire, la famille et la ville: Aix-En-Provence à la fin du XVIe siècle, Histoire 
Notariale (Toulouse, France: Presses universitaires du Mirail, 1998); Marco Mostert, “Forgery and 
Trust,” and Franz-Josef Arlinghaus, “Point of Reference: Trust and the Function of Written Agreements 
in a Late Medieval Town,” in Strategies of Writing: Studies on Text and Trust in the Middle Ages, ed. 
Peter Schulte, Marco Mostert, and Irene van Renswoude (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2008): 37-59, 
277-300; Marco Mostert and P. S. Barnwell, eds. Medieval Legal Process: Physical, Spoken and 
Written Performance in the Middle Ages (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011); Daniel Lord Smail, 
“Witness Programs in Medieval Marseille,” in Voices from the Bench: The Narratives of Lesser Folk in 
Medieval Trials, ed. Michael Goodich (New York, NY, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 227-50. 
19 François Ragueau, Indice des droicts royaux et seigneuriaux : Des plus notables dictions, terms et 
phrases de l’Estat, de la Justice, des Finances, et Practique de France, Recueilli des Loix, 
Coustumes, Ordonnances, Arrests, Annales, Histoires du Royaume de France et ailleurs (Lyon: 
Simon Rigaud, 1620), 498-99. ‘’qui passe les brevets, notes, schedes ou minutres d’obligations, 
contracts, et autres instruments en brief.’’ 
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and possibly interchangeable in concept, are the tabellions, who “puts them on 
parchment, in large writing, and in a form that is conclusive, public, and authentic.”20  
The similarity between the notary and the tabellion is echoed in the court records. I 
should clarify that I have used the term notary for the sake of simplicity and to follow 
common usage in historiography, but to be more precise, the notarial records under 
examination here are drawn from the tabellionage.21 
To complicate things further, in addition to clerics, who had largely been 
responsible for drawing up contracts, especially wills and marriage contracts to the 
extent there were any, up to the period under consideration, there are plenty of 
instances of other legal officials acting in the capacity of notary. For example, a rente 
contract between Jean Heuze and Colin Lebas mentions that one of the previous 
rente contracts in the series leading up to the one in question had been drawn up by 
Jean Debaugremare, lieutenant commissioned by the vicomte of Rouen.22 In another 
contract, in which Pierre Vedier pays off a rente to Phillippe Duval, a prior contract in 
a series was formalized before Guillaume Ango lieutenant géneral of the vicomte of 
Rouen.23 These cases of other officials acting as notaries indicates a fluidity of 
practice and a multiplicity of roles within the legal system that we will need to keep in 
mind as we delve further into the legal culture of late-fifteenth, early sixteenth-century 
                                                          
20 Ragueau, Indice des droits, 499. ‘’Tabellion, celuy qui les met en parchemin, eu grosse, et en forme 
authentique, publique et probante.’’ 
21 Notaries were more common in the south of France, and tabellions were more common in the north. 
Although there were subtle differences between the two, as was typical between practice in the north 
versus the south, they do not make a significant difference to my study. For more on these differences, 
see Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin, eds., Tabellions et tabellionages de la France 
médiévale et moderne (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011). 
22 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. 
23 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 21, 1500. 
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Rouen and the surrounding area. This fluidity and multiplicity will take on a larger 




With some of this basic information about notarial practice and contracts in 
mind, it is important to outline what types of deals were being drawn up before the 
notaries of Rouen. There were many types of contracts, and there were a fair number 
that defy classification. Classification, posing certain challenges, has been the 
subject of some debate among historians of notaries, and different schemes have 
been suggested. Gabriel Audisio in particular has focused specifically on 
miscellaneous contracts to tease out more about the notaries’ roles (drawing up 
contracts, court scribe, or secretary to different groups) and social function within a 
community and legal system, which he characterizes as encompassing a “rich palette 
of activity” in a role that is “not merely reduced to drawing up acts of banality” but 
rather “responds to a need.” He argues that the variability of notarial roles accounts 
for some of the odds and ends found in their records and also argues that increasing 
specialization in the legal system reduced this variability because notaries were no 
longer called in for odd jobs.24  
                                                          
24 Gabriel Audisio, “Notariat en Provence au XVIe siècle: une justice de proximité?” in Entre justice et 
justiciables : Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, 
Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 519-32; 528-31. 
98 
 
It is common for historians to select one type of contract to narrow the scope 
of their study—a necessity given the volume of documents and the general state of 
inventories available—but it is nonetheless useful to cast a broader net here to bring 
clarity to the perspective. Thus, even though in chapters to come I will privilege those 
contracts that result from a dispute in order to shed light on practice and the workings 
of the legal system along a spectrum of legal activity, it is worthwhile to give attention 
to some of the most common contracts, especially when, potentially, any deal could 
go bad. This will help in understanding why deals did go bad, why disputes erupted, 
and why the parties to the contracts took the course they did in resolving them. 
Providing models of different types of contracts will also help anchor discussion of a-
typical contracts and of the disputes to follow. 
One of the main categories of contracts was rentes, which were a type of loan 
and investment.25 The rente was an important work-around to the Catholic Church’s 
ban on usury, which civil authorities enforced, and supported a significant system of 
credit.26 Private individuals or institutions could lend money legally through a rente 
agreement. The monarchy, for instance, made use of rentes as a form of state 
revenue (these forced loans were most notoriously in use in the seventeenth and 
                                                          
25 The best description that I have found for a rente is in Barbara B. Diefendorf, ed., Social Relations, 
Politics, and Power in Early Modern France: Robert Descimon and the Historian’s Craft (Kirksville, 
MO, USA: Truman State University Press, 2016), 298. 
26 John H. Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution: Usury, Rentes, and Negotiability” 
The International History Review 25:3 (Sep., 2003): 505-62. 
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eighteenth centuries and were quite controversial).27 In Normandy, in particular, 
monastic institutions had a long history of being important creditors.28   
The structure of the rente resembles something of a sale and something of an 
annuity.29 The “seller” (borrower) agrees to pay a fixed sum annually, divided by 
regular, designated intervals (typically once, twice or four times a year) in exchange 
for a large lump sum from the “buyer” (lender). Indeed, the “rente” referenced in 
these contracts refers to these regular payments.30 The rente could be set up so that 
payments would be made for a fixed term, either for a certain number of months (or, 
more likely, years) or for the duration of the life of one or the other of the parties to 
the contract (or both), or in perpetuity. In the latter case, the borrower would bind not 
only himself but also his heirs to make these payments in perpetuity until the original 
lump sum (principal) could be paid in full in one cash payment, plus any back 
                                                          
27 See, Richard Bonney, The King’s debts: finance and politics in France, 1589-1661 (New York, NY, 
USA: Oxford University Press, 1981). For a comparative example of this, see Marc Boone, “‘Plus dueil 
que joie’. Les ventes de rentes par la ville de Gand pendant la période bourguignonne: entre intérêts 
privés et finances publiques” Credit Communal: bulletin trimestriel 176 (1991-92): 3-25; and Marc 
Boone, “Stratégies fiscales et financières des élites urbaines et de l'État bourguignon naissant dans 
l'ancien comté de Flandre (XIVe-XVIe siècle).” Actes des congrès de la Société des historiens 
médiévistes de l'enseignement supérieur public 28ᵉ congrès. L'argent au Moyen Âge (Clermont-
Ferrand, 1997): 235-253. 
28 Robert Génestal, Rôle des monastères comme établissements de crédit. Étudié en normandie du 
XIe à la fin du XIIIe siècle (Paris, France: Librairie Nouvelle de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1901). 
29 I have seen the term “rente” translated variably, and some, especially economic historians, use the 
word “annuity” as an equivalent. Although conceptually similar, it runs the risk of being misleading, so I 
have chosen to use the term “rente” for the sake of clarity. On rentes start with Christiaan van 
Bochove, “Configuring Financial Markets in Preindustrial Europe” The Journal of Economic History 
73:1 (March, 2013): 247-78; Chris Briggs and Jaco Zuijderduijn, eds., Land and Credit: Mortgages in 
the Medieval and Early Modern European Countryside (New York, NY, USA: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2018); Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution”; Jan Luiten Van Zanden, Jaco 
Zuijderduijn, and Tine de Moor, “Small is beautiful: the efficiency of credit markets in the late medieval 
Holland” European Review of Economic History 16:3 (2012): 3-22; Jaco Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital 
Markets: Markets for renten, State Formation and Private Investment in Holland (1300-1550) (Boston, 
MA, USA: Brill, 2009); Bernard Schnapper, Les Rentes au XVIe siècle: Histoire d’un instrument de 
crédit (Paris, France: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1957). 




payments (arrears) (the interest rate is lower for perpetual loans than for lifetime 
ones). For these reasons, the rente contract became a form of property that was 
transferable and inheritable and as we shall see in the coming chapters, highly 
contested, especially when delinquent payments left heirs with hefty arrears.31  
Taking as a typical example of a very basic rente contract, we have an 
agreement drawn up between Guillaume Fichet, whom we learn was residing just 
outside the city, and Jean Lepatriarche, rope-maker, living in the city proper. The 
contract also specifies that Lepatriarche is “present” to the drawing up of the contract 
(as opposed to “absent,” which is less common). The agreement is for 40 sous 
tournois a year to be paid quarterly in perpetuity in exchange for 20 livres tournois 
(10% interest, higher than the usury law allowed: 5%). This contract wraps up with an 
acknowledgement (literally, confession) of receipt of the lump sum payment (which is 
neither a frequent nor an a-typical element) and a string of very formulaic 
(abbreviated by “etc.”) promises, guarantees, and references to non-specific 
collateral (“goods and patrimony”). Then, the witnesses to the contract are named. 
Putting it all together, it looks like this:  
Guillaume Fichet residing in the parish of Saint Aignen near Rouen sells for 
patrimony etc. to Jean Lepatriarche, rope-maker, residing in the parish Saint Pierre 
the gatekeeper of Rouen, present, etc. 40 sous tournois of rente in perpetuity per 
year to be paid at the quarter terms etc. the first [to be paid at the] next Easter 
forthcoming prorated etc. on all etc. in exchange for the sum of 20 livres tournois to 
which the said seller confesses receipt and possession from the said buyer which etc. 
and promises etc. to render and pay in full etc. and guaranteeing etc. and in this 
obligated by goods and patrimony etc. In the presence of Pierre Marc and Pierre 
Bosquet.32 
                                                          
31 Ralph E. Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France” The 
American Historical Review 82:2 (Apr., 1977): 271-89. 
32 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. “Guillaume Fichet demourant en la parroisse Saint Aignen pres 
Rouen vend afin d’eritage etc a Jehan Lepatriarche cordier demourant en la parroisse Saint Pierre le 
portier de Rouen present etc quarante solz t de rente a heritage par an a paier aux quatre termes etc 




Similar to Fichet and Lepatriarche, Jean Leroux, a laborer residing just outside 
of the city (in the parish of Notre Dame d’Angoville en Romais), and Regnault 
Lepoulletier, a bourgeois residing in the city proper (in the parish of St. Andrew), 
come to an agreement wherein Leroux “sells” 10 sous tournois of rente in one 
payment per year to Lepoulletier in exchange for 100 sous tournois. However, rather 
than setting up the payments in perpetuity, Leroux and Lepoulletier agree to a fixed 
term of six years after which point Leroux would be expected to pay Lepoulletier the 
100 sous tournois or work out another agreement.33 The contract finishes with the 
same formulae, note of collateral, and naming of witnesses as that of the Fichet-
Lepatriarche contract: “…in exchange for the sum of 100 sous tournois which etc. 
and promises etc. to render and pay in full and to deliver to Rouen etc. and 
guaranteeing succession etc. paying back within six years etc. so as to render the 
said sum of 100 sous tournois, arrears etc. prorated and all costs etc. obligated by 
goods and patrimony etc. In the presence of Robin Langloys et Guillaume 
Daubeuf.”34   
Immediately apparent from these two contracts are the highly structured, 
formulaic aspects of the contracts, and yet, as will quickly become apparent below, 
                                                          
led vendeuren confessa avoir eue et receue comptant dud acheteur dont etc et promist etc rendre et 
paier par execution etc et garant etc et a ce oblihez biens et heritages etc presents Pierre Marc et 
Pierre Bosquet.” 
33 Amalia Kessler has shown that it was common practice for merchants and creditors to work out 
evolving agreements. See Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce. 
34 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 2, 1500. “Jehan Leroux laboureur demourant en la parroisse de notre 
dame d’angoville en Romais vendant afin d’eritage a Regnault Lepoulletier bourgeois demourant en la 
parroisse Saint Andrieu de Rouen present etc Ceste x s t de rente a heritage par an a paier chacun an 
au terme St Michel premier etc a la St Michel prouchain venant sur tout etc par execution pour la 
somme de c s t font etc et promist etc rendre et paier par execution et livrer a Rouen etc et garant de 
surc___ etc racquict dedens six ans etc par rendre lad somme de c s t arrieres etc prorata et tous 
coustz etc oblige biens et heritages etc present Robin Langloys et Guillaume Daubeuf.” 
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there were plenty of options to customize the contract with additions to this base 
model to suit the needs of the parties (and not necessarily equally). It is also worth 
noting that both contracts carried the same (illegal) rate of interest (10%), which is 
not what would be expected in a “rational” market-based transaction (wherein loans 
with different terms have different interest structures). This would seem to suggest 
that underlying social relations factored into the equation, supported in part by my 
discussion of discretion to come. Given this baseline, it is useful to turn to some of 
the variations. 
With the base contract in place, the borrower and lender could renegotiate 
their agreement and add to the rente. As an example of this, Pierre Fleury, residing in 
the parish of Mesnil Durescu, and Richart Cauvyn, residing in the parish of St. Denis 
of Rouen, revisited their contract wherein Fleury agreed to pay Cauvyn 30 sous 
tournois of rente per year. Making explicit note that the contract was still in effect—
“per the letters which remain in effect from the date they were drawn up”—Fleury in 
this new contract agrees to pay 40 sous tournois in rente per year at quarterly 
intervals “above and beyond” the 30 sous tournois already in effect. For this addition, 
he is to receive from Cauvyn 20 livres tournois. Although the addition may seem like 
a lot—a 125 percent increase—I suspect that the formality of the letter of the contract 
betrayed a significant amount of discretion and informal negotiation in the actual 
payment/collection process.35 As long as the borrower was explicitly responsible for 
the arrears, per the contract, it is not unreasonable to assume an accounting which 
                                                          
35 Amalia Kessler notes similar practices among merchants in Paris in later centuries. See Kessler, A 




would tack one or more missed payments, as a line of credit, on to that lump sum 
due (which, in theory, could only be paid in total—or “one or two payments” in the 
case of this contract).36 If such an investment was projected to be “lucrative” and “a 
sure thing,” or if Fleury was in desperate need of repairs to his house, who knows 
what they may have worked out between the lines. Such an arrangement would 
depend entirely on the nature of the relationship between the two parties, which is 
often unknown, even when the situation did explode into a dispute. Some of the 
disputes over arrears analyzed in future chapters will support this theory, so it is an 
important point to recall going forward. 
This new contract between Fleury and Cauvyn is interesting not only because 
Fleury is stacking debts, but because he is also explicitly co-opting his wife Jeanne 
into them. Near the end of the contract, he “so promises that Jeanne his wife will 
ratify this present sale and will obligate herself to the payment of the said rente that is 
etc. receipt in one time or two that is etc. to render the said sum of 20 livres tournois 
arrears prorated and all costs etc. obligated by goods and patrimony etc.”37 Such a 
statement not only furthers my point that women had a significant presence in the 
notarial records but also suggests that her agreement was important to sealing the 
deal, and that she shared a certain responsibility in taking on the debt. This consent 
on her part is particularly surprising given the strictures of Norman law regarding a 
woman’s dowry and communal property and its management in a marriage and in 
inheritance between husband and wife, as outlined in chapter one. Her consent 
                                                          
36 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. “racquict a une ou deu foys touteffois etc.” 
37 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. “et si promist que Jehanne sa femme ratiffira cest present 
vendit et s’obligera au paiement de lad rente touteffois etc racquict a une ou deu foys touteffois etc par 
rendre lad somme de xx L t arrieres prorata et tous coustz etc obligez biens et heritages etc.” 
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would imply that the property (dowry) that she brought into their marriage—and would 
have been strictly separate from her husband’s—or their communal property—to 
which she has some sort of right—is being offered as collateral. This suggests that in 
practice women had much greater financial capacity in marriage than the letter of the 
law, in theory, would allow.38 What is not clear, but also plausible, is the amount of 
pressure her husband could exert to compel to take such an action. All this being 
said, adding to the rente was but one option in adapting the contract.  
On the other side of the coin, the lender could sell the rente or use the rente 
payments to take out his own rente. In one such example, Michiel Lechiguerre, 
mason, bourgeois, and resident of the parish of St. Maclou of Rouen, uses the 
annual 30 sous tournois in yearly rente payments which he is entitled to collect from 
Gieffroy Leroy, of the parish of St. Victor de Buton in the diocese of Chartres, to 
negotiate a rente contract with Mathelin Germont, resident of the same parish of St. 
Victor. Similar to the contract above between Fleury and Cauvyn, this contract 
between Lechiguerre and Germont is sure to note that the rente between the 
Lechiguerre and Leroy is still valid. To that effect, Lechiguerre has a copy of the 
                                                          
38 Similar findings have been shared by Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage and Jacqueline Musset. They 
argue that, in practice, women had greater claim to communal property and greater control over the 
management of communal property than had been previously assumed based on the letter of Norman 
customary law. See Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée dans la Normandie 
coutumière: droit et pratiques dans la généralité de Rouen (Presses Universitaire de la Faculté de 
Droit de Clermont-Ferrand, 2005); Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tendances communautaires des 
époux à la lecture des actes des tabellions et des notaires dans la Normandie coutumière de l’époque 
moderne,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis 
Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 67-81; Virginie 
Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tabellions et l’assouplissement de la norme: l’exemple normand,” in 
Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier 
Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 349-66; Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, “Le 
régime matrimonial normand à l’épreuve des conflits de coutumes (XVIe-XVIIIe siècle)” Les Annales 
de droit 2 (2008): 145-58; Jacqueline Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux en droit normand du 
XVIe siècle à la Révolution française (Caen, France: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 1997). 
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contract, and probably produced it as evidence in the collective witnessing of the 
writing of the contract between him and Germont: “the letters of this agreement, 
resulting from that which he agreed to and which remain in the hands of the said 
buyer etc.”39  This possession of the physical contract, and its naming, underscores 
its value as property and as testimony to the agreement between Lechiguerre and 
Leroy and to its enduring validity.40 
Lechiguerre reinvests the income from Leroy to obtain a lump sum of 20 livres 
tournois from Germont. The fact that payments from Leroy were central to, and at the 
base of, the agreement between Lechiguerre and Germont, demonstrates how debts 
could become linked and how fragile the chains linking them could be. Of course, 
Germont and Leroy were from the same parish, and may have known each other, 
which could have mitigated the risk underlying this transaction. Nonetheless, as 
Lechiguerre re-invested the income, adding the role of debtor to his role of creditor, 
the web of credit and debt grew in complexity, especially since Lechiguerre could 
have sold the rente (if he needed the money now or wanted to re-invest that in 
another rente).  
Furthermore, the rente did not need be a cash transaction, but could instead 
be contracted for payments in kind. It was not unusual, for instance, for the rente 
payments to be in the form of wheat or some other good. Similar to Michiel 
Lechiguerre in the contract above, Robert Griffon, a procureur in the lay court, 
residing in the parish of St. Laurent of Rouen, transferred part of an inheritance, “one 
                                                          
39 ADSM, 2E1 229, September 30, 1500. “envers led Lechiguerre comme il disait jouxte les lettres 
d’icelle fieffe qu’il en disait estre de ce faictes qu’il acorda estre et demourer es mains dud acheteur 
etc.”  
40 Mostert and Barnwell, eds. Medieval Legal Process. 
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myne of wheat of rente in perpetuity,” to Jean Conseil, conseiller in the said court, 
“residing in the parish of St. Estienne de la Rue aux Tournelliers of this city.”41  This 
suggests a certain variability in how people thought about value—goods could be 




Another major element of the contracts listed so far and which will be of 
continued note in this chapter and ones to come is the prevalence of agreements 
between residents of the city of Rouen and other places, some of them close, like St. 
Aignan (up one of the hills leading out of the city), and some of them more distant, 
like St. Victor in the diocese of Chartres. Rouen was an important center of legal 
business as with many other activities. The city, of course, bore witness to the 
activities of its lively and diverse residents but also hosted those dwelling in the 
surrounding area who made the trip to the city to conduct their affairs, legal or 
otherwise. Legal business was often conducted between residents of the city and 
those of the surrounding area. It was indeed rare for the parties to a contract, suit, or 
case before court to be exclusively from the city of Rouen. Looking at the notarial 
records from Rouen (a sampling of 606 out of 1,820), we find roughly 74 percent of 
the records involving residents outside of the contemporary city limits (the modern 
city has since enveloped some of these places or attached them as suburbs). Even 
                                                          
41 ADSM, 2E1 229, September 30, 1500. “assavoir une myne de ble de rente a heritage par an” and 
“Jehan Conseil conseilleur en lad court [laye] demourant en la parroisse St Estienne de la rue aux 
tournelliers d’icelle ville present etc.” 
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more of these records involved land outside of the city, as it was not uncommon for 
residents in the city to own land outside its boundaries.42 Even if the parties resided 
in the city, records will indicate that an individual came from an outlying area. For 
instance, we find a transaction from Antoine Bonjon the rope-maker who is a native 
of the parish of St. Amand Laillier près Moulins en Bourbonnois at the time of the 
transaction residing in the parish of St. Laurent of Rouen with his cousin.43 Given this 
pattern, the boundaries of the city soften, and many different people, residing in the 
city or elsewhere contributed to and shared in its legal culture. Unfortunately, my 
data, temporally limited as they are, are not suited to larger discussions of migratory 
patterns, but further research would likely draw out whether or to what degree 
families straddled these boundaries between city and countryside, whether their 
movements to and fro were temporary or permanent, their evolving economic and 
social status (if any), and how this fluctuated over time. 
The pattern also suggests that the notarial records drawn up in Rouen were 
meant to stand up in multiple jurisdictions, within a scenario of overlapping 
jurisdictions, royal and seigneurial. If we assume that, in cases of debt, like a rente, 
that the contract functioned primarily to protect the creditor, then it would make sense 
for Lechiguerre to formalize the rente with Leroy before notaries closer to home (the 
contract here, between Lechiguerre and Germont, does not indicate which notaries, if 
any in the event of a sous-seing privé, drew up the Lechiguerre-Leroy contract).44 
                                                          
42 ADSM, 2E1 228 and 229. Jeremy Hayhoe has noted that this was common in Northern Burgundy in 
the eighteenth century, suggesting a larger scale trend in the intervening period. See Jeremy Hayhoe, 
Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-Century Northern 
Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008). 
43 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. 
44 Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments.” 
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However, that Germont is making the trip to Rouen when Lechiguerre is the debtor 
challenges this logic. Clearly there is more to it. But if Germont needed to take 
Lechiguerre to court to collect the debt and enforce the contract, where would he go?  
It is also worth noting that lenders (“buyers”) are typically from Rouen while 
borrowers (“sellers”) are typically from outlying areas. This pattern suggests 
economic inequality between city and countryside and to a much less obvious 
degree, given available indicators of status or occupation, social inequality. 
Delving further into these notaries’ clientele, several trends stand out. Over a 
third of the notarial records mention a woman as being either directly or indirectly 
involved in the contract or agreement. The woman might be making a contract in her 
own right, if she were a widow or accompanied by her husband, or she could be the 
mother who left property to her children or even a sister making a partial claim of 
inheritance. The large percentage of women, and their relational statuses, though still 
significantly marital (widow or wife), and the variety of their relations to the other 
parties mentioned indicate that women were active in making contracts and 
especially so in the management of property behind the contracts and significant 
participants in the legal culture, despite the strictures of the law.  
Roughly a quarter of the notarial records make no mention of the occupation 
or social status of the parties, though they might be guessed by the value of property 
involved. Of the records that do mention an occupation, just over 28 percent mention 
one or more clerics. Nearly two thirds mention a “bourgeois” or a specific artisan, and 
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almost a quarter mention a legal official.45 These groups are the most common and 
are, of course, entering into contracts with members across groups in varying 
combinations. We also see noblemen and the occasional laborer, merchant, and 
others. This breakdown suggests that these records are not consistently representing 
the lowest socioeconomic strata (possibly due to notarial fees and other costs), but 
they do represent negotiations between other strata. Social boundaries are crossed 




With these larger patterns in mind, we can turn to the other of the largest 
categories of contracts: ventes (sales of property). These contracts could vary a little 
more than rentes depending on the complexity of the sale and property involved. The 
vente contract begins in much the same way as the rente with stating the parties to 
the contract and the sale. Taking as a typical example the contract between Thomas 
Maugier and Katherine his wife, residing in the parish of St. Vigor of Rouen, and M. 
Jean Lesueur, priest, residing in the parish of Pissy (about 18 km from the center of 
Rouen), “the said wife, authorized,” sells a piece of land to Lesueur. This particular 
                                                          
45 Bruno Sintic found a similar representation in a different study of urban society with a broader 
geographical scope. The four most common groups he found were bourgeois, nobility, officers and 
legal professionals, and priests. He does not seem to have been looking for representation by women, 
but I think tallying them out gives more dimension to the social relations. Additionally, for Rouen 
specifically, tradesmen cannot be ignored. Bruno Sintic, “Saisir la société urbaine des petites villes par 
les actes de tabellionage,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. 
Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 109-17. 
46 My data are not detailed enough to fully flesh out all of the possible nuances of power relations 
between parties to a contract. For more on possible social relations, see Giovanni Levi, Inheriting 
Power: The Story of an Exorcist, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago, IL, USA: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). 
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sale is an interesting example of a married woman contracting a sale. As is standard, 
her husband is present to, and authorizes his wife to make, the deal. The contract 
continues by denoting the amount of land, “three vergees or [about that] etc.,” and its 
precise location: “in the parish of Barentin, bordered dc [on one side by] the king our 
lord’s road; dc and db [on one side and at one end] the lord du Mesnil; and db [at one 
end] Guillaume Dubosc.”47   
 After situating the land, the contract spells out the seller’s right to sell the 
property and gives a brief accounting of how the seller came into possession of it. In 
this case, “This piece of land the said married couple had acquired from Guillaume 
Riviere and Philippine his wife of the said parish of Pissy.” It goes on to detail more of 
that prior contract, indicating that the land in question had been acquired “in 
exchange for other pieces of land--certain other lands which pertained to the married 
couple and to the said wife by her right--per the letters of this said exchange drawn 
up before the said Jaques Houel and Robert Ygou tabellions in the said place of 
Rouen the Friday 3rd day of July of this past year.”48 Since the “present” contract is 
being drawn up on October 2nd, it means that the couple held on to the land for 
approximately three months before selling it again. Unfortunately, the contract from 
July has not survived, or we would know whether or not the couple made a profit on 
the sale—the brief summary of an original contract within a later one rarely gives the 
                                                          
47 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 2, 1500. “Lad femme auctorisee” and “trois vergees ou etc. assis en la 
parroisse de Barentin bournee dc le chemin du roy notre sire dc et db le sire Dumesnil et db Guillaume 
Dubosc…” 
48 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 2, 1500. “Laquelle piece de terre lesd mariez avoit acquise par escchange 
avec autres terrs de Guillaume Riviere et Phle sa femme de lad parroisse de Pissy a l’encontre de 
certaines autres terres qui appartenent aud mariez et sad femme au droit d’ell jouxxte les lettres dud 
eschange passees devant led Jaques Houel et Robert Ygou tabellions aud lieu de Rouen le vendredi 
trois^me jour de juillet derriere passe.” 
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amount, and it usually only appears in relation to some question or dispute; as a 
general rule, the more robust the recap, the greater the anticipated need to shore up 
the defenses. Nevertheless, teasing this contract within a contract apart further, it is 
again striking, just as in the Lechiguerre-Germont contract, that the “letters” (the prior 
contract by which the couple came into possession of the land) are presented to 
corroborate the right of ownership. It is even more striking that the pieces of land that 
had been exchanged in the prior contract were part of Katherine’s dowry 
(“pertained…to the said wife by her right”), which was inalienable, per Norman 
custom, and belonged to the couple—not the husband who legally had right of 
ownership and management, per Norman custom, but to the married couple. And, 
again, Katherine, who has no legal right to manage the communal property acquired 
by the couple, is taking the lead in this sale to Lesueur. Again, this suggests that in 
practice women had much greater financial capacity in marriage than the letter of the 
law, in theory, would allow. It also suggests that women had more discretion over the 
management of the couple’s property than the law would allow. The contract finishes 
by indicating that the land is being sold for 19 livres tournois, that the couple confess 
the receipt of that sum in full, and then the predictable formulae and notation of 
witnesses to the contract.  
As more evidence of the elaborate series of land transfers by the couple, a few 
days prior to the sale to Lesueur, we find Colin Gruel, baker, residing in the parish of 
St. Gervais lez Rouen, selling to Thomas Maugier, mareschal, residing in the parish 
of St. Vigor in Rouen “a portion of a garden or empty plot” for 17 livres tournois. 
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Similar to the contract above, this one confirms the seller’s right to sell the property: 
“All of this garden the said seller said pertains to him.”49   
Of further note, the Gruel-Maugier contract ends by indicating that “Present to 
this deal is Binette, the seller’s wife, by him duly authorized,” who to this transaction 
“consents, agrees, and renounces by these present letters any and all right of dowry 
and other right that she could claim to have or demand on the said portion of garden 
from this moment sold; the said wife promises that never on the said portion of 
garden above outlined will she claim anything nor will claim be made on the title of 
her said dowry nor otherwise in any manner whatsoever on the obligation of goods 
etc.”50 Though requiring her husband’s authorization to do so, Binette’s consent to 
the sale and explicit relinquishment of her right to the land in question—part or all of 
her dowry--is clearly key to cementing the deal. We likewise read in the future 
clauses the underlying risk posed by her and her heirs for reclaiming the land.  
This defensive clause is found in similar contracts, such as that between 
Thomas Boullon, residing in the parish of St. Pierre de Carville in the hamlet of Long 
Paon, and Henry Duclos (present to the drawing up of the contracts) and Mariette his 
wife (absent), residing in the parish of Notre Dame of Auffay. In this contract, Boullon 
sells “a house, a small part of a garden and patrimony…seated in the said parish of 
Auffay.” Like that of Gruel-Maugier, near the end of this contract, it is confirmed that 
                                                          
49 ADSM, 2E1 229, September 30, 1500. “une porcion de gardin ou vuide place…. Tout lequel gardin 
led vendeur disait lui appartenir.” 
50 ADSM, 2E1 229, September 30, 1500. “present a ce binecte femme dud vendeur de lui deuement 
auctorisee quant a ce Laquelle a ceest present vendue et transporte se consenty et acorda et renonca 
et renonce par ces presentes a tout et tel droit de douaire et autre droit qu’elle pourroit avoir pretendre 
et demander sur lad porcion de gardin de present vendue promectre lad femme que jamais en lad 
porcion de gardin dessus bournee riens ne demandera demander ne fera soit a tiltre de sond douaire 
ne autrement en quequue manière que ce soit sur l’obligation de biens etc.” 
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“present to this contract is Robine, wife of the said seller, authorized etc. who of the 
said sale consents and agrees and promises that never anything etc.”51 Apparently 
the rest of this “promise” is understood. Unlike with Binette, this property does not 
constitute part of Robine’s dowry. Per the Norman custom, as we have seen, Robine 
does not have a legal claim to this property, and yet, in practice, her consent to the 
sale and promise not to lay claim to it in the future is crucial to validating the sale. 
This would imply, as it did with Katherine and Binette, that “communal property” was 
more “communal” than the letter of the law would let on.52 It also implies that women 
specifically had greater capacity for legal action than Norman custom allowed in 
theory. 
The interest of the Boullon-Duclos contract as an example does not end there, 
however. In now familiar fashion, the contract stipulates Boullon’s right to transfer 
ownership of the property to Duclos and his wife: “all of which—house, plot, garden, 
and patrimony—pertains to the said Thomas by right and title of gift made over to him 
upon the contract of his marriage by Jean Boullon, his father, who had and acquired 
it by title of fief from Thomas Leroy and Marguerite, his wife, Collenet Baard and 
Alizon, his wife, and others…”53 This double confirmation, not only of the transfer 
from his father, but back to his father’s acquisition of the properties underscores the 
risk involved in acquiring property and determining the seller’s right to sell. The “gift” 
                                                          
51 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 14, 1500. “une maison masure court jardin et heritage ainsi etc assis en 
ladite parroisse d’auffay” and “presente a ce Robine femme dud vendeur aucterise etc qui a lad vend 
se consenty et acorda et promist que jamais riens etc.” 
52 Again, this is supported by work done by Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage and Jacqueline Musset. See 
note 37 above. 
53 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 14, 1500. “laquelle maiso masure jardin et heritage appurtenant audit 
Thomas au droit et tilter du don a lui fait au traicte de son marriage par Jehan Boullon son pere qui 
l’avoit eue et acquise a tilter de fieffe de Thomas Leroy et Marguerite sa femme Collenet Baard et 
Alizon sa femme et autres.” 
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from his father could easily be contested by his older brother (if he had one) as being 
out of proportion to his right to inheritance of the family property (up to one third, 
including acquisitions). In addition to the question of the father’s right to give the 
property in gift to his son, is the father’s right of ownership of the property at all, that 
Thomas Leroy, or Marguerite, or Collenet Baard, or Alizon, or “others” or their heirs 
would not come back to stake a claim to wrongly alienated property. The peculiar 
restrictions and rights governing property under Norman custom must have made 
operations of credit more challenging. These would have been especially challenging 
given increasing reliance, in other regions, on a wife’s dowry as collateral in the 
couple’s debt and when contracting between people accustomed to different codes.54 
And yet, the notarial records suggest that people from varying social groups and 
backgrounds found a way. More research would shed light not only on the workings 
of credit under Norman custom (the effects of Norman custom’s restrictions relative 
to contemporary neighbors) but also on closely linked social practices. I would 
assume that notaries and their contracts helped facilitate the workings of credit even 
under the comparably strict terms of Norman custom.55   
Thomas Boullon’s “right and title” are reinforced “to the extent contained in the 
two letters to this effect drawn up, the one…passed in the year 1486 on the 1st day 
of January before Guillaume Damel and Jean Amiray then tabellions in the said place 
                                                          
54 Christiaan Van Bochove, Heidi Deneweth, and Jaco Zuijderduijn, “Real estate and mortgage finance 
in England and the Low Countries, 1300-1800,” Continuity and Change 30:1 (2015): 9-38; Briggs and 
Zuijderduijn, eds., Land and Credit; Van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and De Moor, “Small is beautiful”; and 
Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets. 
55 For a step in this direction, see Laetitia Renault, “Tabellions et crédit dans les campagnes 
normandes au XVe siècle: quelques hypothèses,” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France 
Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des 
Chartes, 2011): 121-43. 
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of Auffay; and the other…in the year 1490 on Tuesday the 20th day of April after 
Easter before Contet Lenormant and Jean Lemael then tabellions in the county of 
Longueville in the Sergenterie of Basguillaume.”56 We again observe the importance 
of the physical letters (contracts) in bearing witness to the legitimacy of previous 
deals on which the current on is based. Such was their importance that Boullon 
handed them over to Duclos as part of the current contract, transferred with the land 
as property.  
Of greater interest still than the presence, witnessing, transfer, and notation 
thereof of the previous documentation—and this will be a recurring theme in future 
chapters—is the capturing of the persistence of orality and glimpses of performance 
in spite of the privileging of the act of writing. Leading up to Robine’s entrance into 
the contract to state her “consent, agreement, and promise,” in order to lend credit to 
the deal, Boullon gives his word (an oath) that his credit, drawing in part on his 
father’s credit, is good, “in so much as there was the deed from him and his said 
father alone, on oath that he was not required or compelled in any term-life rentes, for 
any amount of money, nor otherwise in old property rentes which he owes because 
of his ancestral lands.”57 The value of his word—his credibility—here in relation to his 
debts, or lack thereof, which would have been attached to his property (similar to a 
mortgage, to which a creditor may have had claim in order to recuperate outstanding 
                                                          
56 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 14, 1500. “le tout joucte qu’il est contenu en deux lettres de ce faictes les 
unes de lad fieffe dud heritage passes en l’an mil iiii^c iiii^xx et six le premier jour de janvier devant 
Guillaume Damel et Jehan Amiray lors tabellions aud lieu d’auffay et les autres dud don passees en 
l’an mil cccc iiii^xx et dix le mardi xx^e jour d’avril apres pasques devant Contet Lenormant et Jehan 
Lemael lors tabellions en la conte de lonqueville en la sergenterie de basguillaume.” 
57 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 14, 1500. “en tant qu’il y avoit du fait de lui et de sond père seullement a 
sermant qu’il ne seoit oblige ne ypothecque en aucunes rentes a heritage a vie somee de deniers ne 
autrement sinon es rentes foncieres et anciennes qu’il doit a caue___ de ses heritages.” 
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debt), is linked to his credit. Boullon’s oath along with the recording of who was 
“present” or “absent” to the drawing up of the contract, legitimized by the presence of 
witnesses, all attest to enduring orality and performance in legal practices, in spite of 
the increasing prominence of writing and documentation.  
 
Chain of Title and Credit Check 
 
Establishing the right to sell the property—the chain of title—was an important 
part of a deal. Just as Katherine proves how she came into the property she sold to 
Jean Lesueur, Boullon indicates his right of ownership in his sale to Duclos. The 
chain of title is a common element of property transactions which reveals a great deal 
about practices of property transfers, including inheritance, and the workings of 
credit. As another interesting example of the chain of title, which also proves that its 
force came not from the presence of documentation (absent in this contract) but 
rather from the oath, reinforcing the enduring quality of orality, I would add the rente 
contract between Cardin Letellier and Marquet Lesueur, both merchants. Right away 
we learn that whereas Marquet Lesueur (of unknown relation to Jean Lesueur the 
priest) is, at the time of the contract, residing in the parish of St. Nigaise [Niçaise] of 
Rouen, Cardin Letellier is “at present residing in Paris,” but is the “son and heir of 
defunct Cardot Letellier, [who] during his lifetime [was] a cloth maker residing in the 
parish of St. Vivien of Rouen.”58 In this contract, Letellier, originally from Rouen but 
                                                          
58 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 30, 1500. “Cardin Letellier marchant a present demourant a Paris filz et 
heritier de defunct Cardot Letellier en son vivant drippier demourant en la parroisse Saint Vivien de 
Rouen lequel apres ce qu’il oult jure et aferme etc qu’il n’estoit tenu subgect charge oblige ne 
ypothecque envers quelque personne en aucunes rentes ypotheques a heritage ne a vie sinon es 
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living in Paris, and who came into the family property back in Rouen, leverages his 
inheritance to set up a rente. Letellier asserts that the property in question belongs to 
him by right of inheritance and that he still owns the property and has not previously 
sold it to another party. To this effect, he swore and affirmed “that he had not sold nor 
transferred nor otherwise alienated any of his patrimonies and revenues succeeded 
to him and fallen to him by the succession of his late father.” In essence, he gave his 
word that he was not double-dipping. Without knowing the exact value of the 
inherited property directly, we can guess based on the fact that it helped secure a 
loan of 120 livres tournois on his promise to pay Lesueur 12 livres tournois of rente 
per year in quarterly installments. In this case, without knowing any prior personal or 
professional connections between Letellier and Lesueur, the notary would be in a 
position to facilitate supporting the chain of title as well as knowing who has property 
to unload and who may be looking to invest, especially if, as was common practice, 
he had performed an official inventory of the deceased’s property shortly after death 
(the date of death is not given, so the amount of time between inheritance and 
investment is unknown).  
The chain of title is often part of a larger credit check. The right of ownership 
(proof of assets) accompanies the revealing under oath of any other debts that might 
compromise the sale and full enjoyment of the property. Similar to Letellier, who 
swore and affirmed “that he was not held subject, charged, obligated, or indebted 
toward any person in any rentes or debts in perpetuity nor for life except in old 
                                                          
rentes foncieres et anciennes qu’il doit a cause de ses heritages et qu’il n’avoit vendu transporte ne 
autrement alliene aucuns des heritages et revenues a luy succedez et escheuz de la succession de 
sond feu père de son bon gre etc.” 
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property dues that he has because of his patrimonies,” we observe Thomas Perrier 
swearing the same status in prefacing his rente contract with Pierre Ducouldray.59 In 
this contract, Thomas Perrier, residing in the parish of St. Just prez Vernon sur 
Seine, after swearing “that he was not toward any person held subject, charged, 
obligated, or indebted in any rentes,” “confessed” to have agreed to a rente contract 
with Pierre Ducouldray, “bourgeois, residing in the parish of St. Vincent of Rouen, 
absent.”60 The crux of this contract, like that of Letellier-Lesueur, is the “confession” 
of sale (remember a rente is formulated as a sale). The act of confessing, with its 
inherent orality, underscores the oral agreement which the contract is documenting. 
Of course, the credit check need not confirm that the buyer has no debts, but 
only those debts which are in place, to further reveal the buyer’s capacity to support 
more debt. As an example, Jean Leterrier, residing in the parish of Morigny, “swore” 
to Jean Courault, moneychanger, residing in Rouen, absent, “that he was not 
charged, obligated, nor indebted toward any other person in any other rentes” in the 
process of setting up (“confessed to have sold”) his third rente contract with Courault. 
To reinforce the oath, and his credit, he makes public his current debts to Courault: 
“the one totaling 30 sous tournois of rente and the other totaling 12 sous 6 deniers 
tournois of rente per the letters of this drawn up which remain in their force and 
virtue.”61 The fact that these prior debts are detailed is also interesting. Courault 
                                                          
59 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 30, 1500. 
60 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 29, 1500. “Thomas Perier demourant en la parroisse St Just prez Vernon 
sur seine lequel apres ce qu’il oult jure etc qu’il n’estoit envers ne a quelque personne tenu subgect 
charge oblige ne ypothecque en aucunes rentes a heritage a vie comme plege ne autrement sinon es 
rentes foncieres etc de son bon gre etc confessa avoir vendu a heritage etc a Pierre Ducouldray 
bourgeois demourant en la parroisse St Vincent de Rouen absent…” 
61 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 30, 1500. “Jehan Leterrier demourant en la parroisse de Morigny lequel 
oultre et par-dessus xlii s vi d t de rente a heritage par an en deux parties qu’il disait devoir de sa 
vendue et obligation a Jehan Courault changeur demourant a Rouen l’une montant xxx s t de rente et 
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presumably knows this information but may expect it to be noted nonetheless as part 
of the formality of the contract to imbue it with more authority. It could also lend 
credibility to the notary in carrying through his professional duties to the letter, giving 
him some sort of claim to professional authority in his diligence to formula and 
process. More probable still is the reiteration and reconfirmation of those debts to 
witnesses—noted at the end of the contract and possibly passersby—to mitigate the 
risk of extending more credit. The confession of debts old and new highlights the 
public nature of the notarial contract, reinforcing its binding quality and giving the 
lender recourse in collection, theoretically.62 The very formulaic nature of the 
presentation of this information does not betray the importance of its presence to the 
contract. And, again, the notary is in a privileged position to facilitate proof of claims 
made, debts, and credit history. This is supported by a customary requirement in 
Normandy, as other regions in the north of France and the Low Countries, that 
transfers of immovable property be recorded in a public register (nantissement), 
which may also explain the growth and development of the financial markets in these 
regions.63 
                                                          
l’autre montant xii s vi d t de rente jouxte les lettres de ce faictes qui demeuraient en leur force et vertu 
etc et apres ce qu’il oult jure et aferme etc qu’il n’estoit charge oblige ne ypothecque envers quelque 
autre personnes en aucunes autres rentes sinon es rentes foncieres et anciennes qu’il doit a caue___ 
de ses heritages de son bon gre etc confessa avoir vendu afin d’eritage etc aud Jehan Courault 
absent etc Cest assvoir vii s vi d t de rente a heritage par an…” 
62 On contract enforcement, see Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late Medieval 
Marseille”; and Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments.” 
63 For more on nantissement, see Robert Besnier, “Le transfert de la propriété dans les pays de 
nantissement à la fin de l’Ancien Régime,” Revue du Nord 40:158 (Apr.-Jun.,1958): 195-200. For more 
on these records and their relation to the growth of the financial market, see van Bochove, 
“Configuring Financial Markets in Preindustrial Europe”; Briggs and Zuijderduijn, eds., Land and 
Credit; Munro, “The Medieval Origins of the Financial Revolution”; Van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and de 
Moor, “Small is beautiful”; and Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets. 
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Nearly 50 percent of all of the contracts formalized before the notaries in the 
period under consideration in this dissertation make reference to a prior agreement, 
overwhelmingly documented before notaries. In the case of a transfer of property, 
such references give legitimacy of ownership and right to enter into an agreement 
with the property in question. In contracts concerning a renegotiation of contracts or 
debts or the settlement of a dispute, the original contract establishes a timeline and in 
the case of a dispute, provides evidence or a target. They reinforce the binding 





With these observations in mind, we can continue with the breakdown of 
common contracts. To that end, a less common, but not uncommon, variation of the 
sale was an échange (exchange of property). Similar to the background of the 
Maugier-Lesueur contract above, an exchange usually took the form of a pair of 
contracts, which was in essence a mirrored pair of sales. For instance, on January 
25, 1500 the notaries of Rouen recorded two contracts, one immediately following the 
other, between “Noble man Pierre Leclerc, lord of Croisset and tax collector for the 
King our lord in Rouen,” and “Master Jean Lebas, priest and curé of St. Jacques of 
Lisieux,” both present. In the first contract, Leclerc gives 50 sous tournois in private 
rente collections, which he “says pertains to him and [claims] to have the right to take 
and collect each year on a house” to Lebas in exchange for “the fourth of a house 
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and patrimony seated in the city of Bernay in the parish of St. Croix.” In establishing 
the chain of title, Leclerc reveals that Alain De Brismarie had sold him the rente 
nearly three years prior: “this rente with other rentes the said lord of Croisset had and 
acquired from Alain De Brismarie per the letters drawn up before the said tabellions 
on the 9th day of August in the year 1497.”  
In drawing up this exchange contract, Leclerc hands over the papers 
pertaining to the rente to Lebas as part of transferring the right of ownership to the 
property that they signify: “And presently the said lord of Croisset gives to the said 
Lebas the letters of the creation of the said rente drawn up in the year 1491 on 
Thursday the 18th day of June before Robert Levigneron tabellion in Rouen with four 
pieces of writing on parchment making mention of the said rente for all be etc.” 
Leclerc gives Lebas not only the original contract drawn up nearly 10 years prior 
(which he had acquired from De Brismarie) but also supplemental documentation 
(“four pieces of writing on parchment”) which reinforces its validity even if its content 
is not explicit. Lebas reciprocates by giving Leclerc the “letters” (contract) pertaining 
to the fourth of the house “made and passed in the year 1458 on the 16th day of May 
before Guillebert Couppequesne then tabellion in Rouen.”64 Without knowing the 
                                                          
64 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 25, 1500. “Noble homme Pierre Leclerc Sr de Croisset et grenetier pour le 
Roy notre sire a Rouen baille en eschange afin d’eritage etc. a maistre Jehan Lebas prebtre cure de 
Saint Jaque de Lisieux etc…. que ledit grenetier disant lui appartenir et avoir droit de prendre et cueillir 
chacun an sur une maison et heritage… Laquelle rente avec autres rentes ledit Sr de Croisset avoit 
eubz et acquis de Alain De Bris__ jouxte les lettres passees devant lesdits tabellions le ix^e jour 
d’aoust l’an mil cccc iiii^xx dix sept// Et presentement ledit Sr de Croisset bailla audit Lebas les lettres 
de la creation de ladite rente passee en l’an mil cccc iiii^xx et unze le jeudi xviii^e jour de juing devant 
Robert Levigneron tabellion audit Rouen avec quatre pieces d’escripture en parchemin faisant 
mencion de ladite rente pour le tout estre etc….le quart d’une maison et heritage assis en la ville de 
Bernay en la parroisse de Sainte Croix dudit lieu… ledit Lebas bailla audit Leclerc vues lettres faictes 




value of the house, it is not possible to determine whether the exchange was an even 
trade or whether the trade favored one party in particular over the other as an act of 
charity or exploitation. Such questions are interesting and important to ask but not so 
easily answered.  
Following this, for reasons unknown but not unique to this case, this contract 
of exchange was insufficient to seal the deal, and we find, right below it in the 
register, the exact same contract in reverse: “The said master Jean Lebas sells, 
relinquishes, transfers, and gives up for patrimony etc. to the said Pierre Leclerc, 
present, etc.…”65 This particular exchange is interesting not only because it 
represents a model of this type of contract and further underscores my points about 
the crossing of geographical and social boundaries and the testimonial nature of 
contracts but also because it shows, through its parts, now familiar in light of 
contracts discussed above, that practices revealed in the contract and the scale of 
transfer--whether for 50 sous or 120 livres--do not vary significantly across traditional 
social divides—the nobleman is not investing more than the merchant.66  In other 
words, social factors do not have an obvious effect on practice or scale (economic 
factors presumably do).  
The rentes, sales, and exchanges, as common as they were, were also points 
of contention if one party did not live up to the terms. They were also frequently 
contested in relation to one party’s heir or heirs. The heirs might call into question the 
legitimacy of the debt or may dispute the alienation of property because the property 
                                                          
65 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 25, 1500. “Ledit maistre Jehan Lebas vend quicte transporte et delaisse 
afin d’eritage etc. audit Pierre Leclerc present etc. Le quart d’une maison et heritage…” 
66 Admittedly this is due, at least in part, to the nature of the merchants’ livelihood, requiring larger 
advances up front, to be sure, but that is beyond the scope of this study. 
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was not eligible to be sold or because the seller was not eligible to alienate the 
property. We saw hints of this overshadowing the Boullon-Duclos contract. In the 
case of disputing the alienation of property, the heirs would be embroiled in a 
clameur de marché de bourse or a réclamation (both being an objection to the sale 
and attempt to negate it and recover the property). These potential disputes cast a 
shadow on the negotiation of contracts and underscore the importance of the 
content. Such disputes will be analyzed at length in the chapters to come. 
 
Marriage Contracts, Wills, and the Acceptance of Lots 
 
Directly related to inheritance and designed to direct and facilitate transfer of 
property between generations, among common notarial contracts, in most parts of 
France and neighboring areas in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were 
marriage contracts and wills.67 However, in Normandy, marriage contracts and wills 
drawn up before notaries were extremely rare, and to the extent that they may have 
been drawn up, they would have been written on paper, which, being less durable 
than parchment, have not survived for this period.68 Indeed, in my sampling of nearly 
a third of the available notarial records for 1500, there were none. To put this in 
perspective, in Paris, in the same year, of 741 notarial contracts (from one notary of 
                                                          
67 Barbara B. Diefendorf, “Women and property in ancient régime France: Theory and practice in 
Dauphiné and Paris,” in Early Modern Conceptions of Property, eds John Brewer and Susan Staves 
(London, UK: Routledge, 1995): 170-93; and Susan Staves, “Resentment or resignation? Dividing the 
spoils among daughters and sons,” in Early Modern Conceptions of Property, eds John Brewer and 
Susan Staves (London, UK: Routledge, 1995): 194-218. 
68 Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tendances communautaires des époux’’; Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les 
tabellions et l’assouplissement de la norme’’; Jean-Claude Perrot, “Note sur les contrats de mariage 
normands,” in Structures et relations sociales à Paris au milieu du XVIIIe siècle, ed. Adeline Daumard 
and François Furet (Paris, France: Libraire Armand Colin, 1961): 95-97.  
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at least 60) there were 15 marriage contracts and 11 wills.69 Their absence from the 
notarial records do not mean that marriage contracts and wills were not utilized in 
Normandy. We have indirect evidence that they were. For instance, the Boullon-
Duclos contract references property passed to Boullon by his father on the instance 
of his marriage. We also find references to dowries, such as those of Katherine and 
Binette. Disputes over marriage agreements, especially over dowries and gifts, were 
also fairly common. We also find occasional references to wills in disputes such as 
that between the Mauclerc brothers (examined in chapter four).70 But families did not, 
as a general rule, formalize such contracts before notaries in this period. It has been 
suggested (for the eighteenth-century) that this was due to inflexibility of Norman 
custom governing family discretion in directing inheritance and transfer of property 
and that turning to a notary would thus not be worth the fee for his services.71  
All of this being said, it is difficult to study such contracts systematically, and 
only very general conclusions can be made at this time. Marriage contracts (where 
and however they were contracted) transferred property to daughters in advance in 
the form of a dowry and may have included part of or the entirety of their 
inheritance.72 Similarly, wills, even more rare than marriage contracts, directed much 
of the content within the divisions of inheritance dictated by Norman custom. More 
                                                          
69 There were 60 notarial études (offices) as of 1480. For more information and for a very useful guide 
into this record set, see Claire Béchu, Florence Greffe, and Isabelle Pébay, eds., Minutes du XVe 
siècle de l’Étude XIX: inventaire analytique (Paris, France: Archives nationales, 1993). 
70 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
71 Perrot, “Note sur les contrats de mariage normands.” 
72 Diefendorf, “Women and property in ancient régime France”; Staves, “Resentment or resignation?”; 
Jean Yver, “La rédaction officielle de la coutume de Normandie (Rouen, 1583). Son esprit” Annales de 
Normandie 36:1 Identités normandes. (1986): 3-36; Jean Yver, Égalité entre héritiers et exclusion des 
enfants dotés: essai de géographie coutumière (Paris, France: Éditions Sirey, 1966); Lemonnier-
Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée. 
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common than wills, but not contracted much before notaries for similar reasons, were 
gifts given between generations during their lifetime. The dispute between the 
Delamare brothers which opens this dissertation centers on a gift from their mother.73  
Disputes over inheritance, wills, gifts, and dowries--whether it was too much or too 
little in terms of the right of inheritance--were fairly common and were colored by the 
heirs remaining after the death of the relative, both in quantity and disposition. 
 More significant, in Norman notarial records, to the transfer of property through 
inheritance was the formal acceptance of divisions. The acceptance of “lots”--
divisions of property—by the heirs was meant to finalize negotiations over the 
division of inheritance to the extent there were any. There were instances of brothers 
exchanging parts of their lots and noting those in the acceptance. Similar to a will, an 
acceptance of lots reads like an inventory. Taking as an example the acceptance of 
lots by Jean Lambert the elder and Jean Lambert the younger of their brother Jean 
Lambert’s estate, we learn that the deceased was a mason residing in the parish of 
St. Laurent of Rouen who owned quite a lot of property in the parishes of Amfreville 
and Lamyvoye (present day Amfreville-la-Mi-Voie) outside of the city (roughly 6km 
from the center of Rouen).  
I will not list the composition of both lots because it is very, very dry reading, 
but the scale of how much property there was—more than a dozen parcels in each 
lot—is interesting. More interesting still is the process (and performance) of settling 
the divisions. According to the contract, the younger brother had divided the property 
in the two lots. It was then up to the older brother to inspect the two inventories, and 
                                                          
73 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. 
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possibly tour the properties, and then to choose first between them which one he 
wanted. The contract does not preview the decision and impersonally lists the 
composition of both lots: “he who will have the first lot….he who will have the second 
lot….” Only after both inventories are spelled out do we find out which one he chose: 
“Present to this were the said Jean Lambert the elder and Jean Lambert the younger, 
which after what the said Jean the elder heard, claimed to have seen the said lots, 
and considered them as good and duly made, and in accepting these, the said Jean 
Lambert the elder takes and chooses the said first lot, and leaving the said second 
lot, which remained by non-choice, to the said Jean Lambert the younger for them to 
enjoy and dispose of as of their proper true inheritance per the above said lots etc. 
and these two promise to hold etc. on the obligation of goods and patrimony etc.”74 
Like many of the contracts discussed above, the orality and performance captured by 
this contract is fascinating.  
One can easily imagine a contract which simply states which brother took 
which grouping of property, signed by both parties. And yet the contract specifies that 
both parties were present to the reading of both inventories (“Jean the elder heard”), 
that the choosing brother saw the lots, affirmed and accepted them as they had been 
created, and then after all of these necessary procedures, chose which one he 
                                                          
74 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 18, 1500. For another example see the acceptance of lots by the heirs of 
Martin Lecousturier, ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. “Ledit maistre Jehan Lebas vend quicte 
transporte et delaisse afin d’eritage etc. audit Pierre Leclerc present etc. Le quart d’une maison et 
heritage… Qui aure le second lot il aura… furent presents lesdits Jehan Lambert l’aisne et Jehan 
Lambert le jeune lesquelz apres ce que ledit Jehan l’aisne oult dit avoir veu lesdits lotz et iceulx tenus 
comme bien et deuement fais et en acteptant iceulx ledit Jehan Lambert l’aisne print et choisy ledit 
premier lot et partant ledit second lot fu et demoura par non choix audit Jehan Lambert le jeune pour 
d’iceulx joyr et disposer comme de leur propre vray heritage a la charge dessusdit desquelz lotz etc. et 
iceulx promist___ tenir etc. sur l’obligation de biens et heritages etc.” 
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wanted. The contract is then wrapped up with defensive clauses, including 
“promises,” to seal the decision. The notary and the parties are not just drawing up 
and ratifying the contract, they are capturing the performance of it. In this acceptance 
of lots, as in others, the younger brother divides the property, and the older brother 
makes the first choice between the two lots. Both brothers then formally acknowledge 
fair division and receipt of the patrimony. This contract is meant to be a final and 
binding agreement between the heirs and to quell a potential dispute because, more 
so than a dowry or a will, the heirs are actively engaged in the division.  
 
Notaries as Brokers of Information 
 
One of the more striking features of the notarial records is the wealth of 
information they furnish regarding the real estate and investment market of greater 
Rouen. Notaries would have been at the center of much of the flow of wealth and 
property, knowing for instance that an heir may have come into a property that he 
would not wish to keep or that another man may have a sum of money from a 
previous sale that he may be wanting to re-invest. This observation is not new, and it 
has been suggested that notaries were important brokers of information and were 
central to the operations of credit in later periods.75 My findings would suggest that 
                                                          
75 The literature on this is extensive but primarily conducted by economic historians. For more social 
history perspective, see James B. Collins, “The Notary as Rural Power Broker: Maître Coujard and 
Pierre Collenot, Syndic of Alligny,” in Social Relations, Politics, and Power in Early Modern France: 
Robert Descimon and the Historian’s Craft ed. Barbara B. Diefendorf (Kirksville, MO, USA: Truman 
State University Press, 2016): 107-33; Hardwick, The Practice of Patriarchy; Julie Hardwick, Family 
Business: Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France (Oxford, UK: 
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such an inquiry could be extended back to the early sixteenth century and that it 
might yield interesting results given Rouen’s status as a hub of a variety of economic 
activities.76 In addition to the contracts discussed above, a pair of sales will show 
some of the maneuvers in the real estate market to which the notary bore witness. In 
the first contract Jean Freret, residing in the parish of Moustieravillier, “of his good 
will, without any constraint whatsoever,” confesses to have sold a plot of land to Jean 
Conseil, “conseiller in the lay court” in exchange for payment of outstanding debts 
and 50 livres tournois in “current, to-date money.”77 We learn that Freret had 
acquired the land from Jacotin Defontaines “for the average price and conditions 
contained and plainly declared in letters regarding this drawn up and passed before 
Thomassin Baudouyn and Jean Leprevost tabellions in the Chastellenie de la Ferte 
                                                          
Oxford University Press, 2009); and Levi, Inheriting Power. For the economic perspective, start with 
the works of Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, in particular, 
Priceless Markets: The Political Economy of Credit in Paris, 1660-1870 (Chicago, IL, USA: University 
of Chicago Press, 2000); Dark Matter Credit: The Development of Peer-to-Peer Lending and Banking 
in France (Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press, 2019); “What do Notaries do? Overcoming 
Asymmetric Information in Financial Markets: The Case of Paris, 1751” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 154:3 (Sept. 1998): 499-530. The following are also very helpful starting points: 
Gelderblom http://www.its.caltech.edu/~rosentha/events/2015-Gelderblom.pdf (Accessed February 17, 
2019);  Zuijderduijn, Medieval Capital Markets; Van Zanden, Zuijderduijn, and De Moor, “Small is 
beautiful”; Briggs and Zuijderduijn, eds., Land and Credit; Christiaan Van Bochove and Heleen Kole,  
“Uncovering Private Credit Markets: Amsterdam, 1660-1809,” Tijdschrift voor Sociale en Economische 
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76 As a start to this line of inquiry, see Renault, “Tabellions et crédit dans les campagnes normandes 
au XVe siècle.’’ 
77 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 27, 1500. “Jehan Freret demourant en la parroisse de monstieraullier 
lequel de sa bonne voullente sans aucune containte congnue et confessa avoit vendu et transporte 
afin d’eritage etc tant pour lui que pour ses hoirs aians cauc___ a Jehan Conseil conseiller en court 
laie acquiseur present pour lui ses hoirs etc…lesquelz heritages led Freret acoit eu et acquis de 
Jacotin Defontaines par les prix moiene et condicions contenus et a plain declairez es lettres de ce 
faictes et passees devant Thomassin Baudouyn et Jehan Leprevost tabellions en la chastellenie de la 
ferte en bray le xiii^e jour de novembre l’an mil cccc iiii^xx dix sept lesquelles avec plusieurs autres 
lettres et escriptures qu’il avoit led vendeur… Que par et moiennant la somme de l L t paier present en 
monnant courant…apres ce que led vendeur oult jure et aferme par les foy et serment de son corps 
qu’il n’estoit envers ne a quelque personne tenu subgect charge oblige ne ypothecque en aucunes 
tentes a heritages ne a vie sommes de deniers ne autrement sinon es rentes fontieres et anciennes 
qu’il doit a cauc___ de ses heritages.” 
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en Bray the 13th day of November in the year 1497.” In assuming possession of this 
property, Freret had also assumed a rente attached to it contracted between 
Defontaines and Michel Feudry and Guillaume Letellier. At this time of his contract 
with Conseil, Freret owed 9 livres tournois in back payments on this rente as well as 
116 sous 6 deniers tournois to the lord of Moustieravillier. In now familiar terms, 
Freret turned over the contract of sale that he had from his purchase of the land from 
Defontaines along “with several other letters and documents which he had” to 
Conseil to possess with the land. The contract wraps up with a credit check from 
Conseil, “sworn and affirmed by the faith and oath of his body that he was not toward 
any person held subject, charged, obligated, nor indebted in any rentes in perpetuity 
nor for life, for any sums of deniers, nor otherwise, except in old property rentes 
which he owed because of his patrimonies.” 
This oath by Conseil is especially interesting because among the witnesses to 
this first contract was Robert Hervieu to whom Conseil turned around and 
immediately sold the land in the following contract. In this second contract “the said 
Jean Conseil” exchanges the property and debt acquired “this very day” from Freret 
for all of Hervieu’s holding in the parish of Quebeuf and Critot sur Cailly.78 Hervieu 
                                                          
78 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 27, 1500. “Led Jehan Conseil baille en eschange afin d’eritage etc a 
Robert Hervieu demourant en la parroisse de quebeuf etc Cest assavoir lesd heritages dessus 
bournez et declarez que led Jehan Conseil a ce jourdit euz et acquis de Jehan Freret….tous et tels 
heritages que led Robert Hervieu avoit es par es de Quebeuf et Critot sur Cailly et qu'il avoit euz a 
tiltre de don a lui fait par Guillaume Hervieu son pere pour les caves___ et jouxte les lettres dud don 
sur ce faictes et passees devant Pierre Cormer et Pierre Huchon tabellions en la sergenterie de cailly 
seubz les tabellions de Rouen le tiers jour de may l'an mil cccc quatre vings et quatorze lesquelles 
avec plusieurs autres lettres faisant mencion du droit que led Robert avoit en iceulx heritage led 
Robert bailla present aud Jehan Conseil… reserve led Hervieu par cested eschange une piece de 
terre nomme le camp des mares pour en faire et disposer a son bon plaisir et n'est en riens comprinse 
end. Eschange…por ce que l'eschange que baille led Hervieu aud Conseil est de plus grant valleur 
que celle que lui baille led Conseil__ icellui Conseil quicta descharga quicte et descharge pour lui etc 
led Robert Hervieu ses hoirs etc de xxx s t de rente a heritage par an et des arrieres de ce deuz en 
laquelle rente led Robert Hervieu s'estoit oblige de sa vendue a prenre sur tous ses biens et heritages 
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owned these lands “by title of gift made to him by Guillaume Hervieu, his father, for 
the reasons laid out in the letters pertaining to the said gift.” Unfortunately, this 
contract does not elaborate on these “reasons.” Pausing on this chain of title, we find 
an example of a transfer of property between generations in the form of a gift (again, 
more common than wills), which may have been a means to transfer specific property 
(perhaps with special sentimental value) to a child within the larger strictures of 
amount and value of property (no more than a third total to any person or persons 
other than the eldest son). As we have come to expect by now, the “letters” (contract) 
pertaining to this gift, “drawn up and passed before Pierre Cormer and Pierre 
Huchon, tabellions in the sergenterie of Cailly under the tabellions of Rouen, on the 
3rd day of May in the year 1494,” along with “several other letters making mention of 
the right that the said Robert had on these patrimonies” were handed over to Conseil 
as part of their deal. Not part of the deal, we come to find, is a piece of land “named 
the Camp des Mares” which Hervieu “reserves” from the exchange to “do with and 
dispose of at his good pleasure.”  
With these larger points settled, we learn that this is not the first deal between 
Hervieu and Conseil. On account of the fact that the exchange under this present 
contract is uneven—“the part of the exchange which the said Hervieu gives to the 
said Conseil is of greater value than that which the said Conseil gives to him”—
Conseil excuses a debt owed him by Hervieu (and his heirs). The debt in question, 
“30 sous tournois of rente in perpetuity per year and the arrears of this due, to which 
                                                          
envers led Conseil jouxte les lettres passees devant lesd tabellions le x^e jour d'avril avant pasques 
l'an mil cccc iiii^xx dix neuf que led Conseil rendy presentement quictes et casses acordant l'arrest de 
ce fait estre raye et adnulle promectant que jamais riens etc…. led Conseil acquicter led Hervieu de iiii 
L t pour une foys paier que icelui Hervieu doit a Colin Dufiefnay et Pierre Martin.” 
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the said Robert Hervieu was obligated…toward the said Conseil per the letters 
passed before the said tabellions on the 10th day of April before Easter in the year 
1499, which the said Conseil renders presently relinquished and broken according to 
the decision on this made, to be crossed out and annulled, promising that never 
anything etc.” From this relinquishment and formal breaking of the rente agreement 
and the crossing out and annulment of that contract we learn that this rente already 
had back payments (“arrears”) accumulating. Not knowing anything more of the 
relationship between Conseil and Hervieu, including possible kinship ties, the 
existence of these back payments suggests some discretion in carrying out the letter 
of the contract and some leniency in collection. This annulment tipping the balance 
back in the other direction, “the said Conseil acknowledges receipt from the said 
Hervieu of 4 livres tournois in a once only payment which this Hervieu owes to Colin 
Dufiefnay and Pierre Martin.” When Conseil assumes possession of Hervieu’s 
property, he assumes the debts attached to it, and Hervieu clears the outstanding 
debt to Dufiefnay and Martin—4 livres tournois—to square his deal with Conseil and 
even out the exchange. This set of contracts shows an apparent “flipping” of property 
on the part of Jean Conseil via a double exchange and a transfer of debt. At the 
center of this web of transactions, the notary witnesses the flow of property, cash, 
credit, and debt, and it is likely that the notary used this knowledge to help negotiate 
and broker this complex set of exchanges.79 
 
 
                                                          
79 For more on brokerage by notaries, see note 74 above. 
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Procuration and Power of Attorney 
 
Following the legal right to sell and establishing the capacity to buy, another 
important type of contract for understanding maneuverings and the capacity for 
initiative in the legal system was the procuration. Similar in certain respects to a 
tutelle (assigning a legal guardian to a minor) or a curatelle (assigning a legal 
guardian to an adult who was without capacity for one reason or another), which 
were examples of justice gracieuse registered through a court, the procuration was, 
generally speaking, the act of giving someone the legal right to act on someone 
else’s behalf, to represent this person before the law, and to manage his or her 
property. It may be useful to think of it similarly to a power of attorney. As a simple 
example of a procuration, we have the example of Robin Benard, huissier, residing in 
the parish of St. Croix of St. Ouen of Rouen, who “without the help of another person 
confides himself fully to the person of Jean Benard, his son, chariot-maker, residing 
in the parish St Maclou of said Rouen.”80 The reason for giving the right of 
procuration to his son, we learn, is consideration for “his antiquity, feebleness, and 
debility and that henceforth he does not have the wherewithal to govern himself and 
                                                          
80 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 24, 1500. “Robin Benard huichier demourant en la parroisse Sainte Croix 
de Saint Ouen de Rouen Lequel considerant son antiquite foiblesse et debillitation et que desormais il 
ne savoit gouverner lui et ses choses sans l’aide d’aucun soy confiant a plain a la personne de Jehan 
Benard son filz caron demourant en la parroisse St Maclou dud Rouen et pour la bonne amour qu’il 
avoit a lui de son bon gre confessa soy estre rendu et du tout denus et delaisse a sond filz avec tous 
et chacuns ses biens meubles et hertiages present et avenir ou qu’ilz soient assis sans riens en 
retenir etc… etc pour d’iceulx biens et heritages joyr et possider par led Jehan Benard ses etc a la 
charge de telles rentes debtes et charges que deubz en sont Ceste rendue faicte Tant a la charge 
dessusd Que par ce que led Jehan Benard qui present estoit se submist et promist trouver et g___rir a 
sondit père boire menger coucher feu lit et hostel et toutes ses autres nectessitez generallment 
quelzconques a lui convenables et necessaires durant sad vie et apres son decez et trepas le faire 
mectre et inhumer en terre sainte et fe fe et paier ses obsecles services et funerailles le tout bien et 
deuement obligez l’un a l’autre biens et heritages etc presents guillaume daubeuf et robin langloys.” 
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his things without the help of another person.” In the contract, it is clearly established 
that the person giving his (or her) legal rights to another person is of sound mind and 
not under coercion. Thus, Robin Benard, confiding himself to his son, “for the good 
love that he had for him, of his good will, confessed himself to be rendered in all 
things laid bare and left to his said son with each and every of his goods, moveable 
property and patrimonies, present and future wherever they be located without 
anything retained etc.” The procuration gives the right of full disclosure to the other 
person (“all things laid bare”) and total discretion over management of all assets--all 
property, fixed or moveable, family patrimony or acquired, including the right to sell or 
acquire new property and including any new property the individual might inherit 
(“present and future”). Although Jean Benard “enjoys and possesses” these “goods 
and patrimonies,” he also assumes, as procureur to his father, liabilities on the 
property and is “charged with paying such rentes, debts, and charges that are due” 
on it. Jean also assumes responsibility for his father’s care and well-being, to provide 
food and drink, heat, accommodation, and a place to sleep “all his other necessities 
generally, whatever are decent and necessary during his said lifetime.” The contract 
also stipulates Robin’s last wishes, requiring his son, “after his decease and passing, 
to do right by him and have him placed and buried in holy ground and to arrange for 
and pay his funeral services and final expenses.” 
Knowledge of a procuration may also come indirectly through a contract of 
sale as in the case of Guillaume Piart. In this contract, M. Guillaume Piart, priest, 
residing in the parish of Cany, confesses to have sold a piece of land to Jean Vastel, 
bourgeois, residing in the parish of St. Caudry le Vieil of Rouen. In establishing his 
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right to sell the land, Piart presents himself as procureur for Guillaume Piart, his 
father, residing in the same parish, and as such “having special power among other 
things to act on his [father’s] behalf and in this right thus he duly presented his 
procuration papers drawn up and passed before Gaultier Malherbe and Pierre Bazire 
tabellions in the city of Cany and Canyel on the 5th day of this present month of 
October.”81   
Presenting paperwork to prove a person’s right to sell property is familiar 
practice, following examination of the above contracts, but Piart is doing more than 
this; he is exercising power and authority transferred to him. As the prelude to the 
expected practice, he is presenting himself, “by virtue of and in exercising his power 
to him given by the said procuration letters.” He then establishes the chain of title and 
                                                          
81 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 29, 1500. “Messire Guillaume Piart prebtre demourant en la parroisse de 
Cany procureur de Guillaume Piart son père demourant en lad parroisse aiant pouvoir especial entre 
autres choses de faire ce qui eust ainsi qu’il a paru deuement par lettres procuratoires de ce faictes et 
passees devant gaultier malherbe et peirre bazire tabellions en la ville de Cany et Canyel le cinqueme 
jour de ce present moys d’octobre lequel messire guillaume piart par vertu et en usant du pouvoir a lui 
donne par lesd lettres procuratoires onfessa avoir vendu quicte transport et delaisse a fin d’heritage a 
tousjours a Jehan Vastel bourgeois demourant en la parroisse St Caudry le vieil de Rouen present etc 
une piece de terre contenant acre et demye assis en la parroisse de veulletes en hamel de heaulives 
bournes dc Jehan Danger le jeune dc led acquiseur comme aiant le droit des hoirs de feu Jehan 
Estambart db Morisse Daugier et db Greffin Desert en lieu de Bynet Gouel laqueele piece de terre led 
guillaume piart avoit eue et qcquise dud Morisse Daugier de lad parroisse de veulletes par le prix et 
jouxte les lettres de ce faictes et passees l’an mil cccc iiii^xx dix huit le xviii^e jour de fevrier devant led 
gaultier malherbe et led vendeur lors tabellions en lad viconte de Cany et Canyel et avec ce led 
vendeur en son propre et prive nom confessa aoit vendu quicte etc a heritage etc audit Vastel pour lui 
etc une autre piece de terre contenant cinq vergees assis en lad parroisse de veulletes end hamel 
bournes dc la piece cy dessus bournes dc pierre de daime dit duflo db guillaume gaillare et db le 
chemin du roy notre sire laquelle piece de terre derriere bournee led prebtre avoit eue et acquise dud 
Jehannet Duegier par le prix et jour les lettres de ce faictes et passees devant led Malherbe et Jehan 
Piart tabellions en la viconte de Caudebec en siege et sergenterie dud lieu de Cany l’an mile cccc 
iiii^xx xix le vii^e jour d’octobre lesquelles deux lettres led vendeur bailla presentement aud achecteur 
pour estre etc en force et vertu ceste vendu etc pour la somme de xx l t avec e s t au vin etc le tout 
franch ven es mains dud vendeur pour lui et sond père dont etc et promist led vendeur tant pour lui 
que oudit nom procuratoire garant etc lesd deux pieces de terre vers tous Cest assavoir lad piece 
dessus premiere bournee de tous troubles encombremens etc en tant qu’il y avoir du fait et obligation 
de lui et de sondit père seulle et lad autre pre de pire bourne aussy de tous troubles etc en tant qu’il y 
avoir de son fait et oblication seulle obligez en sond nom presente biens et heritages etc et par vertu 




his father’s right to sell the property, which he is exercising. To that end, his father 
had acquired the land in question from Morisse Daugier of the parish of Veulletes “by 
the price and per the letters of this drawn up and passed in the year 1498 on the 18th 
day of February before the said Gaultier Malherbe and the said seller, then tabellions 
in the said vicomté of Cany and Canyel.” Here we observe Piart the son as presiding 
notary over the purchase that his father had made in 1498 of the property that he is 
now selling on his father’s behalf. To this sale of his father’s land, he also adds “in his 
proper and private name” another piece of land, which he had acquired from 
“Jeannet Duegier for the price and per the letters drawn up before the said Malherbe 
and Jean Piart tabellions in the viconté of Caudebec in the siège and sergenterie of 
the said place of Cany in the year 1499 on the 7th day of October.” Piart hands over 
all paperwork for both sales to Vastel in transferring ownership.  
Unlike in the procuration contract above, this contract shows how the 
procuration may be exercised. Given that Piart the son adds a sale of his own to the 
contract to make a double sale, we see the deliberate separation of credit, assets, 
and liability in relation to his father’s property and his own at the same time as he 
establishes his legal right to act on behalf of (but separately from) his father. This 
separation is evident when he “promises as much for himself as in the said capacity 
of procureur” and when he denotes different “obligations” for each piece of land, the 
first “of him and of his said father alone,” guaranteeing “by virtue of the said 
procuration the goods, mobile and immobile of his father,” and the other “of his deed 
and obligation alone in his said name.” The contract is of further interest because of 
the blurring of jurisdictional boundaries—although this contract is formalized before 
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the notaries of Rouen, the chain of title for both previous acquisitions leads back to 
notaries of Cany in the vicomté of Caudebec. 
Of even greater interest as an example of the exercise of the right of 
procuration, we have Jean and Colin Guibel acting as procureurs and contracting a 
sale on behalf of Denise Levignereux, widow of Guillaume Guibel and sister and 
heiress of defunct Jean Levignereux. In this contract, property belonging to Denise 
Levignereux by right of succession from her brother is sold to Guillaume Vollant, 
“postulate in the lay court, residing in Rouen” for “the good love that the sellers say 
that the said widow and they have for the said Vollant and as a means of paying him 
back for several great joys and services that they say that he had done for them and 
the said widow.”82 In it we find the same familiar elements, including the 
                                                          
82 ADSM, 2E1 229, November 5, 1500. ‘’Jehan Guibel et Colin Guibel dit Giart procureurs de Denise 
Levignereux veufve de deffunct Guillaume Guibel dit Giart a present demourant en la parroisse 
d’aubourville sur seine seur et heritiere de deffunct messire Jehan Levignereux en son vivant prebtre 
demourant en lad parroisse d’aubourville aiant pouvoir entre autres choses de faire ce qui eussent 
ainsi qu’il a paru deuement par procuration passee le xxiii^e jour de may derriere passe devant Jehan 
Haineaulx et Jehan Levillain tabellions en bailliage de mauleurier lesquelz Jehan et Colin ditx Guibel 
par vertu et en usant dud pouvoir procuratoire a eulx donne par lesd lettres de procuration de leurs 
bons grez etc confessent avoir vendu quicte transport et delaisse afin d’eritage a tousjours a 
Guillaume Vollant postullant en court laye demourant a Rouen qui present estoit etc Cest assavoir xv 
s t de rente a heritage par an que lesd vendeurs disant appartenier a lad veufve de la succession et 
comme hertiere dud feu messire Jehan Levignereux Lequel deffunt avoit acquis lad rente de Jehan 
Foynare de la parroisse Saint Estienne de la rue aux tournelliers de Rouen Lequel Foynart avoit 
promis et s’estoit oblige garant lad rente et icelle amplir fournir faire valloir rendre et paier executoire 
sur tous ses biens et heritages jouxte et selon qu’il est contenur et plusaplus declare es lettres de ce 
faictes et passees l’an mil cccc lxxviii le xxiii^e jour d’octobre devant Guillaume Delamare et Pierre 
Vincent lors tabellions aud lieu de Rouen laquelle rente led Foynart avoit en paravant acquise de 
maistre pierre bazire prebtre cure de la fresnaye a prendre et avoir lad rente sur une piece de terre 
tant en masure que a camp contenant cinq vergees our environ assis en la parroisse St Pierre de 
Varengierville dont estoit lors tenant Jehan Yvelin dud lieu de Varengierville Lequel Yvelin confessa 
par lad acquisition estre tenant de lad piece de terre et estre debteur de lad rente Laquelle il promist 
lors rendre et paier par execution sur lad piece de terre jouxte et selon qu’il est contenu et plusapl 
declare es lettres de ce faictes et passees l’an mil cccc lvi le xxvii^e jour de mars avant pasques 
devant led pierre vincent et nicolas ogier lors tabellions aud lieu de rouen lesquelles deux lettres lesd 
vendeurs baillerer present aud acheteur pour estre et demourant en ses mains etc d’aussy grant force 
etc comme ilz pouvait estre es mains de lad veufve etc Ceste vendue etc pour la somme de xv l t qu 
lesd procureurs vendeurs en confessant avoir eue et receue et leur avoir este paiee comptant par led 
Guillaume Vollant accheteur et oultre pour la bonne amour que lesd vendeurs disant que lad veufve et 
eulx avoient aud Vollant et pour aucunement le recompencer de plusierurs grans plaisirs et services 
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establishment of legal right of procuration as well as the separation of assets and 
liability. Unfortunately, the contract does not elaborate on what the “joys and 
services” were which inspired such gratitude.  
The last thing that I want to draw attention to in this contract is the dual 
status—widow and sister/heiress—of Denise Levignereux. Although not acting in her 
own right directly in this contract (though it would not be too far-fetched to understand 
her influence behind the sale), her status as widow and her status as sister/heiress 
would each bring opportunities and limitations in relation to legal activities. And it 
would be even more interesting, as an avenue of future research, to trace whether 
and to what degree the same limitations imposed upon Levignereux as widow and 
sister/heiress would then be transferred onto her male procureurs and how they 
would then negotiate acting upon and within her rights. In future chapters I will trace 
not only women’s activities but also tease out any patterns related to their status, to 
the extent possible within the scope of this study. In any case, such examples of 
procuration and the exercise thereof add nuance to our understanding of practice 
and the capacity for initiative within the legal system and to the broader 
conceptualization of procureurs and their activities. 
Saving the best example of the exercise of procuration for last and as a good 
preview of the action to come in future chapters, I will examine the establishment of 
                                                          
qu’ilz disent qu’il avoit faiz a eulx et a lad veufve lui donnerer quicter et delaisser tous et telz arrieres 
qu’ilz sont et peuvent estre deubz de lad rente dont de tout etc et promistent lesd vendeurs oud nim 
procuratoire garant etc lad rente vers tous etc en tant qu’il y avoit du fait et obligation d’eulx de lad 
veufve et dud deffunct Levignereu seulle et que jamais riens ny sera demande par eulx ne par lad 
veufve en aucune manière et ace tenir etc lesd vendeurs obliger par vertu de lad procuration les biens 
et heritages d’icelle veufve etc presents Robin Langloys et Jacques Alain.’’ 
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Ysabel’s husband Guillaume Allart as her procureur, found within a contract of sale in 
which he exercises this right, in fine detail.83 This contract begins much like that of 
Piart or Levignereux. We learn that Guillaume Allart resides with his wife Ysabel in 
the parish of St. Ouen de Brueil in the hamlet of Malletot. We also learn that he is 
presenting himself as her procureur to act on that power, and has, per usual, 
presented the documentation of that right: “having power among other things to do 
what has been thus indicated in the procuration contract (“lettres procuratoires”), 
which he has laid before us and runs thusly…”  
Unlike the other examples of exercising the right of procuration that we have 
just seen, before we even get to the point of the contract and how he is exercising 
that power (and finish the opening sentence!), the notary transcribes the entirety of 
the procuration contract. To this point, in the contracts examined above, we have 
seen variations in sharing these prior contracts, giving a contract within a contract, 
but they have been paraphrases and summaries of those contracts. The fact that the 
notary transcribes the entire contract to the letter, including a description of the 
signatures at the end, underscores how unusual this situation was by contemporary 
standards. So much so that the notary felt the need to (or the other party insisted that 
he) include this contract within the primary contract, most likely as a defensive 
measure to justify and legitimate the sale.  
“To all those who will see or hear these letters,” it begins, drawing in the 
attention, both visually and orally, of anyone who may have an interest in its contents, 
                                                          
83 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’Guillaume Allart demourant en la parroisse de Saint Ouen de 
Brueil en hamel de Malletot procureur de Ysabel sa femme aiant povoir entre autres choses de faire 
ce qui euss ainsi qu’il aparu par lettres procuratoires sur ce facitres desquelles la teneur euss…’’ 
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“Pierre Dare, vicomte of Malletot and keeper of the vicomte’s seal of obligations, 
greetings.”84 This opening salutation highlights the public nature of the contract and 
the probability that it was read aloud. The jurisdiction and authority behind this 
contract, and its seal of approval, are fore-fronted. “Know,” he/it commands, “that 
before Oudin Leroux and Guillaume Sergent, tabellions sworn in the said parish, as 
they testified to us, were present Guillaume Allart and his wife at present residing in 
the parish of Saint Ouen de Brueil in the hamlet of Malletot.” The orality and 
performance that this contract captures are striking. The sworn (“official”) notaries of 
this jurisdiction formalize the contract before Dare’s authority, testifying that Allart and 
his wife had physically presented themselves before them to “solemnize” [sacraliser] 
her wishes, following the formality of being authorized by her husband to do so.  
The document continues, “After the said wife had been authorized by her said 
husband as to the passing of what was so, the said wife named Ysabel, daughter of 
Jean Bonamy and heiress of Jean Luce, made, named, ordered, and established as 
her procureur géneral and certain special messenger Guillaume Allart, her husband.” 
For as pompous as the lead up to this act of giving her husband the right of 
procuration is, we really have no indication that she or any of her relatives have any 
special social status, which we would expect to be presented for the audience as 
well. More suspicious, and perhaps explaining some of the caution underlying this 
                                                          
84 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’A tous ceulx qui ces lettres verront ou orront Pierre Dare 
viconte de Malletot et garde du seel des obligations de lad viconte salut. Savoir faisant que par devant 
Oudin Leroux et Guillaume Sergent tabellions jurez en lad si comme il nous ont tesmoigne furent 
present Guillaume Allart et sa femme a present demourant en la parroisse Saint Ouen de Brueil en 
hamel de Malletot apres ce que lad femme eust este auctorisee par sond mary quant a passer ce qui 
euss lad femme nommee Ysabel fille de Jehan Bonamy et heritiere de Jehan Luce feist nomma 
ordonna et estably son procueur general et certain messagier especial Guillaume Allart son mary.’’ 
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contract and the others it supports—its credit—is the question of Ysabel’s capacity to 
exercise her legal right in her own right. Unlike, the Benard procuration, which 
indicates a reason why Robin is passing the right to his son—his age and incapacity 
to manage his affairs on his own—we have no indicators, no justification as to why 
Ysabel feels compelled to take this fairly extreme action. And the build up and later 
transcription of this act—the shoring up of the defenses--underscores just how 
extreme it was. In short, her legal right and capacity are not unusual; the fact that she 
is transferring them to her husband is. But most importantly, the idea that this act of 
transferring her legal right to her husband is extreme—the gravity with which it is 
enacted—reveals the significance of women’s legal capacity in practice, setting aside 
theory, in contemporary eyes, in a time and place where the going is supposed to be 
especially tough for women, particularly married women. The fact that her husband is 
exercising her right in her name, in theory, should not change the limitations of that 
right.  
The interest of this procuration grows when she spells out exactly and in great 
detail what the exercise of her legal right entails, and it gives us a valuable 
perspective on the big picture playing field of practice. To her husband, “this 
constituent gave and gives full power, authority, and special mandate fully to be, to 
appear, to found, to plea for her and to represent, excuse, exempt her person in all 
courts and before all judges as much in the church’s court as in the secular court of 
whatever power or authority they use or are founded.”85 She grants her husband the 
                                                          
85 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’auquel icelle constituante donna et donne plain povoir auctorite 
et mandement especial d’estre comparoir fonder plaider pour elle et sa personne representer excuser 
exoniee en toutes cours et par devant tous juges tant de court d’eglise que de court seculliere de 
quelque povoir ou auctorite quelz usent ou soient fondez…’’ 
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right to represent and stand in for her before all forms of power or authority or to 
excuse and exempt her from such. The fact that she (or the notary) leaves this vague 
but comprehensive gives us a very clear picture of the variety of forms these powers 
and authorities could take and the very likely flux in their source and how they are 
“used,” especially in the context of post Hundred Years War Normandy.  
Where the contract is vague on the “powers and authorities,” it spells out in 
great detail what actions might be taken—and might already be in progress--in and 
out of court. Her husband has the right to represent her “in all of her causes that she 
negotiates, jobs, and affairs which she has or intends to have [had] set in motion or 
to set in motion.”86 He takes over her business past, present, and future. This and 
what follows suggest that she had quite an elaborate series of affairs or strategy 
going, and the relentless list in which all of these actions fall at once suggest how 
banal they are—not dressed up or elaborated upon—and how extreme giving all of 
this up would be. Her husband has the right to assume her affairs “as much in 
claiming as in defending, toward and against all persons her adversaries; to request 
all adjournments, summons, judgments, enforcements, and coercions.” Here we take 
note of the very active and adversarial nature of her affairs (or potential affairs and 
embroilments) in court. The list continues with the right to request “deliverance of 
                                                          
86 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’en toutes ses causes qu’elles negoces besongnes et affaires 
qu’elle a ou entend a avoir meues et a mouvoir tant en demandant comme en deffendant vers et 
contre toutes personnes ses adversaires de requerir tous adjournements citements arrestz executions 
et contrainctes delivrance de namps et de fiefz renvoy de cause de cconvenir reconvenir demander 
nyer cognoistre advouer desavouer administrer tesmoings lettres actes ascriptures es instrumens 
mectre en fourme et manière depreuve dire contre dire tesmoins leurs ditz de deppositions blasmes et 
se opposer en tous cas et a toutes fins poursuites et soustenir son opposition ou oppositions 
apellations garants or garans prendre fais et charge de garant de bailler raisons et repplications tant 
de fait comme de droit aux oppositions fais et articles de partie adverse jurer en l’ame de lad 
constituante et faire tous sermens comme ordre de droit requiert et enseigne…’’ 
142 
 
deposits and dues, referrals to convene, reconvene, claim, deny, to know, to avow, to 
disavow, to administer, to witness contracts [lettres], acts, writings, and instruments 
[contracts], to put in form and manner of proof, to support or contradict witnesses, 
their words, their depositions and accusations.”  
This section of the list, along with that following, highlight the importance of the 
spoken word, acts of witnessing and contesting what is seen, said, and known. Her 
husband has the right to “oppose pursuits in all cases and to all ends and to support 
her opposition or oppositions, appeals, guarantees made or those to take, and is 
charged with being answerable to give reasons and responses, as much of fact as of 
law, to the oppositions made and articles of the adverse party, to swear on the soul of 
the constituent and to take all oaths as order of law requires and instructs.” Striking 
again is the active and adversarial nature of the pursuits, but more striking still is the 
degree to which the husband is taking over her word. Not only does he have the right 
to administer her affairs and represent her in legal actions, he is to take responsibility 
for swearing on her soul and taking all oaths on her behalf. Here again is the extreme 
character of the contract, and it reveals the pervasiveness of the legal system and 
interactions with the law in daily life.  
Her husband is to be her eyes, her voice, and her ears: “to hear laws, rulings, 
judgments, interlocutions, and definitive sentences; to appeal and to complain of 
wrongs, griefs, and sentences; to pursue and sustain the appeal or appeals, to renew 
them or renounce them, to endeavor to undertake and to raise a brief or briefs and all 
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manners of marché de bourse as other claims seen and shown.”87 This section of the 
list is a great window into the spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution that will 
be examined in later chapters and the discretion and decisions that made up 
practice. They also help to place the court within a much broader context of legal 
activity. To reinforce this point further, the husband has the right “to decline court and 
judge and to make known all other things pertaining to the deed according to usage 
in pleading, and also to substitute and establish in his stead one or several 
procureurs who have the power to dispossess.” He could decide to go to court or not 
as needed, as best suits the strategy, and he, as procureur, could hire another 
procureur and further transfer her legal right to one with more expertise as needed.  
Ysabel not only transfers her personal legal rights to her husband, to conduct 
her affairs and represent her in eyes, ears, mouth, and soul, to defend and pursue 
her interests, but she also, as would be expected based on the usual procuration 
contract, transfers her property rights. “Thus it pleases her, and the said constituent 
especially gave and gives these powers to the said Guillaume Allart her husband to 
take over and apprehend the usage and possession of all of her property, rentes, and 
revenues which belong and pertain to the said Ysabel by the death and passing of 
the late Jean Luce as much in Frichemesnil as those parties to come, and to give 
away, affirm, or rent out to such person or persons and for whatever price and sum 
                                                          
87 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’de oyr droitz arrestz jugements interlocutoires et sentences 
diffinitives d’appeler et lui dolloir de tors de griefz et sentences poursuivre et soustenir leur appel ou 
apeaul les renouveller ouy renoncer se mestier est de prendre et lever brief ou briefz et toutes 
manieres de marche de bourse que autres demandes veues monstreset obstencions de lieur eslire 
domicille decliner court et juge et de faire dire toutes autres choses appartenant au fait a stille de 
plaider et deppendent de substituer et establir en lieu de lui ung ou plusieurs procureurs qui ait ou 
aient le povoir dessaisir ou partie d’iceluy.’’ 
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as may please him and to sell them and to renovate as seem good to him and to 
have drawn up the contracts of sale such as pertain to the case and generally to do 
as many of the things above-stated and each of them as if the above-stated 
constituent would do them or could do them if present in her person as the case 
required and mandated.”88  He is assuming her credit, and is assuming her right as 
her, as she would or could act, depending on the circumstances. All restrictions 
within the law that would apply to her are still in effect, and he is responsible, as her 
representative, for all judgments and fines.  
This is indeed an extraordinarily detailed list of the myriad kinds of legal 
activity that she could be involved in, but as extraordinary as the document is, there 
is no indication that the powers she is claiming are exceptional or beyond what would 
be expected of a married woman. What is exceptional, given that this procuration is 
documented (fully, not as an excerpt as would be expected) in the context of a 
property sale, is these powers are spelled out so comprehensively and explicitly and 
transferred totally and completely to her husband to exercise in her stead. The 
contract of sale is documenting her husband’s extraordinary right to act on her behalf 
not her extraordinary rights. 
                                                          
88 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’ainsi qu’il lui plaira et par especial lad constituante donna et 
donne par ces presentes psuissance aud Guillaume Allart son mary de prendre et aprehender la 
saisine et possession de tous les heritages rentes revenues qui sont et appartennent a lad Ysabel de 
la more et trespas de deffunct Jehan Lure tant a frichemesnil que es parties devenir iceulx heritages 
bailler afermer et a louage a telle personne ou personnes et par tel prix et somme qu’il luy plaira et 
iceulx vendre et adeverer se mestier et bon lui semble et d’en faire passer lettres de vendre telles que 
au cas appartendent et generallement de faire autant es choses dessusd et chacunes d’icelle comme 




The procuration contract wraps up with a reminder that the notaries are 
relating all this to the vicomté. Further transcribed are the date “this was done,” which 
was nearly 11 years prior “in the year of grace 1489 on the 14th day of February,” and 
the witnesses: “in the presence of Jean Bots and Guillaume Dubus.” And, again, the 
notary drawing up the contract of sale, in which this procuration appears, leaves 
nothing out and notes the signatures, which authenticate and bestow authority upon 
the contract: “thus signed LeRoux and Sergent.”89 The final note to add here is the 
timing. A procuration could be temporary or confined to a specific case, as in hiring 
an expert to represent someone in court or in a settlement, but it could also be 
indefinite and all-encompassing as in the case of Ysabel. In the latter case, the 
procuration could be revoked, despite the total transfer of legal right, but 11 years 
later, the force of the decision is still in full effect. 
The contract of sale then resumes much in the same manner as that of Piart 
and Levignereux: “Guillaume Allart…[procuration]…which as much in his private 
name as in the said name and in virtue of the said procuration that he affirmed to be 
in virtue without having been revoked and using the power contained in these letters, 
confessed to have sold…to Jean Auber, residing in the parish of Frichemesnil, 
present, Be it known a piece of land containing an acre and a half vergee or etc. 
seated in the parish of Biennays…which…the said seller said and affirmed pertained 
                                                          
89 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’ce fut fait l’an de grace mil iiii^c iiii^xx et neuf le xiiii^e jour de 
fevrier presents a ce Jehan Bots et Guillaume Dubus ainsi signe LeRoux et sergent…’’  For more on 
signatures and authentication of notarial contracts, see Isabelle Bretthauer, “Actes et registres du 
tabellionage ancien d’Alençon (1352-1404),” in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et 
Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 253-
77; Jeay, “Les seings manuels des tabellions”; Poncet, “La monarchie et l’institution du tabellionage.” 
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to his said wife…for the sum of 17 livres tournois.”90 Allart confirms his right to sell 
the property and confesses having done so. The notary then draws up the details to 
formalize and seal the deal.  
 
The Purpose of Contracts: Defensive Tactics 
 
As we have seen so far, having a notary draw up a written contract was an 
important means of memorializing, enforcing, and reinforcing an agreement, and 
more significantly, the contracts facilitated in making (or repairing damage to) social 
relations. On the one hand, they enabled unequal creditor-debtor relationships by 
reinforcing potentially predatory contracts, but on the other, they also linked people 
together in a larger web which encouraged renegotiation to mitigate consequences of 
breaches of contracts. In this sense, notarial contracts, commemorating or recalling 
the original agreement (oral contract), were tools which served significant defensive 
purposes—legal, social, and economic. All the more important was writing a good 
contract, especially if the parties were more distant, geographically or socially.  
For the sixteenth century there exist a pair of texts put together by Pardoux du 
Prat which may be considered good practice guides aimed at the (emerging) 
                                                          
90 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. ‘’Guillaume Allart demourant….lequel tant en son nomme prive 
que oud nom et en vertu de lad procuration quil aferma estre en vertu sans avoir este revocquee et en 
usant du povoir contenu en icelles confessa avoir vendu et de quicte transport et delaisse afin 
d’eritage pour lui sad demme et pour leurs heritiers etc. a Jehan Auber demourant en la parroisse de 
frichemesnil present// C’est assavoir une piece de terre contenant une acre et demye vergee ou etc 
assise en la parroisse de biennays dc aud acquiseur a cause d’une autre acre et demye vergee de 
terre qui est la moictie de neuf vergees de terre dc Jehan Bessin et Jehan Boullent db le chemin des 
baus le conte et db le sr de clere laquelle acre et demye vergee de terre led vendeur disait et afermoit 
appartenir a sad femme Ceste vendue quictance etc pour la somme de xvii l t…’’ 
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profession (notarial practice was old but the profession as such was in a state of 
development and shoring up its boundaries). His Theorique de l’art des notaires and 
Pratique de l’art des notaires are meant to be comprehensive guides to assist 
notaries in their profession, including templates of various contracts. They also 
provide us with an indication of the considerations factored into drawing up contracts 
or “instruments,” as they were commonly known.91 He warns that “omissions” or 
“imperfections,” however minor they may seem, are not “vain” concerns, but rather 
arise from current events: “I know of a lawsuit today, long-running at that, which 
began as a result of an omission made by the negligence or haste of the notary. The 
notary must painstakingly ensure that he builds and fortifies his instrument so that he 
not be insulted or mocked and that he avoid all defect.”92  
Elaborating on this point and emphasizing the importance of spelling out the 
details of the terms, rather than leaving them implicit in the local custom, he warns 
that “it could easily come about that if the instrument is taken far a-distance by the 
parties and is then questioned, the judge of that place being ignorant of the custom 
would condemn the debtor to pay prematurely [based on a specific, long-winded 
example]…and therefore it is not such a matter of so little importance, which must be 
                                                          
91 Pardoux Du Prat, Theorique de l’art des notaires, pour cognoistre la nature de tous Contracts, et 
tous les points de droit qui concernent l’estat, et office de Notariat. Nouvellement traduite de Latin en 
Francoys et succintement adaptee aux Ordonnances Royaux et depuis reveu et augmenté (Lyon, 
France: La veuve Gabriel Cotier, 1571); and Pardoux Du Prat, Pratique de l’art des notaires, 
contenant les formes de minuter et groffoyer toutes sortes de Contracts, tant és matieres 
Ecclesiastiques que Temporelles. Nouvellement traduite de Latin en Francoys et succintement 
adaptee aux Ordonnances Royaux et augmenté de nouveau (Lyon, France: La veuve Gabriel Cotier, 
1571). 
92 Du Prat, Pratique de l’art des notaires, 10. “obmission, ou imperfection n’aneantiroit l’instrument”; 
“Car ceste manière de questions ne sont vaines ne faintes : mais adviennent des affaires mesmes. De 
quelle sorte je say un proces aujoud’huy demené long temps y a meu à cause d’une obmission faite 
par la negligence, ou hastiveté du notaire. Le notaire doit mettre peine de si bien munir, et fortifier son 
instrument qu’il ne soit calomnié, ou moqué : et qu’il evite tout defaut.” 
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despised by the notary if sometime some doubt or hindrance could issue forth from 
this.”93 This example also implies the movement of people and contracts, the 
potentially (and assumed) impersonal social relations between parties who lived at 
significant distances and in different communities and legal cultures or systems (and 
the role of the contract in bridging those geographical and social distances), and 
most importantly the role the written contract is playing in witnessing the original 
agreement in its original terms. The written contract, and especially the notarial 
contract which “looked” more official with its format and seal, was more portable than 
the witnesses to the original contract.  
The purpose of the notarial contract was to bear witness, in a broadly 
recognizable fashion, to the original agreement to ward off potential challenges to 
that agreement across time and space (this parallels the writing of customary law 
more generally—contract or law become less flexible to memory and interpretation 
when fixed through writing). Du Prat underscores this point in defining the 
“instrument”: “By this word INSTRUMENT is…understood all that can instruct legal 
proceedings. And therefore witnesses and persons are reputed as Instruments by the 
law. And one must understand this word generally…instrument is a certain solemn 
piece of writing, well and duly ordered, made, and passed publicly for memorandum 
and by the hand of an authentic, public and approved person.” He specifically 
                                                          
93 Du Prat, Pratique de l’art des notaires, 11-12. “….Il pourroit d’onq facilement advenir, que si 
l’instrument estoit porté és parties loingtaines et estoit debatu, le juge d’iceluy lieu ignorant telle 
coustume condamneroit le debteur à payer au septiéme moys: qui (à dire vray) auroit encores en an 
entier de terme. Et pourtant n’est il chose de si petite importance qui doive estre mise à mespris par le 
notaire si quelquefoys quelque doute ou empeschement pouvoit issir d’iceluy.” 
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contrasts the “instrument” with private writings.94 Again, an authentic and official 
notarial contract is recognizable, according to Du Prat, by its format and formulae—
including the date, place, witnesses, the name and signature of the notary—is public 
(as opposed to secret or private), and written by an officially-appointed professional 
(notaries were regulated offices by the time Du Prat was writing). As this definition 
would suggest by the words “authentic” and “public,” concerns about witnessing 
ultimately derived from bigger concerns about fraud, which was a major pre-
occupation in the early sixteenth century. Reforming legislation made a point of 
addressing witnessing and fraud, and Francis I went so far as to make bearing false 
witness a capital crime in 1539.95 In sum, a good contract was not only well-crafted 
and properly prepared, witnesses and all, to be free of ambiguity but also to remain 
above doubt and dispute, to mitigate challenges to it. 
A good contract affects not only the agreement itself therefore but future 
agreements as well. We have seen that an important element for many contracts is 
the chain of title and the credit check. If a contract is compromised, then subsequent 
contracts resting on the validity of that original are undermined and may risk a 
domino effect that threatens a more elaborate web of credit, economy, and social 
relations. The discussion to come of disputes will bring this risk more clearly into 
                                                          
94 Du Prat, Pratique de l’art des notaires, 7. “Par ce mot INSTRUMENT est...entendu tout ce qui peut 
instruire le proces. Et pourtant les tesmoignages, et les personnes son reputez Instrumens par la Loy. 
Et faut entendre ce mot generalement: autrement, selon le signifié qui est le plus en usage, 
instrument, est certaine escriture solonnelle, bien, et deuëment ordonnee, faite, et passee 
publiquement pour mémoire, et ce par main de personne authentique, publique et approuvee…” 
95 For more on false witnesses and measures against them in practice, see Aurélien Peter, “Prendre la 
mesure de paroles insaisissables: Les faux témoins mentionnés dans les archives du parlement de 
Paris (XVIIe-XVIIIe)” Histoire et Mesure 31:2 (2016): 107-40. 
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focus. Suffice it to say that the shadow of dispute hung over the process of entering 
into an agreement and drawing up a contract.  
It can be reasonably assumed that part of the intrinsic value of a contract was 
its enduring and binding quality. That is, formalizing an agreement before a notary 
was an implicit, and sometimes explicit, defensive tactic. Ideally, the contract 
protected the interests of both parties, but on occasion, it is clear that one party had 
more to lose should the agreement collapse. Moreover, with the shadow of dispute in 
mind, the defensive nature of the contract comes to the fore. That a contract was a 
strategic, defensive move is most apparent in the unusual contracts and the 
deviations from the typical. In a similar vein to Binette and Robine’s assurance that 
neither they nor their heirs will lay claim to the property their husbands alienated, 
noted above, we observe other examples of defensive parts of a contract. In one 
contract in particular, Cardin Millet, “of the trade of cloth maker, residing in the parish 
of Roucherolles sur le Vinier, confessed to have sold…to Cardin Gosmont, sergent of 
the King our lord in the sergenterie of Cailly, residing in the parish St. Nigaise 
[Nicaise] of Rouen, present, etc. two pieces of land of wood and brush seated in the 
said parish of Roucherolles in the Buret Pass.”96 The land is sold for 17 livres 10 
sous tournois, but there is further interest in the transfer of the property. The land is 
held from the monastery of St. Ouen (as indicated in chapter one, one of the largest 
                                                          
96 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 26, 1500. “Cardin Millet du mestier de drippier demourant en la parroisse 
de Roucherolles sur le Vinier Lequel confessa avoir vendu quicte etc a heritage etc a Cardin Gosmont 
sergent du roy notre sire en la sergenterie de Cailly demoutant en la parroisse Stu Nigaise de Rouen 
present etc deux pieces de terre en boys et buisson assis en lad parroisse de Roucherolles en triege 
du buret…led vendeur disant lui appartenir de la succession de ses predecesseurs Ceste vendue etc. 
pour la somme de xvii l x s t avec xxx s t au vin etc franch ven etc dint etc et promist led vendeur etc 
garant etc lesd deux pieces de terre vers tous etc par en faisant et paiant par led acheteur etc au feur 
et prix de xx d t de rente seigneurialles pour chacune acre partie et du nombre de plus grant rente 
seigneurialle deue ausd religieux de St Ouen a l’office du tresorier du couvent d’icelle abbaye.” 
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land-holders in the area) and taxes are due “at the sum and price of 20 deniers 
tournois of seigneurial dues for each acre, part of the greater seigneurial dues owed 
to the said monks of St. Ouen, at the office of the treasurer of the convent of this 
abbey.” Millet shares the chain of title and establishes his right to sell in saying that 
the land in question “pertains to him from the succession of his predecessors.” His 
right to sell the land would have instantly been met with very strict rules in Norman 
custom governing the alienation of family land. Notably his son would have had a 
claim on this land, and so “present to this sale is Guillaume Millet, of the said trade of 
cloth maker, son of the said seller, residing the parish of St. Vivien, who for the good 
love that he bears for his said father, at this present sale and transfer consents and 
agrees and promises and swears that never on the two pieces of land will he demand 
or reclaim or cause to be demanded or reclaimed anything either by title of clameur 
de marché de bourse or otherwise in any manner whatsoever.”97 In this case, 
Guillaume Millet is explicitly called in to relinquish any claim on the property that his 
father is selling. The risk and shadow of future dispute hangs over this contract and is 
specifically named—clameur de marché de bourse. The son’s statement is designed 
to pre-empt this threat. 
As another example of the defensive nature of contracts, there is an intriguing 
case of a man taking in a widow of two husbands and the agreement between this 
man and this woman not to make any claim or have any claim to the other’s property:  
                                                          
97 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 26, 1500. “present a ce Guillaume Millet dud mestier de drappier filz dud 
vendeur demourant en lad parroisse St Vivien Lequel pour la bonne amour qu’il avoit a sond père a 
ceste presente vendue et transporte se consenty et acorda et promist et jura que jamais esd deux 
pieces de terre riens ne demandera ne reclamera ne fera demander ne reclamer soit a tiltre de 
clameur de marche de bourse ne autrement en quelque manière que ce soit.” 
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Jeanne, widow of the late Pierre Desforges and before that of the late Guillebert 
Lechevalier, residing in the parish of St. Jean of Rouen with and in the house of 
Henry Duparc, on the one hand, and the said Henry Duparc, on the other, both 
parties being present freely consent and agree that whatever dwelling or residence 
that they have made together in the past and that they will make together in the future 
does not happen to the prejudice or damage of the other and that for this reason they 
cannot claim any common share of goods in acquisition. Confessing otherwise, that 
by friendship and courtesy the said Duparc had placed and welcomed the said widow 
with him in his hôtel for no other reason than to help her and see to her needs as a 
gesture etc. Robin Langloys and Robert Poree bearing witness.98 
 
In essence, this agreement is designed to prevent any claim to communal sharing of 
property resulting from their cohabitation.99 These defensive strategies lead us closer 




Notarial records hint at what must have been tense situations that had the 
potential to turn into a dispute but nevertheless remained in a pre-dispute phase, 
resulting in re-negotiations of terms. Such is the case where parties had negotiated 
and entered into a contract that was subsequently not fulfilled. The lack of fulfillment 
of that contract leaves no traces of a dispute but rather that of a re-negotiation 
formalized before a notary. To take one instance in particular, involving residents 
                                                          
98 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 3, 1500. “Jehanne veufve de feu Pierre Desforges et euparavant de 
deffunct Guillebert Lechevalier demourant en la parroisse saint jehan de rouen avec et en l’ostel de 
Henry Duparc d’une part et led Henry Duparc d’autre lesquelz vouldit consentiront et acorderont et 
partes presentes veullent consenter et acordent que quelque demeure ou residence qu’ilz avoit faicte 
le temps passe et qu’ilz furent le temps avenir l’un avec l’autre ce ne leur faicte ne a aucun d’eulx 
aucun prejudice ou dommage et que a ceste cause ilz ne puisse avoir ne demander quelque 
communite de biens en conquestz Ne autrement confessant oultre lad veufve que par amytie et 
courtoisie led Duparc l’avoit mise et acueillier a demourer avec luy et en son hostel pour aucunement 
lui aider et subvenir a ses neccessitez en tesmoin etc presents Robin Langloys et Robert Poree.” 
99 Terrien notes that co-habitators, and he gives an example of men, share claim to communal 
property after a certain amount of time. That this could apply to women, given the strictures of Norman 
custom, is striking and seems like a rather large loophole. 
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from Rouen and the surrounding area, representatives of parties of a contract made 
in 1470 formalize an agreement about outstanding debt of 8 mynes of wheat out of 
an original 20. Here the son and heir of Jean Ango, of the same name, comes to 
terms with Simon Haset, representing the party of Colin Devos who owed the 8 
mynes to Jean Lemachon, the original party to the contract with Jean Ango the elder. 
In this record, Jean Ango the younger formally acknowledges receipt and fulfillment 
of the principal and arrears. No mention is made of legal proceedings in or out of 
court or of a legal professional aside from notaries, which we have come to expect 
(and will soon see) from other formalized agreements that have followed legal 
activity.100   
In a similar example, Jean Asse, residing in the parish of St. Germain-sous-
Cailly, “to the end that he be, and remain, released and discharged toward Simon 
Delamare, of the parish of St. Vivien of Rouen, of the sum of 10 livres tournois” which 
was still due to Simon based on promises “made by this Asse to the said Simon” per 
the deal they made when “contracting the marriage of this Simon to Ysabel, sister of 
the said Jean Asse, of his good will confesses” to have agreed to 20 sous tournois of 
rente per year. However, this rente is not as straight forward as it seems. Asse 
promises to “render and pay in full” the outstanding sum of 10 livres tournois plus 
“arrears, pro-rated, and all costs.”101 The rente is essentially a way to tack on 20 sous 
a year to the final payment—adding up the arrears—whenever Asse finally makes 
good. It sweetens the deal to let the debt rest and buy Asse some time. No obvious 
legal dispute has transpired, but Simon Delamare nevertheless holds Jean Asse 
                                                          
100 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 3, 1500.  
101 ADSM, 2E1 229, November 9, 1500.  
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accountable to their previous agreement. They re-negotiate the debt and formalize 
the terms for the fulfillment of the previous contract in a new contract. These re-
negotiations edge us nearer to the spectrum of dispute activity and offer an 
alternative option to open hostilities.  
We see these re-negotiations most clearly in cases of debt. In addition to 
inheritance, debt was a major matter of contention in civil disputes. As we have seen, 
people often entered into debt through contracts, which also stipulated pay off terms. 
Collecting debts made under contracts that had not been fulfilled represent another 
“shade” of the spectrum of disputing.102 What is more surprising about many of the 
cases where debts go unpaid are not the open legal disputes which come of them 
but rather the re-negotiation of the debt and agreement to pay it off, even among 
heirs of the parties to a previous contract. The formalization of the re-negotiation of 
the debt was not a contract that reveals an open dispute, especially not heard before 
a court (though it could have been as a breach of contract, presumably), but it 
reveals an acknowledged problem and attempts to resolve it and come to another 
agreement.103 Disputing in or outside of court is therefore best understood on a larger 





                                                          
102 Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce; and Elise Dermineur, “Trust, Norms of Cooperation, and the 
Rural Credit Market in Eighteenth-Century France” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 45:4 (Spring 
2015): 485-506. 





This chapter has been an introduction to notaries and their records and has 
provided necessary context for an in-depth analysis of civil disputes. I have shown 
not only some of the most common types of contracts but also underlined their 
importance and some of the strategy behind them. Ultimately, formalizing an 
agreement before a notary was a choice among several options, but it had important 
signification in a legal system that was increasingly privileging documentation. And 
yet, in spite of this trend, we notice the persistence of orality and performance in the 
contracts. Notarial records are integral for understanding legal practice and will have 
a sustained presence in the chapters to come because they offer information about 
civil disputes and legal maneuvering inside and outside of the court systems. 
Whether it is a formalization of settlement or arbitration or even a well-crafted 
contract or will—which among other reasons, is designed to prevent disputing—
documents like these complete the picture the court records paint, not only in terms 
of biographical information but also in terms of procedure. 
One of the more important things we can conclude from this lengthy 
discussion of contracts is that people’s conceptions of property and ownership, 
across a significant representation of society of greater Rouen in the late fifteenth 
and early sixteenth centuries were not rigid or standardized to the same degree as 
they would be in later periods. In particular, we can confirm that lineage property held 
a special status for people and preserving it was of broad concern, as will be 
evidenced by the overwhelming number of clameurs taken to recover it in the next 
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chapter. This point follows the strictures of Norman customary law. That said, there is 
far more complexity to the story as evidenced by the contracts discussed in this 
chapter which showed how often people, both men and women, alienated this 
property and took measures to make the agreements in which they alienated that 
property endure. Important in this enduring effort were the fact that the contracts 
were documented before notaries. It may be said then that the transition to privileging 
documentation facilitated the flexibility that oral agreements could not in the specific 
case of alienating lineage property. Having renunciations to claims on such property 
in writing, witnessed, and bearing the notarial seal surely made them less prone to 
challenge than oral promises. The impetus to have more flexibility in the 
management of property on the part of the people may have, in turn, helped drive the 
privileging of notarial contracts and documentation more generally. This trend 
suggests, and is supported by the contracts above, that social relations were also 
relatively flexible, as people entered into contracts with people more distant, socially 
and geographically, from them, and notaries, as important brokers of information, 
facilitated the more flexible networks.  Of great significance, I have also shown that 
women not only had more agency than has been assumed, but they were engaging 
in forming the more expansive social relations. They were also heavily involved 
alongside men in imbuing value into documentation and in co-creating the observed 
emerging documentary practices within the broader legal culture.  
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Chapter Three  
Instigating a Dispute: Offensive Behaviors and Initiatives Taken Prior to 




The previous chapter has shown various agreements and contracts that 
people formalized before a notary. It even revealed re-negotiations of contracts as an 
alternative to disputing. It also showed the enduring orality and performance in 
written practices. The co-existence of oral and written practices in the legal culture of 
greater Rouen and the value that people imbued into these practices will become 
more evident in this chapter. What follows will be an examination of legal action taken 
in advance of, or as an alternative to, appearing before a court. These actions shall 
be considered part of an open dispute, and many of them were “pre-court” 
maneuvers with their distinction from activity before a court being largely a matter of 
timing. I have chosen to draw this fine distinction to highlight the initiative of people in 
civil disputes and to clarify the role of the court in the spectrum of disputing. Even 
though many of these actions instigated an appearance before a court, they did not 
necessitate an appearance. These actions often come to light through court records, 
but they could have stood alone.  
This chapter will begin by examining different policing forces, formal and 
informal: neighbors, guild officers, and sergents. The sergents will be of particular 
interest because of the breadth of their activities, which included assisting in the 
execution of a seizure of goods. The seizure of goods did not require the presence of 
a sergent, however, and it was one of the more common means of enforcing a 
contract involving a debt and of instigating a dispute. A more emphatic instigating 
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move was a clameur. I have already shown examples of the learned view of 
clameurs in chapter one. What follows is a discussion of practice, and it will expand 
upon the observations of the endurance of orality and performance in the legal 
culture. I will also discuss patterns revealed by the records of social groups utilizing 
these tactics. As a complement to these maneuvers and to the spectrum of disputing 
as a whole (and before proceeding too far along it), I will show the flexibility of three 
lesser, emergent legal professions—notaries, sergents, and procureurs. This 
examination of their roles in civil disputes will tie together the legal system and the 
maneuverings of the disputants. It will also highlight some of the options in pursuing a 
civil dispute as well as help to illuminate the obscurity of these officials, who were 
taking on an increasingly prominent role in legal procedures. Finally, to wrap up the 
discussion of actions taken out of court, I will examine settlements and mediation that 
make no mention of a court appearance. This will provide important background for 
the next chapter, which focuses on settlements that were reached after at least one 




 Policing in this period must be placed in the context of mechanisms of social 
control that encompassed a variety of state and municipal officials, clergy, guild 
officers, as well as family and community members. One of the most important 
sources of informal policing in this period consisted of neighbors. Neighbors of 
disputing parties often bore witness to actions leading up to a dispute in or out of 
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court. They may be called in to witness a contract, especially an oral one, and their 
knowledge of the contract (and testimony if a dispute arose which went to court) 
could prove crucial for enforcement of that contract.1 More generally, they would 
notice a person’s habits—their own security, in part, depended on it. They would 
intervene in an emergency in the case of natural or manmade disasters, like fire, and 
violence; as we have seen, the line between civil and criminal could be quite fine.2 
More importantly for our purposes, they would witness a summons to court delivered 
by a sergent or a seizure of goods in enforcement of a contract. Neighbors would 
also be the first responders in the instance of a clameur being raised and would 
serve as witnesses and en masse enforcers of it, which was a sort of kill switch for 
the action that instigated the clameur.3 They could also be called in for their 
expansive memories to certify property lines and instigate a collective action suit 
against a neighborhood nuisance, as in the case of Abraham Leduc’s neighbors, 
which will be elaborated in the next chapter.4 Related to this notion, but taking on a 
character of its own, is popular justice and mass protest or unrest—another use of 
                                                                
1 Oral contracts were frequently discussed and finalized in an area where neighbors could overhear 
(and later confirm) it. For more discussion of examples of this practice, see Daniel Lord Smail, 
“Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late Medieval Marseille,” in Urban and Rural Communities 
in Medieval France: Provence and Languedoc, 1000-1500, ed. Kathryn Reyerson and John Drendel 
(Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 1998): 23-50; and Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The 
Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New 
Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 2007). 
2 Julie Hardwick, Family Business: Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern 
France (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009); Miriam Müller, “Social control and the hue and 
cry in two fourteenth-century villages” Journal of Medieval History 31 (2005): 29-53.  
3 Miriam Müller has done an interesting study of communal policing and the clameur (“hue and cry”) as 
practiced in England. Her study is especially recommended not only for its blend of quantitative and 
qualitative methodology but also because of her attention to difference in practices which resorted to 
the “official” (seigniorial/manorial) system and those which did not. Müller, “Social control and the hue 
and cry.” 
4 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. 
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the clameur was to start a riot.5 Although neighbors may not act in an official or 
professional capacity to police activity, their broadly accepted social duty to observe 
and intervene made them important informal policing agents.  
Such practices show that the “law,” broadly conceived, was not a top-down 
monopoly of the state in this period in Normandy—although the commentators 
introduced in chapter one would argue, on a related note, that the king was the 
source of justice—but was, to the contrary, much more diffuse.6 It in many ways 
resembles Miriam Müller’s observation, for peasant practices in relation to manorial 
courts in fourteenth-century England, that the court may be viewed “as a jurisdictional 
structure superimposed upon existing mechanisms of keeping order within the 
                                                                
5 For work on collective protest and violence, see Carol Symes, “Out in the Open, in Arras: Sightlines, 
Soundscapes, and the Shaping of a Medieval Public Sphere,” in Cities, Texts and Social Networks, 
400-1500: Experiences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban Space, ed. Caroline Goodson, Anne E. 
Lester, and Carol Symes (Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2010): 279-302; Marc Boone, “Armes, 
Coursses, Assemblees et Commocions. Les gens de métiers et l’usage de la violence dans la société 
urbaine flamande à la fin du Moyen Âge” Revue du Nord 1:359 (2005): 7-33; William Beik, Urban 
Protest in seventeenth-century France: The culture of retribution (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997).  
6 This debate is much more heated for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries because it syncs up 
with debates about state building and absolutism. For a selection, see Michael P. Breen, “Law, 
Society, and the State in Early Modern France” The Journal of Modern History 83:2 (June 2011): 346-
86; Michael P. Breen, Law, City, and King: Legal Culture, Municipal Politics, and State Formation in 
Early Modern Dijon (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2007); Hardwick, Family 
Business; Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in 
Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2003); Philip B. Uninsky, “Violence, 
Honor, and Litigation: Injures et Voies de Fait in Pre-Revolutionary Rouen” N.Y.U. Journal of 
International Law and Politics 23 (1991): 867-904; James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern 
France, Second edition (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Cosandey, Fanny 
and Robert Descimon, L’absolutisme en France: histoire et historiographie (Paris, France: Editions de 
Seuil, 2002); David Parker, “Sovereignty, Absolutism, and the Function of the Law in Seventeenth-
Century France” Past and Present 122, (Feb., 1989): 36-74; William H. Beik, “The Absolutism of Louis 
XIV as Social Collaboration” Past and Present 188 (2005): 197-224; William H. Beik, Absolutism and 
Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Authority in Languedoc 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1986); James B. Collins, The State in Early Modern 
France, Second edition (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
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community.”7 Circling back to practices in Rouen, it follows that the boundaries 
between “social norms” and “laws” are blurred.8   
 Among those with a more official capacity for policing were guild officers or 
gardes, elected for a fixed term of years. The guild officers were charged with the 
enforcement of their guild’s statutes as well as with ensuring proper boundaries were 
maintained between theirs and other guilds. They were charged with ensuring that 
outsiders did not encroach upon the professional prerogatives of their trade, which 
included a monopoly over buying, producing and selling goods outline in their 
statutes. These boundaries were especially important to guilds whose trades were 
closely related, such as the cloth and clothing trades. By the end of the fifteenth 
century, on the rebound after the devastation of the Hundred Years’ War, Rouen was 
at the center of a thriving cloth industry (linen was a major export along with woolen 
textiles) with accompanying trades and was equally known for its lively guild scene—
exceptional in the number of trades compared to contemporary cities.9 Moreover, 
                                                                
7 Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry”; 32. 
8 For a good introductory discussion on the relationship between social norms and the law, see Brian 
Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to Global” Sydney Law Review 
30:375 (2008): 375-411. 
9 For more on the effects of the Hundred Years’ War in Normandy, see Jean-Paul Lefebvre-Filleau, La 
guerre de cent ans en Normandie: L’histoire d’un grand massacre (Condé-sur-Noireau, France: 
Éditions Charles Corlet, 2011); Jean-Paul Lefebvre-Filleau, La guerre de cent ans en Normandie 
(Luneray, France: Éditions Bertout, 2002); Kathleen Daly, “Villains into heroes? Some french and 
norman attitudes to norman history in the later Middle ages,” The Burgundian hero: proceedings of the 
annual conference of the Centre européen d'études bourguignonnes (XIVe-XVIe siècles) at Edinburgh 
and Glasgow, 28-30 September 2000 (2000): 183-98; Lucien René Delsalle, Rouen et les Rouennais 
au temps de Jeanne d’Arc, 1400-1470 (Rouen, France: Éditions du P’tit Normand, 1982); and Michel 
Mollat, ed., Histoire de Rouen (Toulouse, France: Edouard Privat, 1979). For effects on artisans and 
trades specifically, see Dominique Léost, “Les métiers rouennais au lendemain de la reconquête 
française (1449-1455).” Annales de Normandie 43:2 Lèpre et guerre XIVe-XVe siècles. (1993): 141-
153. For a good breakdown of corporations and social context in the mid-sixteenth century in Rouen, 
see Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981); Prologue. For merchants and trade more specifically, see Gayle K. Brunelle, The New 




Rouen was exceptional among contemporary cities as being one of the few cities 
with female-dominated guilds (at least five in medieval Rouen, compared to seven in 
Paris), and mastership (or mistress-ship), and especially election to a guild officer 
position, conferred special social status and privileges. Though the exact details of 
this status and privilege (including but not limited to civic enfranchisement) in the late 
fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries remain vague in the literature, it is safe to 
assume that the female gardes were, to a certain degree (supported by practices 
discussed below), empowered legal authorities.10  
With all of this being said, there were plenty of opportunities for disputes to 
arise. One of the more rich set of surviving records among the corporations of Rouen 
for the sixteenth century is actually that of a female guild: the lingères or linen-
drapers (divided by this time into two separate guilds: those who worked and sold 
“old” and “new” linen). Within this record set we find rulings from the vicomté of 
Rouen that no longer exist among the court records. The presence of these rulings 
among the guild records seemingly underscores the importance of the court and its 
rulings, but the very fact that the survival of these rulings depended on actions taken 
outside of court also underscores the importance of situating the court within the 
                                                                
10 Very little has been done on guilds in Rouen prior to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
which is a shame given its rich existing record. For more on guilds in Rouen, see: Maryanne Kowalski 
and Judith M. Bennett, “Crafts, Gilds, and Women in the Middle Ages: Fifty Years After Marian K. 
Dale,” in Sisters and workers in the Middle Ages, ed. Judith Bennett et al. (Chicago, IL, USA: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989): 11-38; Daryl M. Hafter, Women at Work in Preindustrial France 
(University Park, PA, USA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007); Daryl M. Hafter, “Female 
Masters in the Ribbonmaking Guild of Eighteenth-Century Rouen” French Historical Studies 20:1 
(Winter, 1997): 1-14; Daryl M. Hafter, Emmanuel Parent, and Philippe Minard, “Stratégies pour un 
emploi: travail féminin et corporations à Rouen et à Lyon, 1650-1791” Revue d’histoire moderne et 
contemporaine (1954-) 54:1 (Jan. - Mar., 2007): 98-115. 
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larger context of activity outside of court in order to more fully understand the legal 
system, how people interacted with it, and the court’s place in all of it.  
As to their content, the rulings recount not only the ruling of the judge but also 
a narrative of the offense and actions leading up to a court appearance. Adding this 
all up in terms of policing and practice, we observe a mix of life-time professionals, 
such as judges (professionals but not necessarily holding law degrees in this period) 
and lawyers; informal influencers, such as neighbors; the Church, both professional 
and informal, in making and practicing law, advising on affairs, and encouraging 
normative behaviors; a group of temporarily empowered legal officials, who go back 
to being ordinary people (albeit guild masters); and officials whose professional 
duties and boundaries are still being defined, such as notaries, sergents, and 
procureurs (as we shall see below), all contributing to shaping the legal culture and 
the functioning of the system. 
In most cases surviving in the lingères’ archives, the appearance in court 
followed a seizure of illicit goods by the gardes; the, sometimes violent, objection by 
the party having goods seized; and the rapid escalation of that dispute. To take a few 
examples, from the records of the lingères de linge neuf (linen-drapers in new linen) 
we start with the ruling from 1540 before Pierre Dubosc, licencie es loix (the lowest 
law degree, below master and doctor) commissioned lieutenant of the vicomte of 
Rouen, in which Marguerite Petit, Guillemyne Macte, Marion Deleaus, and Katharine 
Dufoure, gardes of the linen-drapers’ guild, bring suit against a woman named 
Jeanne Gosselin (no guild affiliation mentioned) for the insults that she spoke against 
them, requesting that she be fined for the insults and be further required to 
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compensate them for their court costs. They claimed that when they confiscated 
some of the cloth that they caught her selling illegally, she directed “several atrocious 
and ill-reputed insults in the public place” to Marion Deleaus and “among other things 
called her a thief or said that she was nothing but a thief.” The court fined Gosselin 
five sous, ordered her to pay Deleaus’ legal expenses which were moderated to 12 
sous, and ordered her to stop selling cloth illegally in the future.11   
This case is particularly interesting because it highlights the (relatively 
independent) legal authority and initiative of the female gardes. The judge not only 
ruled in favor of the gardes in their complaint against the insult but also upheld their 
                                                                
11 ADSM, 5EP 507b, June 14, 1540. “Lan de grace mil cinq cens quarante le lundy quatorziesme jour 
de Juing. De Relevee en la cohue du Roy nre sire devant nous Pierres Dubosc escuier licencie es loix 
lieutenant commis de noble homme monsr. le viconte de Rouen sur ce que Marguerite Petit, 
Guillemyne Macte, Marion Deleaus et Katharine Dufoure gardes du mestier de linge neuf en ceste 
ville de Rouen pour ceste annee presente comparantes en personne et par Raoul Mouchet leur 
procureur avoient faict convenir et adjourner Jehanne Gosselin affin de faire amende et estre 
condampnee aux despens et interestz desdictes gardes dict que vendredy dernier oult huict jours 
ainsy que lesd. gardes estoient en leurs halles de lingerie avoient trouve ladicte Gosselin qui coupoict 
et datailloict une grosse piece de thoille destouppe laquelle elle debictoict couppoict et tailloict ainsi 
que font ordinairement les maistresses dudict mestier de lingere ce quelle ne povoict faire et est 
prohibe et deffendu par les ordonnances de leurdict mestier soustenans que dicelle estoict amendable 
et condampnable en amende et despens desdictz gardes et oultre et davantage lad. Marion Deleaus 
lune desdictz gardes a faict plaincte et querimonyt sur ladicte Gosselin disant que jeudy dernier icelle 
Gosselin sestoict a elle adressee et luy avoict dict et inpropere plusieurs inures atrosses et 
deshonnestes en lieu public et qui porte record et entre autres lavoict appellee laronnesse ou dict 
quelle nestoict que une laronnesse ou a elle dict quelle luy avoict desrobbe unze aulnes de thoille 
comme ces choses lad Deleaus voulloict veriffier et offroict sommairem. veriffier et prouver sil estoict 
mescongnu Ce qui a este contredict et voullu deffendre par ladicte Gosselin disant quelle navoict 
debbite ne vendu ladicte piece de thoille en detail mais disoict bien et confessoict que vray estoict et 
ne voulloict pas mescongnoistre qui ne luy eust este baille par Anne Oricult femme de Loys Oricult 
une grosse piece de thoille pour icelle vendre au marche comme font les bourg. de ceste ville et ainsi 
quelle estoict a la halle aux fustailliers estoict illec survenu ung povre femme tenant ung enffant en 
son col qui luy pria de luy bailler deux aulnes d’icelle toille ce quelle avoict faict remitant en droict que 
de ce elle nestoict amendable et pour le gard desdictes inures que ladicte Marion Deleaus voulloict 
dire luy avoir este dictes ledict jour de jeudy dernier dict que si elle luy en avoict dict ladicte Deleaus 
luy en avoict par samble dict surquoy les parties oys veu la quallite de la matiere avons ordonne que 
ladicte Gosselin demeurera en amende desdictes inures taxe a cinq solz tourn. et si lavons 
comdampnee en cinq solz tournois de interestz envers ladicte Deleaus avec despens en ce regard et 
deffence faicte a ladicte Gosselin de ne plus vendre pour ladvenir toilles en detail ne chose qui soict 
contre ne en prejudice desdictes ordonnances sur la pane au cas appartenant lesquelz despens 
furent par nous taxes et moderez a la somme de douze solz tourn. a ces pntes comprinses sy 
donnons en mand. au premier sergent ou soussergent de lad ville et viconte sur ce requis le contenu 
cy dess. mctr. a exon. deue joux. sa forme et teneur donne comme dessus.” 
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determination that Gosselin was violating the law and reinforced the female guild 
officers’ legal actions. The sergents were charged with collecting the fine and fees, 
but it is unclear how the order to stop selling cloth illegally was executed (presumably 
by the gardes) and whether it was obeyed (a theme that will be suggested again 
below and then further developed in chapter five with questions of enforcement).  
The confiscation of the goods in this incident was not disputed before the 
judge as it was in the case that follows; it was disputed directly, in the moment, with 
the gardes in the form of a verbal objection to their action and thereby instigated 
additional, more escalated action in court. The central drama of this action in court 
was a criminal act—the insults directed at the gardes. The insult--amplified by its 
having been shouted “in the public place”—would have been considered an attack on 
their honor (linked to their reputation and credit, with important economic and social 
implications). As such, it was considered a criminal offense, albeit a minor one. This 
means that enforcement of civil law met with a criminal offense. Minor criminal 
offenses, such as insults, were prosecuted by the offended party, not an official, as a 
lawsuit, not an act of state repression.12   
                                                                
12 For more on the litigation of insults and other petty crimes in eighteenth-century Rouen, see 
Uninsky, “Violence, Honor, and Litigation.” For a comparative perspective, see James A. Sharpe, 
“‘Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbours’: Litigation and Human Relations in Early Modern England,” 
In Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, 
USA: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 167-87; Martin Ingram, “Law, litigants and the construction 
of ‘honour’: slander suits in early modern England,” in The Moral World of the Law, ed. Peter Coss 
(New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2000): 134-60; Robert B. Shoemaker, Prosecution 
and Punishment: Petty crime and the law in London and rural Middlesex, c. 1660-1725 (New York, 
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Robert B. Shoemaker, “The Decline of Public Insult in 
London, 1660-180.” Past and Present 169:1 (2000): 97-131. The scholarship on slander, insults, and 
reputation and credit is voluminous. For an introduction, see Thelma Fenster and Daniel Lord Smail, 
eds., Fama: the Politics of Talk and Reputation in Medieval Europe (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell 
University Press, 2003); Smail, Consumption of Justice; Avner. Offer, “Between the Gift and the 
Market: The Economy of Regard” The Economic History Review 50:3 (Aug., 1997): 450-76; Clare 
Crowston, Credit, Fashion, Sex: Economies of Regard in Old Regime France (Durham, NC, USA: 
Duke University Press, 2013); Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay, and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, 
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The witnessing of the insult and the orality captured in the court record is 
particularly interesting. The gardes involved in—named, present to, and supporting—
the confiscation are acting as witnesses to the words expressed by Gosselin. They 
have significant interest in the stakes of the decision, as evidenced by their being 
party to the suit alongside their colleague, by their having been present to the action, 
and by their claiming the same status and authority as Deleaus. However, the 
vagueness by which they recount the insults (or by which the court records them) but 
zero in on the word “thief”—“among other things called her a thief or said that she 
was nothing but a thief”—underscores the weight of that word (theft was a crime 
against property not a person but could be punished no less severely, especially in 
instances of significant status difference between accuser and accused) and the 
important, yet ephemeral, nature of the spoken word in the legal culture.13  
Similar to the case above, the following case shows the execution of a seizure 
of goods, the fine line between civil and criminal litigation, and the role played by 
witnesses. In this case, from 1550 before Pierre Dubosc, lieutenant particulier of the 
vicomte of Rouen, in which Christophe Thyron and his wife, cloth merchants (no guild 
affiliation mentioned), sue, and are countersued by, the gardes of the lingères guild. 
                                                                
“The Role of Trust in the Long-Run Development of French Financial Markets,” in Whom Can We 
Trust? How Groups, Networks, and Institutions Make Trust Possible, ed. Karen S. Cook, Margaret 
Levi, and Russell Hardin (New York, NY, USA: Russell Sage Foundation, 2009): 249-85; Elise 
Dermineur, “Trust, Norms of Cooperation, and the Rural Credit Market in Eighteenth-Century France” 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History 45:4 (Spring 2015): 485-506. 
13 In theory, theft could be a capital crime, but it has been suggested that, in practice, most cases of 
theft were settled privately out of court, for various reasons including the potential knowledge of 
domestic life that the thief had. This private and potentially shameful knowledge may be revealed in 
the course of a trial. See for instance Alfred Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives 
notariales” Histoire, économie et société 1:3 (1982): 369-375; and and Hervé Piant, Une justice 
ordinaire: justice civil et criminelle dans la prévôté royale de Vaucouleurs sous l’ancien régime 
(Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006). A study of settlements and prosecution of 
theft would be particularly interesting for Normandy given the peculiar interest in protecting property 
rights written into the customary law and observed, yet toned down, in some practices. 
167 
 
Pursuant to their suit, the Thyrons claimed that the gardes had illegally seized a 
piece of cloth in the market which they had bought in Caudebec and brought to show 
to a specific woman as a potential buyer. In their defense, and pursuant to their 
countersuit, the gardes claimed, in the act of seizing this cloth, to have been met with 
the verbal insult of “wicked thieves” and brought ten witnesses forth to swear to it. 
The court fined Thyron 40 sous for the insult, plus the gardes’ legal expenses (100 
sous minus the consultation fee of 50 sous of an expert lawyer) and threatened him 
with prison in the event of a repeat offense and ordered the restitution of the disputed 
cloth by the gardes to the Thyrons.14 Like the case above, this one shows the legal 
                                                                
14 ADSM, 5EP 507b, November 18, 1550. “Lan de grace mil cinq cens cinquante De mardy dix 
huictiesme jour de novembre De rellevee en la cohue du Roy nre. Sr. a Rouen devant nous Pierre 
Dubosc escuier licen. es loix lieuten. particullier de noble homme monsr. le vicon. de Rouen En la 
matiere d’entre le procur. du roy nre. Sr. et les gardes du mestier de linge neuf comparen. par maistre 
Jehan Ouffray leur procur. Pntes. Katherine Deneufville et Jacquette Thomas dune part et Xpofle. 
Thyron et sa femme marchans de toille comparens par maistre Richard ledoulx leur procur. daultre 
part sur la requeste fcte. par lesd. Thyron davoir restitution dune piece de toille de chamire quilz 
disoient contenir trente aulnes ou envyron qui avoit este ja prinse par Marguerite Petit lune desd 
gardes et laquelle iceulx Thyron disoient avoir achaptee en la ville de Caudebec passez estoient 
quatre moys et laquelle piece ilz disoient avoir fait porter en la halle pour icelle monstrer a une femme 
qui la voulloit achapter de laquelle action lesd. gardes avoient prins deffence et soustenu a bonne 
cause l’approchment dicelle toille et dicelle avoient lesd. gardes led. Procur. du roy joinct avec elles 
soustenu la forfaicture pour les causes et raisons contenez en lacte du dix neufme. jour de mars mil 
cinq cens quarante neuf et davantage avoient lesd. gardes faict plaincte de ce que lesd. Thyron eu 
contend de ce que iceulx gardes leur avoient remonstre que ce nestoit bien faict a eulx de vendre les 
toilles quilz achaptoient et qu’ilz en fraingnoient les ordonnances icelluy Thyron les avoit appellez 
meschantes larronnesses et dict plusieurs aultres injures Surquoy par led. acte lesd. gardes avoient 
este receuz a informer ce quilz avoient faict et a ceste fin produict jusques a dix tesmoingz contre 
lesquelz ou la pluspart il y avoit eu saon allegue par lesd. Thyron et saluaons. baillez par lesd. gardes 
et par aprez l’informaon. publyee aux partyes et depuys le tout distribue par ordonnance de justice a 
honn. homme Maistre Jacques Cadyot advocat aprez lecture fcte. End. acte informaons. Saons. et 
saluaons et des aultres lectres respectivem. closes par lesd. partyes sur ce ouy le rapport dud. Cadyot 
en ensuyvant son adviz et oppinion et des aultres assistens en la plus grand partye nous avons dit et 
dcle. que sans avoir regard a lescript desd. saons. que pour le faict de lad. plaincte en injures quelle 
estoit assez suffisamment rapportee et que dicelle led. Thyron en demourra en amende pntement. 
taxee en regard a la quallite desd. injures a quarante solz et par icelle adjuge ausd. gardes leur 
interest eu lieu de repparaon. qui a este taxe par ladviz que dessus a cent solz et a este enjoinct et 
deffendu aud. Thyron comparent comme dessus de ne plus soy adresser ausd. gardes en invectives 
ne injures sur paine de prison et daultre pugnition a la discretion de justice et en surplus ordonne que 
lesd. Thiron auront restituon. de lad. piece de toille et que a ce fe. lesd. gardes seront contrainctz et si 
avons adjuge ausd. gardes leurs despens qui ont este reservez et taxer pour les bailler par declaraon. 
et fut taxe aud. Cadyot pour son sallaire d’avoir veu lad. Informaon. lectres et escriptures faict son 
rapport et la mynute de ces pntes. la somme de cinquante solz tourn. a prendre et avoir sur lesd. 
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authority and initiative of the female gardes. From this we may glean that the 
privileges accompanying guild membership appear to trump the disadvantages of 
being a woman. Normally, if married, a woman would need her husband’s 
authorization to make these complaints, but her status as a guild official--or even as a 
guild mistress or independent businesswoman--means she can represent herself in 
affairs related to her business. And like the case above, it also shows, in vivid detail, 
the fine line, and easy escalation, between possible interpretations of acts of violence 
and between civil and criminal litigation—here, rolled up into one.15  
The insult (an act of violence in contemporary eyes) levelled at the gardes in 
response to their execution of the seizure of goods (an act of violence—the physical 
confiscation of their stuff--in the eyes of the Thyrons), as we have seen, would have 
been considered an attack on their honor. Once again enforcement of civil law 
(seizure of goods) met with a criminal offense (insult). The judge, in sorting out the 
intricacies of the offenses and complaints, found a way to rule in favor of both parties 
while prioritizing the criminal act--validating the complaint against the insult and 
returning the seized goods (which was, to be sure, an implicit overruling of the 
gardes’ judgment in enforcing the guild statutes and by extension, a blow to their 
                                                                
gardes saonf. leur restor qui leur a este adjuge sur led. Thyron sy donnons en mandement au premier 
sergent ou soussergent royal de lad. ville et vicon. sur ce requis le contenu en ces pntes. mectre a 
execuon. deue jouxte sa forme et teneur Donne comme dessus.” 
15 For more on the nexus between civil and criminal, see Hervé Piant, “Des procès innombrables: 
Éléments méthodologiques pour une histoire de la justice civile d’Ancien Régime,” Histoire et mesure 
22:2 Déviance, justice et statistiques (2007): 13-38; and Piant, Une justice ordinaire; and Shoemaker, 
Prosecution and Punishment. The literature on violence is voluminous. For a beginning, see Julius 
Ruff, Violence in Early Modern Europe (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2001); 
Daniel Lord Smail, Legal Plunder: Households and Debt Collection in Late Medieval Europe 
(Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Daniel Lord Smail, “Violence and Predation in 
Late Medieval Mediterranean Europe” Comparative Studies in Society and History 54:1 (January 
2012): 7-34; Uninsky, “Violence, Honor, and Litigation.” 
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authority and reputation). However, it is interesting that although Christophe Thyron 
and his wife were a joint party, Christophe was singled out for the fine and warning 
about a repeat offense. This suggests that the judge (and probably the law) imbued 
Christophe with more responsibility as a man and as husband for the behavior of his 
wife in public spaces such as the market. He did so in spite of the wife’s apparent, 
but ill-defined, participation in the whole affair—from purchasing and peddling the 
cloth, to the disturbance in the market, to the appearance in court.16 The significance 
of the difference, or lack thereof, in status between Christophe (man, merchant of 
unknown residency) and the gardes (female, resident guild mistresses, gardes) in 
determining the course of the dispute and the outcome (arguably a draw) is 
suggestive of the relationship between (corporate) privilege and (gendered) social 
status. It is an example of how privilege worked in practice to override one 
fundamental social inequality with another.  
Finally, I want to call attention to the important role played by the witnesses in 
the drama in and out of court. An important part of the impact of orality is in who 
speaks the words and who hears them, so the relative weight of the insult—the 
damage, the stakes, of the offense—was in the statuses of the accuser and accused 
and also in the high number of people, the “neighbors” noted above, who could 
swear to having heard it.17 This case and the one above support the persistence and 
                                                                
16 For a recent breakdown of the question of women and crime, see Manon van der Heijden, Women 
and Crime in Early Modern Holland, trans. David McKay (Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 2016). See also, 
Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry.” Shoemaker has also given some attention to the question 
of patterns of women, crime, and prosecution in his study of misdemeanors in England. Shoemaker, 
Prosecution and Punishment. 
17 Uninsky notes that litigation over insults usually included at least two witnesses to corroborate the 
offense. See Uninsky, “Violence, Honor, and Litigation.” For more on witnessing, see Aurélien Peter, 
“Prendre la mesure de paroles insaisissables: Les faux témoins mentionnés dans les archives du 
parlement de Paris (XVIIe-XVIIIe)” Histoire et Mesure 31:2 (2016): 107-40; Daniel Lord Smail, 
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importance of orality and performance in the legal culture of Rouen and its environs 
in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.  
In the last example of a case involving a seizure of goods by the gardes of the 
lingères guild here, from 1553 before Guillaume Druel, licence es loix, lieutenant 
general of the vicomte of Rouen, Jean Delyvet brought Katherine Leleu, one of the 
gardes, into court for having seized some of his cloth in the market. He claimed that 
the seizure had been unjustified and demanded restitution and compensation for his 
expenses in the case. She claimed, and brought forth other gardes to attest, that 
Delyvet had been selling cloth contrary to the ordinances—in pieces, embellished, 
and outside of the market—and made the counter request that he and others be 
forbidden to do so, enforcing the ordinances in place (it is implied that this man 
belonged to the group of “marchans et aultres gens mecaniques’’). The court ordered 
the restitution of the cloth to Delyvet on account of his “parvurete” (poverty) but also 
fined Delyvet five sous six deniers and forbade him and others from selling cloth 
illegally, according to Leleu’s request for enforcement of the law. Neither was 
awarded compensation of expenses.18 Here again, we observe a challenge to the 
                                                                
“Témoins et témoignages dans les causes civiles à Marseille, du XIIIe au Xve siècle,” in Pratiques 
sociales et politiques judiciaires dans les villes de l’Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. Jacques 
Chiffoleau, Claude Gauvard, and Andrea Zorzi (Rome, Italy: École française de Rome, 2007): 423-37; 
Daniel Lord Smail, “Witness Programs in Medieval Marseille,” in Voices from the Bench: The 
Narratives of Lesser Folk in Medieval Trials, ed. Michael Goodich (New York, NY, USA: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006): 227-50; Bernard Schnapper, “Testes Inhabiles: Les témoins reprochables dans 
l’ancien droit penal” Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis 33 (1965): 575-616; Benoît Garnot, Questions 
de justice: 1667-1789 (Paris, France: Belin, 2006); Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of 
Late Medieval Marseille”; Smail, Consumption of Justice; Fenster and Smail, eds., Fama. 
18 ADSM, 5EP 507b, April 28, 1553. ”Lan de grace mil cinq cens cinquante troys Le vendredy vingt 
huictiesme jour d’avril De Rellevee en la cohue du roy nre. Sr. a Rouen devant nous Guille. Druel 
licen. es loix lieuten. general de noble homme monsr. le viconte de Rouen. Sur ce que Jehan Delyvet 
pnt. avoit faict convenir et adjourner Katherine Leleu lune des gardes du mestier de linge neuf aussy 
pnte. et par ouffray son procur. affin de dire les causes pourquoy elle avoit prins et oste ung gobet de 
toille conten. une aulne et demye ou envyron laquelle il avoit apporte vendre pour sa necessite 
requerant avoir restituton dicelle et estre condempnee en ses despens icelle Leleu pnte. en la pnce. 
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initiative taken by the garde in executing a seizure of goods, and the garde under 
accusation bringing in witnesses, and notably, other gardes at that, to reinforce her 
claim/defense. We also find the court overruling the garde’s judgment in confiscating 
the goods but without overtly punishing her—she was not ordered to compensate 
Delyvet, but the punishment may have been implicit in whatever damage was done to 
her reputation and authority of discretion.  
But the most interesting aspect of this case is in the nature of Leleu’s defense. 
She not only recalls the letter of the law and Delyvet’s alleged breaking of it (a claim 
reinforced by knowledgeable but not disinterested witnesses) to the judge, whose law 
degree (a fairly recent requirement for judges) is specifically stated (licence es loix)—
her social status may have been lower but her expertise on the specific laws in 
question may have been comparable to his, giving her a suggestive claim to authority 
relative to him--but she also specifically requests enforcement of the law. The case 
takes on a broader scope by suggesting that there are “others” beyond Delyvet who 
have been breaking the law. The challenges to enforcement and resolution will be 
                                                                
des aultres gardes dud. mestier a dict quelle avoit approche led. Delyvet pour ce quil sefforceoit 
vendre lad. toille hors de la halle ou est accoustume vendre lesd. toilles qui est contre leur 
ordonnance remonstrant que ordinairement puys peu de temps en ca les marchans et aultres gens 
mecaniques vendent et s’efforcent vendre ordinairement lesd. toilles et cavenas hors de lad. halle en 
telle quantite que on leur en demande a raison de quoy leurd. estat et mestier est rendu inutille 
requerant que de ce led. Delyvet feust mys en amende et deffence luy estre fcte. et a tous aultres de 
sa quallite pour le temps advenir ne vendre ne detailler lesd. toilles et cavenas mais icelles apporter a 
lad. halle en pieces entieres sans les decoupper et par noble homme maistre Loys Mustel Sr. du Bosc 
Roger advocat du Roy nre. sr. a este faict semble. requeste pour esviter aux abbuz qui se y 
commectent par chun. jour surquoy aprez avoir oy lad. requeste dud. Sr. advocat du Roy ensemble 
les requestes dicelles partyes a este ordonne que led. Delyvet aura restitution de lad. toille a raison de 
sa parvurete et a luy deffendu et a tous aultres de quelques quallite quilz soient de vendre pour 
ladvenir debiter ne coupper aucunes pieces de toille ne cavenas mais icelles vendre en pieces 
entieres en la halle et lieu accoustume et ordonne a vendre lesd. toilles jouxte lordonnance dud. 
mestier et non ailleurs et partant  lesd partyes ont este envoyez hors de court et sans despens tant 
dune part que daultre sy donnons en mandement au pmier. sergent ou soussergent royal de lad. ville 
et vicon. sur ce requis le contenu en ces pntes. mectre a execuon. deue jouxte sa forme et teneur 
donne comme dessus. [Ema. v s vi d]” 
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examined at length in chapter five; suffice it to say here that the frustration over the 
lack of accountability and lack of support from higher-level authorities outside of the 
courtroom is a suggestive undercurrent to the drama in the courtroom in this case. 
On that note, all of the rulings in the above-mentioned cases involving the gardes 
were confided to the first royal sergent or sous-sergent of the city and vicomté to be 
carried out.  
 Arguably the most important official policing agents of this period were the 
sergents. I use the term “policing agent” here very deliberately. Although the sergents 
morphed into a more professional policing body akin to a modern police force in later 
centuries, to call them “police” would be anachronistic in the context under 
examination in this dissertation because “police” in concept and practice did not exist 
in this period and because, as we shall see, the sergents’ duties encompassed a 
much broader range of activities.19 Nevertheless, their activity qualifies under the 
larger heading of “policing.” My preliminary research suggests that concepts of 
policing in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century in Rouen and its environs 
bore some resemblance to that described by Steven L. Kaplan for eighteenth-century 
Paris, although on a much smaller scale.20 That is, policing was understood as a 
“social process,” a means of governing people, of preserving social order (hierarchy) 
in harmony and concord, and of promoting the public good. Ultimately, it was an 
                                                                
19 Sébastien Hamel, “Être sergent du roi de la prévôté de Saint-Quentin à la fin du Moyen Âge,” 
Valérie Toureille, “Les sergents du Châtelet ou la naissance de la police parisienne à la fin de Moyen 
Âge,” and Catherine Denys, “Les sergents de ville en France du Nord et aux Pays-Bas au XVIIIe 
siècle: évolution d’un métier et d’une pratique sociale,” in Entre justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires 
de la justice du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Saint-Nicolas, Québec, Canada: Les 
Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 55-100. 
20 Steven Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail, 1700-1815” Revue Historique 261:1 
(Janvier-Mars 1979): 17-77. 
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ongoing process of “containing,” through repressive and preventative practices, 
various social forces that threatened to disrupt stability and the status quo.21 It was 
not simply a means of enforcing laws, although such enforcement practices were part 
of the big picture of an orderly society. Just as neighbors and corporations (guilds) 
did their part to regulate (and on a certain level, legitimize and co-define) and 
institutionalize a collective ideal, so did sergents. 
The sergents will receive a lot of attention because of their importance to legal 
activity outside of court. Sergents performed a lot of the footwork for the legal system 
and were sent to arrest, convey and guard criminals. In a similar capacity for the civil 
side, they were sent to deliver summons to appearances in court for civil cases. That 
legal commentators went into such elaborate detail on the particularities required in 
the proper execution of a summons, as seen in chapter one, suggests that the 
importance of the sergents to the workings of the legal system is disproportionate to 
the attention given them, in contrast to other officials such as judges and avocats, by 
                                                                
21 Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail,’’ 17-19 and 24-27. France was, before and 
after the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, what has been dubbed “a society of orders.” The simplified 
ideal being a division into three: those who pray (clergy), those who fight (nobility), and those who 
work (everyone else). The lines between these groups became a little fuzzier in the sixteenth century 
as an ambitious, wealthy and upwardly mobile group of bureaucratic families—many of whom held 
legal offices—from the third estate began making claims of ennoblement as they took over 
administrative positions from the traditional nobility. As such, the “nobility” was in some ideations 
broken down into the “nobility of the sword” and the “nobility of the robe,” or “robins.” For more on the 
society of orders and the robins, see: Fanny Cosandey, ed.,  Dire et vivre l’ordre social en France 
sous l’ancien régime (Paris, France: Éditions des École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 
2005); Georges Duby, Les trois ordres ou l’imaginaire du féodalisme (Paris, France: Éditions 
Gallimard, 1978); Georges Duby, The Three Orders: Feudal Society Imagined, trans. Arthur 
Goldhammer (Chicago, IL, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 1980); Arlette Jouanna, Ordre 
Social: Mythes et hiérarchies dans la France du XVIe siècle (Paris, France: Hachette, 1977); Ralph E. 
Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance and Strategies of Mobility in Prerevolutionary France” The American 
Historical Review 82:2 (Apr., 1977): 271-89; Robert Descimon, “The Birth of the Nobility of the Robe: 
Dignity versus Privilege in the Parlement of Paris, 1500-1700,” trans. Orest Ranum, in Changing 
Identities in Early Modern France, ed. Michael Wolfe (Durham, NC, USA: Duke University Press, 
1996): 95-123. For more on the relationship between policing and state-building, see Marc Raeff. The 
Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Change through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 
1600-1800. New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 1983. 
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the erudite jurists and commentators (and the level of attention is reflected in the 
secondary literature).22 The sergents were frequently charged with publishing laws 
and court rulings (which could, as we saw in chapter one, carry the weight of a law)—
usually by announcements (shouting or “cris”) but also by posting something to be 
read.23 In addition to publishing rulings, they were charged with seeing to the 
execution (enforcement) of a sentence, which commonly meant collecting fines. They 
were also commonly called in to execute a seizure of goods. This made them 
important sources of power and authority at the front and the back end of disputes. 
 
Seizure of Goods 
 
The seizure of goods was one of the more important actions taken prior to an 
appearance in court. Given how often mention of it is made in records of civil dispute, 
                                                                
22 The literature is vast, but for a starting point, see Benoît Garnot, Histoire des juges en France: de 
l’Ancien Régime à nos jours (Paris, France: Nouveau monde éditions, 2014); John P. Dawson, A 
History of Lay Judges (Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 1960); A. Lloyd Moote, The 
Revolt of the Judges: The Parlement of Paris and the Fronde, 1643-1652 (Princeton, NJ, USA: 
Princeton University Press, 1971); Breen, Law, City, and King; Michael P. Breen, “Representing the 
City: Avocats and the Negotiation of Municipal Authority in Seventeenth-Century France,” ,” in Entre 
justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Âge au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan 
(Saint-Nicolas, Québec, Canada : Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 347-64; David Avrom 
Bell, Lawyers and Citizens: the Making of a Political Elite in Old Regime France, (New York, NY, USA: 
Oxford University Press, 1994); William J. Bouwsma, “Lawyers and Early Modern Culture” The 
American Historical Review 78:2 (Apr., 1973): 303-27; Gerald A. Greenberger, “Lawyers Confront 
Centralized Government: Political Through of Lawyers during the Reign of Louis XIV” The American 
Journal of Legal History 23:2 (Apr., 1979): 144-81; Donald R. Kelley, “Jurisconsultus Perfectus: The 
Lawyer as Renaissance Man” Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 51 (1988): 84-102; 
Donald R. Kelley, Foundations of Modern Historical Scholarship: Language, Law, and History in the 
French Renaissance (New York, NY, USA: Columbia University Press, 1970). 
23 For more information on “cries,” publicity and urban space, see Jean-Marie Cauchies, “Le ‘cri’ et 
l’espace urbain: bretèches et publication dans les villes des anciens Pays-Bas” Revue belge de 
philologie et d’histoire 89:1 (2011): 167-89; Symes, “Out in the Open, in Arras”; and Marco Mostert, 
“Making Court Decisions Known in Medieval Holland,” in Medieval Legal Process: Physical, Spoken 
and Written Performance in the Middle Ages, ed. Mostert, Marco and P. S. Barnwell (Turnhout, 
Belgium: Brepols, 2011): 281-95. 
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it is worth discussing it in depth. Like the actions of the sergents (who were often the 
ones charged with carrying out a seizure), they occurred both at the front end of legal 
practices, instigating disputes, and at the back end, as a means to execute a legal 
ruling. We have seen how the gardes of the lingères guild seized illicit goods in the 
marketplace to enforce the prerogatives of their guild. Goods might also be seized to 
reclaim a debt--sometimes to enforce the terms of a contract or sometimes to collect 
a delinquent tax.24 As an example of the former, we have the case of Jean Regnault 
versus Jean Leribert the elder, fermier de l’eaue de Seine heard before the vicomté 
of Elbeuf. Leribert was not shy about taking matters into his own hands. He took it 
upon himself to collect arrears on a rente contract—48 sous, 9 deniers--which he 
claimed Regnault owed him, executing a seizure of some of his goods personally. 
This seizure prompted Regnault to follow up in court with a formal declaration of his 
opposition.25 The case may have ended in the courts, but it did not start there. 
These actions suggest a great deal of initiative on the part of litigants, but not 
only in the sense of simply taking their cases to court. They are in many cases 
initiating legal action, in various forms, outside of the court, and an example of one of 
these actions was a seizure of goods. Of the 109 appearances before the vicomté of 
Elbeuf in 1510, three began with one party seizing the goods of another, but not all of 
them mention a sergent being present to record the activity.26 That a sergent may not 
be required for a seizure of goods softens any understanding of the rigid formality of 
legal proceedings, even if in the case of Leribert we are trading one type of official for 
                                                                
24 Smail, Legal Plunder; Smail, “Violence and Predation”; and Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal 
Culture of Late Medieval Marseille.” 
25 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
26 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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another (though Leribert was not explicitly acting in his official capacity, he certainly 
used his status to his advantage to excuse himself from court and slow down 
proceedings, as will become evident in the next chapter).27 The sergent’s presence, 
as an official representative of the “forces of order,” was not required legally or 
practically to initiate a seizure of goods or to execute the law in these cases.  
Among the records from the Échiquier, four cases indicate a seizure of goods 
had been executed in the events leading up to the appearance in that court. Of 
these, the 1510 case between Jean, Colin, and Étienne Daudin and a priest named 
Jean Bouquet stands out. In this case, the Daudin party, heirs of Guillaume Daudin, 
is claiming that in an attempt to recover alleged delinquent payments, their property 
had been seized in excess (20 to 40 times the alleged value of the delinquent 
payments, to be precise) of the right to do so. The original contract between 
Guillaume Daudin and Robin Hurel (from 1481) had stipulated that if Daudin (or 
anyone who assumed liability for his part of the contract through inheritance or 
purchase) missed three consecutive years of payments on his rente, Hurel (or any 
person or persons who had taken over his part of the contract) would have the right 
to take back the property “without authority of justice” (“sans auctorite de justice”).28  
The importance of the contracts, their stipulations and the discretion in deciding to 
take a hard line on collection, as discussed in chapter two, come to the fore in this 
                                                                
27 A fermier was a type of fiscal agent, similar to a tax collector. Leribert was likely assigned to collect 
dues on the movement of goods along the Seine. Rouen is situated at the last point at which ships can 
travel up the Seine; goods would then be transferred to smaller vessels to continue up the Seine to 
Paris.  
28 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
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case. Also important to note is the difficulty of transferring unwritten understandings 
and credit when a debt was sold, had there been any.  
In 1497, Étienne and Berthault Landri, heirs of Robin Hurel by marriage 
(“because of their wives”), taking a hard line on the stipulation of the contract above-
noted,  and shortly before transferring the right to the rente over to Bouquet, had 
called in a sergent, Jean Couronne, to be present to (that is, to witness) their seizing 
the Daudins’ property. The Daudins, to the contrary, argue that payments had been 
made by them or by others on their behalf during the period in question and that, 
furthermore, the amount of property seized was in excess of the principal and arrears 
allegedly due.29 This case is as rich with initiatives taken out of court by the litigants 
as it is with actions taken in court, including a repeat of the case before a different 
judge in the same court (bailliage of Evreux), and will be elaborated in chapter five in 
relation to challenges to enforcement. It is clear that, notwithstanding the sergent’s 
presence, which was not necessary, that the seizure of goods could be an option for 
legal action taken independent of the court system—and could be built into the 




Another important action taken outside of court was the clameur. Of the 
records under consideration here, there are 28 total references to clameurs in the 
notarial records. Records from 37 appearances before the court in Elbeuf and 6 
                                                                
29 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. For another example see 1B 331, January 30, 1510. Estienne et 
Berthault ditz Landri eulx disant heritiers a cause de leurs femmes dud deffunct Hurel” 
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appearances before the Échiquier mention a clamuer having been made leading up 
to the appearance. There were several types of clameurs which are important to this 
study: the clameur de haro, the clameur de gage plege, and the clameur de marché 
de bourse. All of these clameurs had subtle differences in usage (especially 
according to the law), but in practice, they all had a similar effect in asserting a claim 
to property.  
The clameur de haro is probably the most famous (and infamous) clameur—
popularly associated with Normandy, especially in France and more so self-identified 
in Normandy, but in usage elsewhere in Europe.30 The popular understanding, 
anecdotes, and usage of the clameur de haro, and its association with Normandy, is 
well-documented in contemporary sources and more recent histories, but its essence 
is well-captured by Glasson in a study on the history of the clameur de haro from the 
late-nineteenth century as an “interjection that one hurls to excite indignation or 
disdain against someone.”31 This usage has also been known to incite collective 
actions, such as riots, being linked conceptually to other “shouts” and “cries.”32 
Furthermore, this popular understanding and usage of the haro is often confused with 
the narrower legal sense of the clameur de haro, which will be examined in this 
                                                                
30 For examples of its usage outside of Normandy see, Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry”; 
and Ernest Désiré Glasson, Étude historique sur la clameur de haro (Paris, France: L. Larose et 
Forcel, 1882). 
31 Glasson, Étude historique sur la clameur de haro, 2. For a full discussion of these sources, see 
chapter one, especially notes 89 and 94. See, for example, François Ragueau, Indice des droicts 
royaux et seigneuriaux: Des plus notables dictions, terms et phrases de l’Estat, de la Justice, des 
Finances, et Practique de France, Recueilli des Loix, Coustumes, Ordonnances, Arrests, Annales, 
Histoires du Royaume de France et ailleurs (Lyon: Simon Rigaud, 1620); F. Soudet, ed., Ordonnances 
de l’Échiquier de Normandie aux XIVe et XVe siècles (Rouen, France: A. Lestringant, 1929); . 
“’Harrow!’ Quod He,” Jersey and Guernsey Law Review (Feb. 2008), < 
http://www.jerseylaw.je/Publications/jerseylawreview/feb08/JLR0802_Bridgeford.aspx> Accessed 
September 17, 2012; Glasson, Étude historique sur la clameur de haro; and Hippolyte Pissard, La 
clameur de haro dans le droit normand (Caen, France: L. Jouan, 1911). 
32 Boone, “Armes, Coursses, Assemblees et Commocions.’’ 
179 
 
dissertation. The association with Normandy extends beyond the popular usage, and 
as Glasson beams, “associated with the empire of Norman custom,” the clameur de 
haro is a “glorious memory for Normandy, for it attests to the peculiar attachment of 
this province to respect for the law,” building on his characterization of the legal 
usage as “a powerful and…energetic means…of protecting against unjust 
enterprises.”33 
It is very likely that the concept of “popular action” in the face of “unjust 
enterprises,” especially in instances where the powerful prey on the weak, as noted 
by Terrien (see chapter one), helps explain the confusion between popular usage 
and legal usage—the concept of justice (the “crying out” for justice) resonates 
between them. To be fair to Glasson’s exuberant chauvinism (and imperialism), he 
does make a point of distinguishing between the popular understanding of the haro 
and the much narrower legal sense of the clameur de haro as well as of 
demonstrating its broader usage. However, untangling the legal usage from the 
popular usage and imagination risks being somewhat misleading in and of itself 
because on a certain level, the latter probably lent significant undertones to the 
former in the bigger picture of practice and legal culture. 
That all being said, it is necessary to establish the subtleties and nuances of 
the legal usage to understand the practices observed in the records under 
consideration in this dissertation as well as, and more importantly, to distinguish it 
from other clameurs in use. At the most basic level, the clameur de haro was a cry for 
help (the “hue and cry”).34 It conveyed the urgency of imminent danger to person or 
                                                                
33 Glasson, Étude historique sur la clameur de haro, 6 and 4. 
34 Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry.” 
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property and was a call to immediate witnessing and intervention by those who heard 
it, and those who heard it were required by law to drop everything and come running. 
Recalling Terrien’s commentary from chapter one and reinforcing it with Houard’s 
Dictionnaire analytique from the eighteenth century, the clameur de haro “is a means 
of halting the accomplishment of all that which constitutes a threat to the liberty of our 
persons or causes damage to our goods, when a delay is perilous….And to this 
principle, we must add another, that the haro can only be introduced among us to 
preserve the possession that one has; one cannot have recourse to it to reclaim what 
has been lost or to acquire what one never had.”35 The limitations to usage given by 
Houard here at the end set it apart from the other clameurs to be discussed below. 
As it was practiced in Normandy (at least), people extended the concept of robbery, a 
criminal act, understood in the clameur de haro, to include any act of dispossession 
in progress (as an urgent disruption of the peace), giving it a civil aspect as well as a 
criminal one: “The clameur de haro is an institution of Norman law which, in criminal 
matters, has as its goal the halt of evildoers in their tracks, and which in civil matters, 
serves to reconcile [“règler”] without delay the arguments which require an immediate 
solution.”36 Pissard would have us believe that this “rally cry” was something special 
in Normandy, describing his task, in his otherwise detailed study of Norman 
jurisprudence, as that of “amassing the characteristic traits which make the Norman 
                                                                
35 David Houard, Dictionnaire analytique, historique, étymologique, critique et interprétif de la coutume 
de Normandie, ou l’on troüve la résolution des questions les plus intéressantes du droit civil et 
ecclésiastique de cette province, conformément à la jurisprudence des arrêts. 4 vol. (Rouen: Le 
Boucher le jeune, 1780-1782); vol. 2, 701. “Le haro est donc une voie introduite pour arrêter 
l’accomplissement de tout ce qui porte atteinte à la liberté de nos personnes, ou cause dommage à 
nos biens, lorsqu’il y a péril dans le délai…A ce principe, il faut en ajouter un autre; c’est que le haro 
n’étant introduit parmi nous que pour conserver la possession où l’on est, on ne peut y recouvrir pour 
réclamer une possession perdue, ou en acquérir une dans laquelle on n’est pas.” 
36 Pissard, La clameur de haro dans le droit normand, 1. 
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haro an original procedure” which “will only be fulfilled if the reader finds in this essay 
a new reason to marvel at the mind, so supple and so procedure-oriented, so 
conservative and so entrepreneurial, of the Normans, who little by little were driven to 
transform a simple cry of distress into a regularized and complicated procedure.”37 
The dual nature of the clameur de haro makes its usage in practice a fascinating 
subject of study (one which could use a bit of a refresher from the dusty “nationalism” 
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries), and although I will not argue that 
the dual nature of the haro was unique to Normandy, I will attempt to show some of 
the contours of its practice in and around Rouen in the late-fifteenth and early-
sixteenth centuries to place it among the options available as people worked through 
their disputes and, further, to reveal some of the important insights that it and other 
clameurs offer into the legal culture and people’s interactions with the legal system. 
As broad as its potential usage was, however, it is important to note that the risk 
remained constant: a false clameur de haro (one cried unjustifiably) was penalized 
with the same base fine, meaning that the offender who disturbed the peace and 
forced all of his neighbors to drop everything and come running could expect a fine, 
whether he be the “evildoer” who caused the clameur to be raised justly or the “false 
accuser.” The witnesses could be crucial to determining which one was the 
offender.38 
Part of the clameur de haro’s appeal has been attributed to the opportunities 
created by the immediacy and exigencies of justice upon its cry. For instance, the 
                                                                
37 Pissard, La clameur de haro dans le droit normand, 4. 
38 Pissard, La clameur de haro dans le droit normand. The automatic fine assessed upon the 
clameur’s cry was not unique to Normandy and was an essential element of the clameur de haro’s 
broader usage. On the subject, see Müller, “Social control and the hue and cry.” 
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person who enacted the haro was also “invested with a sort of public power” to arrest 
the “offender” and bring him to justice—and the alleged offender was required to 
appear in court within 24 hours, so it also expedited procedures in court.39 These 
attributions are intriguing and may have held a measure of truth, but I have already 
shown and will continue to show that the state and its officials assumed by this notion 
did not have a monopoly on public power or the law—in theory they did, but not in 
practice. That is, the clameur de haro represents what was already in place, not an 
exception to it—people, especially in civil matters, played a critical role, mediated by 
their power of discretion, in publicizing offenses and mobilizing local authorities.  
Of course, a crucial element of the clameur de haro was that it “forced the 
hand” of the disputing parties and the courts. The case had to go to court, and the 
court decided who should be fined, settling the uncertainty created by the clameur 
and not necessarily according to expectations, depending on the proof available. 
Nonetheless, as important as the court’s role was in assigning blame and in deciding 
the fine and punishment for the offender, another central point of this dissertation, as 
noted above, is that the court and its ruling diminish rapidly in the larger scale of a 
civil dispute. Like seizures of property, a clameur de haro and a foray into court may 
only be the “opening salvo” and the beginning of a series of procedures. Moreover, 
the court’s records sometimes distort the picture because the disputes are often 
settled out of court, even if additional maneuverings in court are in progress at the 
time of the settlement.  
                                                                




As an interesting example of the clameur de haro in action, the final settlement 
contract, formalized before notaries, between Jean (uncle) and Pregent Leprevost 
(son of Jean’s older brother) provides insights into this practice and the richness of 
the notarial records for understanding legal practices more generally. Jean and 
Pregent were contesting rights to some of the patrimonial property which Jean’s 
brother, Rigault, had transferred to him, with the consent of Pregent on condition of 
rente payments, which another contract confirms had been paid. Pregent then 
determined that he had not received a fair cut of some shares and “was combative” 
and “tried very hard to hinder Jean in his enjoyment of the patrimonies and enacted 
the haro.” However, shortly thereafter, the narrative continues, Pregent realized 
“upon bringing this dispute between them before the bailly of Vitefleu or his lieutenant 
and seeing that he could not pursue the said haro, paid the fine for it and obtained 
royal letters” by which others may be given to understand that in making the disputed 
contract, “he had been deceived” and that his uncle made a great sum of money at 
his expense. The letters ordered that the “contract be rescinded, broken, and 
annulled,” and Jean “contested and challenged” the letters, “saying that they were 
obtained under false pretenses and denatured the facts” and that they omitted sums 
of money that Pregent had received.  
In his defense before the bailly of Vitefleu, Jean claimed that the letters were 
inadmissible, and seeing Pregent’s defense of his claim as it was and seeing the 
writing on the wall, “as the case was hanging before the court,” Jean approached 
Pregent about a settlement. Having seen his uncle’s defenses in turn, Pregent went 
to the bargaining table with his uncle to work out a settlement, which by and large 
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favored Jean except for a substantial cash payment of 150 livres which Jean made to 
Pregent. By this agreement both were content, the royal letters, which Pregent 
handed over to Jean, were nullified and broken, and they promised to “vuider la 
court” [literally “empty the court”].40   
This case between Jean and Pregent provides an interesting example of the 
haro as an act of instigation in a dispute but one which, although presumably 
achieving an annoyance factor, proved to be not sustainable (because it was enacted 
after Jean had taken possession of the property not as the preventative measure for 
which it was intended) and “forced” other maneuvers in and out of court. It is also an 
example of some of the narrative qualities and the orality captured in notarial records 
and the equally important act of transferring possession of documents (elaborated in 
chapter two). More importantly, this settlement places the haro within a much broader 
context of practice. For instance, the fine Pregent would have paid was about five 
sous. If we assume that he knew that the haro was a lost cause going in and decided 
that the five sous was an acceptable price (on the scale of 150 livres; 1 livre = 20 
sous) for the ruckus it would create, then the haro may be seen as a far cry from the 
                                                                
40 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. For another example see 2E1 229, October 5, 1500. “lequel 
Pregent s’estoit puisnagnes___ [pugnare = combat] non obstant ces choses efforce troubler et 
empescher ledit Jehan Leprevost en la joissance desdits heritages et fait haro et sur ce proces 
entr’eulx intente devant le bailly de Vitefleu ou son lieutenant et voiant qu’il ne pouvoit conduire ledit 
haro avoit d’icelui fait amende et obtenu lettres royaulx en moys d’octobre derriere passe donnant a 
entendre que endit contract faisant il avoit este deceu et que sondit oncle avoit recueilly grant somme 
de deniers durant le soubz___ dudit Pregent lesqulez deniers appartenant audit Pregent tendit par 
lesdites lettres ledit contract estre recinde, casse et adnulle lesquelles lettres royaulx eussent este 
contredictes et debatues par ledit Jehan Leprevost disant quelles estoient subreptices et obreptices et 
que en icelle estoit teu et obmis la droicture dudit Jehan Leprevost qui avoit fait plusieurs mises pour 
ledit Pregent et autres caucions que ledit Jehan Leprevost entendre declerer en temps et lieu par 
lesquelles ledit Jehan Leprevost eust pretendu deffence desdites lettres devant ledit bailly de Vitefleu 
ou son lieutenant sur l’enterinement desquelles ledit proces estoit pendant et voiant ledit Pregent 
Leprevost les deffend dudit Jehan Leprevost son oncle s’est tourne devers lui et tant fait que sur ce 




glorious harbinger of justice imagined by Glasson and Pissard. It becomes one 
maneuver among many, a pawn sacrificed in the larger chess game of the dispute 
with his uncle. It is also plausible that Pregent’s knowledge of the law and the 
nuances of the different clameurs available to him was a little rusty—or that the 
contested possession was more ambiguous than it seems, given the state of the 
record—and that he was trying different procedures as the dispute progressed, 
improvising as it developed. The risk of the fine may have been acceptable even if 
the ruling was not clear from the start. Regardless of Pregent’s strategy in pursuing 
the dispute, the clameur de haro was not a discrete act. 
As further evidence of how the haro worked in practice, there is a similar 
account of a haro made in the events leading up to an appearance before the 
Échiquier. In this case, Robert and Jean Dorenge raised a clameur de haro against 
the recteur and vicaire de Sarneville, Colin Barbey, who denied them an 
announcement in the church, that had been approved via letters, by the bishop of 
Lisieux or his official, to recover a receipt for a sum of money. This action brought 
them to plead before the vicomté d’Auge at the seat of Honfleur which was the 
beginning of many actions and delays before various courts, and a couple of defaults 
by the Dorenges, that ultimately led them before the Échiquier.41 As another example 
of improper usage of the haro (and failures can be as revealing as successes), we 
can assume both that contemporary understanding of proper usage was a little fuzzy 
and also that practice was more fluid than the letter of the law allowed. It also 
provides an important example of the coexistence of oral and written practices. The 
                                                                
41 ADSM, 1B 331, January 28, 1510. 
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Dorenges obtain letters to grant them the right to make an announcement in church, 
which was an important means of publicizing a contract drawn up before a notary and 
which set a distinct time limit (theoretically, though there were excuses to be found) 
for disputing that contract—a year and a day. This practice, according to Terrien, was 
especially important for undermining a clameur de marché de bourse (discussed 
below); in lieu of the announcement, the timeline extended to ten years.42   
To add more context to the clameur de haro in practice, I think it is important 
to examine a few from the court in Elbeuf, even from a (not far) different year (there 
were no instances of the clameur de haro recorded in 1510). Looking at the lower 
court examples, the haro seems to be used mostly in cases of physical altercations 
(“malfacons de corps”)—four out of six during three weeks of 1502.43 One such entry 
has Pernot Bonamy appearing to plead his defense against a clameur de haro raised 
against him by Guillaume Hebert and his mother for an assault which drew blood. 
Another entry notes that Richard Ducure is paying the fine for a clameur de haro 
raised against him by Jean Poullain after punching Poullain during a heated game of 
“boules.” Another entry notes that Pernot Morel is paying the fine (5 sous) for a 
clameur de haro raised against him by Jean Bacheler in relation to an attempted 
dispossession of some of Bacheler’s patrimony. A final example has Guillaume 
Delacroix paying the fine for a clameur de haro raised against him by the fermiers of 
the mills of Elbeuf for trying to slip a “hamboure” of beer passed them “without paying 
                                                                
42 Guillaume Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil tant public que privé, observé au pays et Duché de 
Normandie, Second edition (Paris, Jacques du Puys, 1578), 320-21. 
43 ADSM, 52BP 9. “Guillaume DeLacroix fist amende d’une clameur de haro sur luy faicte par les 
fermiers de la prevoste coustume et moullins d’Ellebeuf pour ce qu’il en pore... ung hamboure du biere 
sans paier la coustume.” 
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the custom.” Even this very small sample of cases provides a fascinating range of 
usage for the haro and is worth a slight temporal digression from the main sample of 
these records. Although lacking in details about the incidents that prompted the haro, 
we nevertheless observe the fluidity of practice where daily life and the legal system 
come together.  
For all of this discussion, the supposed popularity and renown of the clameur 
de haro is disproportionate to its presence in the records under consideration here: 
twice in the notarial records, three times in the Échiquier, and none in Elbeuf (though 
there are 6 over the course of three sessions in 1502).44 It is but one of several 
clameurs in practice. For my purposes, the clameur de haro examined alongside the 
other clameurs underscores the persistence of orality and witnessing in legal 
practices (introduced in chapter two). 
Another noteworthy clameur, though mentioned in the records less frequently 
than the haro (only once in the notarial records and none in the others) was the 
clameur de gage plege. Similar in certain respects to the haro, the clameur de gage 
plege concerns property seizure and possession, but it is not specific to hereditary 
lands (patrimony) and lacks the undertones of imminent danger, though it is easy to 
imagine the initial response scene being comparable (however, a sergent had to 
record it for it to be valid and Terrien’s description of it and other “clameurs” would 
suggest that it was more of a “complaint” than a “shout”).45 We learn from a 
settlement contract between neighbors that Jean Petit raised a “clameur de gaige 
plege” against Rogier Lecheron during the course of a dispute over a property line 
                                                                
44 ADSM, 52BP 9. 
45 Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil. 
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and building project attempted by Petit. The dispute worked its way through the 
courts up to the Échiquier before the parties worked out a settlement, which will be 
elaborated in the next chapter.46   
By far the most frequent clameur in the records was the clameur de marché de 
bourse, which was a means of reclaiming lineage property that had been sold, in 
exchange for the reimbursement of the sale price [bourse]. The importance of lineage 
property has already been introduced in previous chapters, but the clameur de 
marché de bourse was one of the more important legal practices used to recover and 
maintain it.47 Of all of the appearances before the vicomté of Elbeuf in 1510, 35 were 
in relation to a clameur de marché de bourse—that’s nearly a third of the 
appearances.48 Among the notarial records there are 17 references to this clameur 
and 2 in the Échiquier records. In chapter two, I showed some examples of attempts 
to defend against the threat of this clameur in contracts. Further, it is fairly common 
for the chain of title in contracts (discussed in chapter two) to indicate that the 
property had been (re)gained by clameur de marché de bourse. For example, Noel 
Lemachon notes in his sale of property to Colin Leclerc that he had recovered and 
gained the right over the property in question by clameur de marché de bourse from 
Guillaume Roque who had bought it from Noel’s brother Jean. The contract also 
indicates that when the rente contract between Jean Lemachon and Guillaume 
Roque was nullified, the money that Jean had loaned Roque who had then loaned it 
to Gillet Dufour had to be returned. The contract between Noel Lemachon and Colin 
                                                                
46 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 8, 1500. 
47 It was similar to a nouvelle dessaisine procedure or the reclamation in use in other parts of France. 
See Giesey, “Rules of Inheritance.” 
48 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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Leclerc also suggests that some of the finer details of recuperating the property were 
still being sorted out because the vicomté of Rouen had ruled in favor of Noel the 
very day that he drew up the contract with Leclerc, but Leclerc would have assumed 
Noel’s right to collect.49 The clameur de marché de bourse was clearly a 
commonplace among the courts and the notaries and a preferred action taken to 
instigate a claim on property. The lengths that people went to reclaim property, and 
the fact that it was institutionalized and common in practice, underscore how 
important lineage property was to Norman legal culture. 
In terms of the court records, the proceedings following a clameur de marché 
de bourse reveal some interesting points of practice. For example, the case between 
Guillaume Robellot and Jean Robellot before the vicomté of Elbeuf reveals more 
about activity out of court than anything in court. In this case, Jean Robellot had 
raised a clameur de marché de bourse against Guillaume Robellot. Following this, on 
September 5th, Jean Yver, the sergent, delivered a summons to Guillaume to 
respond to the clameur and then, with the help of a couple of other men, conducted 
an inventory and appraisal of the property in question (valuing 40 sous tournois). 
When the court date arrives on September 18th, Guillaume does not appear and is in 
default. The court records this brief narrative of events but not a sentence.50 Defaults 
will be discussed at length in the next chapter; suffice it to say here that the pattern of 
defaults suggests that the case was left hanging. This means that much happened 
leading up to the appearance in court, on a fairly short turnaround, but that following 
                                                                
49 ADSM, 2E 1 228, January 29, 1500. For another example of the clameur de marché de bourse, see 
2E 1 228, January 15, 1500. 
50 ADSM, 52BP 11, September 18, 1510. For more examples, see the three records following on the 
same page, all from the same day. 
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this one appearance, the court did not render a decision. The fact that so many 
cases are left “unresolved” (without a court ruling), as will be elaborated in chapters 
four and five, indicates on the one hand that “resolution” was not necessarily the 
most important issue at stake in conflicts and on the other, that resolution for the 
legal culture of Normandy in this period, especially with regard to civil procedures, 
had a different meaning. That is, a court ruling and resolution of a conflict were not 
equivalent, and “justice” more broadly did not require or necessarily result from a 
court ruling. 
Taking an example from the other end of the court system, the Échiquier 
heard, deferred and heard again an appeal and complaint from Robert Legouez 
regarding a couple of clameurs raised against him by Guillaume Levesque and 
Thomas Berquet and his wife that resulted in an appearance before the vicomté 
d’Auge in the ples de la sergenterie de Pont l’Évêque in 1507. We learn that in 
subsequent proceedings, Legouez claimed to have transferred the disputed property 
and debt of 11 livres tournois to his uncle Jean Lepannier who would assume 
defense of the clameurs. In that regard, Legouez claimed that Lepannier had 
“sufficiently accepted the transfer of the patrimonies,” but he adds that the transfer 
was “made in his [Lepannier’s] absence.” On this premise, Levesque opened 
proceedings pursuant to the clameur against Lepannier “by several and diverse 
summonses” to the “ples du pont levesque” and “toward him took several defaults.” In 
the meantime, Jean Lepannier “had gone from life to death and his succession 
passed to several underage children” whose tuteur, Jean de Brey, upon receiving a 
summons for them to appear in court on the matter, “declared that the children would 
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hear nothing demanded on the said patrimonies and that they did not want to accept 
the sale that Legouz claimed to have made to their father Jean Lepannier in his 
absence.”51 With this deflected sale, Legouez was back to defending the clameurs. 
The Échiquier had postponed the case 16 days because it was “not for the present in 
a state to be judged” (“le proces n’est pour le present en estat de juger”) before 
supporting the vicomté against Legouez’s complaint and sending the dispute over the 
claimed property back to that court for resolution.  
This summary and small excerpt from this case presented to the Échiquier 
reveals a great deal about legal maneuverings in and out of court and the role of the 
courts and contracts in the melee. The first notable point is the failed (absentee) 
contract between Legouez and Lepannier. The difference between this deflected sale 
and a fraudulent contract remain unclear—there is no evidence in this case that 
Legouez was accused of fraud during the proceedings. How the Lepannier party was 
able to successfully deflect the sale is also unclear but an interesting point for 
discussion of enforcement practices (elaborated in chapter five). The contract--
                                                                
51 ADSM, 1B 331, January 8 and January 24, 1510. “depuys lequel transport ledit Levesque s’estoit 
clame pout avoir et ratraire dudit Legouez lesdits heritages ainsy decretez sur le nom dudit Julienne 
sur laquelle clameur assignacion avoit este faicte audit Legouez a comparoir es ples du pont 
l’evesque devant le viconte d’Auge ou osn lieutenant devant lequel icelluy Legouez s’estoit comparir 
et declaire qu’il n’estoit plus tenant desdits heritages et qu’il les avoit transportez et baillez audit 
Lepannier et a ces causes disoit ledit Legouez soy en estre alle hors de proces et avoit ledit Lepannier 
Lequel Lepennier avoit passe procuration expresse pour proceder et deffendre la clameur dudit 
Levesque et par ce disoit ledit Legouez que icelluy// pannier avoit suffisamment accepte le transport 
fait en son absence desdits heritages et aussy ledit Levesque avoit procede contre ledit Lepannier par 
plusieurs et diverses assignacions esdits ples du pont levesque sur ladite clameur et vers luy prins 
plusieurs deffaulx et pour ce que ledit Jehan Lepannier estoit alle de vie a decez et sa succession 
escheue a plusieurs enffans soubz ausquelz avoit este esleu tucteurs et que sur l’assignacion qui 
avoit este faicte audits soubjectz Jehan de brey tucteur desdits soubjectz avoyent declare que lesdits 
soubjects n’entendoyent aucune chose demander esdits heritages et qu’ilz ne voulloyent accepte la 
vendue que ledit Legouez disoit avoir faicte audit Jehan Lepannier père desdits soubjectz en son 
absence et qu’ilz se rapportoyent audit Legouez dobair ou deffendre a ladite clameur et aussy pour ce 
que ledit Legouez aprez ladite declaration avoit derechef este appelle ausdits ples du pont levesque…” 
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assuming that it existed, and even if it didn’t—was a personal defensive ploy on the 
part of Legouez in the midst of litigation in which he leveraged a well-known and 
accepted method of transferring legal responsibility over the disputed property. Even 
though the guardian of Lepannier’s minor children, very much in defense of their 
interests, passed on the acquisition from their cousin, at the very least, it clogged the 
workings and bought him some time with multiple summonses, appearances, and 
defaults indicated.  
The tactic by Legouez not only reveals contracts in a new light as potential 
instruments of diversion, but it also places activity out of court in the foreground of 
activity in court. We also observe by this case that the activity in court was fairly one-
sided with the claimants appearing and the defender(s) not appearing. But the pivotal 
action in the dispute remains the clameurs raised by Levesque and the Brequets 
which instigated litigation and looped the court in, even if it was peripheral to much of 
the action.  We can conclude from this that the court is not the main player but that it 
remains key as an enforcer (or potential enforcer), albeit not center stage. 
The manner and frequency of the use of the clameur underscores the 
importance of legal activity preceding appearances in court. Even as a more formal 
instigation, clameurs help to put appearances in court in perspective, placing them 
within the larger picture of the dispute. They also add nuance to our understanding of 
the role of officials in a dispute. Though clameurs were frequently invoked, it is rare to 
find mention of a sergent having been summoned to record one.52 Such actions 
taken leading up to a court appearance, involving officials or not, suggest a great 
                                                                
52 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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deal of independence, initiative and self-determination on the part of interested 
parties to a dispute. 
Focusing on actions taken outside of court or as an instigation to an 
appearance in court, it is important to examine more carefully who was actually 
involved in such actions, as claimants or claimees, to see if they form a 
representative sample of disputants or favor one social group more than another. 
Regarding the seizure of goods, there is very little demographic information in the 
records mentioning this action, though the activities of the gardes of the lingères guild 
helps round this out. However, for the clameurs, the records under examination here 
indicate that this action was practiced fairly evenly by a range of groups. For 
instance, of the total number of references to clameurs, 12 of the notarial records (of 
27 total) and 4 from the Échiquier (of 7 total) indicate that women were involved in 
some capacity. Of the other major groups mentioned, tradesmen and bourgeois 
figure in 14 references in the notarial records, once in Elbeuf (for which demographic 
information is scant anyway), and once in the Échiquier; nobles and clergy figure in 
12 references in the notarial records, 9 in Elbeuf, and 4 in the Échiquier; and legal 
professionals figure in 7 references in the notarial records, none in Elbeuf, and 2 in 
the Échiquier. No one group stands out significantly, suggesting that the practice was 
not favored by, or exclusive of, one group.53  
 
                                                                
53 These groups are the most common ones represented in the sources sampled here, but admittedly 
represent a (significant but unknown) segment of the population as a whole. Similar findings are 
presented in: Bruno Sintic, “Saisir la société urbaine des petites villes par les actes de tabellionage,” in 
Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, 
France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 109-17; and Smail, “Notaries, Courts and 





The final action taken outside of court pursuant to a dispute and the resolution 
thereof that needs mentioning here is the mediation and settlement of disputes 
before an appearance in court. Among the notarial records, the settlement between 
the heirs of Regnault Cabot and Jean Bourdon stands out. In this settlement, Nandin 
Cabot, as part of reconciling his inheritance with his co-heirs of Regnault Cabot, 
agrees to pay the outstanding debt from a rente contract to the heir and 
representative of the party of Bourdon, Jacques Devreux.54 The debt had grown, with 
arrears, from 45 sous tournois to 70 livres tournois—again reinforcing the idea that 
there was considerable discretion in the collection of debt but that transferring that 
unwritten understanding, relationship, and credit nurtured between the individual 
parties, through a sale or even across generations (to those not on board with the 
informal understanding), was a significant challenge to these implicit operations of 
credit and debt. To that end, whereas nantissement typically supported the workings 
of credit on a more formal level (as discussed in chapter two), in cases like these, 
where the credit may have been of a more personal nature, nantissement, by 
publicizing the letter of the agreement, may have had an effect beyond or even 
opposite to intention.55  
This settlement contract indicates that Devreux “wanted to mettre en criee 
pour passer par decret les heritages de Nandin Cabot,” meaning that the dispute was 
                                                                
54 ADSM, 2E 1 228, January 4, 1500. 
55 For more on nantissement, see Robert Besnier, “Le transfert de la propriété dans les pays de 
nantissement à la fin de l’Ancien Régime,” Revue du Nord 40:158 (Apr.-Jun.,1958): 195-200. 
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heating up and the threat of a possible court action was looming. As an alternative, 
Cabot loans Devreux some property, and gives him the right to profit by them, as 
collateral in exchange for more time to collect the funds. Within six years, Cabot 
would, per the terms of the agreement, pay the outstanding debt plus costs, fulfill and 
wipe out the rente contract, and the collateral property would return to him.56 Such 
disputes reached a stage escalated beyond a renegotiation of a contract, but both 
parties decided, or were persuaded by relatives and friends, to come to a resolution 
without resorting to court. These settlements take a very similar shape to those that 
come after an appearance in court, a pattern which diminishes the presence of the 
court and removes it from a central position in the unfolding and resolution of a 
dispute. Settlements reached after a scheduled audience before a court will be 
examined at length in the next chapter. 
 
Multiplicity and Fluidity of Legal Professions 
 
When considering the actions of disputants inside or outside of court, we must 
not lose sight of the fact that their actions were not always as independent as they 
may seem and that some of them were turning to different officials and legal 
professionals at various stages for specific things (and possibly influenced by 
membership in kinship groups, guilds or other collective affiliations); they also turned 
to members of the clergy for advice and informal mediation of disputes. Although 
higher-level officials such as judges and avocats have received a considerable 
                                                                
56 ADSM, 2E 1 228, January 4, 1500. 
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amount of attention from historians, lower-level officials, with the exception of 
notaries, though crucial, as we have seen, to civil disputes, have received far less.57 
Despite some very promising initial research, little is known of the sergents and 
procureurs who frequent the records.58  
Shifting our focus to the officials most commonly mentioned in the records, we 
find, in this period before duties were defined and the rigid and exclusive boundaries 
of these professions drawn, an interesting degree of flexibility in the professions. That 
is, we find legal professionals playing multiple roles and a fluidity in their duties and 
practices. The richest source of evidence for these professionals and their activities 
in the records under examination in this study are the notarial records, but court 
records provide another perspective and help complete the picture. Each set of 
records offers a different lens through which to observe practice, offering a different 
perspective on the same practices and at the same time revealing different practices. 
Examining the scope of activities of these professionals adds complexity to our 
understanding not only of the spectrum of disputing from the angle of the 
                                                                
57 Further, most of the literature for judges and avocats relates to criminal procedures or their 
involvement in politics or relation to the monarchy.  
58 For more on sergents, start with Hamel, “Être sergent du roi de la prévôté de Saint-Quentin’’; 
Toureille, “Les sergents du Châtelet ou la naissance de la police parisienne’’; and Denys, “Les 
sergents de ville en France du Nord et aux Pays-Bas au XVIIIe siècle.’’ The literature on procureurs is 
slightly more expansive. In particular, start with Rafe Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise: 
Communauté and Seigneurie in Early Modern Provence” The Journal of Modern History 82:3 
(September 2010): 519-45; Claire Dolan, “Les procureurs, intermédiaires entre la justice et les 
familles: l’exemple des comptes de tutelle à la fin du XVIe siècle,” Isabelle Carrier, “L’art de louvoyer 
dans le système judiciaire de l’Ancien Régime: Le procureurs et la procédure civile,” and Sylvie 
Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” in Entre justice et 
justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, 
Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 461-503’’; Claire Dolan, Les Procureurs du Midi, 
sous l’Ancien Régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Sylvie Perrier, Des 
enfances protégées: La tutelle des mineurs en France (XVIIe-XVIIe siècles), Enquête à Paris et à 
Châlons-sur-Marne (Saint-Denis, France: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1998). 
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opportunities and ambiguities that disputants navigated but also of the discretion of, 
and ambiguity for, the officials in the legal system. 
The simplest example, but by no means simple, of the multiplicity apparent 
within a legal profession is that of the notaries. We have already seen (in chapter 
two) something of the range of documents that notaries drew up as well as their 
position at the center of information in the credit market. We also know that notaries 
played an important role in formalizing a resolution to a dispute (though this will be 
discussed in depth in the next chapter). It is common knowledge that priests served 
in the capacity of notary (and one of the settlement contracts refers to a notary/priest 
in an ecclesiastical court in Rouen), especially in rural areas, long before the period 
under consideration and continued to do so after, though in a more diminished 
capacity as the monarchy tried to assert its own prerogatives with respect to notarial 
records (discussed in the previous chapters).59 Along these lines, rarely do we find 
notaries acting in another capacity, but we do find a wide range of other officials 
acting as notaries. Typically these instances come forward in relation to prior 
contracts, such as in the establishment of a chain of title or in the dispute of a 
previous contract. The most common instances are that of a procureur, conseiller, or 
even a lieutenant of a vicomte or bailli acting as a notary, as seen in chapter two. We 
also recall the Piart contract, where the son, a priest, served as a notary for a sale 
contracted by his father, and then, several years later, was serving as procureur to 
his father.60 Although an important question and line for further research, it is unclear 
                                                                
59 ADSM, 2E 1 228 January 15, 1500. For a comparative example, see Giovanni Levi, Inheriting 
Power: The Story of an Exorcist, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Chicago, IL, USA: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1988). 
60 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 29, 1500. 
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at this time whether these contracts drawn up by stand-in notaries (and even oral and 
sous-seing privé contracts) were more prone to being disputed. The nature of such 
disputes would reveal a lot about the legal culture and about people’s familiarity with 
contract composition and what they considered to be essential and legally binding. 
The next example of the flexibility of the legal professions under examination 
in this dissertation is that of the sergents. We have already seen some of the 
sergents’ activity in policing, but their duties encompassed a broader range of activity 
beyond policing. It should also be noted that although the office of sergent was not 
supposed to be hereditary in this period, I have found clear references to hereditary 
sergents.61 Although there is no mention of other officials acting in a capacity of a 
sergent, we have seen in this chapter that they performed a lot of leg work in 
facilitating and witnessing some of the actions taken out of court by disputants. They 
also had a role in publicizing laws and court rulings and collecting fines.62 Their work 
in delivering summons and recording events, when they were called, was as varied 
as, and determined by, the actions taken by the disputants. This conformed, as 
discussed above, to the bigger picture goal of policing.63 
To draw the variability out a little more, I want to focus in particular on the 
activities of Jean Yver, sergent in the vicomté of Elbeuf, whose name will pop up in 
relation to various cases examined in this dissertation. By 1510, he had been 
practicing for at least eight years as sergent in the vicomté, giving him a considerable 
amount of experience by the time the cases in question rolled around. One of Yver’s 
                                                                
61 See, for example, ADSM, 2E 1 229, November 7, 1500 and 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
62 Cauchies, “Le ‘cri’ et l’espace urbain.’’ 
63 Kaplan, “Réflexions sur la police du monde du travail.’’ 
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more common activities was to summon people to court, as defendants or witnesses. 
In the cases against Abraham Leduc (elaborated in the next chapter), he rounded up 
and swore in 19 expert witnesses (the oldest men in town) to “recall” the boundary 
lines of a property recently enclosed. He would also be present in court to swear that 
he had properly summoned people who had not made an appearance—a fairly 
regular occurrence as we shall see. Such was the case with Jacquet Vallet, whom 
Yver had summoned “speaking to his person,” (“en parlant a sa personne”) to appear 
in court to answer an accusation of assault on Raoullin Cavellier’s wife. Yver could 
also be called upon to seize someone’s property at the behest of a private individual 
or at the behest of another official, for example to collect delinquent taxes as was the 
case with Fleury Mesnage, for example or at the behest of a private individual. In the 
event that the person having his goods seized objected, as did Fleury Mesnage, he 
would pass along the person’s formal opposition for the purpose of setting up an 
appointment in court (he may have also informally passed along the person’s 
informal objections). He could then expect to be blamed for an improper seizure (as 
Mesnage tried to assert). Yver would also receive and record clameurs. One of the 
entries for the court’s sessions on June 18th notes that “Jean Yver recorded that this 
past Sunday [Jeannet] Lefevre clamored to him to have and retrieve from [Simmonet] 
Dupuis [drappier] by the sale price and reason of lineage a piece of land…seated in 
the parish of Caudebec.”64 Yver and other sergents represented the power of the law 
                                                                
64 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Simonnet Dupuis drappier en deffault vers Jehannet Lefevre filz de Collin Lefevre 
porteur de clameur de marche de boursse et recorda Jehan Yver sergent que dymenche derrain 
passe led Lefevre cestoit a lui clame pour avoir et ratraire dud Dupuis par bourse et raison de lingnage 
une piece de terre contenant cinquante perches ou environ assis en la parroisse de Caudebec 
entriege de boscquet duree d’un coste bouys pigrior d’autre coste plusieurs boutieres d’un bout 
Jacques Dufay escuier et d’autre bout led boscquet duree que led Dupuis aent et acquise de Pierre 
Lefevre demourant a Rouen prochain dud clamant obaissant paier le prix que lad piece de terre lui 
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on the one hand but also facilitated practices and helped connect people to the legal 
system on the other. 
Of the legal professionals and practitioners under consideration here, the 
procureurs are the most complex and nebulous group. Very little research has been 
done on the procureurs to date, as Michael Breen has recently lamented, (and most 
of it has been on professional procureurs), so very little is known about them.65 The 
boundaries between different genres of procureurs--professional (and different types 
of these, moreover), legally-appointed (power of attorney), and stand-in procureurs--
is ill-defined in the contemporary legal commentaries, as seen in chapter one, and in 
much of the historiography. They are all easily lumped together under one heading, 
but they are not easily distinguished, and much remains to be done on enriching our 
understanding of “procureurs” and their practices. 
The records examined in this dissertation suggest some interesting parallels 
between professional procureurs and notaries, despite their relative obscurity. That 
is, although subject to some regulation of practice and in some instances carrying a 
bestowed office or title, not all of those acting as procureurs were professional 
procureurs (who made a living representing the legal interests of another person). 
We have seen similar phenomena among notaries—where the office and profession 
of notary are still in development. Similar to the example of notaries, we find 
instances of conseillers and other officials serving as procureurs. However, for 
                                                                
avoit coste et tous loyaulx coustz ralate tout ce que par raison et la coustume du pays en faict a 
rabatre et lui avoit requis adjournement deu et tout ce qui au cas appartient lui estre bien et demande 
faict lequel adjournement il avoit faict led jour de dymenche en parlant a la personne dud Dupuis…” 
65 Michael P. Breen, “Law and Social History in Early Modern France,” in Social Relations, Politics, 
and Power in Early Modern France: Robert Descimon and the Historian’s Craft ed. Barbara B. 
Diefendorf (Kirksville, MO: Truman State University Press, 2016): 42-60. 
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conseillers, avocats, judges, and lieutenants/vicomtes, these professions carry more 
distinct titles. A conseiller may act as a procureur, but I have yet to see the inverse.  
Furthermore, it is not always clear that those acting as procureur have any 
status as a legal professional, “high or low,” or any formal legal training or degree (a 
newer requirement for legal professionals of most types in the early sixteenth 
century). It is also important to recall the procuration contracts, discussed in the 
previous chapter, which set up a power of attorney and transferred legal rights to 
another individual on behalf of the one. All of this suggests that the designation 
“procureur” or “notary” is linked more to the practice than a title which bears status 
(although there are distinct, titled offices such as the procureur du roi). In other 
words, “procureur” (or “notary”) denotes a role more than a “status,” so it may be best 
to think of the procureur as a legal “representative” of an individual or party.66 This 
broader conceptualization of the procureur helps to explain some of the variability of 
the role and of their practices. Of course, as these professions became more 
regulated and more commodified later in the sixteenth century, the boundaries of the 
profession likely became more rigid and imbued more status. 
Of the titled procureurs, a notable example is the procureur fiscal. One 
contract in particular makes reference to a nobleman’s “procureur fiscal en 
normendie,” and one of the more notable cases from Elbeuf (that concerning 
Abraham Leduc) indicates the actions taken by the “procureur de la sieurie,” which I 
                                                                
66 Historians (especially Anglophones) have rather easily translated the distinction between avocat and 
procureur according to the distinction between barrister and solicitor familiar in British law. Although I 
will admit there are similarities, I think too little is known of the procureurs at this stage to use this 
translation (solicitor). It would be more tempting to translate “procureur” as “procurator” (agent), but 
“procurator” appears to have additional meaning derived from Roman law, which may be confusing if 
used to discuss practices in northern France. 
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interpret as another name for the same official.67 The procureur fiscal was an official 
appointed by the seigneur (lord) to perform duties in the seigneurial court akin to 
those of the procureur du roi in the royal court. That is, he “represented the interests 
of his lord” and “acted in the interest of the public good,” which Sylvie Perrier 
suggests landed him in an “ambiguous position of having to serve two masters.”68 
The procureur fiscal’s exact duties were related to the privileges and customs within 
that jurisdiction and so were as varied as the jurisdictions themselves. In the 
hierarchy within seigneurial jurisdictions, the procureur fiscal generally came after the 
judge and before the procureurs hired privately, who came before the huissiers, 
notaries and sergents. Perrier has likewise determined, in her research on the 
procureur fiscal’s role in the legal appointing of guardians, that procureurs fiscals did 
not get involved in civil matters between those of legal majority. In so much as they 
were present for certain cases, they were not systematically brought in to audiences 
before the seigneurial courts, and their presence was only required in cases where 
they had to represent the lord’s interests wherein said interests were brought into 
question or in representing the ministère public in criminal and police matters as well 
as those involving minors and incapables. Despite this, the procureur fiscal was a 
“very active auxiliary of justice since a good proportion of cases introduced in 
seigneurial courts pertained to justice gracieuse.”69  
As for the non-titled procureurs, people hired procureurs for a broad range of 
tasks. Their primary, yet expansive, role was to serve as legal strategists, and they 
                                                                
67 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500 and 52BP 11, respectively. 
68 Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” 493. 
69 Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” 491-95. 
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would represent their clients in court (and thereby their clients would not need to 
appear). They were brought into a dispute because of their expertise in civil law 
procedure, surpassing even the avocat in knowledge not of the law codes but of the 
law in practice.70 That said, procureurs were very much at the heart of civil procedure 
and civil disputes in practice: “Among the numerous actors thus implicated in the 
administration of justice, the auxiliaries of justice, even more so than the judges, were 
in direct contact with those who would be answerable to it and represented, in a very 
concrete way, the judicial system at the individual level.”71 Making the case for the 
study of civil procedure, being more common than criminal, makes the case for 
procureurs and “lesser” officials as a subject worthy of scholarly attention. 
And yet, for as much as we know of procureurs, they remain in the 
background of many of the records under consideration here. There is often a brief 
reference as to their participation, and we can infer that they did a lot of leg work 
collecting documentation and representing clients (sometimes in their absence) in 
court. For instance, from the records of Elbeuf, we know that the same Leribert we 
observed above hired Michel Deleslardiere to be his procureur.72 We also know that 
a Vincent Regnault appeared in court with a Francois Leflameng as procureur to 
defend a declaration and clameur de marché de bourse.73 Moreover, Jacques Dufay 
had a team of at least three procureurs (including Leflameng) making various 
appearances in his defense of a clameur de marché de bourse initiated by Jean 
                                                                
70 Dolan, Procureurs du Midi; Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise’’; Dolan, “Les procureurs, 
intermédiaires entre la justice et les familles’’; and Carrier, “L’art de louvoyer dans le système judiciaire 
de l’Ancien Régime.’’ 
71 Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” 491. 
72 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
73 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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Carre (elaborated in the next chapter).74 Ysabel’s procuration contract, discussed in 
the previous chapter, reveals quite a bit about what a procureur might be expected to 
do, including hiring a more qualified procureur (recall that her husband was the 
primary procureur, but the contract stipulated that he had the right to bring in 
[professional] procureurs to pursue her interests as a case necessitated).75 
Nevertheless, we are left guessing at more exact details of their practice, including 
especially the fees for their services, which are left out of the records under 
consideration here. 
Accepting that procureurs were important legal strategists, we must credit 
them with their (obscure) share of actions taken inside and outside of court on behalf 
of disputants, as consultants and agents/representatives, and we must keep that in 
the back of our minds when analyzing the recorded activities of disputing parties. We 
must also bear in mind that procureurs worked for a fee and that there were 
economic considerations in hiring them just as there would have been in the decision 
to go to court. The procureur was likely central to the shape and trajectory of many 





Officials and legal professionals played important roles at strategic points 
along the spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution. From formalizing contracts 
                                                                
74 ADSM, 52BP 11 
75 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 27, 1500. 
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to actions taken in and out of court, we find evidence of people calling upon the 
services of legal professionals in various capacities. We also find that the boundaries 
around these professions were not always clearly defined. The variety and ambiguity 
of practitioners correlated to the variety and ambiguity of the legal system itself, 
which allowed for significant initiative on the part of litigants in resolving disputes, as 
we have seen and as we will see in chapters to come. The flexibility of practitioners, 
as a product of the legal culture, also facilitated the flexibility of actions taken in and 
out of court. Looking back at the open-dispute and instigating maneuvers taken prior 
to an appearance in court—from policing to seizures of goods to clameurs--we see a 
great deal of initiative taken by the parties to a dispute and the strategic interventions 
of different professionals. These actions are reinforced by settlements formalized 
prior to any court appearance. Looking forward to varying court appearances, we will 
come to a better understanding of the practice of civil disputes, of the roles of legal 








Up to this point I have given an overview of the legal system and 
contemporary thought on it; of notaries and the contracts they formalized; and of 
legal actions taken prior to an appearance in court. It is now time to turn our attention 
toward what happened when people finally decided to turn to a court intervention in a 
dispute. Recalling the case between the Delamare brothers which opened this 
dissertation, we turn now to activities before one or more courts but focus on the 
disputes which were heard by but not resolved before a court. Weaving together 
findings from the lowest and highest courts as well as notarial records, this chapter 
will begin by examining settlements and arbitration and will then move to a fine-
grained analysis of the role of procureurs in these cases and of the litigators most 
commonly involved in these disputes. Once we have laid the groundwork of options 
for resolution out of court and the people involved, we will dive more deeply into 
some of the actions taken in the course of court proceedings to see what we might 
glean about the motivations and strategies affecting the unfolding of cases. As we 
trace the activity of people in and out of court over the course of these proceedings, 
we will ultimately arrive at a much broader perspective of the legal system in relation 









Interpreting the significance of settlements out of court and arbitration have 
been the subject of some debate. Those in favor of the concept of infrajustice regard 
settlements as something removed from, and rivaling, the court system, and the 
focus has been primarily on the criminal side.1 Jeremy Hayhoe has argued that 
settlements and especially arbitration (in eighteenth-century northern Burgundy) did 
not threaten and rather worked with the court system, on both the civil and criminal 
side.2 In a similar vein, Rafe Blaufarb, analyzing civil procedures specifically, 
challenges the distinction in recent scholarship between “formal legal procedures 
(associated with the rise of the modern state) and informal ones such as compromise 
and arbitration (associated with the medieval church and noble culture)” by showing a 
dynamic relationship that existed between the two (in Provence) for at least the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and probably before and after.3 He argues that 
                                                          
1 Benoît Garnot, “Justice, infrajustice, parajustice et extrajustice dans la France d'Ancien Régime” 
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 4:1 (2000): 103-20; Benoît Garnot, “Une 
réhabilitation? Les justices seigneuriales dans la France du XVIIIe siècle” Histoire, économie et 
société 24:2 (2005): 221-232; Benoît Garnot, Histoire de la justice: France, XVIe-XXIe siècle (Paris, 
France: Gallimard, 2009); Hervé Piant, Une justice ordinaire: justice civil et criminelle dans la prévôté 
royale de Vaucouleurs sous l’ancien régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 
2006); Nicole Castan, “La justice expéditive” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 31:2 (Mar. - Apr., 
1976): 331-361; Nicole Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc à l'époque des Lumières (Paris, 
France: Flammarion, 1980). 
2 Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-
Century Northern Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008). 
3 Rafe Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise: Communauté and Seigneurie in Early Modern Provence” 
The Journal of Modern History 82:3 (September 2010): 519-45; 543. A similar argument has been 
made by medievalists. See Maïté Billoré, Isabelle Mathieu and Carole Avignon, La justice dans la 
France Médiévale (VIIIe-XVe siècles) (Paris, France: Armand Colin, 2012); Frederic Cheyette, “Kings, 
Courts, Cures, and Sinecures: The Statute of Provisors and the Common Law” Traditio 19 (1963): 
295-349; Stephen D. White, “‘Pactum...Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium’--The Settlement of Disputes 
by Compromise in Eleventh-Century Western France” The American Journal of Legal History 22:4 
(Oct., 1978): 281-308; and Patrick J. Geary and Jacqueline Falquevert. “Vivre en conflit dans une 
France sans État: typologie des mécanismes de règlement des conflits (1050-1200)” Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales 41:5 (Sep. - Oct., 1986): 1107-33. 
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negotiation and arbitration (in which he includes settlement out of court) were the 
ultimate goal behind the variety of legal maneuvers in the predictable cycle of 
litigation between large property holders and that the length of this cycle and the 
absence of court verdict were not symptomatic of judicial inefficiency or dysfunction—
contrary to what has been argued by others, notably Nicole Castan for eighteenth-
century Languedoc and Steven Reinhardt for the Sardelais in the eighteenth-
century.4 “The civil law of early modern France was neither expected nor asked to 
render decisive rulings,” according to Blaufarb, and “the purpose of legal 
contestation…was to provide a framework for negotiation…a means to disagree and 
debate” while upholding the social order.5 Blaufarb has shown that appearing before 
a court was a sort of lever in a larger process, a chapter in a more elaborate story.6  
This debate, largely led and elaborated upon by scholars of the eighteenth-century, 
determined and supported by studies of different regions in the eighteenth century, 
constitutes part of a larger debate on the state of the legal system leading up to the 
French Revolution and the impact of the French Revolution on access to, and on the 
effectiveness of, justice.  
Although the nature of settlements is important, this metanarrative of justice 
and the Revolution is rather far removed from late-fifteenth-, early-sixteenth-century 
                                                          
4 Castan, “La justice expéditive”; Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc; Steven G. Reinhardt, 
Justice in the Sarladais, 1770-1790 (Baton Rouge, LA, USA: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). 
This view has also been adopted more recently by Anthony Crubaugh, Balancing the Scales of 
Justice. Local Courts and Rural Society in Southwest France, 1750-1800 (University Park, PA, USA: 
The Pennsylvania State University, 2001). 
5 Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise,” 544. This is part of a much larger debate on whether the 
prevalence and “value” of settlements were symptoms of “inadequacy”—broadly speaking—of 
premodern institutional justice. For an example of the other side of the debate, see Crubaugh, 
Balancing the Scales of Justice. 
6 Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise,” 520-21. 
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Normandy, and this will change the character of the analytical framework slightly. My 
own work resonates closely with that of Hayhoe and Blaufarb, as outlined above, and 
it may be viewed, in part, as an extension of the questions above to an earlier period 
and a different legal culture, drawing in Normandy and social questions like gender 
into the story. However, it is worth emphasizing that in my study, we are not looking 
at the endings of the Old Regime legal system but rather the transformations of the 
medieval system and the beginnings of the early modern, so assumptions going in 
must be different. The records from early sixteenth-century Rouen sampled for this 
dissertation would suggest that a broad range of actions taken in and out of court in 
pursuit of a dispute were the norm and that distinctions between “formal” and 
“informal” procedures, similar to that outlined by Hayhoe and more so by Blaufarb, 
were more procedural than practical. Looking at dispute procedures more holistically 
allows for a more complete understanding of how people interacted with the legal 
system and how certain parts of that system related to other parts. 
One of the primary challenges to examining settlements is the problem of 
giving them definition. Often conflated with mediation and arbitration in the 
historiography, the judicial and notarial records are not much more helpful in 
clarifying the process.7 Jeremy Hayhoe has drawn attention to the imprecise use of 
terminology in the historiography and has defined the different terms in great detail. 
He also argues that, in Southern France in the eighteenth century, arbitration is an 
extension of court authority and is therefore more enforceable than private 
                                                          
7 Jeremy Hayhoe, “L’arbitre, intermédiaire de justice en Bourgogne vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle,” In 
Entre justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan 




settlements and mediations; further, it is more appealing to litigants as an 
enforceable solution to a dispute and appealing to the court which can delegate 
decisions while maintaining authority. The practices that I have observed in the early 
sixteenth-century Norman records would not fully support such a conclusion because 
settlements do appear to be more common than arbitrations and less contested. The 
inclusion of arbitration and settlement within the more nebulous category of 
“infrajustice” complicates the discussion further. In the sixteenth-century Norman 
records, a settlement may be referred to variably as a “transaction,” an 
“accommodement,” a “médiation” or a “compromis” and for the purposes of this study 
will be simply defined as an agreement reached out of court between two parties to 
resolve a dispute. Unlike an arbitration, which was sometimes mandated by a court, 
was mediated by one or more court-appointed officials (which could, and often did, 
include relatives, and as Zoe Schneider has shown, women) and likely had the 
resolution recorded by that court, the settlement was arranged independently by the 
parties themselves or their friends and relatives (and if they had sought the 
assistance of procureurs, may or may not have been following the advice of those 
intermediaries) and may have been recorded, sometimes before a notary, or may 
have remained an oral agreement.8 The settlement may (or may not) have 
encompassed a mediation, which would have meant involving a third party, sought 
out and agreed upon by the disputing parties, to help them come to an agreement. 
Procedurally, the mediated settlement strongly resembled an arbitration, especially if 
the parties over the course of their dispute had appeared (or at least made 
                                                          
8 Zoe Schneider, “Women before the Bench: Female Litigants in Early Modern Normandy” French 
Historical Studies 23:1 (winter 2000): 1-32. 
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arrangements to appear) in a court. Part of what makes a settlement so difficult to 
define is its malleability. Far removed from the lofty, clear-cut, systematic, and rigid 
ideals and aspirations of the learned jurists of chapter one, its malleability is indeed 
what made it so useful. Settlement, arbitration, and mediation are conflated with good 
reason—they all have elements that intertwine, often in unequal proportions--but 
teasing out the subtle differences among them, as well as the areas in which they 
overlap, brings into focus the variety of options and the potential for complex 
maneuvers that people had and, as a result, their capacity for agency and strategic 
entanglement or disentanglement. 
With this in mind, the notarial records provide critical information about 
settlements and actions taken out of court that are absent from the court records. In 
such cases, disputing parties formalized their settlement in a contract drawn up 
before a notary, presumably as an attempt to prevent further disputing. Here we can 
recall the case that opened this dissertation. Two brothers fighting over inheritance 
began a heated court battle in the plés de la sergenterie de Pavilly (about 10mi north-
northwest of the city) before the vicomte of Rouen or his lieutenant, but in the interest 
of “peace and brotherly love,” they resolved the matter out of court and drew up a 
formal document to this effect in front of a notary in Rouen.9 This act of settlement 
and the desire to avoid court was so common that the notary had a formula for 
drawing it up which was so well understood that he abbreviated it (“etc.”). Further 
motives for why the parties wanted to avoid court are not spelled out.  
                                                          
9 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500.  
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To the example of the Delamare brothers, we can add the settlement between 
Jean and Pregent Leprevost from the previous chapter. In a dispute over patrimony, 
uncle and nephew were embroiled in court proceedings which, because of Pregent’s 
failed haro, involved at least two appearances before the bailli of Vitefleu. Owing to 
each other’s claims and defenses, as stipulated in the contract itself, and possibly 
sensing that they were in for a long and drawn out court battle, Jean approached 
Pregent about working out an agreement, and Pregent consented. So, while the case 
was left hanging, which might lead us to believe that the case had been postponed 
and no resolution had yet been given, Pregent and Jean in fact came to an 
agreement to resolve the dispute out of court.  
As part of the arrangement and to ensure that “there could be no more 
proceedings on the above-mentioned circumstances,” Pregent handed over all 
documentation and evidence that he had gathered in pursuit of his case. And here 
we recall the significance of transferring documentation elaborated in chapter two. He 
also agreed to “desist and depart from the proceeding.”10 Pregent’s agreement to 
desist and vacate the court indicates that Pregent had instigated the proceedings in 
court (because a defendant cannot call off proceedings so readily), but his consent to 
pay the fine (the amount is not given) and release Jean from the responsibility of it 
suggest that Jean may have had an edge after all. The payout of 150 livres by Jean 
                                                          
10 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. “desormais entre eulx deux ne puisse avoir aucun proces des 
choses dessusdits circonstances deppendent ne autrement et si luy promist bailler toutes les lettres et 
escriptures qu’il avoit et povera recouvrer touchant lesdits heritages et se desista et departy ledit 
Pregent Peprevost dudit proces et deleffect et poursuilte d’icellui et au moien des choses dessusdites 
et pour eviter audit proces frais et mis. d’icellui et a toute autre poursuilte que ledit Pregent Leprevost 
eust peu faire vers ledit Jehan Leprevost icelui Jehan Leprevost donna audit Pregent la somme de 
sept vings dix livres quelle somme ledit Pregent confessa avoir eue et receue dudit Jehan// Leprevost 
et sentint pour content et oultre promise le fait tenu quicte.’’ 
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to Pregent probably evened things out and may be a clue to the projected costs and 
fine incurred by Pregent for his various legal maneuvers; however, they would be 
impossible to separate from any compensation over the disputed property and 
revenues.11 The fine for an unjustified haro, for instance, pales in comparison, but the 
haro case was resolved before the second court proceedings pending as of the 
settlement, and with this in mind, many fines were “arbitrary,” meaning that judges 
had the discretion to assess them to “fit” the offense and the value of what was 
contended.12 The question of cost and the difficulty of determining it will be discussed 
in chapter five along with the question of discretion. 
Similar to the agreement reached between Jean and Pregent Leprevost, the 
settlement between Robert Ygou and Nicolas Fere’s heirs also involved a cash sum 
in exchange for abandoning the cause in court. The contract notes that Ygou was 
demanding the third of a house and patrimony from Fere and that the case was 
hanging before the assise of Rouen. The contract also notes that Fere has died while 
the case was ongoing and that this has prompted Ygou to confess that he never had 
any right to the disputed property. As such, Ygou ratified the sale of the property that 
his uncles had made, making exception of his mother, and agreed that the heirs of 
Fere would enjoy the property as he had done prior to the court proceedings. The 
court records were to be renounced, Ygou would desist and abandon the case before 
the court, and in exchange he received 4 livres tournois “to support the expenses 
made by the said Ygou in pursuit of the trial” from Pierre Delahaye, “who married the 
                                                          
11 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. 
12 Guillaume Terrien, Commentaires du droit civil tant public que privé, observé au pays et Duché de 
Normandie, Second edition (Paris, Jacques du Puys, 1578); F. Soudet, ed., Ordonnances de 
l’Échiquier de Normandie aux XIVe et XVe siècles (Rouen, France: A. Lestringant, 1929). 
214 
 
widow” (of Nicholas Fere) and Pierre and Guillaume Fere.13 This case suggests that 
the cost of court proceedings was not exorbitant, but could be significant to a poorer 
person. It also shows how dramatically proceedings could change when transferred 
from one generation to another. It is possible that Ygou had a personal grudge 
against Nicholas Fere that he did not wish to pursue against Fere’s heirs. It is also 
possible that proceedings were projected to be more complex and lengthy (and 
expensive) with the transfer between generations, and he decided to cut his losses.  
An arbitration does not look much different from a settlement, especially when 
it is drawn up before a notary. In one such case, two parties--Raoulin Lambert and 
his wife Jeanne (represented by Raoulin’s father Jean Lambert as procureur), 
residing in the parish of Amyvoye (present day La-Mi-Voie), and Raoulin Denormare 
and his wife Marguerite, residing in the parish of Bloville--had gone to the vicomte of 
Rouen at the ples de la sergenterie de Pont Saint Pierre held in Rouen to claim 
partial right to a piece of land issuing from Roumyet Raoul, father to both women via 
different mothers.14 There the judge had “passed a compromise” in which both 
parties, in order to pacify their discords, promised to agree to the sentence to be 
                                                          
13 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. For more examples see 2E1 228, January 14 and 21, 1500.  
14 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. ‘’Raoullin Lambert et Jehanne sa femme demourant en la 
parroisse de l’amyvoye et Raoulin Denormare et Marguerite sa femme demourans en la parroisse de 
Bloville icelles femmes heritieres chacune en partie de deffunct Roumyet Raoul Lesquelz apres ce 
que lesd femmes oulrent este auctorisee Lesquelz leverent greerent ratiffierent accepterent et oulrent 
agreable la sentence contenue en ung fueillet de papier dont la teneur eussent Nous Colin Lambert, 
Jaquet Raoul, et Guillaume Raoul charges arbitres de tous les discors et proces pendant par devant 
Monsr le viconte de Rouen ou son lieutenant es ples de la sergenterie de pont saint pierre Entre 
Raoulin Denormare d’une part et Jehan Lambert pour lui et procureur de Raoulin Lambert son filz et 
sa femme d’autre part jouxte le memorial dud compromis fait et passe es ples dud pont st pierre tenus 
a Rouen par noble homme Guillaume Ango lieutenant general de mond Sr le viconte le xxiii^e jour de 
septembre l’an mil v^c par lequel compromis lesd parties ont promis tenir et avoir agreable la 
sentence qui par nous arbitres seroit faicte en peine de x L t et sans appel ne dolleance a en dire et 
sentencier dedens les prouchains ples eussent dud compromis fait et passe a nous aujourd a 
mercredi iiii^e jour d’octobre end an mil v^c assemble ensemble pour d’iceulx discords paciffier et 
appoincter et avons fait sentence telle que il s’ensuit….’’ 
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given in advance of the next court session by appointed arbiters, Colin Lambert, 
Jaquet Raoul and Guillaume Raoul (apparently family members, though the exact 
relations are not indicated), on penalty of 10 livres tournois and to forego the option 
of appeal or complaint regarding the sentence. The arbiters also ruled on a second 
suit between the two parties regarding a fee for service by Lambert’s daughter to 
Denormare. The arbiters ruled that the property and levees on it were to be divided 
equally between the parties and that Lambert’s daughter, being six or seven years 
old, was too young to warrant a fee for service. Further, they ruled that the Lamberts 
would “vuider la court et juridiction desdits proces” (literally “empty the court and 
jurisdiction of the said trials”) and pay half of the fine, costs and expenses for the 
suits. Unfortunately, again, the final tally of the fine, costs, and expenses is not given.  
Furthermore, even though, based on studies of arbitration practices in later 
periods, we would expect the ruling from the arbitration to have been documented as 
part of the court record, this one was finalized as a document within a contract in 
front of a notary.15 This contract suggests, on the one hand, that, in this jurisdiction in 
this period, the notary was also the court recorder or that an arbitration was not 
automatically recorded by the court as it would be in later periods.16 On this 
assumption, the notary is serving an important supplementary function as court 
recorder (typical in the fifteenth century, especially in rural areas), and/or if not 
serving the court, is satisfying a desire on the part of the litigants to have a record of 
the oral proceedings, which would in turn mean that disputing parties, alongside 
                                                          
15 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
16 This would be contrary to the practices observed in Hayhoe’s study of Burgundy in the eighteenth 




centralizing, top-down initiatives discussed in chapter one, are co-creating the value 
of documentation and reinforcing the trend toward privileging it, as discussed in 
chapter two. This action would support not only the idea that such contracts were 
serving a commemorative and testimonial purpose but that the choices of litigants 
were supporting the growth of institutions, though settlements and arbitration add a 
lot of gray area between the roles these institutions are actually playing.17   
Approaching it from a different angle, with the unfortunate disappearance of 
the court record entirely (records from the vicomté of Rouen, as noted in chapter 
three, have survived only very sparsely), this contract may also be read as a 
postscript to the court record and a double-documentation of the final agreement, 
even a hybrid arbitration-settlement. Additionally, having a copy of the final arbitration 
for the family record would have been a practical act of foresight given that obtaining 
a copy of the judicial records later could be challenging and costly in the event that 
questions arose or that hostilities resumed.18 In this scenario, assuming the initial 
record before the court bears the stamp of authority and coercive potential of the 
court, this postscript suggests the difficulty of enforcement and realization of that 
potential and the risk of a resumption of hostilities, all of which will be elaborated 
                                                          
17 On writing as an act of witnessing, see Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record, 
England 1066-1307, Second edition (Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell, 1993); and Carol Symes, “Out 
in the Open, in Arras: Sightlines, Soundscapes, and the Shaping of a Medieval Public Sphere,” in 
Cities, Texts and Social Networks, 400-1500: Experiences and Perceptions of Medieval Urban Space, 
ed. Caroline Goodson, Anne E. Lester, and Carol Symes (Burlington, VT, USA: Ashgate, 2010): 279-
302. On the role of people and their practices supporting the growth of state institutions see Daniel 
Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-
1423 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2003); and Julie Hardwick, Family Business: 
Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
18 Several ordinances chastise officials for delaying delivery of such documentation and the case 
between the children of Jean Ausoult and the esliseurs of Tuit Signol before the vicomte of Elbeuf 
supports this concern. ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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upon in chapter five. This record within a record also suggests the possibility of a 
desire to give additional direction, interpretation and an action plan to the decision. In 
either case, the notary is playing a pivotal role in the process of resolving the dispute. 
Putting these considerations into even greater relief, a settlement may even 
follow a failed arbitration. Taking the case between Jean Ribault and Jean Dugardin 
as an example, their arbitration had included a contingency that if anything had been 
omitted or if new information not accounted for by the arbiters came to light, Ribault 
would be within his right to continue pursuit of his “mobile and patrimonial actions and 
demands” against Dugardin. In opposition to which, we learn from the contract, “the 
said Dugardin intended to defend himself by several means and reasons that he 
intended to declare and support in time and place, and the said Ribault intended to 
support the contrary.” At which point, both parties “could enter into a long suit; to flee 
and avoid which they had assembled together by means of their counsels and 
friends” to work out a lasting settlement. In this settlement, Ribault agreed, in 
exchange for some property, to cease and desist his suit, and a debt plus arrears 
owed by Dugardin was forgiven in exchange for a lump sum payment of 250 livres 
tournois to be paid to Ribault.19 The amount of any original debt is unknown, but we 
                                                          
19 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 22, 1500. “Comme desccord et proces feust meu et espere mouvoir entre 
Jehan Robault l’aisne bourgeois et demourant en la parroisse saint erblanc de Rouen une part et 
Jehan Dugardin changeur aussi bourgeois et demourant en lad parroisse d’autre part Sur plusieurs 
actions et demandes mobilles et hereditalles que led Jehan Ribault voulloit faire aud Dugardin a 
raison de ce que led Jehan Robault disait que en faisant certaine sentence arbitraire de leurs 
descords il avoit este dit que se aucune chose avoit este obmis et qui fu trouve du compte de 
l’entremise d’entr’eulx qui n’eust este couche en icelui et dont lesd arbitres meussent en congnoissant 
icelui Ribault demouroit entier a faire poursuilte sur led Dugardin ainsi qu’il verroit bon estre jouxte lad 
sentence desquelles actions et demandes led Dugardin eust intention soy deffendre par plusieurs 
moiens et raisons qu’il avoit intention declairer et soustenir en temps et lieu et led Ribault eust 
intention soustenir le contraire et qu’il y avoit eu plusieurs obmissant end compte de lad entremise 
Surquoy icelles parties povoient entrer en long proces pour fuir et eviter auquel ilz se soient 
assemblez ensemble et par le moien de leurs conseulx et amys demourant a acord et appoinctement 
tel qu’il eus__ Savoir faisant furent presents lesd Jehan Ribault l’aisne d’une part et Jehan Dugardin 
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can assume that it was substantial and in excess of 250 livres tournois based on the 
assumption that the value of the property plus the lump sum equated to or were an 
acceptable fraction of the original amount (plus projected court costs to recover it).  
The stakes for Dugardin’s credit and possible continuing social or business 
relations between Dugardin and Ribault can only be treated speculatively, but such 
considerations would complicate the situation further. The trade-off for salvaging 
Dugardin’s credit, for instance, may have meant a larger pay out and desire to settle 
out of court to keep the lid on his alleged delinquency in paying his debts. What is not 
clear (and a conclusive answer to which is beyond the scope of this study) are the 
levels of publicity of court appearances versus settlements/contracts on the one 
hand--was settling out of court more discreet and conciliatory? Knowing, based on 
material discussed in chapter two, that notarial contracts were not necessarily, even 
typically, drawn up behind closed doors, required and represented witnessing of the 
agreement, and were in some cases read aloud in a similar manner to court rulings, 
would suggest that the discretion of one practice versus the other may have been 
fairly even (designated court buildings were still rare in the late fifteenth century and 
many proceedings still took place “in open air”).  
Also unclear, however, is the perception by the litigants of one or the other 
practice being more shameful or socially taboo--was going to court and not finding a 
way to settle a sign of stubbornness or spite, and did it signal the end of social 
                                                          
d’autre part lesquelz pour eviter ausd proces Tant sur lesd actions que autrement en quelques 
manieres et pour et quelque cause ou causes que ce soit Confessant leur appoinctement et traicte 
estre tel qu’il euss___ C’est assavoir que led Jehan Ribault l’aisne quicta et clama quicte a toujours// 
led Jehan Dugardin de toutes et telles demandes et actions tant mobilles que hereditalles que icelui 
Jehan Ribault lui eust peu ou pourroit faire en quelque manière que ce soit ou peust estre de tout le 
tmeps passe jusques a ce jour moiennant et par ce que led Jehan Dugardin quicta transcporta et 
delaissa afin d’eritage pour lui etc. aud Jehan Ribault l’aisne pour lui ses hoirs…’’ 
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relations?  Smail and Kagan’s studies of litigation would suggest so. Kagan has 
argued that “[g]oing to court involves a series of decisions and generally occurs only 
after other methods of reconciliation, arbitration, and compromise have failed” and 
that “a lawsuit in the sixteenth century was a good sign that other, more amicable 
methods of reconciliation and compromise had failed. It signaled the end of 
friendship, and for many it was a precursor to violence.”20 Taking up Kagan’s 
argument that a “lawsuit was an excellent means of settling scores [and] exacting 
revenge,” Smail has argued that hatred, and the appeal of ruining an enemy 
financially with the cost of litigating, was a strong motivating factor in taking someone 
to court; that taking someone to court was an act of public humiliation; and that the 
courtroom was a new arena for feuding.21 In a similar vein, Castan has argued that 
going to court was a matter of shame for peasants.22  
Jeremy Hayhoe has challenged these claims by calling attention to the 
numbers of litigants as well as by breaking down some of the motives and rhetoric 
behind claiming that an opponent was hard-headed.23 His study suggests that going 
to court was fairly routine and banal: “In this litigious society, court cases did not 
generally lead to the severance of normal social bonds (in contrast to the situation in 
contemporary industrialized societies, and with the notable exception of private family 
matters, there was little public dishonor associated with calling in the seigneurial 
court to mediate between disputing parties.” 24 Further supporting this perspective, he 
                                                          
20 Richard L. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castille, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1981). See ch. 1 but the quotes are from pp. 137 and 91, 
respectively. 
21 Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castille, 136; Smail, Consumption of Justice, 11-12. 
22 Castan, “La justice expéditive”; Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc. 
23 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism, 99-101. 
24 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism, 98. 
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found that going to court did not preclude future dealings, as many opponents in 
court were quick to strike up another deal.25  
These opposing arguments may, in part, be attributed to the different socio-
legal-cultural contexts and the types of records analyzed by the historians in 
question. I therefore hesitate to draw on one side or the other as support in 
interpreting the context under examination in this dissertation. Given the laconic 
nature of the records available for the late fifteenth and early sixteenth century, a 
larger sampling would be necessary to piece together tidbits into trends and yield a 
more thorough response to these questions. Nonetheless, my research, suggests 
that Hayhoe’s argument that litigation was fairly banal was closer to the mark than 
the notion of litigation being a source of shame for people in late-fifteenth and early-
sixteenth-century Normandy. Although my data are not extensive enough to show 
people maintaining ongoing social relations after litigation, there is even less 
evidence to suggest that anxiety about the potential negative impact of litigation on 
an individual or family’s honor was a major consideration in the process. Of course, 
social relations and honor are not exactly equivalent, but I do think that social 
relations influenced the unfolding of litigation and the directions it took more so than 
honor in most cases.  
Moreover, the fluency that people had with legal instruments seem to suggest 
that legal actions, in court or out, were not shocking or scandalous. What we can 
assume is that people had more flexibility in the final resolution to their dispute the 
farther removed from the courts they were because the courts had to follow the letter 
                                                          
25 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism, 122. 
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of the law more closely than private parties. Assuming that social relations were a 
primary motivating factor would account for the variety of practice observed, including 
renegotiation of debts and supplemental contracts, taking advantage of the options 
afforded by the aforementioned flexibility and discretion. It would also account for 
hints (with a necessary caveat for formulae) like that in the Delamare settlement 
which opened this dissertation that preserving “peace and brotherly love” were 
important, a sign that that was in theory a larger, acknowledged communal value if 
not a reality. When the relationship between the parties mattered, for whatever 
reason it mattered, it would direct action away from the courts, not because going to 
court was shameful but because parties could customize their solution to the problem 
at hand more easily. The priority of social relations would also account for the court’s 
indulgence toward litigants and its allowance of ample time for parties to work things 
out on their own. The law was an important tool in making or breaking social 
relations, but it was much more complex than the act of going to court.  
What the Ribault-Dugardin case does show is that arbitration and settlement 
were not mutually exclusive, and one of these procedures could fill in where the other 
was lacking. It also shows that the progression of a dispute, in and out of court, could 
easily be cyclical rather than linear. Settlements could break this cycle but, like any 
other contract, were vulnerable to challenge at a later point. A court may provide a 
resolution that the parties could not arrive at on their own, or the parties, at the 
prospect of a lengthy court battle, may decide to leave the courts out of it entirely. 




These settlements and arbitrations out of court also highlight the limited role 
that the court is playing in the larger context of dispute resolution. Though we find 
instances of failed settlements before the courts, we also find failed court cases 
before the notaries. Sometimes the settlements also suggest a desire to prevent or 
end long, drawn out court proceedings. These examples illustrate the variability in the 
route to settlement as well as the fluidity of practice in the legal system. Parties could 
appear before a court for a decision and then come to their own agreement 
afterwards. As we will see in the next chapter, this also suggests that enforcement 
may have been a challenge for the litigants and that to some degree, coming to an 
agreement outside of the court may have been a matter of practicality in reaching 
closure. 
In a similar vein, the notarial records, as much as the court records, reveal 
information about court proceedings, about movement between and among courts, 
and about the flurry of activity that took place between appearances in court. For 
example, in the settlement contract between Jean Petit and Rogier Lecheron, there is 
an account of a dispute over a property line and building activity which escalated to a 
point where Petit raised a clameur de gaige plege. The contract continues to explain 
that Petit had received a favorable ruling before the vicomte of Vernon which 
prompted Lecheron to appeal to the bailli of Gisors, who ruled in favor of Lecheron. 
Petit countered by appealing to the Échiquier, which is where the case was pending 
when “in order to pacify the said parties, they were assembled together by theirs 
relatives and friends.” Lecheron and Petit’s procureur (his son) agreed that Petit 
would abandon his case in the Échiquier and acquit Lecheron in exchange for which 
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Lecheron promised to stop doing prejudice and damage to Petit’s property and to 
stop troubling and hindering Petit from building in the vacant area. Lecheron agreed 
to cease all claims to the property for himself and his heirs and confessed to have 
accepted a cash sum of 100 sous tournois from Jean Petit the younger’s hands.26 
The contract does not indicate why Petit did not come to the table himself, though it 
would not be too hard to imagine that tensions were not fully resolved. Following this 
                                                          
26 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 8, 1500. “Comme proces feust meu et pendant en l’eschiquier de 
normendie en dolleance prinse et obtenue par Jehan Petit sur maistre Guillaume Damel escuier 
lieutenant commis de Monsr le bailly de Gisors pour plusieurs tors et grefz a lui fais par led lieutenant 
a l’instance de Rogier Lecheron en la deppendance d’une clameur de gaige plege mise et assise par 
led Petit a l’encontre did Lecheron pour ce que led Lecheron lui empeschoit la jouissance d’une allee 
assise d’un coste lepignon de la maison dud Lecheron et ung appentis d’autre coste la masure et 
vuide place dud Lepetit db a la rue d’autre bout a la court dud Cheron a prendre icelle allee autant que 
la cause dud Petit se comporte et mesme la joyssance d’une place ou soulloit avoit anciennement 
cause assis aud lieu ainsi que lad cause soulloir contenir en long et le surquoy led Lecheron voulloit 
ediffier son appentis sur le dessus et entree d’icelle// d’icelle cause et empescher la veue du sousperal 
d’icelle et disant avoir allee en lad vuide palce ce que led Petit voulloit deffendre par lad clameur de 
gaige plege qu’il avoit mise qui fut en l’an cccc iiii^xx douze et tellement avoit este procede sur lad 
clameur en la vicomte du bourgaige de Vernon par les parties que veu le rapport des ouvriers 
machons charpentiers et voisins congnoissant le lieu descorde dessus bourne entre lesd parties la 
promisant d’icelle heritage avoit eeste adjugee aud Petit du pocessore dud heritage sans prejudice du 
principal de matiere en baillant plege et caucion de laquelle promise led Lecheron avoit prins 
dolleance sortissant juridiction es assises dud Vernon en quel siege d’assise led Petit avoit requis 
ainsi qu’il avoit fait en lad viconte aud Damel commis a congnoistre de lad matiere veu ses droitz et la 
possession qu’il avoit eue dud heritage de laquelle requeste il fut escondit par led Damel dont il avoit 
obtenu et prins sad dolleance sortissant juridiction d’assise end eschiquier pour lequel proces paciffier 
lesd parties se feussent assmeblez ensemblres par le moien d’aucuns leurs parens et amys et fait 
transation et appoinctement entr’eulx en la manière qui eussent Savoir faisant etc. se comparution led 
Rogier Lecheron d’une part et Jehan Petit le jeune procureur suffisant fonde de Jehan Petit l’aisne son 
père Promectant qu’il aura agreable etc. d’autre lesquelz confessant les choses dessusd estre vrayes 
et par lad transaction icellui Lecheron quicta et delaissa et par ces presentes quicte et delaisse pour 
lui et ses hoirs ou aians cause aud Jehan Petit l’aisne et a ses hoirs ou au porteur de ces lettres Tout 
et tel droit qu’il eust peu demander et reclamer en lad allee et place out est lad cause cy dessus 
bourne et declare Moiennant la somme de c s t que led Lecheron confessa avoir receuz par les mains 
dud Jehan Petit le jeune par ce que led Cheron sera tenu porter et soustenir ses causes et veues 
qu’ilz viennent et sont sur lad masure allee et vuide palce et qu’ilz ne puissent faire prejudice ne 
dommage aud Petit eud heritage et sans ce que led Cheron puisse donner aucun trouble et 
empeschement aud Petit quant ainsi seroit qu’il voul sist ediffier en lad vuide palce et dessus lad 
cause et que jamais out heritage riens ne demandera ne fera par lui ne par autre en aucune manière 
et par ce que led Petit sera tenu vuider la court de l’eschiquier et en acquicter led Lecheron et a ce 




point a little further, I would caution against the blanket assumption that settlements 
necessarily did more to salvage social relations than court judgments because of the 
likely banality of going to court on the one hand and the unknown shape of social 
relations post settlement on the other.  
As further evidence of the information about maneuverings in and out of court 
that notarial records can provide, we learn from the settlement contract between 
Helie Vippart (priest, curé de l’Aunay) and Guillaume Haveron that their case 
bounced around the ples de la sergenterie de Dyne, the vicomté of Roucheville, the 
vicomté of Auge, and the Échiquier. Vippart had seized some of Haveron’s goods to 
collect back payments (30 livres) on a rente (the principal was 6 livres). In response 
to this seizure, Haveron had declared a formal opposition that spilled from court to 
court as rulings kept coming in Vippart’s favor. Each ruling and renewed attempt at 
enforcement led to new proceedings until both agreed to the settlement contract, 
facilitated by Vippart’s brother, Jean Vippart, chevalier and sire of Drumare. Also of 
note is the jurisdiction hopping not only between courts but between notaries. The 
original rente contract (dating to January 1493 [n.st.]) had been drawn up before 
notaries in the vicomté of Auge whereas the final settlement was drawn up before 
notaries in Rouen.  
More impressive still is the compressed timeline of this case, given the infamy 
of the judicial system for long procedures in this period. The original execution 
(seizure of Haveron’s goods) took place in April 1498, and the settlement, post all of 
the maneuverings from court to court, was drawn up less than two years later in 
January 1500, where the case was pending simultaneously before the lowest court 
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(the sergenterie de Dyne) and the highest (the Échiquier). Also clear is that 
Haveron’s original debt (6 livres per annum) grew five times in just over five years, 
meaning that Haveron had likely not made any of the annual payments since 
agreeing to the original contract (and owed Vippart 42 livres by the time of the 
settlement). This also means that the priest, for reasons unknown, had not, as far as 
we know, attempted to collect the delinquent payments until five years had passed 
and, not knowing what changed, had decided to set aside any charitable impulses 
and channel his discretion toward collection, underscored by the aggressive act of 
seizing Haveron’s goods.27 To go so far as to call this seizure an act of “legal 
plundering,” although not incorrect per se, would seem a tad strong, conceptually, 
given the intervening time between the first missed payment and the seizure.28 It is a 
question of degree. A seizure of goods, in the right circumstances, was a socially and 
legally sanctioned act of violence, to be sure, but were the circumstances right?  
Among the likely considerations were status differences between the parties (a 
person of lower status may have had a harder time executing a seizure on a person 
of higher status); the amount of debt and how notorious it was in the community 
(variably defined); the number, character and status of witnesses to the original 
                                                          
27 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 30, 1500. On charitability and conciliation stemming from ecclesiastical 
sources, see Éric Wenzel, “Des lois du roi au sang du Christ. Le clergé paroissial, auxiliaire précieux 
de la justice d’Ancien Régime,” in Entre justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen 
Âge au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Saint-Nicolas, Québec, Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de 
Laval, 2005): 583-98; Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court 
and the Rise of Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale 
University Press, 2007); James A. Sharpe, “‘Such Disagreement betwyx Neighbours’: Litigation and 
Human Relations in Early Modern England,” In Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations 
in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 167-87. 
28 Daniel Lord Smail, Legal Plunder: Households and Debt Collection in Late Medieval Europe 
(Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Daniel Lord Smail, “Violence and Predation in 




contract; and the ongoing social relations between the parties (and possibly their kin) 
and the notoriety of those relations. The question of discretion will be elaborated in 
chapter five. 
As a final example of maneuverings in and out of court present in the notarial 
records is the contract between Preudomme Duval, nobleman residing in the parish 
of St. Martin sur Revelle of Rouen, and Mahiet Duquesnay, bourgeois residing in the 
same parish. Behind this contract, which may best be described as a settlement 
wrapped up in a sale, was a complex settlement of an inheritance resulting from an 
elaborate series of debts on the part of the deceased (Jaquet Dupast), the stakes of 
which affected multiple parties. Duval and Duquesnay went back and forth between 
contracts and courts until landing at their (final?) contract.29 
For all of the notarial contracts we have, a number of them contain evidence of 
prior court proceedings. Many of these records take the form of settlement 
agreements outside of court, meaning the parties negotiated and reached an 
agreement outside of court and cancelled their suit, but as discussed in chapter two, 
many of them also reveal court proceedings through a chain of title, establishing the 
seller’s right to sell. This is one major reason why notarial records are so important to 
read alongside civil court records to understand civil dispute practices. Of the notarial 
records under examination, just over one in eight allude to prior court proceedings. 
To reinforce this point, comparative data from the same year for one notary in Paris 
indicates that of the 741 contracts recorded, 20 were settlements, 5 were in relation 
to an arbitration, 49 were procuration contracts pursuant to an impending dispute, 
                                                          
29 ADSM, 2E1 229, November 8, 1500. 
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and 32 contain odds and ends references to legal proceedings, including attestations 
(witness statements).30 This means that a significant percentage of notarial records 
contains information about activity in the courts. Many of these proceedings 
documented in the notarial records from Rouen were in courts for which records no 
longer survive both outside of the city of Rouen and within the city itself such as, 
notably, the vicomté of Rouen. For example, we have a follow up to a sentence 
rendered by the assises de Pontautou [vicomté of Rouen] before the notaries of 
Rouen.31 The notarial records survive where the records of the vicomté of Rouen 
have disappeared. 
Notarial records represented the formalization of negotiations, some of which 
were tense and involved a legal dispute, between two parties or among several. 
What is clear is that going to court was simply one step—one optional step—in 
resolving a civil dispute and that to understand more completely the practices of 
resolving civil disputes, whether it involved litigation or not, it is necessary to look 
beyond the courts and their records. Though the focus in this dissertation is on civil 
law practices, the same reasoning applies to criminal procedures as well, especially 
for petty crimes. There were a lot of similarities between practices in relation to 
criminal offenses, such as insults, and civil ones, such as collecting a debt. Both 
types of cases were heard alongside each other in the lower courts and procedures 
moved in and out of court. For example, in Elbeuf, sandwiched between ongoing 
proceedings regarding a disputed property boundary between Thomas Bacheler and 
                                                          
30 Claire Béchu, Florence Greffe, and Isabelle Pébay, eds., Minutes du XVe siècle de l’Étude XIX: 
inventaire analytique (Paris, France: Archives nationales, 1993). 
31 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 3, 1500. 
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Julien Lefevre on the one side and ongoing proceedings involving collection of back 
payments on a rente between Jean Leribert and Jean Regnault on the other is the 
ongoing proceeding between Jacques Vallet and Raoullin Cavellier (on behalf of his 
wife). According to Cavellier, Vallet “without cause or just reasoning (“sans cause et 
raison raisonnable”)” addressed himself to Cavellier’s wife as she passed him and 
then proceeded to give her “one or several blows” with an iron implement on “the 
head, the neck, the arm, and other parts of her body” causing her to bleed such that 
she required “visitation” (by which I interpret this to mean some form of medical 
attention, but the record is not explicit). Although, Jean Yver, sergent had, since the 
last session, adjourned him—“speaking to his person”--to appear and respond to the 
complaint filed against him, Vallet declined to appear. The court registered a default 
for Vallet but did not fine him and instead ordered him to be “constrained by body and 
goods” to appear and respond to the complaint. This was on June 18th, and no 
further mention is made of the case in the court record, despite expecting 
something—a request for delay, an appearance—in the next session on July 2nd.32 
This was just another day in court (and not in court). It should also be noted, quickly, 
that this was the only complaint of physical violence recorded in this court in 1510, 
underscoring the exceptional quality of criminal proceedings, dwarfed by civil ones, 
even if civil and criminal proceedings bear some resemblance.  
                                                          
32 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Jacquet Vallet deffault vers Raoullin Cavellier ples pour sa femme et 
recommande Jehan Yver sergent avoir adjourne led deffaillant en parlant a sa personne et pons les 
derrains ples pour respondre aud Cavellier sur sad plaincte laquelle il fist present disant que mercredi 
derrain led Vallet sans cause et orasion raisonnable s’estoit adreche a sad femme ainsi qu’elle passoit 
par devant laiys dud Vallet lequel lui avoit baille vng ou plusieurs coups de pallete de fer sur la teste le 
col le bras et autre partie de son corps a sang et playe tellement qu’il acabla requerant visitacion et de 
seur plus estre receu a informer dud cas pour y estre. Sur ce procede ainsi que de raison et led 
deffaillant estre contrainct par corps et biens a son repleinier d’ester a droit sur lad plaincte laquelle 
reponce par l’advis de la court lui a este acordi et donne en mandit” 
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Resuming the main thread of our argument, the line between civil and criminal 
was fairly thin. It has been suggested that even a significant number of felony crimes 
such as theft and murder were settled before notaries rather than judges.33 
Furthermore, we have already seen the narrow line between civil and criminal 
crossed in the examination of the lingères cases before the vicomte of Rouen (in 
chapter three), in which we observed the quick escalation of civil to criminal—
meeting a seizure of goods with insult. It is also not a stretch to imagine a seizure of 
goods (or a “renegotiation” of debt) devolving into fisticuffs, though there is not an 
example of this in my sample. This escalation gave the court cases a dual—civil and 
criminal—nature. We also saw, in chapter three, the dual practice of the clameur de 
haro in relation to physical violence or property. Whether in civil or criminal matters, 
people generally had an array of options in pursuing resolution to their dispute.34 
 
Procureurs and Settlement of Conflicts 
 
When thinking about the considerations behind the decision to settle out of 
court, we recall the procureurs of the previous chapter. If professional procureurs 
(and here I mean specifically those who primarily made their living as legal 
representatives of clients, not those contracted to stand in as powers of attorney such 
                                                          
33 Alfred Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives notariales” Histoire, économie et société 
1:3 (1982): 369-375; and Alfred Soman, “Deviance and Criminal Justice in Western Europe, 1300-
1800: An Essay in Structure” Criminal Justice History Vol. 1 (New York, NY, USA: The John Jay 
Press, 1980): 1-28; Piant, Une justice ordinaire; John A. Dickinson, “L'Activité judiciaire d'après la 
procédure civile: La bailliage de Falaise, 1668-1790” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale 54:2 
(1976): 145-68. 
34 For a good comparative example, which also employs a mixture of quantitative and qualitative 
methodology, see Robert B. Shoemaker, Prosecution and Punishment: Petty crime and the law in 
London and rural Middlesex, c. 1660-1725 (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1991). 
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as Jean and Colin Guibel for Denise Levignereux or Guillaume Allart for Ysabel) have 
been credited with being legal strategists, however ill-defined their role in the legal 
system may have been otherwise, then we would expect a significant presence in 
cases of settlement.35 Their influence upon the decisions of parties to continue the 
battle in court or to come to a less costly agreement should be measurable. What we 
find is not quite such an easy correlation. Not all settlements make reference to a 
procureur and not all references to procureurs are in relation to a settlement. This 
trend again underscores the flexibility of the procureurs’ role in relation to civil 
disputes more generally and settlements more particularly, when they are called in at 
all.  
There are several possible, yet inconclusive, explanations for the relative 
scarcity of procureurs in the settlement contracts. A possible explanation for their 
absence in the settlement contracts is one of degree. A professional procureur may 
have been consulted regarding the case and/or the settlement or may have even 
gone so far as to recommend a settlement as the best course of action but did not go 
so far as to represent the client in hammering out the details or drawing up the 
contract. A different degree of consultation/representation may have incurred a 
reduced fee. There may also have been some reluctance to bring a more formal legal 
                                                          
35 ADSM, 2E1 229, November 5, 1500 (Levignereux) and 2E1 228, January 27, 1500 (Allart). Blaufarb, 
“Conflict and Compromise”; Claire Dolan, “Les procureurs, intermédiaires entre la justice et les 
familles: l’exemple des comptes de tutelle à la fin du XVIe siècle,” Isabelle Carrier, “L’art de louvoyer 
dans le système judiciaire de l’Ancien Régime: Le procureurs et la procédure civile,” and Sylvie 
Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la protection des mineurs orphelins,” in Entre justice et 
justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, 
Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 461-503’’; Claire Dolan, Les Procureurs du Midi, 
sous l’Ancien Régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2012); Sylvie Perrier, Des 
enfances protégées: La tutelle des mineurs en France (XVIIe-XVIIe siècles), Enquête à Paris et à 
Châlons-sur-Marne (Saint-Denis, France: Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 1998). 
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professional into a less formal legal process (referring to the settlement agreement 
not the contract, which was, as we have seen, very formal). Finally, it is possible that 
recourse to procureurs was favored by some (perhaps those more prone to going to 
court) and not others or that it was spotty and irregular. In other words, the trend is 
that it wasn’t really a trend. One thing is certain—unlike at the Chatelet in eighteenth-
century Paris, people were not required to be represented by a procureur. More 
research is needed to flesh out the activities of the procureurs in the domain of 
dispute settlement.  
 
Demographics of Settlements 
 
Turning to the disputants, we do not find a particular group dominating the 77 
settlement contracts. Similar to the clameurs of the previous chapter, we find a near 
even distribution of references to the four largest groups represented in the notarial 
records36 (in different combinations of oppositions): women (36), bourgeois and 
tradesmen (36), clergy and nobility (34), and legal professions (20). Breaking down 
the category of women in particular, there are 17 references to the woman’s status as 
wife, 7 as widow, 11 as daughter, 3 as sister, and 2 as mother. Some of the records 
mention several women, and sometimes one woman is referenced with more than 
one status—appearing as a wife alongside her husband making a claim to some 
                                                          
36 Bruno Sintic found a similar representation in a different study of urban society with a broader 
geographical scope. The four most common groups he found were bourgeois, nobility, officers and 
legal professionals, and priests. He does not seem to have been looking for representation by women, 
but I think tallying them out gives more dimension to the social relations. Additionally, for Rouen 
specifically, tradesmen cannot be ignored. Bruno Sintic, “Saisir la société urbaine des petites villes par 
les actes de tabellionage,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. 
Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 109-17. 
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property as a daughter. Even if we allow for some overlap, the dominant status is 
marital (wife/widow), which we would expect based on women’s legal rights.37 The 
second largest status being that of daughter reinforces our understanding that 
inheritance disputes were among the largest category of disputes.  
The distribution of references to these different social groups suggests that 
settlements were not an option which was favored or dominated by one of them in 
particular but which was, rather, more broadly used and accessible across these 
groups. Obviously these groups only represent a slice of society in their own right, 
but it is fairly safe to assume that social status alone did not determine whether 
people resorted to a settlement; economic status likely did, inferring from the 
absence of lower socio-economic groups. These results must remain tentative, 
however. Some contracts do not indicate one or both party’s occupation or social 
status, and Piant in particular has suggested that such a blank was indicative of a 
party wanting to conceal a lower status.38 Having a range of social groups 
represented in the records indicates that no single group dominated processes of 
settlement and that a significant portion of the population actively participated in the 
legal system and in shaping the legal culture. 
In terms of the presence of women particularly, juxtaposing the notarial 
records to the court records yields some interesting results. Of the 109 appearances 
                                                          
37 There is, of course, a significant difference between the legal rights of wives and widows. See 
Janine Lanza, From Wives to Widows in Early Modern Paris: Gender, Economy, and Law (Burlington, 
VT, USA: Ashgate, 2007); Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée dans la 
Normandie coutumière: droit et pratiques dans la généralité de Rouen (Presses Universitaire de la 
Faculté de Droit de Clermont-Ferrand, 2005); Jacqueline Musset, Le régime des biens entre époux en 
droit normand du XVIe siècle à la Révolution française (Caen, France: Presses Universitaires de 
Caen, 1997). 
38 Hervé Piant, “Des procès innombrables: Éléments méthodologiques pour une histoire de la justice 
civile d’Ancien Régime,” Histoire et mesure 22:2 Déviance, justice et statistiques (2007): 13-38. 
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before the vicomté of Elbeuf recorded, only seven mention women, one of which 
involves two men appearing with their wives in an inheritance dispute. Another man 
and wife appear together seeking an appointment, and a husband represents his wife 
(the Cavellier case outlined above). The four remaining appearances by women 
involved two widows, one of whom appeared three times—once in May and twice in 
September—to contest a decret d’héritages.39 From this data, it appears that women 
are only directly involved in the courts in a limited capacity. They are either widows 
representing themselves, or they are represented by their husbands or male kin. The 
scarcity of women in court in Elbeuf may be explained by its more rural setting and 
stricter adherence to Norman custom governing women’s legal capacity in 
management of property.40  
The cases involving female guilds, like the lingères, in Rouen, as we have 
seen, would seem to support this urban-rural dichotomy, but even so, these records 
are quite sparse (and involved the gardes, who enjoyed a more privileged status than 
a woman who was not a mistress), and I have already presented evidence that would 
suggest that the boundaries of the city and its culture were quite porous. 
Nevertheless, the cases involving women offer a small representative slice of larger 
patterns. In five of the seven cases, the dispute is in relation to inheritance; this 
percentage (71) is nearly the same for the entire sample (76). For the other two, one 
is in relation to an assault and the other does not specify what the dispute is about 
                                                          
39 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
40 Some scholarship supports a connection between an urban setting and women’s opportunities, 
including legal ones. See, for example, Manon van der Heijden, Women and Crime in Early Modern 




(many entries do not, but the subject may be gleaned from other appearances by the 
parties in question which are obviously part of the same case based on context). 
Women’s disputing patterns, then, are not out of the ordinary within the larger 
patterns of Elbeuf (to the extent that they can be established at this time).  
That being said, the number of women mentioned in court cases in Elbeuf 
contrasts dramatically with the records from the Échiquier. Of the 30 records 
sampled, 16 mention women, of which 13 involve a wife or widow and the remaining 
three do not specify—an overwhelming representation of marital status as opposed 
to other relations (mother, daughter, sister, etc.).41 As dramatic as the difference is 
between the records from the two courts, the representation of women in the records 
of the Échiquier, in themselves fairly extraordinary given the court’s status as a 
sovereign court and its jurisdictional breadth, nearly matches that of the settlement 
contracts: 47% for the settlements and 52% for the Échiquier mention a woman. 
Given the significant differences between these types of records and the people that 
created them, the similarity in the representation of women is surprising, and it would 
be tempting to bracket them as coincidental. However, there may also be an 
important link between women’s legal opportunities and experiences between the 
notaries and the Échiquier. Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage in particular has shown that 
despite the strictures of Norman custom regarding women’s claims to and 
management of property, people found ways around them, and notaries were the 
greatest facilitators of this activity. She found that notaries translated client requests 
into legal terms and that they cloaked contracts, whose legality was questionable 
                                                          
41 ADSM, 1B 331. 
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according to the rigors of the law’s letter, in fail-safe clauses. She also found that 
although lower court jurisdictions were prone to rejecting such sketchy contracts as 
illegal, the Parlement (Échiquier) was more prone to upholding the legality of the 
contract.42 These findings are the results of examining records from later periods 
(and slightly different notarial records), but nonetheless, they seem to indicate that 
there is more to the similarity of experiences represented in my data. That said, we 
must be cautious with this data. My data do not distinguish instigators and 
defendants of disputes at this time. More research would be needed to explore this 
question further. 
 
Actions and Procedures In Court and Out 
 
Now that we have established the general contours of settlements and know 
more about the people involved in disputes that go to court, we can turn to a more 
fine-grained analysis of activities in and out of court which follow a decision to go to 
court. One of the most important initial decisions in the escalation of a dispute would 
have been to which jurisdiction to turn. Knowing that there were a myriad of options, 
conditioned in part by privileges assigned to an individual’s social status, it would be 
tempting to try to map a web of possibilities and then glean one or both parties’ 
strategy for pursuing the dispute based on their chosen course. However tantalizing 
                                                          
42 Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les tabellions et l’assouplissement de la norme: l’exemple normand,” 
in Tabellions et Tabellionages de la France Médiévale et Moderne, ed. Mathieu Arnoux and Olivier 
Guyotjeannin (Paris, France: École des Chartes, 2011): 349-66; Virginie Lemonnier-Lesage, “Les 
tendances communautaires des époux à la lecture des actes des tabellions et des notaires dans la 
Normandie coutumière de l’époque moderne,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un 
notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch (Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du 
Havre, 2014): 67-81; and Lemonnier-Lesage, Le statut de la femme mariée. 
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that prospect is, I would caution against leaning too heavily on conclusions in regard 
to strategy because records do not exist in meaningful quantity from all of the options 
we know to have existed. Nevertheless, we have in many of the settlement 
agreements recorded by notaries and records of cases heard before the Échiquier 
information about court proceedings leading up to the settlement or appearance 
before the Échiquier. This information is rare for the court of Elbeuf because there 
was little to no action before other courts prior to an appearance before it (which we 
would expect given its status as a court of first instance), and these records are 
generally much more laconic (due, likely, to differences in procedure between the 
lowest and the highest courts rather than differences between rural and urban justice, 
although more research may reveal significant differences between the latter two). 
Even less common but most interesting of all are the instances where the parties 
change jurisdictions over the course of pursuing the dispute. We have already seen 
this in the case between Vippart and Haveron outlined above where they made a 
lateral move from one vicomté to another.43 Such instances reveal a great deal about 
the role of the courts in disputing procedures and the legal system more broadly.  
Although we must leave room for disputes wherein both parties are going in 
with good, or at least benign but self-assured, intentions, it is also reasonable to 
assume that sometimes both parties may not have been going into their court 
proceedings completely in good faith. As problematic as it may be to try to glean 
motives and emotions from lititgants’ activities—Jeremy Hayhoe, echoing Hervé 
Piant, has drawn attention to the surprising volume of self-disclosed level-headed 
                                                          
43 ADSM, 2E1 229, November 8, 1500. 
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individuals, who abhorred litigation, who appeared in court and has picked apart the 
rhetorical strategies that underlay such claims--it is nevertheless useful to examine 
concerns about and accusations of obstruction of proceedings, and instances that 
would seem to support those concerns, in search of a better understanding of 
people’s opportunities, frustrations and experiences with the legal system. In addition 
to the changing of jurisdictions and appeals/complaints observed above, there were 
numerous obstruction tactics that manipulated procedural requirements and 
loopholes in the system and created opportunities.44 In chapter one, we saw the 
learned jurists discuss some of these concerns and tactics. Another stalling point 
could be a delay to wait for a change in officials.  
More subtle tactics could hide beneath procedural requirements. For instance, 
there are instances of accusations of one party withholding documents or information 
or not sharing them with the other party for review in a timely manner. That such a 
tactic could work highlights the importance of documentation and procedure as well 
as the opportunities that the system created. It likewise reveals some of the physical 
constraints of the system.  
Of particular interest is the case between the children of Jean Ausoult, who 
was deceased at the time of the proceeding, and the éliseurs of the prévôté of Le 
Thuit Signol (within the jurisdiction of Elbeuf).45 Although we may only speculate on 
the details of the case and what brought them into court (quite possibly an underlying 
tax dispute), the parties involved appeared eight different times before the court. 
                                                          
44 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism, 98-101. 
45 An “éliseur” was a tax collector. Eventually, cases heard before the prévôté of Le Thuit Signol 
appealed to the bailliage ducal d’Elbeuf. 
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There was also a possibility of underlying family tension. The representatives of each 
party--Pierre Tallon as tuteur for the children and Robert Tallon for the éliseurs--
shared the same family name, and on two separate occasions Nicolas Ausoult, father 
of Robert Tallon, and Jean Tallon, son of Robert Tallon, both made appearances. In 
one session Robert Tallon, summoned by Jean Tallon, suggested that he and the 
éliseurs were contracted to provide documents needed for another trial but that the 
children submitted the information in such a disorganized way, including submitting 
more at the last session, that it had been impossible to produce them, which was why 
he had not paid the required damages and fees. The children blamed him for the 
delay of the trial, and he turned the blame back on them. In the session immediately 
following, Nicolas Ausoult promised 26 feuilles tant écrits que non écrits from the 
children to be delivered to his son, Robert Tallon, and the éliseurs.46 Again, the exact 
details are unclear, but it appears that there were several layers of court cases 
wrapped up in theses appearances.  
This case is also an example of the importance of documentation and of giving 
parties the opportunity to look over the opposition’s materials in civil procedure to 
prepare a response. The dispute between the children of Jean Ausoult and the 
éliseurs of Thuit Signol over documents is not unique. Nor is the activity of the 
procureurs, who make intermittent appearances to report on documentation. The 
case between the Daudins and Jean Bouquet (introduced in chapter three) 
represents another example of documentation being the subject of and the deciding 
factor in a dispute. A dispute over delinquent rente payments and a seizure of goods 
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had been decided before the bailli of Evreux (according to the Daudins) until 
Bouquet, having acquired the contract, dredged up the past by requesting a copy of 
the court’s records of the case. The record was not available, so the Daudins were 
“forced to start over.” Bouquet’s plea complains that his casual attempt to recover the 
writings had been obstructed and so he made a formal request to retrieve them, 
which prompted the Daudins to renew their complaint before the bailli of Evreux (the 
missing record pertains to a complaint/appeal). The case then hinged on the original 
rente contract, the contract which transferred the right (ownership) of this contract to 
Bouquet, and undocumented payments of the disputed arrears. By the time the 
Échiquier heard this case, the court ordered the parties to correct and submit their 
(written) pleas with all relevant documentation for deliberation and ruling.47 The 
documentation, capturing the oral qualities of the original contract and the narrative 
pleas of the parties, but missing the alleged payoff, was ultimately what the judges 
reviewed and deliberated. Documentation could be critical in civil procedure before a 
court at any level but became increasingly so the farther the case moved up the line.  
The court, especially at the lower levels, although privileging documentation, 
did not seem to presume literacy on the part of the litigants, as the numerous 
postponements suggest. The postponement would allow finer scrutiny of the letter, 
declaration etc. and, more practically, the opportunity to find someone to read it. 
Giving parties adequate time to scrutinize evidence and respond to it was a 
cornerstone of procedure, and the “adequacy” of the time allowed was partly 
determined by the parties, who could request extensions. For example, in the eight 
                                                          
47 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
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appearances registered before the court in Elbeuf in 1510 concerning Julien Lefevre 
and Thomas Bacheler, all of which were “continued” (postponed), two consecutive 
entries (September 17th and October 8th) contain a note that specifies that the case is 
being postponed so that one or both parties may bring written evidence (“pour 
apporter faiz”).48 In another case before the vicomté of Elbeuf, a dispute over 
inheritance between brothers Antoine, Jean, and Guillaume Mauclerc, we learn that 
Antoine had convened his brothers to court to formally “have a share in the 
succession of mobile as well as patrimonial property of defunct Jean Mauclerc, their 
father, such as may pertain to them according to reason and the custom of the 
region.” Having all come in person, the entry specifies, Guillaume and Jean, who was 
a priest and was the executor of their father’s will, contested the allotment on the 
grounds that all mobile goods were to come to them “as much by reason of 
continuity…as per the will.” This entry provides a rare glimpse of the actions in court 
as the proceedings unfolded, with the judge observing as the parties went to it—a 
rapid flurry of moves, countermoves, and papers. The priest produced a copy of the 
will, and Antoine demanded to see it, so it was given to him. Antoine countered that 
there was a discrepancy between the will and some letters that had been 
communicated to them, which the priest demanded to see, having some letters of his 
own. The entry leaves off with Anthony requesting time to “recover” the letters 
(apparently he had not brought them with him to court) and the granting of his 
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request until the next session. This entry on June 18th was the last entry for these 
parties for the year 1510.49  
This case, and that of Bacheler-Lefevre, reveal that documentation was 
important but not always at the forefront of people’s minds, giving us important 
insights into practices and standards of preparation and organization within the legal 
culture of Rouen and its environs. They also reflect the “piecemeal” addressing of 
evidence and non-sequential presentation of pleas that have come to characterize 
(“modern”) civil law systems.50 Of course, knowing that not having documents ready 
at hand and the need to find them was an acceptable excuse in the eyes of the court, 
presented an opportunity for a delay—to stall, to regroup, to reconsider, etc. People 
presumably used the court’s procedural requirements and inclination toward leniency 
in regard to parties’ marshaling and management of documentation to their full 
advantage. That this led to accusations of delaying the process deliberately is hardly 
surprising.51 The social status of the parties, with the exception of the priest, is 
                                                          
49 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Sur ce que Anthoine Mauclerc avoit faict convenir et adjourner messire Jehan 
Mauclerc prebtre et Guillaume Mauclerc pour avoir partage en la succession tant mobil que hereditel 
de defunct Jehan Mauclerc leur père telle qui leur povoit appartenir selon raison et la coustume dupuis 
Aprez ce que lesd parties se fait comparus en personne et que iceullui prebtre et led Guillaume outre 
dit et declare que pour le regard dud meuble ilz voulloient deffendre led partage pour ce qu’ilz disoient 
tous lesd biens meubles tant par raison de continnuite leur competent et que a tiltre de testament et 
delays faict par leurd deffunct père dont led prebtre estoit executeur ainsi qu’il faisoit apparoir de la 
coppie d’icellui testament lequel testament icellui Anthoine demanda a voier qui lui fut baille present et 
touchant led partage heredital iceulx prebtre et Guillaume leur acordairent qu’il face telz lotz qu’il verra 
bon estre sauf la question des blasmes par ce qu’ilz seront chacun d’eulx tenant communiquer leurs 
lectres d’un a l’autre et pour ce journee leur fu baillee a dymenche prochain venant et regard les 
lectres demandez par led prebtre aud Anthoine icellui Anthoine demanda temps de les recouvrer qui 
lui acorde jusques a la prochaine vicomte.” 
50 For more on this, see Gillian K. Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual 
Commitments,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005): 175-203. 
51 See, for example, ADSM, 1B 331 January 12, 1510 and January 26, 1510. Smail, Consumption of 
Justice; and Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981). 
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unknown in these examples, but on the whole, there is no real evidence of a 
significant difference in approaches to written documents by people of different 
status. We can speculate that wealthier people had greater access to them and had 
more practice in using and managing them, but then again, they also would have 
likely hired people to do it for them. 
Although we must be cautious about reading too much into accusations, they 
nevertheless resonate with and represent a matter of broader concern and a certain 
plausibility in courses of action. Recalling the scholarship of our erudite jurists from 
chapter one, we saw concerted discussion of the subject of abuses within the legal 
system, particularly in regard to the obstruction and drawing out of proceedings. We 
find hints of those concerns in the notarial and court records; however, the claims are 
not exhaustively developed.52 We must also bear in mind that accusations of 
obstruction could also be a delaying, if not only a deliberately offensive or annoying, 
tactic (if we assume that such an accusation would be investigated). 
The final delaying tactic under consideration in this chapter is the decision not 
to show up in court. The best example of this encountered so far was in the case of 
Legouez versus Levesque and the Berquets before the Échiquier outlined in chapter 
three. Recalling that, after several defaults of his own, Legouez tried and failed to 
transfer liability to Lepannier, who then, possibly ignorant of the transfer though not, 
presumably, ignorant of the summonses, registered a few defaults of his own, we find 
Levesque beating his head against the bench as his case goes on and on.53 For the 
                                                          
52 For an example, see ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 




court of Elbeuf there are many instances recorded of parties not appearing for their 
audience. Entries such as “Jacques Dufay, escuier, was asked, called, and placed in 
default toward Jean Carre, bringer of a clameur de marché de bourse” from April 9th; 
“Jacques Dufay, escuier, default toward Jean Carre, bringer of a clameur de marché 
de bourse” from April 23rd; “Jacques Dufay, escuier, was asked, called, and placed in 
default toward Jean Carre, bringer of a clameur de marché de bourse” from May 7th; 
“Jean Lefevre, bringer of a clameur de marché de bourse, in default toward Simonnet 
Dupuis” on September 17th; and “Jeannet Lefevre default toward Simmonet Dupuis” 
on October 29th are very common.54 Even though this was a finable offense, after 
several occurrences properly established (i.e. the defaulting party did not have a 
reasonable excuse for his absence, such as being unaware of the summons, being 
ill, travel difficulties, etc.), very few notations of the fine are present (even fewer 
excuses are noted).  
Indeed it is more striking when a fine is recorded than when it is not. Very few 
indicate a sentence, fine or otherwise, as a result of a failure to appear, some 
indicate a postponement, and the majority say nothing. For instance, on December 
3rd, the court of Elbeuf finally fined Jeannet Lefevre “at the instance of two defaults.” 
The amount of the fine was not indicated, and the case was postponed again. 
However, entries from September 3rd, September 17th, and October 29th note a 
default by Lefevre, and one from June 18th notes a default from Dupuis (who was a 
                                                          
54 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Jacques Dufay escuier fut demande appelle et mis en deffault vers Jehan Carre 
porteur de clameur de marche de bourse jouxte etc.” “Jacques Dufay escuier deffault vers Jehan 
Carre porteur de clameur de marche de boursse.” “Jacques Dufay escuier fut demande appelle et mis 
en deffault vers Jehan Carre porteur de clameur de marche de bourse jouxte etc.” “Jehan Lefevre 
porteur de clameur de marche de bourse en deffault vers Symonnet Dupuis jouxte etc.” “Jehannet 
Lefevre deffault vers Symonnet Dupuis jouxte etc.” 
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cloth-maker, we learn).55 This suggests either that the repercussions are so 
commonplace and obvious that they need not be mentioned or that, based on the 
few sentences and postponements that are present, the court is remarkably tolerant 
of this behavior. Some studies of civil dispute practices in later periods have found 
that not showing up was an admission of guilt and an acceptance of debt and of the 
ensuing sentence.56 The idea that one party was letting the other have his way by 
non-engagement and not appearing may explain some of the absenteeism, but it 
does not neatly account for all of the behaviors observed in my study. For instance, it 
is not rare for a party to lodge a complaint that a judge is too reluctant to assign a 
default. Michel de Batenceurt, bourgeois de Rouen, presented such a complaint 
against Hugues Bureau, lieutenant général of the bailli of Caen, to the Échiquier. The 
case began when De Batenceurt objected to taxes levied on one of his boats by Jean 
Onardel and Nicolas Basire (“fermiers des neuves et anciennes aides de la ville de 
Caen”) on the basis that, by royal privilege, “bourgeois de Rouen” were exempt from 
such taxes. In the course of proceedings, when Bureau, adjudicating the case, 
proved reluctant to “inscribe a default,” giving his opponents another appointment, 
that De Batenceurt felt was due, he complained to the Échiquier. The Échiquier 
determined that the case had been “poorly conducted, given and appointed by the 
said Bureau, lieutenant, and well complained against by the said plaintiff” (“du proces 
il sera dit qu’il a este mal procede et donne et appoincte par led. Bureau lieutenant et 
                                                          
55 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Jehannet Lefevre porteur de clameur de marche de bourse fut mis en amende 
quant a instance de deulx deffault en quoy il s’estoit lesse mectre vers Symonnet Dupuis et continue 
pour appointer descleration.” 
56 Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce; Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; Dickinson, “L'Activité 
judiciaire d'après la procédure civile’’. 
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bien dolle par led. complaignant”).57 Inter-city rivalries aside, there was not a simple 
“if a party no-shows, then default; if default, then fine” formula governing procedures; 
judges had a considerable amount of discretion, and sometimes that discretion was 
contested. It is a remarkably tolerant attitude, and it is unclear from these records 
what the participants—judges, plaintiffs and defendants—thought the purpose and 
function of the court was exactly. The court stands by with coercive potential, but it 
takes something truly extraordinary to fully activate that potential. On a related note, 
this case also suggests that privilege (or at least certain privileges) may not have 
been so easily leveraged or recognized in practice, as it was in theory.  
Litigants also had a considerable amount of discretion in deciding which 
options to pursue when, and sometimes that discretion was contested too (as 
obstruction). As another example, Pierre Lepetit filed a complaint in the Échiquier 
against Guillaume Adoubart, conseiller commissaire for the bailli of Evreux, for 
“wrongs and griefs” that had been done to him in settling his parents’ estate and his 
claims to inheritance against would-be debt collectors—the debt contested was 57 
sous tournois of arrears on a rente contract, a not necessarily insignificant, but hardly 
staggering, figure.58 The proceedings as recounted, covering nine pages of the 
register in increasingly messier handwriting, appear to be a series of prescriptions by 
the court for Lepetit and non-compliance followed by complaints on his part. Lepetit 
tried to cast doubt on Adoubart’s narrative that he was being a deliberate pain, but 
his much less detailed accounting of his behaviors failed to convince the judge. The 
                                                          
57 ADSM, 1B 331, January 12, 1510. 
58 To give this figure a little context, Benedict indicates that 47 livres equated to about five months’ 
wages for a master mason in the mid-sixteenth century. Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion, 
12. There were 20 sous to a livre and 12 deniers to a sol, meaning that the debt was less than 3 livres. 
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Échiquier ruled against Lepetit, fined him (for an amount unspecified), and sent all 
parties back to continue proceedings before Adoubart.59 Turning Lepetit back over to 
Adoubart’s mercy may have been a greater punishment than the fine. We observe 
from this and the other examples outlined above that beyond the decision to turn to 
the court and schedule an appearance, the decision to follow through on making an 
appearance, or not, was a critical element of practice, manifest through an array of 
options, in civil disputes. Although the risk seems minimal given the patterns of 
behavior observed, having a court officially inscribe a default could add up, and if 
enough of them were recorded without sufficient excuse, then the court could rule in 
favor of the other party, leaving the first party with a potentially hefty bill for the courts’ 
services if he or she let the proceedings drag out to that point. What is also apparent 
is the removal of the courts from a central place in the resolution of civil disputes. The 
court records, especially those of Elbeuf, document, in large part, what is not 
happening in court. The courts and even the individual procedures in working with a 
court, like scheduling an appearance and maybe going, are set within a much larger 
relief of options.  
The cases before the court of Elbeuf discussed above especially show the 
fluidity of practice and the relatively passive role the court is playing in these cases. 
Moreover, the court often seems to be standing in more as another mediator than as 
a judging force.60 Of the 109 appearances, 85 are explicitly postponed, while 12 list 
the opposing parties only—in some places the register looks more like a list than a 
summary of actions. In fact, the court only renders seven final decisions in the whole 
                                                          
59 ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
60 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism. 
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year. The remaining appearances are listed as defaults, but this does not imply a 
final decision, as even more cases are postponed in spite of a default. There are 22 
defaults recorded, only two of which prompt a final decision.61 The court is either 
indulgent to people’s inability to be present in court, or it has little power to bring them 
in, or a little of both. What is surprising is how often the summons are ignored and the 
lack of (immediate) repercussions beyond the fine when a fine is assessed. 
What we learn about defaults from the records of the Échiquier adds more 
nuance to this picture. The default was a sort of judgment but was not the same as a 
ruling on the case itself, especially since most of the appeals come in the form of a 
complaint against the judge of the preceding jurisdiction. The De Batenceurt case is 
an example of this—the decision to “inscribe” a default could be a matter of 
contention as well as any other ruling.62 And yet, the many proceedings and defaults 
of Jacques Dufay in Elbeuf add nuance to the designation. For the Échiquier, there 
was only one default ruled in the cases examined. That being said, we do know from 
a few of the settlements that indicated proceedings before the Échiquier that there 
was a window of opportunity to settle out of court somewhere between scheduling 
the appearance and the ruling—recall the settlements between Lecheron and Petit 
and between Haveron and Vippart discussed above.63  
Elaborating further on patterns of court appearances, the first most striking 
aspect of court appearances is the number of noted scheduled appearances in 
relation to the number of cases. Of the 109 appearances before the vicomté of 
                                                          
61 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
62 ADSM, 1B 331, January 12, 1510. 
63 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 8, 1510; and January 30, 1500.  
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Elbeuf, there are only 40 distinct cases, which deflates the activity in court and the 
presence of the court in the bigger picture of legal practice. The remaining 
appearances are part of ongoing cases in which the same parties reappear either in 
the same manner as before or with a switch in who is complaining against whom. It is 
in some cases a long process of moves and countermoves. Moreover, a number of 
people were involved in several different cases. Although it is risky to assume that 
people bearing the same name are the same person—a list of witnesses called to 
testify in support of Jean Gueroult and Robert Mouchart’s defense against Jean 
Martin’s clameur de marché de bourse (all of whom were convened by Jean Yver, 
sergent, but all but one of whom defaulted) underscores this risk: Credot Martin, 
Rogier Martin, Martin Martin, Raoulin Martin, Jean Meret dit Foriere, and Jean 
Merot—certain people stand out nonetheless. For instance, Jacques Dufay, escuier 
of Bois Guillaume (now a suburb to the north of Rouen), had what appears to be a 
rough year in 1510 (his noble status presumably made him a target for litigation by 
disgruntled tenants and creditors but also gave him the clout to get away with more). 
He was called into court 14 different times by four different people, of whom Jean 
Carre stands out. Carre, who filed a clameur de marché de bourse to reclaim a house 
or part of a house, valuing 12 livres 10 sous tournois, seated in the parish of St. Jean 
in Elbeuf (south of Rouen), appeared in court eight different times in 1510 alone (the 
case began prior to 1510) to pursue his case before the court finally ruled in his favor, 
and even after the court ordered Dufay to be fined, there were still two follow up 
appearances before the court to finish the process. In the final session, the court 
awarded the property definitively to Carre, giving him the right to take possession of it 
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and ordered the first sergent or soussergent (deputy sergent) to “put the said Carre in 
possession of the said property and in this to guard it from all force and undue 
violence.”64  
Whereas we may be surprised by the number of appearances and the number 
of defaults by Dufay in this case, we are also reminded that Dufay had a team of at 
least three procureurs managing his case, so it is also difficult not to imagine a 
deliberate strategy behind the numerous procedures (hold out and hold on to the 
property as long as possible?). The cost of litigation and the fine incurred, though 
seriously defended by the procureurs, appear not to have been Dufay’s foremost 
concern since he did not bother to collect the reimbursement for the disputed 
property owed to him. That said, the repetition of appearances in cases suggests 
complexity in the unfolding of, and rendering a decision in, those cases. 
To put these multiple appearances in greater perspective, the vicomté was 
only in session on 14 different days in 1510. This means that some people, like Jean 
Carre, were frequent flyers while their case was ongoing. It also suggests that people 
may have needed to turn elsewhere if resolution was more time-sensitive, which 
would account for some of the sudden disappearance of cases from the records. 
Some of the default numbers have even been attributed to evidence of out of court 
settlements.65 Although there is not an exact correspondence between the number of 
appearances and the number of people involved on either side of a case, more 
                                                          
64 ADSM, 52BP 11. “Et fu donne en mandement au premier sergent ou soussergent de lad viconte 
mectre led Carre en saissine et possession dud heritage et en ce le garder de toulte forche et 
viollence indue.” 
65 Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives notariales”; and Soman, “Deviance and Criminal 
Justice”; Piant, “Des procès innombrables.’’ 
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people, more often than not, meant more appearances and suggests that more 
people meant more complexity to the unfolding of cases. The social status of one or 
more parties may have also influenced the length of a case, but this information is too 
infrequently noted to draw conclusions one way or another.  
In addition to the case involving the children of Jean Ausoult detailed above, 
another striking case of multiple parties making multiple appearances is the also 
familiar case of Jean Regnault versus Jean Leribert the elder, fermier de l’eaue de 
Seine. Recalling that Leribert executed a seizure of some of Regnault’s property to 
collect on a debt, this seizure prompted Regnault to follow up in court with a formal 
declaration of his opposition. In the meantime, Regnault had called two brothers, 
Jean and Guillaume Leblanc to act as guarantors of the debt and to testify on his 
behalf. Guillaume refused. Jean did not refuse but made things difficult for Regnault 
nonetheless.66   
Regnault called upon Jean and Guillaume Leblanc to act as guarantors to his 
debt and to testify as to Leribert’s actions. The sergent Guillaume Bourdet reported 
that he had summoned Jean Leblanc en garranti and collected the paperwork of 
Regnault and Leribert for Michel Leflameng, the procureur representing the Leblancs, 
who was in the process of preparing four reports and a declaration. Regnault, in 
another appearance, in the presence of Leribert’s procureur, insisted that Guillaume 
Leblanc should testify, seeking a garanti to this effect from Leflameng, who refused 
because Leribert had not appeared in court. Leribert, it was noted, had not shown up 
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to court because he was a fermier.67 The case was adjourned to summon Leribert to 
the next session. In the next session, Leribert, in response to a request from Jean 
and Guillaume Leblanc, who would otherwise refuse to testify on Regnault’s behalf, 
produced a letter to prove that he was a fermier, and the case was adjourned to give 
the Leblancs time to look at it.  Finally, after the fourth summons, Jean Leblanc 
appeared in court as a garrant for Regnault. The case was adjourned, with the court 
holding on to the disputed property. After a few more sessions, we see a Vincent 
Regnault appear in court with a Francois Leflameng as procureur to defend a 
declaration and clameur de marché de bourse made against him by Jean Leribert. 
Although it is unclear whether this case is related to the other, it is clear that Leribert 
is a busy man in court. Several more sessions, all of which are postponed, take us to 
the end of the year.68  
The patterns of appearances before the Échiquier were noticeably different, as 
should be expected given its status as a sovereign court. The multiplicity of 
appearances is of a much smaller degree—just over 15 percent of cases were 
postponed--and the rate of assessing fines much higher—just over one third indicate 
a fine. In addition to the Legouez case, which was postponed, as mentioned 
previously, the case between Robert de Thienville on the one side and Guillemette 
Pelerin and inhabitants of several parishes on the other was postponed one month to 
convene and question experts, including carpenters and masons.69 Guillemette 
                                                          
67 In addition to the agricultural sense, “fermier” was (based on readings of other cases) the term for a 
customs officer or tax collector, but the sense is not explicit here. Nonetheless, based on the context, I 
would favor the tax collector interpretation, which would likely bestow more privileges. 
68 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
69 ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
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Pelerin is an interesting figure in the records and her presence seems to support the 
idea that noble patrons, even women, would get involved in a case, leveraging their 
social status, to lend weight to the claim of one of the parties.70  
The more descriptive nature of the records of the Échiquier, represented by 
the narratives of the case (the pleas) given by opposing parties, reveals some of 
these proceedings but is rather more summary of actions pertinent to rendering a 
final judgment. That many of these proceedings existed, as is clear from lower court 
records and some notarial records, but were not pertinent in an appeal reveals a 
great deal about the court’s indulgence of such behaviors (with notable exceptions 
like Lepetit, discussed above), about the higher court’s perspective of happenings in 
the lower courts, and about the pitfalls of relying too heavily on records from the 
higher court when examining practice. That is, records from the higher court do not 
represent a complete picture of the case leading up to the appearance before it but 
rather a selection of what happened which may be pertinent to the appeal.  
The observation that multiple parties to a case, with their own agendas and 
priorities, tended to drag out proceedings has its exceptions, of course. As “immortal” 
as some of these cases could be, to use the contemporary term, some of them could 
also be swift and efficient. Collective actions, as that initiated by the inhabitants of 
several parishes with the support of Guillemette Pelerin against Robert de Thienville, 
introduced above, could take time if experts and witnesses needed to be consulted.71 
Collective actions could also influence a quick turnaround on a case to render a 
                                                          
70 Henri Dubois, “Nobles dames et damoiselles de Normandie en cour d’appel (1374-1403),” in Au 
cloître et dans le monde: Femmes, hommes, et sociétés (IXe – XVe siècle), ed. Patrick Henriet and 
Anne-Marie Legras (Paris, France: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2000): 301-9. 
71 ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
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ruling and a sentence, sometimes double that, in a day. On a chill February morning, 
the 26th to be exact, Denis Farin, commissioned lieutenant of the vicomte of Elbeuf, 
took a side trip to his usual bench for the day’s sessions. Plume in hand, or unnamed 
scribe at his elbow, he made an on-site visit to hear, and to see, a complaint against 
Abraham Leduc’s newly constructed fence.72 Leduc’s neighbors, represented by the 
procureur de la sieurie (the lord’s procureur—an official who was appointed by the 
lord to serve the dual function of public prosecutor, to serve public interest and to 
keep the lord’s peace in the case of public disturbances, and of legal representative 
of the lord’s private interests) himself, complained that Leduc’s “enclosure” was a 
novelty, an encroachment on common land, and a nuisance (“sur ung approchement 
en quoy icellui Leduc avoit este mis par ledit procureur de ce qu’il avoit fait de 
nouveau constuire ou ediffier certain paillifz ou closture joingnant et contigu de sa 
maison assise a la rue meleize prez la croix feret le tout contre et en prejudice de la 
varye et de la chose publicque”).73 A fairly common complaint for this period in 
Normandy and elsewhere, Jean Yver, sergent, diligently recorded the initial complaint 
and rounded up as many of the resident “old guys” as he could to testify at Farin’s 
visit.  
The 19 men summoned provide us with an interesting sample of the locals: 
Berthault Coullombe* (90 years old), Collin Davyd (70), Jean Hesbert* (60), 
Guillaume Ausoult* (60), Edouard Leboullenger (80), Gieffin Gourdel* (60), Jean 
Varouldes (60), Guillaume Mancel (60), Robin Despperoys (50), Laurens Lavisne 
                                                          
72 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. 
73 I am freely assuming that “procureur de la sieurie” is equivalent to the “procureur fiscal” referenced 
in other contexts. For more on the procureur fiscal, see Perrier, “Le procureur fiscal et son rôle dans la 
protection des mineurs orphelins.’’ 
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(60), Louys Lesueur (35), Guillaume Regnault*, boucher, (48), Jean Carre* (50), 
Jean Cave (40), Jean Boscguillaume (40), Collin Delarue (35), Guillaume Tollenner 
(60), Guillaume Herle (40), and Jean Guenet (40).74 Within this sample of many of 
the most common first names of the period in this area, we find one representative 
only from each family with an age spread from 90 at the oldest to 35 at the youngest, 
with a majority falling in the 50-60 range. Extended kin networks unknown, one family 
is not dominating the testimony, though several generations of the neighborhood are 
represented by the family’s oldest, most able (physically and mentally), or most 
prominent member. The only occupation or status-marker noted is that of the butcher 
Guillaume Regnault. Also striking is the number of them (those with an asterisk (*) 
next to their name) who appear, or who share a family name with another litigant, in 
Elbeuf’s court records for the year 1510 (about a third of them). The most notable 
absences in this regard are the Martin, the Bonyn, the Bonamy, the Lefevre, the 
Levesque, and the Dupuis families, who may not be residing in close enough 
proximity or who have some other reason to excuse themselves or for being 
excluded.  
With everyone gathered at the place being disputed, at 8:00 a.m., the 
proceedings began. First, the sergent called each witness, all of whom had come in 
person, to swear, in the presence of Farin and the procureur, to tell the truth on the 
encroachment. The witnesses were then taken on a tour to see and to visit the entire 
length of the disputed place. Upon their return from this tour, they reported to Farin, 
under oath, in the presence of Abraham Leduc, that the fence made by Leduc 
                                                          
74 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. 
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adjoining, and contiguous with, his house, was a new undertaking and “against and 
to the prejudice of the public access.”75 The highly performative nature of these 
proceedings—with the witnesses (many of whom, it would be reasonable to assume, 
had instigated the complaint) being sworn in, taking a tour of the space and then 
reporting their findings in front of their offending neighbor—is remarkable. The orality 
of the proceedings, in light of the flurry of documentation examined above, is also 
remarkable. As much as people complained about or searched for or presented 
documentation, and as much as courts chose to privilege it, documentation did not 
dominate proceedings to the same degree as witness or guarantor statements, 
complaints and clameurs, or the movement in and out of court, especially in the lower 
court. Further, the oral nature of the proceedings (and the brisk February morning 
air?) also very likely expedited resolution.76   
The report was all Farin needed. “Having heard the report and at the request 
of the said procureur,” he “ordered and sentenced” Leduc to take down and remove 
the fence to return the place to its former state, “as it was accustomed to be in the 
past and in preceding the enclosure.” He also fined Leduc for the offense, which he 
“executed” immediately “in his presence,” collecting the money on the spot (the 
marginal notation “EM” on the register also indicates that the fine was collected, but it 
does not indicate the amount).77   
                                                          
75 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. 
76 Piant, “Des procès innombrables.’’ 
77 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. “…et Jehan Guenet ages de quarante ans pour estre et 
comparoir ce jourduy heure de huit heures sur le lieu descordable lesquelz en la presence de nous et 
dud procureur furent appellerz par led sergent auquel appel ilz se comparurent tous en personne et 
iceulx par nous adjurez a dire verite sur led approchement aprez ce qu’ilz oulrent veu et visite bien au 
long led lieu descordable et en le presence dud abraham le duc a leur retour nous disdrent et 
rapporterent par leurs sermens que led closture de pallifz faicte par led Leduc joingnant et contigue de 
sad maison et de lad croix feret estoit nouvelle entreprise et contre et eu prejudice de la varye 
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Putting a “point” on this case, figuratively speaking, but not even starting a 
new line on the register, a new collective action began against Leduc. In this case, 
the procureur and fifteen of Leduc’s neighbors, including Caudry Lefevre, Pernot 
Boscguillaume, Robinet Bonamy, Regnault Levesque, Colin Levesque, and Collin 
Leboullenger, complained about Leduc’s misappropriation and pollution of a well 
“adjoining and contiguous with his house but public and common to all the neighbors 
of the street,” who had been accustomed to “go there all and as many times as it 
pleased them” and who Leduc now “wanted every day to speak against [“contredire”] 
and hinder them, saying that the well pertained to him particularly.” Further, he was 
pumping the water into his boilers, for use in his cloth-making business, and the 
water from these boilers was leaking back into the well, “which was contrary to the 
public good” (“laquelle chose estoit contre le bien de la chose publicque”). Farin “tried 
to interrogate and examine” the people present to “know whether the well was 
common and public,” and Leduc “tried to interrogate and examine” them on the same 
point.78 The performance of these proceedings is a little less ceremonious than the 
                                                          
publicque. Ouy le quel raport et a l’instance dudit procureur avons ordonne et sentence que lad 
closture ou pallifs faicte par led Abraham Leduc sera reamenerent et de fait abatue et le lieu renvoys a 
son premier estat deu ainsy qu’il avoit acoustume destre le temps passe et eu precedant d’icelle 
closture dit lad Abraham Leduc mis en amende de lad entreprise la quelle sentence ou mandement 
appointement presentement et en notre presence sut mis a execution et en une autre instance…” 
78 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. “voysins dud Abraham Leduc estoitent plaintifs sur led 
Abraham Leduc que combien qu’il y oult certain puys joingnant et contigue de la maison de Abraham 
publicque et commun a tous les voisins de lad rue et a ce moien y aller toutes et quanteffoys qu’il a 
plairoit de neant icelluy Leduc chacun jour les voulloit a ce contredire et empescher disant led puys a 
luy appartenir particullierement et qui puys est acoit une denestre ouvreante sur le boit joingnant et 
contigu d’icelle puys par la quelle il puchoys de l’eaue d’icelluy et la fais aller dedens ses chaudieres 
ou il oppeirit de son mestier de drapperie et les maidices qui veurient desd chaudieres aucuneffoys 
redoudoytement et chieschettement dedens led puys et se avoit au prez dud puys certain appentiz par 
le quel l’eaue du cyel degoustoit et chiechoit dedens led puys laquelle chose estoit contre le bien de la 
chose publicque et povoit de ce advenir inconnement en nous requerant sur ce provision et que 
voulsissions interroguer et examiner lesd gens de veue savoir se led puys estoit commun et public 
icellui Abraham Leduc sur ce que voullions interroguer et examiner lesd gens de veue a la fin dessusd 
confessa recongnust que led puys n’estoit point partiellierement maiz estoit public et commun a tous 
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last, and we imagine a small but imposing crowd of fed up neighbors massed around 
Farin and Leduc complaining about their recent loss of access to, and the offender’s 
contamination of, this well (on top of that *offensive* fence). Judge and defendant 
float questions in all directions looking for clarity and support. At the end of this quick 
flurry of words, Leduc, shrinking back in the face of his neighbors, “confessed and 
acknowledged that the well did not pertain to him particularly but was rather public 
and common to all the neighbors of the place.” The record continued, “He did not 
want to hinder their access to the well,” but he reserved the right to continue his work 
and requested that everyone chip in to attach a new and stronger rope to the well to 
bring up the water. “Seeing this confession and response from Leduc,” Farin ordered 
that “henceforth the well would be common to all of the neighbors of the said place 
and as such, by common expense, there would be a rope placed on the well to draw 
for water from it” and all would do their part in the maintenance of the well. He also 
ordered Leduc to construct and maintain a gutter under the offending window of his 
                                                          
les voisins du lieu et ne voulloit ne enterine contredire ne empescher les voysins ne autres que toutes 
et quenteffoys qui leur plairoit a une queue de l’eaue pour leur usage qu’ilz le peussent faire maiz en 
tant que a luy estoit leur consentoit et accordoit l’usage d’icellui puys comme puys public et commun 
par cenque chacun en sa part et porcion continueront au cirage et voidenge d’icelle touteffoys que 
mestier seroit et mesmes a querir le corde d’icelle puys et y faire ung potence pour atachey lad corde. 
Veue laquelle confession et responce dud Abraham a nous ordonne que desormaiz led puys sera 
commun a tous les voysins dud lieu et que a communs despens il y sera mis une corde pour tyrer de 
l’eaue dud puys et que touteffoys qu’il sera mestier de voider et curer icellui puys chacun y contribura 
en sa part et porcion et eu surplus que icellui Abraham sera faire la paren d’au prez dud puys sur la 
quelle sad fenestre est assise de pierre en aboutant sur sad maison ou est sa tainture et ou lad 
fenestre est assise et que led Leduc sera mestre une gouttiere de quatre a cinq piedz au long du 
degouse de sad maison qui est assise prez led puys laquelle demourrae l’estat qu’elle este de present 
assise pour ce que par lesd gens de veue et aussy par l’impertion des anciennes lenones ou autres 
loys a quoy led Abraham Leduc se submist faire et acomplir les choses dessusd en tant que a luy 
apartien faire et agreer enseignemens il n’a point este trouve ne rapporte que pour le present lad 
maison assise prez led puys soit sur la vanarit publique desquelles choses lesd Robinet Centsolz 
Robin caron Cardin Lefevre Anthoine Duhuze Henry Lecherf Pernot Boscguillaume Adam Dumarest 
Robinet Bonamy regnault Levesque Jehan Cauchoys Michault Lemonnier Guillaume Lemonnier Collin 
Levesque Collin Leboullenger et Simonnet Hary nous requestent ces presentes pour leur valloir et 
servir ce que de raison donne commune dessus.” 
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house to divert leaking water from his boilers away from the well. Leduc “submitted 
himself to do and complete the above-said things,” and “on which things” all of the 
neighbors present requested a copy of the day’s proceedings. Not bad for a 
morning’s work. Farin went on to hear seven more cases that same day. 
 These “on-site” proceedings and judgments by Farin for the court of Elbeuf, 
reveal a great deal about practice and serve as an important counterbalance to 
cases discussed above. They demonstrate specifically how neighborhood policing 
could work (introduced in chapter three), putting an end to nuisance behaviors that 
crossed a line and calling in the local judge to put his stamp on it. They also show 
that legal practice, the law’s authority and coercive power through enforcement 
behaviors (elaborated in chapter five) were more diffuse and not a top-down 
monopoly in this period in Normandy.79 They confirm that a dispute with its 
proceedings, ruling and sentence could all be remarkably swift or could drag on with 
different maneuvers and an apparent reluctance to render judgment and sentence. 
This fact was likely not lost on Jean Carre, who, having served as a witness to swift 
justice in the morning, met Farin in the afternoon for another session in which 
Jacques Dufay defaulted.80  
Social factors likely made a big difference in these cases. Jean Carre had to 
go through the motions and patiently maneuver through the troubled waters of 
litigation that nobleman Jacques Dufay and his team of procureurs stirred up in 
opposition to his clameur de marché de bourse. That said, Carre probably heard 
                                                          
79 Hardwick, Family Business; Smail, Consumption of Justice; Philip B. Uninsky, “Violence, Honor, and 
Litigation: Injures et Voies de Fait in Pre-Revolutionary Rouen” N.Y.U. Journal of International Law 
and Politics 23 (1991): 867-904. 
80 ADSM, 52BP 11, February 26, 1510. 
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about the quick resolution to Jean Boullart’s clameur de marché de bourse, which 
took only two sessions, both falling in the month of January, against a fairly 
cooperative Simon Hode.81 Carre also witnessed the coercive power of the lord’s 
procureur and the even greater coercive power of collective action during a fairly 
well-orchestrated encroachment suit and a fairly impromptu rush upon the judge at 
the end to pursue another sort of encroachment complaint. Unlike the collection of 
individual parties seen in some of the cases examined so far, the collective social 
pressure of a “mob” of determined neighbors could brush the unnamed lord’s 
procureur aside after a pro forma introduction of the complaint to compel a piggy-
back suit. The oral proceedings wrapped up relatively efficiently, but the plaintiffs still 
wanted a written record of the proceedings. Documentation may then be understood 
as the “double-edged sword” of justice, which litigants increasingly imbued with value 
and made necessary to proceedings, while at the same time slowing those 
proceedings down.82 This is, of course, a simplistic explanation of complex and 
variable practices. 
 
Length of Cases 
 
Accusations of abuses and delaying tactics as well as complaints about the 
length of litigation have drawn scholars in to a debate about the length of cases and 
how to interpret it. How long did it take to dispute before a court? Was the length a 
                                                          
81 ADSM, 52BP 11, January 3 and 17, 1510. The clameur began, technically, in the preceding 
September, but Boullart had lodged it against the wrong person, who had transferred the property to 
Hode. 
82 Piant, “Des procès innombrables.’’ 
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sign of inefficiency, inefficacy, inadequacy, resistance, or corruption? Or, was it an 
attempt to deter disputes and encourage resolution out of court? Was it actually a 
deterrent and in what sense?83 What the majority of viewpoints in this debate have in 
common is the presumed centrality of the court, and the ideal that it should be so, in 
civil disputes. These assumptions added to the fact that much of the evidence for 
arguments in the debates comes from the Parlements (i.e. at the end of the longest 
trials), private papers from elite families (a very narrow segment of the population), 
and from criticisms drawn from printed sources with their own agendas leave the 
debate rather one-dimensional. Recognizing that the length of cases before a court 
has been a subject of great concern but also that much of the literature focuses on 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, I want to take the opportunity to examine 
the question of time in late fifteenth-, early sixteenth-century Rouen to see what the 
records under consideration in this project yield in terms of the length of cases 
specifically and legal practices more broadly. With the delaying tactics, procedural 
requirements, and the nature of appearances discussed above in mind, we can dive 
more deeply into the amount and length of ongoing litigation.  
Although the cases involving multiple parties in multiple appearances from the 
court of Elbeuf generally offer us little satisfaction when it comes to details or 
narrative, they nonetheless provide important information about the process of civil 
                                                          
83 Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise”; Hayhoe, “L’arbitre, intermédiaire de justice en Bourgogne’’; 
Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; Crubaugh, Balancing the Scales of Justice; Nicole Castan and Yves 
Castan, “Une économie de justice à l'Âge Moderne: composition et dissension” Histoire, économie et 
société 1:3. (1982): 361-367; Castan, “La justice expéditive”; Castan, Justice et répression en 
Languedoc; Michael P. Breen, “Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France.” The Journal of 
Modern History 83:2 (June 2011), pp. 346-86; and Michael P. Breen, “Law and Social History in Early 
Modern France,” in Social Relations, Politics, and Power in Early Modern France: Robert Descimon 




litigation. Even within the span of one year, it is clear that cases heard by the court 
were most often either very short, with only one appearance in court, or a long, drawn 
out process.84 The length of time most often resulted from parties trying to put all of 
the supporting materials together for their case and to find people to testify on their 
behalf. Of course, delaying the process could also be part of the litigation strategy if 
one party was trying to obstruct or discourage the activity of the other.85 It is more 
likely that procedure before the court was stricter in its requirements to render a 
decision and offer resolution and that this, coupled with the cost, forced parties to 
regroup and possibly reconsider. It is also possible that the court simply did not want 
to hear civil cases—possibly disdaining them along the lines of the learned jurists 
from chapter one—or that there was an idea that the resolution and harmony effected 
by it would be longer lasting if both parties were actively enfranchised in the final 
decision rather than having a judge hand one down. That is, the court wanted to 
stand back as a mediating force to encourage reconciliation between disputing 
parties and offered them plenty of opportunities to back down from formal 
proceedings. Furthermore, we may infer that asking, and dwelling on, how long court 
cases lasted is not exactly the right question, making debates about the significance 
of the length of cases beside the point. What we are observing from these records is 
a concept of justice which does not consist of court cases—the process is what is 
                                                          
84 Smail has observed similar practices in his research in Marseille in the fourteenth century. Daniel 
Lord Smail, “Témoins et témoignages dans les causes civiles à Marseille, du XIIIe au Xve siècle,” in 
Pratiques sociales et politiques judiciaires dans les villes de l’Occident à la fin du Moyen Âge, ed. 
Jacques Chiffoleau, Claude Gauvard, and Andrea Zorzi (Rome, Italy: École française de Rome, 2007): 
423-37. 
85 Smail, Consumption of Justice; Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion. ADSM, 1B 331, 
January 12, 1510. 
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important, not the day in court—so what looks like a “delaying” tactic may actually be 
a move into a parallel form of justice-seeking such as negotiation, contracts, etc. 
As one would expect, the cases before the Échiquier, when they give any 
sense of timeline, reveal a consistently and considerably longer timeline between 
initiation and resolution of a dispute. The case as presented to the Échiquier in 1510 
between Gilles Fayel and Mathurin Legalloys, for example, dates back to a ruling 
from 1502 by the mayor of Nonancourt in relation to some debt that Legalloys had 
inherited from his father who had acquired it from a delinquent debtor Hector 
Gazeau. This ruling from 1502, being challenged before the bailli of Evreux (which 
procedure was the subject of the complaint to the Échiquier) had been an endpoint to 
dispute proceedings leading up to it both in and out of court, but this ruling had not 
provided satisfactory resolution and eight years later, the case continued.86  
This case is an extreme example, but it does serve my point that the records 
from the Échiquier are not the best sources for measuring the average timeline of 
cases. They often do not give enough detail about proceedings leading up to the 
appearance before the Échiquier to determine how long each intervening step took. 
We should expect cases that moved through three courts (vicomte to bailliage to 
Échiquier on the ideal model) to have taken longer than those that only moved 
through one. Since there were far fewer cases that made it to the highest level, the 
most meaningful source of information about the average length of litigation is going 
to be the lower courts. The cases before the Échiquier and the other Parlements 
                                                          
86 ADSM, 1B 331, January 17, 1510. 
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need to be studied as revealing and important entities but entities outside the norm 
when the question is the average length of time. 
Notarial records, for the most part, suggest shorter, but not necessarily short, 
timelines. The settlements sometimes suggest an urgency to resolve the dispute out 
of court before it progresses too far in court and sometimes suggest a desire to 
prevent dragging the dispute out too long. These expressed motives for settlement 
reveal the potential for speed and the potential for length and suggest that the pace 
was at least in part determined by the parties themselves and their decisions for the 
course of their disputes. The notarial records and the court records from Elbeuf and 
the Échiquier reveal a lot of variation in the timeline of disputing both in the court and 
out. What is not clear, despite (ordinarily one-sided) accusations and complaints of 
the delay in litigation or agreements by both parties to avoid further action in court, is 




The forays into court discussed in this chapter offer an important glimpse into 
civil litigation procedure—the back and forth, the length, the importance of 
documentation etc. From scheduling an audience to making an appearance, or not, 
to the preparation and adherence to procedures to accusations of abuse and even to 
the eventual settlement out of court, they highlight the maneuverings of the 
disputants and situate the court more clearly in the larger landscape of dispute 
proceedings. We take these decisions to go to court but not resolve the disputes in 
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court along with some of the more common procedures in court and proceed to the 
next chapter for an analysis of resolutions of disputes by a court judgment and 
enforcement thereof. 
More importantly, as we move into the next chapter on resolution and 
enforcement practices, it is important to bear in mind that my examination of 
settlement practices and maneuverings in and out of court show that the legal culture 
defined resolution and justice differently. Equally important to recall is that the 
question of how long cases lasted is to miss the point. The legal culture placed a 
greater value on procedure and on repairing and maintaining social relations than on 
the notion of “speedy” or “efficient” justice, and people were afforded ample 
opportunity to come to a renewed agreement which best suited their individual needs 








 The preceding chapters have shown much of the activity along the spectrum 
of disputing with a particular emphasis on actions taken outside of the courts and 
actions taken to resolve a dispute before a final ruling by a court. This chapter will 
provide an in-depth analysis of court rulings, sentences prescribed, and enforcement; 
it will also elaborate on themes of witnessing, discretion, reputation and cost. With 
this, it will challenge the theory that litigation was a commitment to cause as much 
damage to an opponent as possible as well as the assumption of finality or resolution 
in court rulings--how final is final and who really decides this? The question is not 
whether the court wanted to have the final say in a case or whether it was content to 
allow parties to resolve disputes independently, even encouraging such practices. 
The question is what role it did play in resolution and enforcement and how effective 
it was, challenging a prominent assumption that the court served as a lever at key 
moments in a dispute to bring parties to a settlement by serving as a costly and 
coercive threat, central to thought and background to action.1  
                                                          
1 For important contributions to this debate, see: Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: 
Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University 
Press, 2003); and Jeremy Hayhoe, “L’arbitre, intermédiaire de justice en Bourgogne vers la fin du 
XVIIIe siècle,” In Entre justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, 
ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 617-26; Jeremy 
Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Northern Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008); Rafe Blaufarb, 
“Conflict and Compromise: Communauté and Seigneurie in Early Modern Provence” The Journal of 
Modern History 82:3 (September 2010): 519-45; Isabelle Carrier, “L’art de louvoyer dans le système 
judiciaire de l’Ancien Régime: Le procureurs et la procédure civile,” in Entre justice et justiciables : Les 
auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe siècle, ed. Claire Dolan (Québec, Canada: Les Presses 
de l’Université de Laval, 2005): 479-90. 
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In this chapter, I will not argue that this was not the case, but I will argue that it 
was not so simple. Although I cannot answer how enforcement worked (and how it 
didn’t) exactly, this chapter will open more avenues of investigation by exploring 
some of the enforcement practices in relation to civil disputes in late-fifteenth- and 
early-sixteenth-century Rouen as observed in the notarial records as well as the court 
records from Elbeuf and the Échiquier.2 In so doing, I will argue that evident 
challenges to enforcement diminish the coercive power of the courts.  
On the surface of it, one would expect a court’s ruling on a case to be 
decisive—judgment rendered, resolution final--especially that of the Échiquier as the 
last court of appeal. However, even if, for a moment, we set aside the notarial 
records that chip away at this judicial fantasy, the court records themselves indicate 
that this was not the case on many occasions. This does not necessarily mean that a 
court’s decision was challenged (overtly)—the option of appeals show that it could 
be—but that the dispute did not necessarily end. It may, of course, be regenerated in 
off-shoot cases between litigants and/or their heirs. It may also be the court itself that 
continues the loop by dismissing the case or sending it back to the lower courts for a 
decision. The record of a ruling may also be “lost.” Looking at court records from the 
vicomté of Elbeuf and the Échiquier in Rouen reveals a lot about the role of courts in 
the resolution of disputes. This chapter will follow these points by examining four 
main categories related to judgment: court rulings, sentences, appeals, and 
                                                          
2 For an important contribution to the theory of how contracts are enforced and the many variables to 
that part of civil law, see Gillian K. Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual 
Commitments,” in Handbook of New Institutional Economics, ed. Claude Ménard and Mary M. Shirley. 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer, 2005): 175-203. 
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enforcement. It will then elaborate on related themes of witnessing, discretion, 




Beginning with court rulings, we recall from the previous chapter the apparent 
dual reluctance of, and lack of opportunity for, the court of Elbeuf to render a final 
decision in the fact that it only rendered seven on the 109 appearances before it for 
the year 1510. Many cases disappeared as abruptly from the record as they 
appeared. The case between Jacquet Vallet and Raoullin Cavellier is an example of 
this. Cavellier appeared in court on behalf of his wife to complain that Vallet had 
assaulted her to the point of drawing blood. Vallet had not appeared, and the case 
was postponed to summon him again to answer the accusations against him. And 
that was the final entry on the matter.3 We can only guess how the disputed was 
resolved. We do know that complaints floated around, especially at the highest 
levels, about “desertion” (usually following complaints about the numbers of requests 
and the length of cases) and can assume that sudden disappearances could be a 
nuisance for the courts’ operations and caused concern that attention was 
unnecessarily diverted from cases that were still ongoing. Legislation, like the royal 
ordinance on the administration of justice from 1493, was passed repeatedly to 
address such complaints.4 The most plausible explanation for these sudden 
                                                          
3 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
4 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’an 420, jusqu’à la révolution de 1789. 29 vol. 
Edited by François André Isambert et al. Paris: Belin-Leprieur and Verdière, 1821-1833; vol. 11, pp. 
214-49; article 59. “Et si d’aucune sentence y a appellation interjettée len notre cour de parlement et 
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disappearances is that the parties worked out a settlement. Evidence for some of 
these settlements is found in the notarial records, but many were also probably 
negotiated orally.5 These disappearances and complaints suggest that if courts were 
content by people working out settlements and encouraged such practice, not 
everyone was on the same page about it. Given that the ordinance from 1493 
focused primarily on procedures in the highest courts, I would assume that there 
were considerable differences between practices and attitudes on “comings and 
goings” in the lower courts and in the highest. More research would be needed to 
flesh this theory out.  
In addition to abandoned cases, we also recall the number of cases 
postponed and the extraordinary lead up to the final decision in some of the cases, 
such as Jean Carre calling Jacques Dufay into court eight times before the court 
ruled in his favor or the complex proceedings between Jean Leribert and Jean 
Regnault.6 The number of entries which indicate that a case is continuing for the 
purpose of summoning a witness or one of the parties, for bringing documentation 
                                                          
elle n’est relevée dedans les trois mois, le juge pourra mettre à execution la sentence nonobstant 
oppositions ou appellations quelconques, sans ce qu’il soit besoing à la partie de faire adjourner 
l’appelant en matière de désertion d’appel, et néantmoins ordonnons à notre procureur général qu’il 
fasse adjourner l’appelant en notredite cour pour, veoir déclarer estre descheu, en amende de 50 
livres parisis.” See also article 57: “Souventesfois advient que ceux qui on délinqué se absentent et 
est nécessité de procéder contre eulx par adjournemens personnels, et les appeller à ban et à jour à 
eulx assigné, et laissent donner la sentence, et après en appellent en icelle cour où ils ne comparent 
point, mais se laissent mettre en défaut et après que la sentence est confirmée par arrest, ils se tirent 
en la chancellerie et obtiennent lettres pour estre reçus en leurs justifications en reffondant les 
despens de déffaut. Nous avons ordonné et statué que tel arrest sera exécuté royaumment et de fait 
selon sa forme et teneur, en tant que touche l’intérest de partie; nonobstant lesdites lettres, en baillant 
caution par icelle partie de le rendre en fin de cause, après cogneu desdites lettres et si elles son 
enthérinées.” 
5 For more on settlements for petty and not so petty crimes, see Alfred Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris 
d'après les archives notariales” Histoire, économie et société 1:3 (1982): 369-375; and Alfred Soman, 
“Deviance and Criminal Justice in Western Europe, 1300-1800: An Essay in Structure” Criminal 
Justice History Vol. 1 (New York, NY, USA: The John Jay Press, 1980): 1-28. 
6 ADSM, 52BP 11.  
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(“pour apporter faiz”) as in the case of Julien Lefevre and Thomas Bacheler, or for 
preparation and reading such documentation as in the case of the Mauclerc’s 
inheritance far outweigh the rulings.7 The apparent open-endedness of proceedings 
and willingness on the part of the court to give litigants every opportunity to find an 
alternate solution, diminished its coercive image, suggesting that the courts, at least 
in terms of civil law, viewed themselves more as a last resort for resolving civil 
disputes, perhaps to encourage continuing social relations and harmony, rather than 
as a deterrent to future actions as it would be for criminal acts.8 The same ordinance 
from 1493 quoted above indicates that elite contemporaries recognized this issue as 
well, complaining that “parties do not fear to make infinite requests.”9 The degree and 
extent to which this concern was shared (or fairly isolated among select elites) is less 
important than the implication that the court’s coercive presence in the legal system 
was far from dominant (or feared) in practice. The patterns observed in people’s 
actions in and out of court support this idea. Some people were in a hurry to settle 
once the dispute went to court, and some people were not. One party’s status relative 
to another probably influenced this to a certain degree, but the demographic 
information in my samples is not consistent enough to draw conclusions on that topic 
at this time. 
This observation is also not meant to imply that the court’s coercive power, if 
inconsistent, was completely lacking. When Denis Farin, lieutenant of the vicomte of 
                                                          
7 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
8 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise.” 
9 Recueil général des anciennes lois françaises depuis l’an 420, vol. 11, pp. 214-49; article 50. “les 




Elbeuf, went out to hear a complaint about Abraham Leduc’s new fence, the morning 
of February 26, 1510, Leduc’s neighbors had the satisfaction of hearing a ruling in 
their favor and the ordered removal of the offending fence that same day. In fact, 
they tacked on another complaint against Leduc about the misappropriation and 
contamination of their well and received a favorable ruling on that on the same day 
as well.10 The court could render a decision with remarkable efficiency. Even so, the 
orchestrated nature of the first case and the impromptu undertones of the second 
(elaborated in chapter four) suggest that Leduc’s neighbors were exercising as much 
coercive power as the court, if not more, in influencing the pace and direction of 
rulings. Furthermore, and this will be an ongoing theme in this chapter, it is one thing 
to order that the fence be taken down or that Leduc install a gutter, and it is another 
thing entirely whether, when, and how those orders are followed. Leduc’s neighbors 
very likely played a greater role in the oversight of these orders than the court, since 
the stakes were higher for them and they may have been in closer proximity to 
monitor Leduc’s actions and inaction. The court’s role as a decisive force is thus 
limited relative to social pressures, and the court is less central to the bigger picture 
of disputing practices. 
We contrast these patterns from the lowest courts with those of the highest 
court of appeals, looking at its register of rulings, and yet arrive at similar 
conclusions. Of the 30 judgments examined (out of 219 total) from the Échiquier in 
1510, only five were postponed. Among these postponed cases are counted the now 
familiar case of Robert Legouez versus Guillaume Levesque and Thomas Berquet 
                                                          
10 ADSM, 52BP 11. 
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and his wife, coming up from the bailli of Rouen, which was postponed because the 
case was not “in a state to be judged,” as well as that of Robert de Thienville versus 
Guillemette Pelerin and the inhabitants of several parishes, coming up from the bailli 
of Caen, which was postponed to consult expert artisans in relation to the disputed 
building project in question.11 The relatively small number of postponements relative 
to the rulings (below) would seem to support the decisive power of this court. This is 
not surprising given its status as a sovereign court, at the peak of the judicial 
hierarchy, with different stakes and different spaces for maneuvering; however, its 
status as a sovereign court also makes it rather more exceptional than normative. 
The records from Parlements have received more scholarly attention generally, and 
their records are important for understanding practice, especially in accounts of the 
lead up to an appearance before it included with some of the entries, but we must 
also be cautious about weighing observations and analysis proportionately so as not 
to distort the bigger picture of practice with exceptional examples—they help to 
complete the picture but they should not enjoy a central place. 
Of the 25 cases remaining in my sample from the Échiquier, one or more 
rulings were given per case, depending on the appeal, complaints and counter-
complaints encompassed in the case brought before it. Recall as an example the 
complain that Pierre Lepetit brought to the Échiquier against Guillaume Adoubart, 
conseiller commissaire for the bailli of Evreux, for “wrongs and griefs” that had been 
done to him in settling his parents’ estate.12 The primary complaint is that Adoubart is 
                                                          
11 ADSM, 1B 331, January 8 and January 24, 1510. “le proces n’est pour le present en estat de juger.’ 
ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
12 ADSM, 1B 331, January 26, 1510. 
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mismanaging the case. The primary dispute is between Lepetit and his parents’ 
creditors. The court ruled against Lepetit on the primary complaint not on the primary 
dispute and then sent the central case itself back to the lower court for judgment. In 
total among the appearances examined, the court ruled in favor of six complaints and 
against double that figure (supporting the proceedings of the lower court). The court 
also ruled nine dismissals and three cases sent back (renvoyé).13   
As an example of a case that was dismissed and sent back, the case between 
the Daudins and Jean Bouquet, first introduced in chapter three, is also one of the 
richest examples from the Échiquier’s records for insights into our understanding of 
rulings. We have examined the case so far in relation to the seizure of goods 
executed during the course of the dispute and also for the importance of 
documentation to the proceedings. Related to the latter, the case is of special interest 
because of the repeat of the case and the ruling, which, whether or not it was an 
actual repeat or the Daudins trying to pass a forgotten “desertion” off as resolved, 
reveals some of the potential challenges to resolution in relation to court rulings, 
including a missing record. It will be of continued interest for my examination of 
enforcement and discretion further in this chapter as well, so I am going to 
paraphrase the case in detail, following its presentation in the court record fairly 
closely to give a sense of the pleas made by both parties. 
Jean, Colin and Étienne Daudin file a complaint (“dolleance”) against Jean 
Fillon, once lieutenant general of the bailli of Evreux, in relation to a case against 
Jean Bouquet, priest.14 In support of their complaint, the Daudins claim that they had 
                                                          
13 ADSM, 1B 331. 
14 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
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proceeded in the court in question via written facts and ordinary accounts and had 
taken their right [received a ruling in their favor] as much to the principal case as to 
their original complaint submitted to the bailli [this is an apparent lateral appeal, which 
was not rare given the interchangeability of vicomté and bailliage in some places]. 
These original proceedings had been brought to a close in 1502.  
Since that time Bouquet turned to the chancellery of the court for a copy of the 
case record and documentation.15 Ostensibly he was searching to see what terms 
had been decided to see whether he was responsible for any outstanding loose ends 
and liabilities, but he was also searching for evidence that the case had indeed been 
brought to a close. He was not able to recover the record as expected. Bouquet 
pressed the issue to the point that the Daudins were forced to renew the case, or, 
rather, to start over and resubmit their appeal/complaint before the bailli.  
Whatever the previous ruling had been, this time, after the request had been 
submitted and the parties heard, the presiding judge—Thomas Postel, “counselor in 
the said court and deputed commissaire”—ordered the Daudins to detail what had 
happened on the day of the audience in court about which they were complaining, 
along with their original case, to determine whether they had rightly or wrongly filed 
their complaint.16 According to the Daudins, their father Guillaume Daudin had been 
enfiefed certain property (“heritages”) by (defunct) Robin Hurel in exchange for 70 
sous tournois per year of rente payments on condition of repurchase and by 
condition also that in the event that the borrower defaulted in three consecutive years 
                                                          
15 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
16 Commissaires, in this period, were officials who had variable duties and functions, especially in rural 
areas, which could include presiding as a judge. They were not, however, police officers in the modern 
sense of the term. “conseiller en lad court et commissaire deppute par icelle.” 
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of payments, Hurel would be able to seize back the property “without authority of 
justice” (“sans auctorite de justice”).17   
For this reason, Étienne and Berthault Landri, so-called heirs of the defunct 
Hurel by marriage (“because of their wives”), had claimed that in the year 1497 or so 
the Daudins, representing the right of their father [by inheritance], had defaulted on 
the rente payments for three consecutive years. The Landris thus turned to Jean 
Couronne, sergent at that time [though presumably no longer so by 1510], and in his 
presence, attempted to seize the property/debt, for which they took movable goods 
belonging to the Daudins amounting to 20, even 40, times the value of the three 
years’ worth of rente. The Daudins argued that, notwithstanding their trivial and 
continued possession of the property, the Landris had also opposed the transmission 
of the Daudins’ inheritance, but nothing had come of it.18   
Soon after this point, Bouquet had acquired the right of the Landris and 
obtained letters (subrogation) to take up the opposition to their inheritance, for which 
he was fined by Fillon, lieutenant of the bailli of Evreux. In the course of those 
proceedings, the Daudins had claimed that they, or someone on their behalf, had 
paid all or part of the disputed arrears, during the three years in question, and had 
offered to pay back the principal and any remaining arrears to the Landris/Bouquet 
so that Bouquet “did not know that the Daudins had defaulted” (meaning they wiped 
out the debt and left no trace of default).19 They also claimed that the “condition” in 
                                                          
17 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
18 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. “Estienne et Berthault ditz Landri eulx disant heritiers a cause de 
leurs femmes dud deffunct Hurel” 
19 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. “…icellui Bouquet intyme avoit acquis le droit d’iceulx Landri et 
obtenu lettres pour est receu a opposition en la deduction de laquelle opposition apres la matiere 
sortie par devant maistre Fillon lieutenant dud bailly avoit este soustenu que led intime devoit faire 
l’amende de lad opposition voullant procurer lesd complaignants que en icelles// trois annees ilz 
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the contract (collecting without recourse to justice) only applied to Hurel not to heirs 
or anyone assuming the contract. Nonetheless, Fillon awarded the disputed property 
(“heritages”) and others not included in the original contract (“plusieurs autres 
heritages non comprins en lad. fieffe”) to Bouquet, prompting the Daudins to file a 
complaint that Fillon had done them wrong (“leur avoit fait tort et grief apparent”). In 
that appeal, the Daudins argued that Bouquet should be fined, by which the judgment 
should be broken and annulled, and that Bouquet should be condemned to restitution 
of the levees that Bouquet or his brothers had by force or otherwise taken, enjoyed, 
or had hindered the enjoyment of, along with expenses, damages and interests.  
With the Daudins’ plea closed, Bouquet responded to it by arguing the 
contrary (“avoit este dit et soustenu le contraire”)--that they (the Daudins) had been in 
agreement with the procedure and the written facts, all of which had been submitted 
to the court scribe.20 He complained, however, that he had been obstructed in his 
attempt to recover the writings and that he had not been able to do so and made a 
more formal request, which forced the Daudins to file a complaint (“lesd. 
complaignants fussent contrainctz a proposer sur leurd. dolleance”). Bouquet added 
that the “vice of litigation was not unknown to the plaintiffs” (“vice de litige ne fut pas 
                                                          
avoient pai ou autres pour eulx en tout ou partie lesd arrieres ou l’anie d’iecelles annees et non 
obstant et qu’il eust este offert paier en argent comptant le principal et arrieres de lad rente aud 
Bouquet subrogue desd Landri et qu’il ne fust aucunememnt congnu que iceulx complaignants 
eussent defailly mesmement quant ainsi oust este se estoit lad condicion nulle et ne se povoit 
estendre aud heritiers mais aud Hurel seul sans avoir regard au choses dessusd led Fillon lieutenant 
avoit ordonne que led Bouquet joyroit desd heritaiges et de plusieurs autres heritaiges nnon comprins 
en lad fieffe comme lesd complaignants disoient estre contenu et le tout demonte pour congnu par les 
faiz et escriptures ainsi clozes devers lad court enquoy faisant led Fillon leur avoit fait tort et grief 
apparent pour laquelle cause ilz avoient obtenu leurd dolleance soustenant lesd complaignants que 
d’icelle led inthime devoir faire amende par laquelle le jugie dont estoit dolle devoit estre casse et 
adnulle avecques et est condemne a la restitution de levees que led intime ou ses freres avoient par 
force ou autrement prins et perceuz ou empeschez percevoir avecques despens dommaiges et 
interestz a quoy de la part dud Bouquet intime avoit este dit et soustenu le contraire…” 
20 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. 
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mescongnu par lesd. complaignants”). He also presented documentation of his 
having assumed the right of the Landris (subrogation contract) to the disputed 
property and debt collection and, further, documentation of the original “obligation” 
(contract in which debt is formally acknowledged) dated August 2nd, 1481, which 
clearly stated that in the event that the borrower (“preneur”) defaulted in three 
consecutive years of payment, the lender, or whoever had taken over the right, could 
seize back the property enfiefed and do so “without authority of justice.” He had, 
further, presented the documentation to the Daudins in relation to the default.  
As to the “facts” that the Daudins had alleged before the judge in question, 
Bouquet claimed that that was not the question at hand and that they had never 
alleged them before the judge in question, which a copy of the complaint by the 
Daudins proves and in which there is no mention. During those proceedings they had 
also not provided any receipt, discharge or other documentation that the debt had 
been settled. Accordingly, the judge had “rightly, and in keeping with the law,” 
ordered and declared that Bouquet would have enjoyment of the property of his fief 
and had not awarded additional property beyond that included in the fief, as the 
Daudins would have the court believe, because Bouquet had never demanded more 
property than that included in the fief--he had stopped and was stopping at the 
property loaned.21 To further support his claim that the judge had every reason to 
                                                          
21 ADSM, 1B 331, January 19, 1510. “…mais touchant les faiz que lesd complaignants disoient avoir 
alleguez devant led juge subgect disoit icellui intime que ce n’estoit la question presente aussi que 
jamais ilz ne furent alleguez devant led juge subgect preuve la coppie de la dolleance desd 
complaignants qui n’en fait aucune mencion et quant ilz eussent este alleguez ce que non encores 
pendant le proces actendre qu’il a aparoissent de racquit quictance ne autre descharge le juge acoit 
bien et juridiquement ordonne d’avoir// declare la joissance par provision a icelluy intime des 
heritaiges de sad fieffe et n’’voit pas adjuge autres heritaiges comme lesd complaignants a voulloient 
mectre en fait car icellui intyme ne demander jamais autres heritaiges que ceulx ainsi fieffez…” 
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award the property to him, he brought a copy of the original complaint (“dolleance”), 
as proof, in which the Daudins confessed having been served letters regarding the 
defaulted payments and thus rendered the seizure just and lawful. As for the offers 
that the Daudins claimed to have made and were being forced to make, namely, to 
garnish and pay the principal and arrears that may have been due, Bouquet claimed 
that they were impertinent and that he had every reason to deny and refuse them. By 
these means and others alleged by him against the Daudins, he supported his case 
that for their complaint the Daudins must be fined and by this fine, the judge had to 
uphold the ruling with restitution of the levees, expenses, damages, and interests.  
On which, the parties having been heard in judgment, the court ordered them 
to correct their pleas and submit them with their supporting documentation to the 
court within the time stipulated and the matter would be put to council to determine 
their right (“pour leur estre fait droit”). The Échiquier dismissed the complaint by the 
Daudins without assessing a fine or awarding expenses to either party (“la dolleance 
mist au neant sans amende et despens”). However, it did order that Bouquet would, 
provisionally, enjoy the disputed property as collateral for restitution if he be awarded 
such by the lower court at the end of the trial. The court then sent the parties back to 
the bailliage of Evreux to continue proceedings on the principal subject of their case 
(“renvoye lesd. parties par devant led. bailly ou son lieutenant pour proceder sur le 
principal de leur matiere ainsi qu’il appartendit”). 
The case between the Daudins and Bouquet is rich in enforcement practices. 
In regard to rulings specifically, it is interesting because it shows some of the 
challenges to the resolution understood in rulings. Very much central to the complaint 
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is not only the original contested ruling but the missing ruling on the appeal which 
necessitated a “re-trial.” That the original ruling is challenged is expected in appeal 
proceedings. What is surprising is the plausibility of a missing ruling, which casts a 
shadow of uncertainty over rulings. Whether or not there was a ruling on the first 
appeal is less important than the uncertainty of it, forcing a resumption/renewal of 
proceedings. And it had only been eight years—not even as long as the contract had 
been in effect prior to the “end” of the initial appeal. It underscores not only the 
increasing importance of documentation but also, and more so, its relation to 
publicizing a ruling.22 The elevated, but not especially high, social status of these 
parties is less significant than the procedures and challenges faced in this case, 
which are broadly accessible and applicable in experience and not dependent on 
status. 
Examining the Échiquier’s rulings more closely, the “strong” rulings in favor or 
against complaints were nearly equivalent to the “weak” rulings of dismissal and 
renvoyé, even more so if linked to the postponements, especially if, conceptually, we 
think of a renvoyé and a postponement as two sides of the same “deferred judgment” 
coin. The rulings “end” the procedures—appealed cases or complaints--before the 
Échiquier, but the resolution of the core of the dispute remains tentative. In other 
words, a ruling does not necessarily mean a resolution.  
The notarial records add even more complexity to our understanding of court 
rulings. In the settlement contract between Jean and Pregent Leprevost, for instance, 
                                                          
22 Marco Mostert, “Making Court Decisions Known in Medieval Holland,” in Medieval Legal Process: 
Physical, Spoken and Written Performance in the Middle Ages, ed. Mostert, Marco and P. S. Barnwell 
(Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011): 281-95. 
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we recall (from chapter three) that the (required) ruling on Pregent’s clameur de haro 
was a relatively minor, and possibly intentional, hurdle on the way to further 
proceedings. The ruling did not provide resolution to the dispute, though it may have 
influenced the direction. The additional proceedings were not a direct appeal of the 
ruling but were rather a different set of proceedings pursuing the same core 




Reinforcing the uncertainty and lack of resolution overhanging rulings, 
sentencing patterns also reveal a great deal about the role of the court in resolving 
disputes. Aside from ruling in favor of or against one party or another, after which we 
would expect a finalized transfer of property in civil cases, the court would also 
decide whether or not to fine one of the parties as punishment for some part of the 
proceedings and possibly even award damages and expenses incurred to the 
winning party. Of the 25 rulings the Échiquier passed, only half came with a fine, and 
all of them were in relation to the “strong” rulings indicated above. But, even then, not 
all of the strong rulings assessed a fine. Even more striking is the sentencing from 
Elbeuf, which only noted assessing five fines for the year. The lack of zeal in 
assessing fines takes some of the sting out of the cost of going to court and lightens 
some of the burden of resolution on the losing party (the question of cost is discussed 
at length below).  
                                                          
23 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. 
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It is worth recalling here too the defaults discussed at length in the previous 
chapter. When the judgment was a default, it rarely brought a fine--though it was in 
theory a fineable offense after a few had been officially tallied--or a ruling on the 
case. The stakes of the recording of a default, we saw in chapter four, were high 
enough that a plaintiff might appeal the decision not to record a default, just as 
Michel de Batenceurt did in his case against Jean Onardel and Nicolas Basire over 
taxes on his boats in Caen.24 The default may best be thought of as a ruling on an 
action or procedure, a sub-ruling in the bigger context of the case, made up of 
several or many actions or procedures (unlike in other contexts where it was 
essentially an admission of guilt).25 And the case itself is part of the whole of a 





With these observations about rulings and sentences in mind, it is important to 
take a more in-depth look at appeals and complaints to see what light they may shed 
on the role of courts in the resolution of civil disputes. As expected, the appeal was a 
direct objection to a ruling by a lower jurisdiction and a request for the Échiquier to 
review the case and render a judgment. There are also instances, though much 
                                                          
24 ADSM, 1B 331, January 12, 1510. 
25 Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of 
Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 
2007); Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; John A. Dickinson, “L'Activité judiciaire d'après la procédure 
civile: La bailliage de Falaise, 1668-1790” Revue d’histoire économique et sociale 54:2 (1976): 145-
68; ); Daniel Lord Smail, “Violence and Predation in Late Medieval Mediterranean Europe” 
Comparative Studies in Society and History 54:1 (January 2012): 7-34. 
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fewer, of people appealing arbitrations. For example, Jean Ducroq appealed the 
ratification of an arbitration between himself and Sauvage Destanely and his wife 
over the transfer of a rente to the couple as part of their marriage contract by the 
Jean Lepelletier, lieutenant particulier of the bailli of Gisors.26 More common were 
appeals of defaults, such as that of priest Guillaume Dugardin on a ruling of default 
which awarded disputed property to Jean Lerine, bourgeois of Rouen. The case had 
begun before the vicomte of Rouen, which ruled in favor of Lerine. Dugardin 
appealed this ruling to the bailli of Rouen. Upon the third default by Dugardin, Louis 
Dare, lieutenant general of the bailli, declared the final default and upheld the ruling 
of the vicomté. The Échiquier upheld Dare’s judgment and fined Dugardin.27 
Most commonly, an appeal was registered as a complaint (“doléance”) against 
the judge of a preceding jurisdiction—often in relation to ongoing proceedings and 
objections to how the judge of the lower court is handling the case—unnecessary 
delays and postponements, reluctance to rule a default, etc. Michel de Batenceurt’s 
complaint against Hugues Bureau, lieutenant général of the bailli of Caen, to the 
Échiquier is a straightforward example of the appeal as complaint.28 Another example 
is that of Jean Baron who brought a complaint against the bailli of Caen in relation to 
an ongoing case between him and Martin Maurry, representing himself and the right 
of Jean Buitel and Perrette his wife. The case was hanging after two “instances” in 
the vicomté of Fallaise and then after two more in the bailliage of Caen.29  
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In such cases, the Échiquier would decide if a complaint/appeal was “mal 
dollé” (unjustified) dismissing or punishing the complaint and implying the upholding 
of a previous judgment, if there was one, or “bien dollé” (justified) implying the 
overturning of a previous judgment. However, in the case where the Échiquier 
decided that a complaint was justified, it could postpone the case to judge it 
separately and render a ruling on the case itself, which may or may not have ended 
in the appellant’s favor, as in the case of Robert Legouez.30 The appeals and 
complaints represented an opportunity to affect the tempo of proceedings, to stall (as 
in the case of Lepetit) or to try to speed up (as in the case of De Batenceurt) 
proceedings, and to question the management of proceedings by, and the judgment 
of, the judges of the lower courts. The very nature of an appeal temporarily cast 
doubt upon and sometimes outright undermined the “finality” of a court ruling or the 
resolution of a case. Knowing that settlements, too, could break down and make their 
way into the courts, as we have seen, casts a shadow of doubt over the entire 
spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution and adds greater complexity to our 
understanding of enforcement practices. 
 Following these appeals and complaints, it would also be interesting to track 
which courts appear the most often in the appeals before the Échiquier because, 
depending on population, it could be a sign that rulings from that court or official 
specifically were most contested or controversial or alternatively, that that jurisdiction 
heard a higher volume of cases proportionate to others. It could be suggestive of a 
sort of “hotbed” for civil disputes before the court and a higher level of contention 
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regardless of the underlying cause of the number of appeals coming to the Échiquier. 
Of all of the different bailliages whose decisions were appealed in my sample, 
Rouen’s is by far the most represented in the appeals, comprising just over one-third 
of the cases. The nearest followers are Caen, Constentin, and Evreux, which, added 
together, equal that of Rouen. It is important to note, however, that Rouen had a 
significantly higher population than the other cities. Whether that higher population 




 The discussion on rulings, sentences, and appeals ties into a larger discussion 
of challenges to enforcement and enforcement practices. Enforcement—the extent to 
which it occurred and the extent to which it was possible--has been a long-standing 
gray-area for the early modern legal system. Enforcement is often assumed in the 
ruling, but the records examined in this dissertation do not give much evidence for 
how enforcement worked. They do, however, hint that enforcement did not 
necessarily follow a ruling or sentence, that there were various enforcement practices 
in play, and that the prevalency of challenges to enforcement erode assumptions of a 
top-down coercive power emanating from “the court” or “the state.” Gillian Hadfield, in 
particular, has argued (in relation to modern contract law) that there is great 
complexity in the operation of the law in practice and that “there are many potential 
enforcement mechanisms available to support agreements,” not limited to court 
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rulings.31 Approaching enforcement practices in late-fifteenth- and early-sixteenth-
century Rouen and its environs with this theory in mind, it becomes possible to see 
court rulings and sentences within a larger spectrum of enforcement practices. Just 
as the courts play a limited role in dispute proceedings, they play a limited role in 
enforcement, relying instead on supplemental “mechanisms.”32   
As difficult as evidence of enforcement practices is to come by, some 
information can be gleaned from the court and notarial records. Rulings on appeals 
present one of the more obvious enforcement practices in the court records. As 
subtle as it is, the act of upholding a ruling in an appeal was an act of re-enforcement 
by adding legitimacy to the ruling from the lower jurisdiction. The judgment was 
questioned, and that doubt and contention was laid to rest. Upholding an appeal may 
be thought of as one form of “re-enforcement”--a judgment supporting a judgment. 
Another form of re-enforcement was a court ruling in favor of a party that had seized 
the goods of another, either enforcing a contract, as in the case of the 
Landris/Bouquet on the Daudins, or enforcing guild statutes, as in the cases of the 
gardes of the lingères guild seizing illicit fabric examined in chapter three. However, 
in the cases surrounding a seizure of goods examined, the initial act of enforcement 
was challenged, which necessitated the “re-enforcement.” Similarly, overturning a 
ruling in an appeal had the effect of reversing the course of enforcement, and any 
provisionary measures, such as one party holding onto disputed property and 
collecting revenue from it (think Bouquet in his case against the Daudins outlined 
                                                          
31 Hadfield, “The Many Legal Institutions that Support Contractual Commitments,” 177-78. 
32 Court authority backed law enforcement, in theory. Courts enforced laws through rulings and 
supported officials, such as sergents, in proper execution in the event of a complaint. 
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above), would need to be reversed. Since delays could be considerable, shifting the 
course of enforcement could create a larger ripple effect. 
 Very few surviving records document procedures for enforcement of court 
rulings. Within court records, especially from the Échiquier, there are occasionally 
descriptions of how cases unfolded, and these narratives will mention enforcement 
actions after the earlier rulings. The case of Jean Ducroq, mentioned above, is an 
example of this.33 In this case, Ducroq appealed a ruling by the bailli of Gisors, and 
the Échiquier ruled that the complaint was unjustified, that the case had been well-
judged, and fined Ducroq 10 livres while also awarding expenses to his opponents 
Sauvaige Destennaly and his wife. Ducroq’s mother, Robine Debail had given 
Destennaly the right to a rente contract and its arrears (the right to collect on this 
debt) as a wedding present. Ducroq contested the execution of this right, that is, the 
enforcement of the terms of the contract. Each ruling from successive courts 
prompted a new attempt at collection, which met renewed opposition. The multiplicity 
of attempted and failed attempts to enforce the court’s orders underscores the 
challenge to enforcement. These references are fairly rare, but they are telling 
nonetheless.  
Generally, as we saw with the lingères cases in chapter three, sergents were 
charged with the execution of a sentence, including publicizing the ruling and 
sentence as well as collecting fines and fees. The sources are not clear on how this 
process worked (one imagines a sergent and/or one or more soussergents calling on 
the person’s home), although legal reformation legislation and legal treatises do 
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reiterate that it should be fairly immediate, suggesting that it was, in fact, not so. This 
suggests more complexity to how power and authority were wielded in the legal 
culture, possibly explained, at least in part, by socio-economic differences, which 
accounts for the challenges to enforcement. 
 Another indicator of the challenges of enforcement are complaints about the 
lack of enforcement. We have already seen the erudite jurists from chapter one 
address these concerns in their writings, specifying the terms, including the timeline, 
by which a sentence needed to be executed, so clearly it was a matter of broad 
concern. Along these lines, the lingères from time to time would demand enforcement 
of ordinances in the course of their own suits. When Katherine Leleu met opposition 
to confiscating Jean Delyvet’s illicit cloth, for example, she specifically requested that 
the judge uphold the ordinances and forbid others from selling cloth in the future.34 
We also see appearances before the Échiquier which request an execution of a 
sentence. Jean Gaude, residing in the parish of Abbeville in Picardy, and Simon 
Adam both presented such requests to the Échiquier.35 Hardouin Theroulde brought 
a copy of the court’s ruling in to the Échiquier and formally requested execution of it 
in spite of his opponent having filed an opposition to the execution (collection of back 
payments of revenue from a chapel).36 Similarly, in the case of Jean Lepetit, the court 
responded to a demand for enforcement that due notice had to be made before 
enforcement could be executed.37  
                                                          
34 ADSM, 5EP 507b, April 28, 1553. 
35 ADSM, 1B 331, February 8, 1510 and February 12, 1510. 
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We see by these examples that enforcement could be as much of a (varied) 
process as the dispute itself. We may also infer that, similar to the examples above, 
enforcement practices were more complex than we might assume (such as a state-
appointed official immediately enacting the court’s decision) and followed a specific 
process, and further, following what was suggested by Ayrault in chapter one, that 
this legal culture, or at the least its institutional apparatus, was highly procedure-
oriented. It was not simply a matter of enforcing rulings, but making sure that they 
were enforced following proper procedure. 
Enforcement practices could also be cyclical. Cases such as those of the 
lingères show both the leading role that the gardes were playing, and the supporting 
role that the courts were playing, in enforcement and challenges posed not only by 
the likes of Delyvet but also by the judge. The gardes’ actions are central to the entire 
process of enforcement because they catch the malefactors coming and going—their 
act of enforcement in confiscating the cloth is challenged in court and their 
enforcement is upheld by the court, but they would be the best-positioned to make 
sure that the ruling in their favor was itself enforced, by monitoring activity to make 
sure that cloth was not sold illegally in the future (thus the fear that if they stop 
enforcing their privileges, the privileges would disappear practically speaking). 
Another important example of the cyclical nature of enforcement is that of 
Abraham Leduc and his neighbors in Elbeuf examined in chapters three and four.38 
In this case, the neighbors initiated a suit to enforce local laws and norms about 
enclosure, and once they received a favorable ruling, they would have played a 
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primary role in ensuring that the ruling was enforced—that the fence was removed, 
that obstructions to the well ceased, and that a gutter was properly installed to divert 
pollutants to the well. For this reason, the neighbors requested documentation of the 
case and ruling, to have future recourse as necessary and very likely to justify actions 
taken to move the process along if Leduc dragged his heels in following through. The 
sentence was not specific about the time-frame for executing the requirements for 
Leduc nor did it stipulate oversight. This is because the neighbors were understood 
as providing the oversight as interested parties, exercising their informal policing 
function to enforce laws, and more importantly, communal norms.  
Such cases show coordinated enforcement efforts between authorities and 
interested parties and show the importance of enforcement from “below” as much as 
that from “above.” We must not lose sight of the potential from “above” as in the case 
of Jean Carre being assigned a sergent to assist in retaking possession of a house 
from Jacques Dufay and “in this to guard it from all force and undue violence.”39 The 
threat of violence and the need to counteract that, however, reveals yet another 
challenge to enforcement. 
As an extreme example of the cyclical aspect of enforcement, we see the 
challenge of enforcement come to a head when the execution of a sentence is 
contested and re-enflames the dispute. We’ve seen examples of this in settlement 
contracts especially. The settlement contract between Haveron and Vippart 
(discussed in chapter four) shows that in the course of their dispute, each new ruling 
and renewed enforcement led to new proceedings; that is, enforcement could renew 
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the cycle of disputing and enforcement as opposed to ending it.40 Furthermore, the 
arbitration contracted between the Lamberts and the Denormares in relation to a 
dispute over a piece of land (discussed in chapter four) suggests that behind this 
postscript to the arbitration was a risk of a resumption of hostilities, further 
underscored by the threat of a fine in the event of an appeal or complaint about the 
ruling.41 Heading off an expected challenge to enforcement was itself a 
(re-)enforcement practice, but it also reveals that enforcement was not a simple task.  
These settlement contracts also show how important notarial records are for 
filling in gaps in understanding how enforcement worked—arguably more important 
than the court records. Jean de Rouves, for instance, sold land that he had reclaimed 
by clameur and trial before the vicomte of Pont St Pierre from his uncle Guillaume de 
Rouves back to his uncle. The accounting of legal action is found in the chain of title 
to the sale of the property by Guillaume de Rouves, tanner, to Thomas Brisbarre.42 
The right of the property passed to Jean, but ultimately, it passed back to Guillaume. 
Lacking details owing to its indirect revelation, this case is somewhat of a mystery 
because it would have been an even back and forth. Jean would have had to 
compensate Guillaume for the sale price of the property per the requirement of the 
clameur procedure. Guillaume would have then paid Jean to repurchase the land. 
Unless one of them got a real bargain or the value of the land changed dramatically, 
they would have been passing the same amount of money back and forth and paying 
court costs in the process. Without knowing more details, it is difficult to say whether 
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41 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
42 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
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this was a ploy to annoy the uncle, whether it was an act of charity or of predation. 
Regardless, the chain of title can be an important source of evidence of enforcement 
because it shows how a person came into a piece of property (via enforcement). 
Added to the above example is one where Colin Delyvet formally transfers a piece of 
property to Laurent Delapreuse “in obedience to a clameur de marché de bourse 
taken and obtained” by the latter.43 Further evidence for enforcement is found in 
postscripts and receipts. As an example of the latter, Guillaume Mauduit 
acknowledges that he received the sum of money awarded to him by the vicomte of 
Elbeuf from Toussaint Letort in fulfillment of the decree.44 These postscripts to court 
cases bring us full circle in our discussion of the spectrum of disputing. In order to 
ensure enforcement of a ruling by a court, some parties chose to draw up the details 
in a contract and formalize this agreement before a notary. These cases suggest that 
it was one thing to have a court rule in one party’s favor but that it was another thing 
to see that that ruling was enforced. One imagines the difficulty in enforcement when 
parties decide to take extra precautions via contract. The rulings thus enforced, these 
contracts drawn up before the notaries also serve as a receipt and a defensive 
measure against claims to the contrary and demands for enforcement. 
The modest but important role that notaries played in enforcement of court 
rulings reinforces the idea that resolution before a court was not as definitive as it 
may seem on the surface. It also sets the courts within a broader spectrum of dispute 
resolution. The notion that the courts represented the peak of resolution and 
enforcement has been challenged by their own records. This is not to say that the 
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courts did not represent a formidable coercive power, but that in practice, the 
resolution they provided to disputing parties was perhaps as tenuous as settlements 
reached without them.  
That being said, court records also cast a shadow over contracts and 
enforcement of them. For instance, in the Legouez case described in chapters three 
and four, we saw that Robert Legouez had tried to pass disputed property and debt 
over to his uncle Jean Lepannier via contract. Lepannier’s heirs deflected the 
contract, and Legouez resumed his defense.45 This deflection is interesting because 
there was no successful enforcement of the contract, but the implication of fraud 
behind the failure of enforcement also met no response. The contract simply 
disappeared from proceedings with no enforcement pursuant to either interpretation 
of this contract. The case of the Daudins versus Bouquet is the clearest example of 
challenges to enforcement.46 The contract stipulated that the property loaned could 
be reclaimed after three consecutive years of missed payments and that enforcement 
of that condition could be executed by the creditor, bypassing the court. Anticipating 
that this condition would not be enough to carry out the enforcement, the 
Landris/Bouquet brought in sergent Jean Couronne to oversee proceedings. The 
Daudins challenged the enforcement by claiming that the condition allowing the 
bypassing of the court was not transferrable with the contract (upon inheritance or 
sale) and by claiming further that the enforcement was excessive and over-reached 
the debt.  
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Transferring a contract could open difficulties in enforcement of its terms 
because the core of the contract was the oral agreement between the parties, 
including any unwritten understanding or trust (credit) between them. The written 
contract served a commemorative function, and it was only becoming, slowly and 
awkwardly, an instrument of enforcement.47 This fact coupled with the missing written 
ruling central to the proceedings suggest that documentation was presenting new 
challenges to oral enforcement practices in Rouen in this period. That is, in this 
important period of transition for the legal culture, we see nascent privileging of 
documentation popping up in the sources, but we also see an uneasy management 
and leveraging of this documentation. Even as documentation could present a 
solution to a problem—enforcing contracts—it also could just as easily exacerbate 
the problem of coming to resolution of a dispute until people became more fluent with 
documentary practices.  
 
Witnessing, Legal Credit and Discretion 
 
Very much linked to these oral enforcement practices was the act of 
witnessing. Daniel Smail found, in fourteenth-century Marseille, in fact, that witness 
testimony to the terms of the contract was more important than the terms of the 
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document.48 Whether the degree of importance attached to witness testimony relative 
to the document in late fifteenth-, early sixteenth-century Rouen is the same as 
fourteenth-century Marseille is unclear, but there was clearly a broad-sweeping 
concern by authorities about witnessing by 1539 when Francis I ordered that false 
witnesses were to meet capital punishment. That such a punishment was rarely 
prescribed shows the importance of discretion to enforcement (elaborated below). 
But the seriousness of concern over witnessing does reveal how important 
witnessing was to the functioning of the legal system, especially enforcement.  
Witnessing was important to both oral and written practice. For example, the 
law accorded special concern to the issue of false witnessing of contracts, particularly 
marriage contracts.49 Knowing that by of the end of the fifteenth century, two notaries 
and two witnesses who knew the contractees had to sign off on a contract in order for 
it to be legitimate and knowing that for most contracts in my sample the same handful 
of witnesses signed most of the contracts, reveals at once the importance of 
witnesses for the integrity (and performance) of contracts and also the significant gap 
between the letter of the law and practice. Although there were occasionally 
variations in the witnesses listed, the same dozen names or so overwhelm these 
exceptions, and this trend seems to indicate that many of the contracting parties did 
not know each other and that their social relations outside of the contract were fairly 
impersonal. People were entering into agreements across social distances, and the 
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extra defensive security provided by the notarial contract (however real or false that 
actually was) facilitated these relations.  
In the case of the Daudins versus Bouquet, the missing documentation of the 
ruling was amplified by the missing (dead?) judge and the lack of witnesses to 
corroborate that it had been given (probably because it hadn’t, knowing the patterns 
of cases that simply dropped from the courts). Witnessing—“hearing and swearing”--
was a key responsibility which Ysabel passed to her husband Guillaume Allart in her 
procuration contract.50 Witnesses were also key to clameur proceedings—hearing 
the cry, dropping everything to intervene (as necessary), and corroborating what 
happened to determine who was in the right and who the wrong and to whom the fine 
would be assessed. Witnesses also saw the lingères seize Jeanne Gosselin’s illegal 
cloth and heard the insults that she fired back at them.51 Witnesses, however, were 
only as good as their credibility, and discrediting witnesses was a time-honored 
defensive strategy.52 
Reputation was important to enforcement practices. It could lend credibility to 
or discredit witness testimony. The “legal credit” understood in reputation may be 
included under the larger umbrella of the economy of justice. At stake, for instance, in 
the litigation surrounding the gardes’ seizure of illegal cloth, was not only the 
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enforcement of statutes which protected the prerogatives of the lingères guild, but 
also the defense of their reputation for exercising appropriate discretion in those 
enforcement practices to ward off increasing challenges to enforcement. Reputation 
was closely linked to discretion. 
One of the more important aspects of enforcement and sentencing was 
discretion. We have already seen in the previous chapters instances of discretion in 
enforcement activities. For instance, we have clues from the notarial contracts that 
debts, particularly rentes, may not have been collected rigorously. This is evident not 
only in disputes over “delinquent” sums but also in the terms of the initial contracts, 
especially but not exclusively, those with fixed terms. The contract’s indication that 
the principle plus any arrears will be due was both a defensive measure to allow for 
collection of any delinquent sums but also left room for interpretation. It gave the 
parties the implicit opportunity to come to an informal agreement about “running a 
tab” to tack on the regular payments to the end. The creditor would still collect the 
same amount of money, eventually, but the option to defer payment(s) to the end 
would give the debtor more flexibility, especially if payments were contingent on 
harvests or trade imports. Theoretically the creditor could chose to enforce the terms 
of the contract rigorously, but allowing room for discretion would open up operations 
of credit under a fairly strict system which banned usury (see chapter two).53  
Such discretion would likely depend on the relationship, the trust cultivated, 
between creditor and borrower—imagine additional personal, professional, kinship, 
proximal residential, etc. ties—vouchers for the borrower from others with these ties 
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to the creditor, collateral offered, the projected return on the investment, and if all of 
that failed, then the “credit” of the borrower as relayed by the notary. The presumed 
existence of these agreements “between the lines” of a contract are supported by the 
persistence of oral contracts (notably marriage contracts) and by the endurance of 
orality transcribed within the contract itself, all of which is suggestive of a significant 
oral legal culture co-existing alongside an emergent one which privileges 
documentation. The physical contract and the implicit agreement would satisfy both 
elements of the legal culture.  
 That said, however, we have seen indicators that the implicit agreement ran 
foul or that such discretion was not easily transferrable in cases where a contract or 
debt was sold or inherited (especially if the inheritance transferred to more distant kin 
relations). In such cases, some form of enforcement was enacted. Indicators that an 
implicit agreement existed and ran foul may be gleaned from cases of pre-dispute 
renegotiations of debt or from cases where disputes were settled out of court before 
any appearance in court. Such cases would indicate that there may have been a 
bump in the borrower’s credit or that the continued value of the relationship between 
both parties merited a soft-line approach to enforcement. This soft-line approach 
would suggest some degree of gentle, but no less persistent, corrective measures to 
set the agreement back on track. In such cases both parties to the original contract 
were usually still alive and holding the contract. The renegotiation of a marriage gift 
contracted between Jean Asse and Simon Delamare examined in chapter two is an 
example of this discretion in enforcement of an oral contract.54 The contracts 
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between Pierre Fleury and Richart Cauvyn and Jean Conseil and Robert Hervieu in 
stacking or eliminating debt, also from chapter two, are also examples of this 
potential.55  
The kin relationship between Asse and Delamare and the assumed 
meaningful, perhaps kin, relations between the latter parties mentioned suggest that 
when the relationship mattered to both parties, discretion could strongly influence the 
contours of legal actions taken. Of course, there is not an exclusive correlation 
between challenges to discretion and dispute procedure. However, we must 
remember that notarial contracts and settlements were no less public than court 
appearances, but they may have been less scandalous and less damaging to a 
person’s credit, since a person’s willingness to negotiate was likely linked to his or 
her credit. A willingness to negotiate could save some legal fees or litigation costs 
and spare some scandal in relation to dispute practices. On the other hand, having a 
reputation for being litigious (like Bouquet tried to suggest of the Daudins) or for 
having a stubborn or combative temperament could damage a person’s credit.56 
Such considerations may have provided some of the motivation for 
settlements such as the one reached between Jean and Pregent Leprevost, which 
noted at the outset of the dispute between them that Pregent had been 
“combative.”57 However, as noted above, we must be equally careful about assuming 
that an appearance in court—a lawsuit—was scandalous. The high rate of litigation in 
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the sixteenth century suggests that it was, in fact, fairly banal to go to court and that 
litigation did not actually damage a person’s reputation or credit-worthiness. Such 
patterns are also observed in later periods, and in such cases, a lawsuit does not 
exclude a future contract or loan between the disputing parties; such future credit 
relations post-lawsuit were also fairly banal.58  
Cases where a contract or debt was transferred by sale or inheritance indicate 
that discretion (and by extension, credit) was not so easily transferrable. The many 
disputes over long-standing debts and delinquent payments attest to this limitation on 
transmitting discretion, whether they were resolved in court or out. And yet, there was 
some overlap between the soft-line and hard-line approaches to enforcement. 
Contracts that result from a dispute settled before action in court, such as the one 
between Nandin Cabot and Jacques Devreux (examined in chapter three) are good 
examples of this point.59   
Despite these caveats, some trends do emerge. Cases of dispute over debt 
which went to court and were resolved with court rulings or contracts of settlement 
after court appearances had a fairly high rate of generation transfer—either 
intergenerational conflicts, conflicts initiated between ancestors which were then 
settled by heirs, or conflicts between heirs that flared up quickly and were then 
settled. All that being said, there need not have been any transfer or evidence of an 
implicit agreement for a hard-line approach to enforcement to be enacted.  
Of course, discretion in the enforcement of contracts and laws is imbued in 
many of the other practices examined in prior chapters. People exercised discretion 
                                                          
58 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism, 98, 122-23. 
59 ADSM, 2E 1 228, January 4, 1500. 
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in enforcing their agreements and in taking the initiative to seize another party’s 
goods or to cry out a clameur. Examples of such actions elaborated in previous 
chapters indicate that enforcement did not necessarily require the coercive powers of 
state officials. We have likewise seen, in complaints and requests for enforcement, 
that the coercive power of state officials was sometimes not sufficient either.  
And in some cases, discretion was called into question. Disputed discretion is 
most starkly seen in the cases involving the gardes of the lingères guild before the 
vicomté of Rouen, where they were called into court to answer for their enforcement 
of guild statutes. Opposition to Jean Leribert’s seizure of Jean Regnault’s goods to 
collect on a debt (outlined in chapter three) and a similar instance in the Daudin-
Bouquet case (above) are also examples of questioning discretion as are complaints 
to the Échiquier, such as that of Michel de Batenceurt or Pierre Lepetit, regarding a 
lower court official’s mishandling of a case and reluctance to register a default where 
one party thought that one was merited.60 The question of judicial discretion is an 
important one and is related to theories of justice and of the structure of the judicial 
system as well as the education and professionalism of judges.61   
 
 
                                                          
60 ADSM, 52BP 11; and 1B 331, January 12, 1510 and January 26, 1510. 
61 James E. Shaw, The justice of Venice: authorities and liberties in the urban economy, 1550-1700 
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006). See also, Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to 
Conscience: perspectives on the English criminal trial jury, 1200-1800 (Chicago, IL, USA: University of 
Chicago Press, 1985). The literature on Loyseau and his criticisms of seigneurial justice is also an 
important contribution to the question of discretion. See, for example, Charles Loyseau, A Treatise of 
Orders and Plain Dignities, ed. and trans. Howell A. Lloyd (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1994); Brigitte Basdevant-Gaudemet, Aux origines de l’Etat Moderne: Charles Loyseau 1564-
1627 Théoricien de la puissance publique (Paris, France: Economica, 1977); and Robert Descimon, 
“Les paradoxes d’un juge seigneurial: Charles Loyseau (1564-1627)” Les Cahiers du Centre de 





An important question underlying many of the actions and procedures under 
examination in this dissertation is that of cost. Indeed, the question of cost is one of 
the bigger questions still bedeviling investigations into the legal system in the early 
modern period in France on a broad scale. The cost of Old Regime justice is very 
much bound up with the dark reputation that Old Regime justice had for being a 
confusion of jurisdictions filled with ignorant, complacent, or greedy officials, who 
presided over a system that was inefficient, intolerably lengthy, and out of reach for 
most people. Moreover, the cost is presumed to be especially egregious for civil 
litigation, but could really apply to any procedure initiated by a private party (as 
opposed to an inquisitorial procedure—in relation to a major crime—for which the 
official in charge of that particular jurisdiction bore responsibility for the costs of trial). 
Part of this assumption derives from the “collective wisdom” and rhetoric of early 
modern, predominantly seventeenth and eighteenth century sources. For instance, 
“everyone knows” that a “bad settlement is better than a good trial” and that Racine’s 
“plaideurs” racked up astronomical fees pursuing outrageously long, farcically petty 
suits.62 The economy of justice has been cast in a very negative light. This raises the 
question of whether early modern men and women were skilled practitioners of 
parallel kinds of justice because that made sense in their legal culture or whether 
                                                          
62 The first saying is quoted in Nicole Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc à l'époque des 
Lumières (Paris, France: Flammarion, 1980); 15. Racine’s Plaideurs is a very well-known comedic 
play from the seventeenth century in which the central drama focuses on absurd lawsuits. The play is 
often quoted and used to frame discussion of cost, length of time for suits, and the larger processes of 
litigation more generally. It is used almost as much as Loyseau’s works to set up old regime justice. 
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they resorted to them because of the limitations of the courts. Although both answers 
are likely appropriate to a certain degree, I would favor the former interpretation 
because of the vast amount of initiative and agency demonstrated by the litigants 
observed in the records and because the courts could be effective, even if in many 
cases they were not asked to be so. 
Of course, the hard reality is that litigation, civil or criminal, could be ruinously 
expensive. The evidence for this fact is hard to ignore. A couple of account books 
examined by Philip Benedict break down charges associated with a couple of suits in 
the late sixteenth century amounting to 47 livres (“about five months’ wages for a 
master mason”) for a case lasting less than a year and 311 livres for a case lasting 
five years.63 Similar accountings have been found in many different regions for the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as well. Smail has argued, moreover, that the 
allure of financially ruining one’s opponent was a strong motivating force for 
litigation.64 Such evidence has led to the sweeping conclusion that “la justice coûte 
cher” (“justice is expensive”) at best and at worst, “predatory”.65 There is truth to the 
collective wisdom.  
And yet, as damning as this evidence seems, it provokes additional questions 
that are not easily answered. The biggest of these questions is, if costs were “known” 
to be so prohibitive, why is there overwhelming evidence that people frequently 
chose to take up lawsuits? It is equally “well-known” that the early modern period was 
                                                          
63 Philip Benedict, Rouen during the Wars of Religion (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University 
Press, 1981), 12. 
64 Smail, Consumption of Justice. 
65 Pasal Bastien, “Introduction: La Justice coûte cher…,” in Les juristes et l’argent: le coût de la justice 
et l’argent des juges du XIVe au XIXe siècle, ed. Garnot, Benoît (Dijon, France: Éditions universitaires 
de Dijon, 2005): 7-11, 7 and 10. 
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highly litigious with an unusually high rate of litigation (admittedly by modern 
standards)—peaking in the sixteenth century but going strong into the seventeenth 
century before dropping off sharply, for reasons unknown, in the eighteenth 
century—not only in France but in England and elsewhere.66 Some of the 
discrepancy may result from the way the numbers are presented—for example, not 
breaking down the number of cases initiated in court but settled outside (incurring 
fewer costs) and the number of cases that progressed all the way to the end 
(incurring more costs)—thereby inflating numbers. There were also surely some 
people who went to court repeatedly, even frequently. Some historians, like Rafe 
Blaufarb, have argued that going to court (with the threat of expenses associated 
with court proceedings) was a means of forcing a reluctant opponent to get serious 
about working out a settlement, which was the preferred outcome to a dispute.67 
Acknowledging these possibilities and not excluding potential others, the number of 
people and the number of suits nevertheless remains very difficult to reconcile with 
the figures on cost.  
Another plausible explanation that is gaining ground among historians is that 
although litigation could be expensive, it was typically not so or that at the very least, 
people found ways to cut costs and since the cost was not fixed, it could vary 
considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction (of which we already know there were 
                                                          
66 Christopher W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of the Commonwealth: The ‘Lower Branch’ of the 
Legal Profession in Early Modern England (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Richard L. Kagan, “A Golden Age of Litigation: Castile, 1500-1700,” In Disputes and Settlements: Law 
and Human Relations in the West, ed. John Bossy (New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 
1983): 145-66; Richard L. Kagan, Lawsuits and Litigants in Castille, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 1981); Michael P. Breen, “Law, Society, and the State in Early 
Modern France” The Journal of Modern History 83:2 (June 2011): 346-86. 
67 Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise.” 
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many). Among proponents of this idea are Jeremy Hayhoe, Hervé Piant, Michael 
Breen.68 These scholars have notably drawn attention procedural differences and the 
significant impact such difference could have on the final tally. For instance, oral 
procedures were relatively cheap, but as soon as a suit strayed into a written 
procedure, the charges could increase rapidly.69 Such observations about practice 
force us to view the casual paragraph on the account books shared by Benedict, out 
of context of the legal proceedings, with more suspicion. This difference in 
procedures also underscores the importance of trends toward privileging written 
documentation and the impact that that may have had on litigation practices. These 
findings are part of larger projects which seek to challenge assumptions about the 
working of the early modern French legal system and which chip away at the dark, 
even predatory, reputation of Old Regime justice.  
For my study, my sources are disappointingly silent on costs of proceedings. It 
has not been clear how much a notarial contract cost nor how much any of the 
multitude of other proceedings cost, let alone the totals for different cases. Some of 
this may be found in other studies, such as Philippe Cailleux’s detailed breakdown of 
the costs associated with different types of notarial contracts.70 And yet, it is difficult 
to test how such prescriptions matched practices. And since we do know that costs 
                                                          
68 Jeremy Hayhoe, “Le parlement de Dijon et la transformation de la justice seigneuriale (1764-1774),” 
in Les juristes et l’argent: le coût de la justice et l’argent des juges du XIVe au XIXe siècle, ed. Benoît 
Garnot (Dijon, France: Éditions universitaires de Dijon, 2005): 49-58; Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; 
Hervé Piant, “Des procès innombrables: Éléments méthodologiques pour une histoire de la justice 
civile d’Ancien Régime,” Histoire et mesure 22:2 Déviance, justice et statistiques (2007): 13-38; Breen, 
“Law, Society, and the State in Early Modern France.” 
69 Piant, “Des procès innombrables.’’ 
70 Philippe Cailleux, “Pratiques et tarifications des actes des tabellions rouennais à la fin du Moyen 
Âge,” in Tabellionages au Moyen Âge en Normandie: Un notariat à découvrir, ed. Jean-Louis Roch 
(Rouen, France: Presses universitaires de Rouen et du Havre, 2014): 25-44. 
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were tallied procedure by procedure, person by person, with each individual being 
compensated for his work or his right in the matter, and that procedure could vary 
widely depending on who the parties decided to involve at what point, it has been 
impossible to derive averages to make more generalized conclusions.  
Looking back at the account books (one from one guild’s records and one from 
a parish’s records) to which Benedict draws attention, which are the closest of all of 
the evidence outlined thus far to the context in time and place of my study, it is hard 
not to take note of the exceptional nature of this evidence. The fact that much of the 
evidence for the cost of litigation is sparse, even accidental, makes it suggestive but 
not yet conclusive—much more data need to be gathered. The facts cannot be 
ignored, but sometimes, when taken out of context, they can be made into more than 
they are. Also of note is the apparent correspondence between length of proceedings 
and cost—the longer proceedings lasted, the most expensive the final tally. However, 
although judges had a role in requiring certain procedures and in setting the pace—
as evidenced by the number of postponements and certain complaints—the reasons 
for which were, it has been argued, partly due to a desire to give litigants ample 
opportunity to settle on their own, the litigants themselves also had a significant 
measure of discretion in choosing the course of their dispute and for speeding things 
up or slowing them down.71   
                                                          
71 Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise”; Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; Dickinson, “L'Activité 
judiciaire d'après la procédure civile’’; Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives notariales”; 
and Soman, “Deviance and Criminal Justice”; Hervé Piant, Une justice ordinaire: justice civil et 
criminelle dans la prévôté royale de Vaucouleurs sous l’ancien régime (Rennes: Presses universitaires 
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I have found cryptic references in the notarial records especially to costs and 
the desire to avoid them. For example, the settlement contract between Robert Ygou 
and Nicolas Fere’s heirs stipulates that Ygou was to receive 4 livres tournois to 
compensate him for legal expenses incurred “in pursuit of the trial.”72 As a more 
common example, the arbitration contract between the Lamberts and the 
Denormares stipulates that both parties will be responsible for an equal share of the 
fine, costs, and expenses associated with their suits, but it does not indicate how 
much that was.73 Most references, in fact, note the desire to avoid the projected 
length of litigation and make no reference to cost—an example of such a reference is 
found in the Delamare settlement which opened this dissertation.74 However 
suggestive these references are, their explanatory power is fairly hollow, along the 
lines of a canned response or the “collective wisdom” outlined above. The bottom line 
is there is very little hard, regular evidence of cost, negligible or exorbitant, in my 
sources.  
The clearest evidence of cost comes from the lingères cases discussed in 
chapter three. And what is most striking about the cost is how much it varied. The 
cases were, in nature, very similar—controversy over a seizure of allegedly illicit 
goods by the gardes met with the occasional insult. And yet the total costs (fine plus 
legal expenses) for all three cases examined varied considerably. The explanation for 
these differences rests, I think, in the underlying social considerations of each case. 
The difference between Thyron, married man and cloth merchant, who cast insults at 
                                                          
72 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 31, 1500. 
73 ADSM, 2E1 229, October 23, 1500. 
74 ADSM, 2E1 228, January 2, 1500. 
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the gardes and was fined 40 sous plus legal expenses at 100 sous, and Jeanne 
Gosselin, of unknown marital status but probably not married, who cast the same 
insults at the gardes and was fined five sous plus legal expenses mitigated to 12 
sous suggest that socio-economic status was factored into the final sentence.  
More interesting still is the apparent inverse relation between status and 
sentence in these cases. Although the status divide between Gosselin and Thyron 
was not as extreme as it could have been—between, say, a nobleman and a 
laborer—nevertheless, it seems that Gosselin is receiving more consideration than 
Thyron because of her lower socio-economic status.75 For similar reasons—his 
“parvurete”—Delyvet is fined five sous six deniers and has the cloth returned to 
him.76 This inverse discretion may account in part for the complaints about the “dark” 
Old Regime justice, lodged principally by those with higher socio-economic status. 
Costs could be higher and could also be mitigated, depending on a more holistic 
review of the case and the parties involved. What we must remember is that judges 
were supposed to exercise discretion and that many fines were supposed to be 
“arbitrary” (left ultimately up to the decision of the judge) to be proportionate to the 
circumstances. We arrive from all of this at a definition of justice as “arbitrary” (rather 
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In this chapter, I have tried to show many of the enforcement practices and 
challenges to enforcement that come through the notarial records and the court 
records sampled for this dissertation. Through analysis of court rulings, sentences 
prescribed, and enforcement practices, I have shown how cyclical practices could be. 
I have also shown how enforcement practices from below supported those from 
above which diminished the role of the court and its coercive presence. Equally 
important were the ways in which witnessing, reputation, and discretion intersected 
with enforcement practices. Finally, I elaborated on the question of cost which has 
run through this dissertation and culminates, in theory, with enforcement. As with so 
many other practices and options for people in pursuing their disputes examined in 
this dissertation, enforcement practices must take their place along the spectrum of 
negotiation, conflict, and resolution. 
What these observations add up to is a broader communal support network of 
enforcement practices which spills beyond the courts and their rulings. The matrix of 
social relations, manifested through witnessing practices, considerations of reputation 
and discretion, provided coherency to the challenges to enforcement observed. As 
with the discussion of the length of cases in chapter four, my examination of cost also 
casts doubt on the relevance of fixating on the cost of Old Regime justice, given the 
variety of options and the amount of discretion litigants and judges (and even the 
lower level professionals who have been a subject of interest in this dissertation) had 






“A bad settlement is better than a good trial”, so the saying used to go. Many 
scholars, like Nicole Castan and others following in her footsteps, have taken this 
popular sentiment, along with its associated complaints of “immortal” lawsuits, 
exorbitant costs, and scheming lawyers, and plentiful evidence of settlements as a 
clear sign of the failures of Old Regime justice.1 Although primarily expressed in 
reference to the criminal side of the legal system (in the eighteenth century), this view 
nevertheless places a premium on decisive court rulings. In so doing, it undermines 
the legitimacy of alternatives to such rulings in the resolution of conflicts and derives, 
in part, from a larger narrative glorifying a triumphant state-building project.2 At 
almost the polar opposite, Hervé Piant argues (for the eighteenth century in 
Vaucouleurs) that such agreements and settlements out of court—“infrajustice”—
represented the preferred and most just course of action for most people. He further 
claims that, although not formal, these methods of resolving conflicts were perceived 
as legitimate and far surpassed the formal court system in numbers.3 Although I 
agree, in certain respects, and have shown that the courts played a more limited role 
in civil dispute practice and resolution than that to which they are often given credit, I 
                                                          
1 Nicole Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc à l'époque des Lumières (Paris, France: 
Flammarion, 1980); 15. See also, Anthony Crubaugh, Balancing the Scales of Justice. Local Courts 
and Rural Society in Southwest France, 1750-1800 (University Park, PA, USA: The Pennsylvania 
State University, 2001). 
2 For elaboration on this idea, see Brian Z. Tamanaha, “Understanding Legal Pluralism: Past to 
Present, Local to Global” Sydney Law Review 30:375 (2008): 375-411. 
3 Hervé Piant, Une justice ordinaire: justice civil et criminelle dans la prévôté royale de Vaucouleurs 
sous l’ancien régime (Rennes, France: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2006). See also Nicole 
Castan, “La justice expéditive” Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales 31:2 (Mar. - Apr., 1976): 331-361; 
Castan, Justice et répression en Languedoc; and Steven G. Reinhardt, Justice in the Sarladais, 1770-
1790 (Baton Rouge, LA, USA: Louisiana State University Press, 1991). 
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have also shown that activities in and out of court are best understood as part of a 
larger spectrum of negotiation, conflict and resolution. I have argued, above all else, 
that the perspective of legal practices needs to be broadened in order to more 
completely understand how the system worked and how people worked the system.4 
In pursuit of this end, I chose a narrow geographical and temporal scope. 
Rouen, as a center of commerce, religious activity, administration, and legal activity 
surrounded by thriving agriculture and textile industry, offers a variety of options for 
inquiry into people’s socioeconomic-legal practices with a plentiful, yet manageable, 
set of records. The late fifteenth and early sixteenth century was a period of important 
projects and reforms for the legal system, among those the codification of customary 
laws, and yet there are very few studies of civil disputes in this period. The limited 
number of works upon which to build also necessitated a narrow scope. 
Narrowing the focus still further, I chose to focus on civil cases rather than 
criminal ones. This, in part, helps to balance a distortion in the historiography which 
has privileged the criminal side of the legal system. Although the literature on civil law 
in France, and specifically disputes and litigation, is growing with contributions from 
Daniel Smail and Julie Hardwick, more often civil matters are overshadowed as in 
Zoe Schneider’s study of lower court officials and governance which weaves in civil 
jurisdictions but to a limited extent or in Jeremy Hayhoe’s study of seigneurial justice 
which dedicates a single chapter to conflict and compromise that closely examines 
                                                          
4 The concept of “working the law” has been suggested by Julie Hardwick. See “Women ‘Working’ the 
Law: Gender, Authority, and Legal Process in Early Modern France” Journal of Women’s History 9:3 
(Autumn, 1997): 28-49. Broad views of legal practice and legal systems have been especially fruitful in 
legal pluralism literature. For starters and good reviews of the literature, see Tamanaha, 
“Understanding Legal Pluralism”; and Griet Vermeesch, Manon van der Heijden, and Jaco 




litigation and arbitration.5 More common still are those studies that take a socio-legal 
approach but focus primarily on criminal records while hinting that civil litigation was 
important.6 Jonathan Dewald’s case study of Pont-St-Pierre in Normandy is a classic 
example of this approach. Amidst a lengthy discussion of violent conflict, he 
acknowledges, without providing more detail, that “more often” than acts of violence 
and assault “the villagers used litigation—with surprising tenacity and with some 
degree of success” against elite members of the community to assert their rights of 
property and usage.7 The fact that people were more likely to be drawn into civil 
cases than criminal ones makes the examination of civil cases that much more 
important.8 
For my analysis of civil disputes, I chose to juxtapose seigneurial court 
records, royal court records, guild records and notarial records. I also chose to 
examine a group of legal commentaries to highlight the differences between theory 
and practice. Although many studies of French legal history and social history make 
use of these records and sources, it is quite rare to find studies of legal practice 
                                                          
5 Daniel Lord Smail, The Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 
1264-1423 (Ithaca, NY, USA: Cornell University Press, 2003); Julie Hardwick, Family Business: 
Litigation and the Political Economies of Daily Life in Early Modern France (Oxford, UK: Oxford 
University Press, 2009); Zoe A. Schneider, The King’s Bench: Bailiwick Magistrates and Local 
Governance in Normandy, 1670-1740 (Rochester, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008); 
Jeremy Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism: Seigneurial Justice and Village Society in Eighteenth-
Century Northern Burgundy (New York, NY, USA: University of Rochester Press, 2008). 
6 Michael Breen has summarized the shift in French historiography from legal history (history of laws 
and institutions) to socio-legal history, as an homage to Robert Descimon. Michael P. Breen, “Law and 
Social History in Early Modern France,” in Social Relations, Politics, and Power in Early Modern 
France: Robert Descimon and the Historian’s Craft, ed. Barbara B. Diefendorf (Kirksville, MO, USA: 
Truman State University Press, 2016): 42-60. 
7 Jonathan Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre, 1398-1789: Lordship, Community, and Capitalism in Early Modern 
France (Berkeley, CA, USA: University of California Press, 1987); 148. It should also be pointed out 
that the data in this chapter (“community and conflict”) derives primarily from a sample of records from 
the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 




which examine notarial records in depth.9 In an effort to counter-balance these 
limitations, I have shown the promise and necessity of in-depth inquiry into notarial 
records for understanding and analyzing legal practices. Much more work in this area 
remains to be done for the sixteenth century as for other periods. 
An additional way this study has attempted to contribute to methodological and 
historiographical approaches to the early modern legal system has been by 
expanding the limited yet growing literature on lower level officials like notaries, 
sergents, and procureurs and to illuminate their roles in the actions taken by people 
in pursuit of their interests.10 I have highlighted the multiplicity and flexibility of their 
roles. I have also called attention to the variability of those who take on these roles, 
especially the procureurs, who could be titled office-holders, private legal consultants, 
or those exercising a form of power of attorney. Teasing out the nuances of their 
activities is another important direction for future research.  
With all of this in mind, the main purpose of this dissertation was to show the 
wide variety of options people had in pursuing and resolving their civil disputes and 
the wide variety of activities they undertook toward this end. My analysis of these 
options has revealed important patterns of conception and practice. Similar to the 
villagers of Pont-St-Pierre, the people of Rouen and the surrounding area “proved 
capable of defending their interests in the complex ways the early modern state 
                                                          
9 Jeremy Hayhoe noted this as well, and the studies he cites as “steps in the right direction” predated 
his own by almost 10-20 years, which stand at 20-30 at this date. Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism. 
Alfred Soman also made a case for examining notarial records for legal practices, especially in relation 
to criminal cases. Alfred Soman, “L'infra-justice à Paris d'après les archives notariales” Histoire, 
économie et société 1:3 (1982): 369-375; and Alfred Soman, “Deviance and Criminal Justice in 
Western Europe, 1300-1800: An Essay in Structure” Criminal Justice History Vol. 1 (New York, NY, 
USA: The John Jay Press, 1980): 1-28. 
10 Claire Dolan, ed., Entre justice et justiciables: Les auxiliaires de la justice du Moyen Age au XXe 
siècle. (Québec, Canada: Les Presses de l’Université de Laval, 2005). 
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demanded.”11 That the early modern legal system was complex has been well-
established. As Frederic Baumgartner argued, “The French of the sixteenth century 
were a people who respected law and loved litigation despite enormous complexity 
and confusion in the legal system. The only certainty about French law of that era is 
that any statement about it has many exceptions….The result was a system of law 
that resulted in enormous confusion, protracted litigation, and frequent miscarriages 
of justice.”12 Differences in regional laws and practices were considerable. What held 
true for eighteenth-century Burgundy did not necessarily hold true for eighteenth-
century Bordeaux or Normandy.13 These differences were even more pronounced for 
the sixteenth century. However, these complexities did not seem to deter people, 
who created opportunities out of the confusion. Although Baumgartner’s assessment 
that people in this period respected law and loved litigation and that generalizations 
are fraught with oversimplifications is valid, to argue that that necessarily resulted in 
confusion and protracted litigation, let alone “miscarriages of justice,” is to accept 
reforming rhetoric (and complaints by elite voices in the course of their 
professionalization campaigns—a process of exclusion, for better or worse), too 
easily. What I have tried to emphasize through my analysis is that there was great 
complexity to people’s legal practices, but the complexity of the system did not seem 
to deter people or disrupt justice because people defined justice differently from 
modern-day historians. People were not simply making the best of a bad system; 
                                                          
11 Dewald, Pont-St-Pierre, 128. 
12 Frederic J. Baumgartner, France in the Sixteenth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 84. 
See also Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism.  
13 Hayhoe, Enlightened Feudalism; Crubaugh, Balancing the Scales of Justice; Dewald, Pont-St-
Pierre; Schneider, The King’s Bench. 
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they were co-creating and shaping it through their practices. The complexity and 
open-endedness of the system suited the complexity and variability of their needs 
and interests, and my study has shown the high level of strategic thinking and 
agency with which they directed their legal maneuvering. I have shown their various 
activities in and out of court along a spectrum of negotiation, conflict, and resolution 
and have shown some of the challenges faced—from defensive contracts to failed 
contracts, from obstructions and manipulations of the pace of court actions (by both 
litigants and officials) to demands for enforcement. I have also shown the 
coexistence of written and oral practices within the legal culture.  
From all of this, we must remember that even though people may have had 
access to various courts and legal authorities, not all (perhaps not even most) chose 
to take advantage of this access. My research suggests that the courts’ roles in 
resolving disputes was relatively small in relation to the courts’ representation in 
scholarship. By privileging courts and court records, we risk capturing a small piece 
of practice, over-emphasizing the importance of the courts and legal authorities and 
even of misunderstanding the courts, how they functioned, and their role in society 
more broadly. Moreover, this activity outside of court does not have to imply that the 
court is less authoritative or powerful, but it does suggest that the role of the court in 
resolving civil disputes is limited. Appearing (or not) before a court is only one, not 
necessarily definitive, option in pursuing a dispute. Both Daniel Smail and Julie 
Hardwick have emphasized the importance of having options in litigation and how the 
decision to go to court led to the growth of the legal system and of the state.14 But the 
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cases I have studied raise the question of the extent to which utilizing this option 
lends authority, power, and legitimacy to the court when it is frequently not involved in 
the resolution. This is not to say that the relationship is not there, but rather, that the 
relationship is not so easily determined.15 Also difficult to reconcile with this argument 
about the growth of the state are the numerous studies which argue that people used 
the threat or first step of going to court as a coercive tactic to force an opponent to 
“get serious” about coming to an agreement.16 On the one hand this tactic worked 
because of the coercive potential of the courts (and the state), but on the other hand, 
the court was another game token that was rarely asked and sometimes refused to 
exercise that potential. And this was largely determined by the disputants 
themselves. 
From all of the activities and maneuverings examined in this dissertation we 
learn several keys things about the legal culture of early sixteenth-century Normandy. 
The first is that it was highly procedure-oriented. The numerous delays and 
postponements permitted to get the procedure right confirm this aspect of the law. 
The second is that witnessing and orality persisted even as documentation was 
playing an increasingly privileged role in the unfolding of cases. This new emphasis 
on documentation challenged and put stress on practices and procedures in place, 
and we see a transitional process of reconciling new (more widely accessible and 
utilized) technology to persisting values. This process, and the accompanying “blues 
                                                          
15 Richard J. Ross and Philip J. Stern, “Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism,” in 
Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850, ed. Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross (New York, NY, 
USA: New York University Press, 2013): 109-41. 
16 Rafe Blaufarb, “Conflict and Compromise: Communauté and Seigneurie in Early Modern Provence” 




of document management,” surely accounts for the length of certain proceedings. In 
this sense we can contrast the case of the Mauclercs in resolving their inheritance 
troubles, hinging on misplaced, even competing, documentation with the cases 
against Abraham Leduc, which were mostly oral proceedings and wrapped up 
efficiently in one morning.  
Building on this idea of reconciling new practices to old, we also learn a great 
deal about the role that this documentation is playing in the legal system and society 
more broadly, not simply in relation to disputes. We especially learn a lot about the 
purpose of contracts for these people. Having a notary draw up a written contract 
was an important means of recalling, enforcing, and reinforcing an (oral) agreement, 
and more significantly, the contracts facilitated in making (or repairing damage to) 
social relations, particularly across larger socio-economic divides. On the one hand, 
they enabled unequal creditor-debtor relationships by reinforcing potentially 
predatory contracts, but on the other, they also linked people together in a larger 
web, requiring serious consideration of doing damage control, socially and 
economically. All the more important was writing a good contract, especially if the 
parties were more distant, geographically or socially. If we understand notarial 
contracts as a tool of memory—commemorating or recalling the agreement (oral 
contract)—then it is easier to read them as being defensive in purpose, which 
enabled more impersonal social relations; it also helps explain the growth of the 
notarial profession during the golden age of litigation.17   
                                                          
17 For more on the commemorative function of written records, see Michael T. Clanchy, From Memory 
to Written Record, England 1066-1307, Second edition (Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell, 1993); and 
Carol Symes, “Out in the Open, in Arras: Sightlines, Soundscapes, and the Shaping of a Medieval 
Public Sphere,” in Cities, Texts and Social Networks, 400-1500: Experiences and Perceptions of 
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As documentation enabled more distant social relations, we also see in the 
myriad of legal practices—“confusion”--a larger process of working out of to what 
degree these relationships mattered to people. The increasing use of more formal 
contracts (along the oral-written-notarial continuum discussed in chapter two), with 
increasingly defensive elements, therefore, helps to explain higher litigation rates 
because these contracts were useful as leverage in a dispute and because they 
enabled tenuous, less personal social relations, which had a greater potential for 
rupture. They gave parties a false sense of security and decreased the impetus for 
social responsibility. However, parties also faced challenges in managing and 
leveraging these new tools at their disposal, requiring increasing assistance from 
other professionals, such as procureurs and contributing to the growth of these 
professions. The transition to privileging documentation, and the challenges of 
effectively using it in a still highly oral legal culture, and increasing litigation may be 
seen as cyclical and feeding into each other. There was an apparent correlation 
between the use of documents and the increased length of litigation; moreover, 
better defense (notarial contracts) lead to more offense, meaning that the solution to 
                                                          
Medieval Urban Space, ed. Caroline Goodson, Anne E. Lester, and Carol Symes (Burlington, VT, 
USA: Ashgate, 2010): 279-302. On the enforcement of contracts and the role of the written contract 
versus the oral contract, see Daniel Lord Smail, “Notaries, Courts and the Legal Culture of Late 
Medieval Marseille,” in Urban and Rural Communities in Medieval France: Provence and Languedoc, 
1000-1500, ed. Kathryn Reyerson and John Drendel (Boston, MA, USA: Brill, 1998): 23-50; and 
Amalia D. Kessler, A Revolution in Commerce: The Parisian Merchant Court and the Rise of 
Commercial Society in Eighteenth-Century France (New Haven, CT, USA: Yale University Press, 
2007). For more on the golden age of litigation, see Christopher W. Brooks, Pettyfoggers and Vipers of 
the Commonwealth: The ‘Lower Branch’ of the Legal Profession in Early Modern England (New York, 
NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Richard L. Kagan, “A Golden Age of Litigation: Castile, 
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(New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 1983): 145-66; Richard L. Kagan, Lawsuits and 
Litigants in Castille, 1500-1700 (Chapel Hill, NC, USA: The University of North Carolina Press, 1981); 
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History 83:2 (June 2011): 346-86. 
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challenges of enforcing contracts exacerbated this problem during this period of 
transition, until people established good document practices and became more fluent 
with them. 
This cyclical trend also influences our understanding of the nature of 
settlements because they represent, to a degree, an acknowledgement that the 
relationship between the disputing parties mattered enough, socially or economically 
with the webs of credit (defined both socially and economically in its own right) built 
through these contracts, to add more nuance to the resolution of the dispute than a 
court ruling, which tended to follow the strict letter of the law more closely, may have 
allowed. Instigating a legal dispute could be a means of enforcing a contract (or more 
broadly of claiming a legal right), but less important than having a court ruling was 
inspiring one or both parties to come to terms, and at whatever point in the process 
that happened (if it happened), a new agreement (re-negotiated contract or 
settlement) followed. What we are observing in the various actions observed in this 
dissertation, and the larger trends that emerge, are responses to unexpected 
consequences of change in this period of transition for the legal culture as people 
shaped and reshaped it.  
It is worth pausing, for a moment, to ask whether a case progressing all the 
way to a court ruling (or even simply stepping into court) implies that the relationship 
between the disputing parties did not matter. The answer is: not necessarily—a court 
ruling did not preclude future relations (it was not, in itself, an act of rupture), but it 
does imply that there was something else driving the dispute which led to a situation 
of irreconcilable differences. More significantly, this means that it is less pertinent to 
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ask why people “settled” for “less” than a court ruling than to ask why people went to 
court and maybe even settled for a court ruling; that is, why people settled for a more 
rigid solution closer to the letter of the law than a customized solution, more tailored 
and improvised to their unique circumstances. This, in turn, helps us understand the 
legal system more holistically and the role of the courts within that system, playing an 
integral, but not central, part. 
Finally, related to social relations, we learn key aspects of the conception of 
justice for this legal culture. Discretion was much more important than equality in how 
people defined justice—in other words, justice was “arbitrary” (it was measured to fit 
the circumstances of the case). The above-mentioned social relations, including 
webs of credit, and co-opting social consensus among the informal policing agents 
were necessary for the effective operation of “justice” and its associated enforcement 
practices. Moreover, it is clear that the monarchy was passing laws to regulate the 
speed of proceedings, but it is unclear how rigorously these were enforced (their 
repetition suggests enforcement was ineffective or lacking). It is also unclear who 
was instigating these changes and who might benefit. Judges, backed more or less 
by royal authority, seemed content to encourage disputants to work things out on 
their own, and disputants were not necessarily in a hurry to reach a formal resolution 
either.  
Thus, “efficiency” and “speedy” as defined in a modern understanding of 
justice did not seem to be a primary concern or conception of justice in early 
sixteenth-century Normandy. Resolution for the legal culture of Normandy in this 
period, especially with regard to civil procedures, had a different meaning. That is, a 
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court ruling and resolution were not equivalent, and “justice” more broadly did not 
imply a court ruling. In conclusion, I would argue that it is important to focus on why 
the system made sense not why it didn’t, to focus on different practices and their 
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